Ex Parte Hector Resendis-Martinez v. the State of Texas

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
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No. 08-24-00014-CR
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EX PARTE HECTOR RECENDIS-MARTINEZ

On Appeal from the County Court
Kinney County, Texas
Trial Court No. 11904CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Hector Recendis-Martinez appeals from the trial court’s order denying his

pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus based on his claim that he was the subject of selective

prosecution. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order.

I. BACKGROUND

Recendis-Martinez, a noncitizen, was arrested for allegedly trespassing on private property

in Kinney County, Texas in December 2021 as part of Operation Lone Star (OLS), the State’s

policy to address the influx of illegal border crossings from Mexico to Texas and “combat the
smuggling of people and drugs into Texas.”1 He filed a pretrial application for a writ of habeas

corpus in the county court, arguing the State was selectively prosecuting him in violation of his

equal protection rights because the State was only arresting male noncitizens for alleged

trespassing in a five-county area, including Kinney County, pursuant to the OLS policy in effect

at the time of his arrest.

The county court denied relief without issuing a writ or holding a hearing, and Recendis-

Martinez appealed to the Fourth Court of Appeals. The appeal was transferred to this Court

pursuant to a Texas Supreme Court docket equalization order.2 In November 2023, we construed

the appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus, denied the petition without prejudice, and remanded

the matter to the county court.3 We instructed the county court to consider Recendis-Martinez’s

writ application on remand in light of the Fourth Court of Appeals’ opinion in Ex parte Aparicio.

There, the Fourth Court held that Aparicio, a male noncitizen who was arrested pursuant to the

OLS policy for allegedly trespassing, was the subject of selective prosecution and therefore

entitled to habeas relief.4 Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued a second order

in January 2024 denying Recendis-Martinez’s writ application. Recendis-Martinez appealed from

that order.5

1
See Ex parte Aparicio, 707 S.W.3d 189, 194 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Aparicio v. Texas, 145
S. Ct. 2852 (U.S. June 30, 2025) (No. 24-6057) (discussing the Governor’s Office’s stated purpose of OLS).
2
See Tex. R. App. P. 41.3 (requiring a transferee court to apply the precedent of the transferor court).
3
Ex parte Recendis-Martinez, No. 08-23-00202-CR, 2023 WL 8285829, at *5 (Tex. App.—El Paso Nov. 30, 2023,
no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
4
Ex parte Aparicio, 672 S.W.3d 696, 701 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023) rev’d, 707 S.W.3d 189 (Tex. Crim. App.
2024), cert. denied sub nom. Aparicio v. Texas, 145 S. Ct. 2852 (U.S. June 30, 2025) (No. 24-6057).
5
In its order denying the writ, the trial court concluded that although the State’s OLS arrest policy had a discriminatory
effect, the State did not engage in “purposeful discrimination.” Instead, the trial court concluded, the State’s arrest
policy was motivated by the need to “immediately deal with the situation at hand during a state of emergency and
disaster” at the border due to the “unprecedented number of illegal crossings of immigrants” and the limitations
imposed by the lack of adequate jail space available to house arrestees.

2
In the interim, the Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State’s petition for discretionary

review of the Fourth Court of Appeals’ opinion in Aparicio, and in February 2024, we abated

Recendis-Martinez’s appeal pending that decision. In October 2024, the Court of Criminal Appeals

reversed the Fourth Court of Appeals’ decision in Aparicio.6 In its opinion, the court first held

that Aparicio’s claim of selective prosecution was cognizable in a pretrial application for a writ of

habeas corpus.7 It then explained that “[i]n order to succeed in a claim of selective prosecution or

selective enforcement, the claimant must prove with ‘exceptionally clear evidence’ that: 1. The

prosecutorial policy had a discriminatory effect; and 2. it was motivated by a discriminatory

purpose.”8

The court assumed for the sake of argument that the first part of the prima facie case was

met, as “the evidence adduced at trial demonstrated some level of a ‘discriminatory effect’ in that

women were not prosecuted (at least under the State offense of criminal trespass).”9 However, the

court held that Aparicio had failed to present clear evidence demonstrating that the OLS policy of

arresting only men for criminal trespass at the border was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.10

The court held that the evidence presented in Aparicio’s case—most of which consisted of the

testimony of DPS Captain Betancourt, a prosecutorial liaison for Maverick County, and four DPS

Troopers working with OLS in a five-county area—demonstrated that the State chose to arrest

only men for trespassing in response to an “emergency” situation at the border caused by the influx

