Nnamdi Ikenna Eneremadu v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-23-00296-CR
NO. 09-23-00297-CR
__________________

NNAMDI IKENNA ENEREMADU, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause Nos. 23-373909 and 23-373910
__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Nnamdi Ikenna Eneremadu appeals his conviction in trial cause

number 23-373909 for failure to identify to a peace officer and his conviction in trial

cause number 23-373910 for criminal trespass. In Appellant’s sole issue on appeal

in each case, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying

Appellant’s request to reopen the evidence after he and the State had rested their

1
cases but before closing arguments and before the jury was charged. We overrule

Appellant’s sole issue and affirm.

Background

In cause number 23-373909, Eneremadu was charged by information with

failure to identify himself to a peace officer, a class C misdemeanor. 1 See Tex. Penal

Code Ann. § 38.02(a), (c)(1). In cause number 23-373910, Eneremadu was charged

by information for criminal trespass, a class B misdemeanor. See Tex. Penal Code

Ann. § 30.05(a), (d)(1). The cases were tried together. In each case, Eneremadu

pleaded “not guilty”, and the jury found him guilty. In trial cause number 23-373909,

the jury assessed a $500 fine. In cause number 23-373910, the jury assessed

punishment at thirty days of confinement in county jail (but recommended

suspension of the confinement and that he be placed on community supervision),

and the jury assessed a $1,000 fine. The trial court ordered Eneremadu to pay a $500

fine in cause number 23-373909, and in cause number 23-373910 the trial court

suspended the 30-day jail sentence and placed him on community supervision for

eighteen months. Eneremadu timely filed this appeal.

1
According to the State, the offense was initially believed to be a class B
misdemeanor under section 38.02(d) because of an outstanding class C misdemeanor
warrant for Appellant’s arrest at the time of the offense, but, due to a lack of any
allegation of fugitive status in the complaint and information, the State agreed at trial
to treat the offense in Cause No. 23-373909 as a class C misdemeanor.
2
Evidence at Trial

Testimony of a Resident of the Oak Haven Apartments

A resident of the Oak Haven Apartments testified that the residents at the

property are “[m]ostly retired people[]” and that most of the residents are over

seventy years old. According to the resident, the property is private, is gated and

“totally fenced in[,]” has several no trespassing signs displayed, and has only one

way in or out. She testified that each resident has a “fob” to open the entrance gate,

and at the gate a visitor can gain access to the property by typing the apartment

number of the resident they are visiting into a box, the resident can then press a key

on their phone, and then the gate opens for the visitor.

The resident testified that on February 20, 2023, she and two other women

had been walking on the property inside the gates and they stopped to talk when they

saw a stranger, whom she agreed at trial was the defendant, walking towards them.

After they confirmed that none of them knew the man that was approaching them,

they asked him if he was lost or who he was there to see. Eneremadu did not identify

any resident in the complex that he knew, and he told the women that he “was

spreading the word of God.” She and others told Eneremadu multiple times that he

was on private property and needed to leave because he was trespassing, but

Eneremadu would not leave, and the police were called. According to the resident,

Eneremadu told the women that his car was there, but he did not remember where

3
he parked it, and the resident testified that she did not remember him ever mentioning

that he was there to help someone move into the complex. The resident testified that

although she was not scared of Eneremadu, he was making statements about whether

the women were Christians and went to church and the women were trying to

convince him to leave. The resident testified that when the police arrived, she voiced

to them her concerns about Eneremadu being on private property. According to the

resident, when she and the other women saw the police arrive, the women told

Eneremadu that the police were there, and he quickly walked away from them. The

resident testified that she was later informed that Eneremadu had been knocking on

doors at the complex. The resident identified photographs of the entrance and exit

gates of the property, photographs of the point where visitors can gain access by

dialing a resident’s number were admitted into evidence, and photographs of several

no trespassing signs on the property, and the photographs were admitted into

evidence.

Testimony of Officer Eric Bauer

Officer Eric Bauer with the Shenandoah Police Department testified that

around 6:30 p.m. on February 20, 2023, he was on duty and dispatched to the Oak

Haven apartment complex regarding a suspicious person in the gated community.

According to Officer Bauer, the typical residents there are “55-plus[]” years old,

most residents are in their seventies or early eighties, and the complex is a fully-

4
gated community with single-story apartments. Officer Bauer testified that there are

four unobstructed no trespassing signs on the exterior of the complex and consent is

required to access the community. Officer Bauer testified that there is only one

functioning gate where there is an entrance and an exit, and there is an access box

there and a no trespassing sign on the main entrance gate.

According to Officer Bauer, when he arrived at the complex in his patrol car,

the gate was closed, and a code had to be entered to access the complex. Once inside,

Officer Bauer looked for the suspicious individual that was described as a younger

“black male, blue shirt, and black pants[]” who was reportedly walking around the

complex and going up to different apartments, knocking on doors, and asking to

speak with residents inside, and also approaching people in the parking lot to speak

with them. After driving into the back half of the complex, Officer Bauer eventually

located a man matching the description who was walking towards an apartment. At

trial, Officer Bauer identified the defendant as the man he found at the complex.

Officer Bauer testified that he radioed to his partners that he had located the subject

and was going to exit the vehicle and talk to him. As Officer Bauer approached

Eneremadu and started asking him “something to the effect of, hey, man what’s

going on tonight[,]” Eneremadu turned around and looked at Bauer, and Bauer

continued approaching in attempt to find out what Eneremadu was doing and start a

5
conversation with him. Officer Bauer was in uniform and believed it was clear to

Eneremadu that he was a police officer.

Officer Bauer testified that Eneremadu initially said he was on the premises

to talk about religion and God. Bauer testified he told Eneremadu he needed to leave

the property, but Eneremadu did not leave. According to Officer Bauer, for almost

thirty minutes he and Eneremadu talked about many topics including religion and

what “private property means,” and Bauer asked him numerous times for his name,

date of birth, and whether he had a driver’s license or identification card. Officer

Bauer testified that he explained to Eneremadu that because it was a “55-plus only”

community and for public safety and officer safety he needed to know who was

walking around the community. Bauer testified that Eneremadu clearly understood

English and what Bauer was asking, but Eneremadu told Bauer he did not want to

provide that information to Bauer because if Bauer “r[a]n [Eneremadu’s]

information []something may pop up.” Officer Bauer testified that, based on his

more than ten years in law enforcement, that comment made him believe that

Eneremadu may have an active warrant. Two other officers arrived on the scene and

those officers also each explained to Eneremadu that he was trespassing and that he

needed to provide identifying information. According to Officer Bauer, Eneremadu

later in the conversation stated he was on the premises looking for a location because

he was going to help someone move, but Eneremadu could not provide the name of

6
the person he was supposed to be helping move nor could he explain whether he had

permission to be on the property, and he could only provide the name of a dispatcher

and not a moving company. Bauer testified that Eneremadu may have said the name

of the dispatcher was “Bob.” Later in the conversation, Eneremadu changed his story

and stated he was instead actually visiting someone on the property, but he was

unable to provide that person’s name. Officer Bauer testified that he and the other

two officers continued to explain to Eneremadu that if he did not provide his

identifying information that he would be charged not only with criminal trespass but

also with failure to identify. At one point, Eneremadu tried to negotiate with Bauer

and asked him that if he provided Bauer his identifying information would Bauer

promise to let him go. Officer Bauer testified that after Eneremadu was arrested for

criminal trespass, he was detained in the back of Bauer’s patrol vehicle, and

Eneremadu continued to refuse to provide his identifying information after being

asked by Bauer for an additional eight to ten minutes. Officer Bauer then called

Sergeant Hilado to the scene for Hilado’s automated fingerprint identifying scanner

(AFIS) device which could identify Eneremadu with a fingerprint scan. After Hilado

arrived and scanned Eneremadu’s fingerprint, the officers were able to identify

Eneremadu through a photograph and a Texas driver’s license number that dispatch

was able to run to confirm Eneremadu’s identity. Officer Bauer transported

7
Eneremadu to the jail where he was booked for charges of criminal trespass and

failure to identify.

Video recordings from Officer Bauer’s body cam and dash cam depicting

Eneremadu’s interaction with law enforcement were admitted into evidence and

portions of those exhibits were played for the jury.

Testimony of Sergeant Joshua Hilado

Sergeant Joshua Hilado with the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office

testified that he was called to the scene to use his AFIS device to identify a subject.

Hilado showed the device to the jury, explained how it operates, and testified that

the device is tied into the state’s fingerprint database. According to Sergeant Hilado,

at the scene he used the AFIS device to identify the subject as Eneremadu, and he

identified the defendant at trial as Eneremadu.

Eneremadu’s Testimony

After the State and defense rested but prior to closing arguments and the

reading of the charges, the defense moved to reopen the evidence and the trial court

reopened the evidence because Eneremadu wanted to testify. Eneremadu testified

that he is a U.S. citizen, was born in west Africa, and immigrated to the United

States. According to Eneremadu, he does different odd jobs, including moving,

remodeling, and tutoring. Eneremadu testified that in the past he has worked for the

moving companies Coleman American and New World Van Lines.