6
Ex parte Aparicio, 707 S.W.3d at 210.
7
Id. at 202–203.
8
Id. at 204.
9
Id. at 207–08.
10
Id. at 208–210.

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of migrants and a lack of jail space to house those found trespassing at the border.11 The court

therefore determined that the OLS policy or “mindset” of arresting only men for trespass was

“more likely” motivated by the “limited resources” the State had to address the “ongoing

emergency” at the border “rather than gender discrimination.” 12 According to the court, the

evidence demonstrated “far more heavily that the necessities of reality during an ongoing

emergency (limited resources in the face of ‘sheer numbers’), rather than gender discrimination,

was more likely the motivation for any discriminatory effect” (emphasis in original).13 The court

concluded that Aparicio had failed to meet his burden of “demonstrating a prima facie case that

he [was] arrested and prosecuted because of his gender,” and as such, did not meet the

“‘demanding’ standard required for judicial interference in the State’s discretion in administering

criminal justice policy and priorities” (emphasis in original).14

Aparicio filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, and

in January of 2025, we granted the State’s motion to again abate the appeal until that petition was

resolved. After the high court denied certiorari, declining to review the Court of Criminal Appeals’

opinion in Aparicio, we reinstated Recendis-Martinez’s appeal to consider the trial court’s ruling.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We generally review a trial court’s ruling on a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus

under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006); Ex parte Jarreau, 623 S.W.3d 468, 472 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. ref’d). But

11
Id.
12
Id. at 210.
13
Id. at 209–210.
14
Id.

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“when, as here, the resolution of the ultimate issue turns on the application of purely legal

standards, we review the trial court’s ruling de novo.” Jarreau, 623 S.W.3d at 472. Further, we

must uphold the trial court’s ruling if it “was supported by the record and was correct under any

theory of law applicable to the case[,] . . . even if the trial court gave the wrong reason for its

ruling.” Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (en banc) (citing State

v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc); Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539,

543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc)); see also Ex parte Guerrero, No. 04-24-00583-CR, 2025

WL 2399174, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 19, 2025, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not

designated for publication).

III. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Recendis-Martinez acknowledges that in Aparicio, the Court of Criminal

Appeals held that Aparicio, who had been arrested under the same OLS policy, failed to establish

he was the victim of selective prosecution based on the record before the trial court. However,

Recendis-Martinez contends the record in his case contains additional evidence that was not

included in Aparicio’s case, i.e., an affidavit from Victor Escalon, the South Texas Regional

Director of the Texas Department of Public Safety responsible for initially overseeing the OLS

operations for the South Texas Region, which included Kinney County. And, he contends,

Escalon’s affidavit provided “exceptionally clear evidence” the court found lacking in Aparicio’s

case to establish a prima facie case of the State’s discriminatory motive in arresting only males for

trespassing at the border.

In his affidavit, Escalon averred that, as part of the OLS operations, “[o]n or about August

2021, DPS personnel were directed [by DPS leadership] not to arrest females for criminal

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trespass.”15 He further averred that at the same time, DPS leadership “focused arrests on males

between the ages of 18–65 ([‘]non-elderly adult males[’]).”

Escalon explained that DPS considered several factors in making this decision. The factors

he cited were substantially similar to those the State offered in Aparicio’s case to justify the

decision, i.e., related to limited resources available to combat the emergency situation at the border.

But Recendis-Martinez finds it significant that Escalon also averred that the policy was adopted in

part based on the State’s belief that “non-elderly adult male trespassers” (between the ages of 18

and 65) posed a “greater public safety threat” than female trespassers, and that “[i]n the West Texas

Region, DPS personnel have regularly encountered mostly males transporting controlled

substances in heavy backpacks.”

Recendis-Martinez further points to Escalon’s comparisons between male and female

trespassers in his affidavit. First, Escalon stated that, based on his experience as the South Texas

Regional Director and his “past experience with border operations,” he has “observed that

primarily single adult males and male drug smugglers move through desolate rural areas to avoid

detection and capture,” while female trespassers and those in family units “identify locations to

cross where the city provides more infrastructure on both sides of the river.” Second, Escalon

observed that, in his experience, “DPS personnel who encountered females on private property

could not easily distinguish between those who were also trespassing and those who were being

smuggled or trafficked by their male companions,” and “[t]o avoid potentially arresting female

15
Escalon averred that this practice changed in November 2022 when DPS personal began arresting females in various
border counties for criminal trespass. This change occurred after Recendis-Martinez was arrested for criminal trespass.