8
Eneremadu testified that in the present case, “Mr. Robert” texted him an

address at the complex to assist in a moving job. According to Eneremadu, “Mr.

Robert” is either a mover, a dispatcher, or a driver and “a mover or maybe a

contractor or somebody in the moving industry.” Eneremadu testified he did not

know the name of the business that solicited him to assist with the move, he did not

know the last name of “Mr. Robert,” nor the name of the company for which “Mr.

Robert” works. According to Eneremadu, he had never met “Mr. Robert” but

Eneremadu testified he is usually hired for moves through a cell number from which

he gets an address for the job. Eneremadu testified that, “I have provided [Mr.

Robert’s] cell phone number. And I have shown the text evidence.” Eneremadu

testified that when he got to the complex, he did not see a security guard at the gate

or inside the complex, he followed a car through the gate when the gate opened for

that car, and he met several people inside the complex before the police arrived an

hour or two later. Eneremadu testified that he did not remember seeing any no

trespassing signs at any of the complex’s gates. According to Eneremadu, “Mr.

Robert” never showed up at the premises and Eneremadu was never paid for the job.

Eneremadu testified that he had the unit number for the move but not the resident’s

name, and that he told the officers that the job must have been cancelled. Eneremadu

testified that although the job had apparently been canceled and no one in the

complex gave him permission to be there, he did not have to leave once the job was

9
canceled because he had met people there that day. According to Eneremadu, none

of the residents at the complex that he talked to that day asked him to leave, and the

resident that testified that she asked him multiple times to leave had lied. Eneremadu

testified that when the officers asked him for his identifying information, he said, “I

don’t have it[,]” and that when they asked him for his last name, he responded that

it was private information. Eneremadu agreed he remembered attempting to

negotiate with the officers that he would provide his last name if they let him leave,

and that the reason he did not provide the officers his identifying information was

because he did not know what would come up when the officers ran his information.

According to Eneremadu, he ultimately provided the officers his first and last name

before he was handcuffed. Eneremadu testified that he did not remember if any of

the officers told him that he had a class C warrant out of Pasadena, and he denied

that he did not want to provide his identifying information because he had the

warrant out of Pasadena.

Issue on Appeal

In Appellant’s sole issue on appeal in each case, he argues that the trial court

abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s request to reopen the evidence a second

time after he and the State had rested their cases but before closing arguments and

before the jury was charged. Specifically, Appellant argues that he was denied a fair

trial when the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to reopen evidence for a second

10
time. According to Appellant, evidence of the text messages he received that directed

him to the property “were essential to [his] line of defense[] in that he believed he

had permission to be on the premises[,]” the evidence was not cumulative because

the earlier testimony was “extremely limited in that regard[,]” and if the evidence

had been admitted it would have “gone to the weight or credibility of other

evidence.”

Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s denial of a request to reopen the evidence under an

abuse of discretion standard. Pond v. State, No. 09-09-00483-CR, 2011 Tex. App.

LEXIS 4505, at *34 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 15, 2011, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication); Reeves v. State, 113 S.W.3d 791, 794 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2003, no pet.) (citing Peek v. State, 106 S.W.3d 72, 79 (Tex. Crim. App.

2003)); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.02. A trial court abuses its

discretion when it acts without reference to any guiding rules and principles or acts

arbitrarily or unreasonably. Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App.

2019). “As long as the trial court’s ruling is within the ‘zone of reasonable

disagreement,’ there is no abuse of discretion, and the trial court’s ruling will be

upheld.” De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343-44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)

(quoting Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on

reh’g)); see also State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 439-40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

11
Analysis

Article 36.02 provides that a court “shall allow testimony to be introduced at

any time before the argument of a cause is concluded, if it appears that it is necessary

to [the] due administration of justice.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.02.

“‘[D]ue administration of justice’ means a judge should reopen the case if the

evidence would materially change the case in the proponent’s favor.” Peek, 106

S.W.3d at 79; Reeves, 113 S.W.3d at 794. Under the “due administration of justice”

requirement, the evidence must be more than relevant, and it must actually make a

difference in the case. See Peek, 106 S.W.3d at 78-79. And the evidence cannot be

cumulative. Taylor v. State, No. 09-17-00023-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 5654, at

*6 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 25, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication); Birkholz v. State, 278 S.W.3d 463, 464 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009,

no pet.) (citing Peek, 106 S.W.3d at 79).