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trafficking or smuggling victims, DPS personnel focused on arresting non-elderly adult male

trespassers, especially since jail capacity has been limited.”16

According to Recendis-Martinez, the evidence showed the State was openly discriminating

against males based on their alleged propensity to be more “dangerous” and more likely to engage

in criminal conduct than females, who the State believed were more likely to be “victims.” And,

he contends, Escalon’s affidavit demonstrates that the State was openly considering “gender” in

its OLS policies and engaging in “prejudice” and gender “stereotyping” by only arresting males at

the border. The affidavit, according to Recendis-Martinez, constituted clear proof that the State’s

OLS policy constituted the type of “invidious” discrimination that the court in Aparicio recognized

was impermissible. See Aparicio, 707 S.W.3d at 205–06 (noting that Black’s Law Dictionary

“defines ‘invidious discrimination’ as: ‘Discrimination that is offensive or objectionable, esp.

because it involves prejudice or stereotyping.’”).

We agree with the State that the affidavit is not substantially different than the evidence

the Court of Criminal Appeals examined in Aparicio or this Court examined in the various other

post-Aparicio cases, which was found insufficient to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination. 17 Though Escalon acknowledged that the State focused on arresting male

trespassers because they posed a “greater public safety threat” than females, he also explained that

the State’s purpose in only arresting men was motivated by the limited resources available to

address the ongoing emergency at the border, adding that the lack of jail space was exacerbated

16
In addition, Recendis-Martinez maintains that the State’s arresting of females in Kinney County after the litigation
over the State’s OLS policy began shows the State’s claim that it only arrested male trespassers due to limited jail
space “was not the actual reason driving the discriminatory treatment[.]”
17
See, e.g., Ex parte Melo-Sanchez, No. 08-23-00301-CR, 2025 WL 2778133, at *2 (Tex. App.—El Paso Sept. 29,
2025, no pet.) (affirming trial court’s decision denying defendant’s application for a writ of habeas corpus where the
defendant presented substantially the same evidence that the Court of Criminal Appeals found insufficient to support
a prima facie case of gender discrimination in Aparicio).

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by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2021 and 2022.18 Noting the Texas Jail Standards requiring men

and women to be housed separately, Escalon further explained that “[i]n the West Texas Region,

DPS personnel have regularly encountered mostly males transporting controlled substances in

heavy backpacks.” Escalon believed the State’s initial decision to arrest only men was a “practical”

necessity in light of the limited jail space. Moreover, Escalon had “been working with State and

Federal OLS partners to increase jail space capacity, including to house more female arrestees”

since July 2021.

We conclude that Escalon’s explanation for the State’s purpose in adopting its OLS arrest

policy was substantially similar to the explanation the State’s witnesses provided in Aparicio, i.e.,

allocating limited resources available to address the ongoing emergency situation at the border.

Escalon’s affidavit did not establish that the State’s policy was motivated by an invidious

discriminatory purpose, i.e., “with a mind so unequal and oppressive that the system of prosecution

amounts to a practical denial of equal protection of the law.” Id. at 204, 206 (internal quotation

marks omitted).19

Like Aparicio, Recendis-Martinez failed to establish a prima facie case that he was

unlawfully arrested and prosecuted because of his gender. We therefore conclude that the trial

18
Escalon further explained that the public safety threat posed by trespassers consisted not only of the damage the
trespassers inflicted on private property at the border, but the dangers the trespassers themselves faced, noting that
“[m]any of them have died from dehydration, exhaustion, and other ailments while traversing rural and remote land,
especially in hot temperatures . . . . Most of them have been male.”
19
We further note that although not addressed extensively, other courts, including the Fourth Court of Appeals, whose
precedent we must follow, have rejected claims of gender discrimination in post-Aparicio cases in which defendants
have presented Escalon’s affidavit in support of their claims. See, e.g., Ex parte Lopez, No. 05-24-00082-CR, 2025
WL 2880829, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 9, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(concluding that Escalon’s affidavit was substantially similar to the evidence presented in Aparicio’s case and did not
support a finding that the State had engaged in gender discrimination in its OLS arrest policies); Ex parte Sanchez
Dubon, No. 04-24-00584-CR, 2025 WL 2399175, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 19, 2025, no pet.)
(per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Ex parte Guerrero, No. 04-24-00583-CR, 2025 WL 2399174,
at *1–2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 19, 2025, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

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court acted properly in denying Recendis-Martinez’s application for a pretrial writ of habeas

corpus.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment denying Recendis-Martinez’s application for a pretrial

writ of habeas corpus, and we remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings in

accordance with our opinion. All pending motions are denied as moot.

LISA J. SOTO, Justice

December 19, 2025

Before Salas Mendoza C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)

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