In the present case, after the trial court had already allowed the defense to

reopen the case once, both sides rested for the second time. The parties and the judge

were discussing the jury charge prior to closing arguments, and the defense then

moved to reopen the evidence a second time to allow Eneremadu to testify again

because he wanted to further explain why he was at the complex. The State argued

that there was no good cause to reopen the evidence and that “there was testimony

several times of why [Eneremadu] believed he was there [a]nd there was plenty of

12
opportunity yesterday, while the defendant was on the stand, to get out any and all

evidence that they wanted to present.” After the trial court consulted legal authority,

the trial court informed the parties of some of the cases the trial court found

instructive, and the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: . . . All of these [cases] dealt with reopening
evidence at some point, either at punishment phase or at guilt/innocence
where at the close of evidence but prior to reading the jury charge, there
was a request to reopen the evidence to call a witness. And it appears
that it is at the discretion of the trial court[.] [T]he Code of Criminal
Procedure does require a trial court to allow testimony to be introduced
at any time before the argument of a cause is concluded if it appears
that it is necessary to the due administration of justice under Article
36.02.
The proffered evidence is necessary to the due administration of
justice if it would materially change the case in the proponent’s
favor. . . .
In other words, the evidence must be more than just relevant. It
must actually make a difference in the case. Evidence that is merely
cumulative of other evidence does not meet this standard.
....
I would like to hear from defense counsel the proffered testimony
in specificity that would not be cumulative from yesterday.
....
So, what additional testimony do you plan to elicit today that
requires you to recall your client?

[Defense counsel]: That there were communications between
him and Mr. Robert. But, again, those communications are not clear.
We don’t have any specific order as to what time he was to be there.

THE COURT: And are you able to elicit more detail about those
communications if you were to call your client?
....
[Defense counsel]: There’s no evidence that those text messages
didn’t take place and what my client did or the results of it.

13
THE COURT: But, . . . , none of that is new for this jury. This
was all brought out yesterday. And your client had ample opportunity
to tell the jury about it and did and was cross-examined about it and - -

[Defense counsel]: There was discussion. Clearly there was.

THE COURT: . . . the case law that I’m - - that I’m moving under
here, and that I’m reading, requires that the testimony your client give
this morning not be cumulative, that it not be the same as what he would
already had testified to yesterday. And everything, you’ve said it
yourself, is it would be the same as yesterday.

[Defense counsel]: It would be a reaffirmance of yesterday’s
testimony with regard to the communications. And that’s why he was
there, in anticipation of working that day to move.

THE COURT: But a reaffirmance means that he would simply
be saying the same thing that he testified to yesterday and that’s not
good cause to reopen evidence, [defense counsel].

[Defense counsel]: That is essentially correct.

THE COURT: Okay. So, with that, then I do find that it is not a
good reason for me to reopen evidence for a second time in this case.
Reopening the evidence for the first time in this case, I certainly did not
hesitate because your client had not had the opportunity to testify. And
when you advised him that it would be a good idea, he took your advice.
And I allowed you to reopen the evidence. And he testified and was
able to give the information that he did yesterday to the jury which
allowed you to move forward with your trial theory that you’ve had
from the very beginning, which is the mistake of fact as to how he came
to be on that property. . . .
So, [defense counsel], you’ve been very consistent with your trial
theory throughout this case. And your client was able to do that
yesterday. Me allowing him to - - or you to reopen the evidence. But
today, me allowing you to reopen for a second time, by your very
assertions, there is nothing new that he would be testifying to.
So, at this time, I will not be allowing that based on the case law
that I’ve cited, based on the proffered testimony, the four-prong test

14
that I have reviewed, and the Code of Criminal Procedure that guides
me in this. I will be denying that request.

Here, defense counsel represented to the trial court that if the evidence was

reopened a second time, Eneremadu’s testimony would not include any new

information and would essentially be a “reaffirmance of” previous testimony. We

conclude on this record, that the trial court’s denial of Eneremadu’s request to reopen

the evidence for the second time was not an abuse of discretion. The trial court

reasonably could have concluded the evidence Eneremadu wanted to present was

cumulative and it would not make a material difference in the case. The trial court’s

ruling was not outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. See Peek, 106 S.W.3d

at 79; Taylor, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 5654, at *6; Birkholz, 278 S.W.3d at 464; see

also De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343-44; Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391. We

overrule Appellant’s issue in both cases on appeal and affirm the trial court’s

judgments.

AFFIRMED.

LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice

Submitted on July 22, 2024
Opinion Delivered July 31, 2024
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Chambers, JJ.

15