Roberto Alba Rivera v. the State of Texas

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-24-00373-CR

ROBERTO ALBA RIVERA, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court 3
Tarrant County, Texas1
Trial Court No. 1804950, Honorable Brian Bolton, Sitting by Assignment

August 25, 2025
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant Roberto Alba Rivera’s four felony convictions stem from a traffic stop

and search of his vehicle.2 In this appeal, he challenges the denial of his motion to

1 Pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court’s docket equalization efforts, this case was transferred to

this Court from the Second Court of Appeals. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. Should a conflict exist
between precedent of the Second Court of Appeals and this Court on any relevant issue, this appeal will
be decided in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
2 Appellant was convicted of manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance in penalty group

1B—Fentanyl, Methamphetamine, and Cocaine (Count 1); two counts of manufacture or delivery of a
controlled substance in penalty group 1—Fentanyl, Methamphetamine, and Cocaine (Counts 2, 3); and
suppress the evidence seized in the search of his vehicle contending that the officer

lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.3

BACKGROUND

At a pre-trial hearing, the trial court heard testimony from Arlington police officer

Jose Camacho pertaining to the events relevant to Appellant’s motion to suppress. The

State also introduced into evidence the dashcam video from the patrol car which captured

the stop. The parties stipulated that it was a warrantless arrest.

Officer Camacho testified that, as a patrol officer, he had conducted approximately

1,000 traffic stops. Around 7:00 p.m. on June 27, 2022, he and his partner were patrolling

a high-crime area. After seeing Appellant’s vehicle leave a corner store’s parking lot,

Officer Camacho observed him drive on the solid double yellow line in the center of the

roadway. Officer Camacho activated his emergency lights and then observed Appellant

crossing the double yellow lines while making a left-hand turn. After the officer stopped

the vehicle, he approached the driver’s side window and immediately detected an odor of

marijuana emanating from the vehicle. Upon searching Appellant’s vehicle, the officer

found a firearm, $1,199 in cash, notes of drug transactions, and what subsequent testing

confirmed to be fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine.

unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon (Count 7). See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.112(c),
.1123(d); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04.
3 Appellant’s punishment range was enhanced based on his status as a habitual offender (Counts

1–3) and a repeat offender (Count 7). See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42. The trial court entered judgment
consistent with the jury’s recommended punishment: Count 1 at 30 years’ confinement; Count 2 at 25 years’
confinement; Count 3 at 25 years’ confinement; and Count 7 at 20 years’ confinement.

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In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court found the officer credible and

noted that Appellant drove his vehicle in an unsafe manner because of other vehicles on

the roadway. The court stated, “when [Appellant’s] vehicle did cross over, broke the

plane, and left its lane of traffic into the double yellow lines, I’m going to find that was a

reason to articulate a reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop.”

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence using a bifurcated

standard. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In reviewing

the trial court’s decision, we do not engage in our own factual review. Romero v. State,

800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc). The trial judge is the sole trier of

fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.

Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We give almost total

deference to the trial court’s rulings on questions of historical fact and application-of-law-

to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Amador, 221

S.W.3d at 673. But when application-of-law-to-fact questions do not turn on the credibility

and demeanor of the witnesses, we review the trial court’s rulings on those questions de

novo. Id.

When, as here, there are no explicit fact findings and neither party timely requested

findings and conclusions from the trial court, we imply the necessary fact findings that

would support the trial court’s ruling if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to

the trial court’s rulings, supports those findings. State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236,

241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 25. We then review the trial

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court’s legal ruling de novo unless the implied fact findings supported by the record are

also dispositive of the legal ruling. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 819 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006).

APPLICABLE LAW

A warrantless traffic stop is analogous to a temporary detention, and like all Fourth

Amendment seizures, it must be justified by reasonable suspicion. State v. Hardin, 664

S.W.3d 867, 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022); see U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Reasonable

suspicion exists if the officer “has specific articulable facts that, combined with rational

inferences from those facts,” lead the officer to reasonably conclude that a person has

committed a traffic offense. Hardin, 664 S.W.3d at 872. We review a reasonable

suspicion determination by considering the totality of the circumstances. State v. Cortez,

543 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). An actual violation does not need to have

occurred; rather, it is only necessary that the officer had a reasonable suspicion that a

violation occurred. Jaganathan v. State, 479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). A

seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes does not occur until after a person has been

stopped, either physically by law enforcement or by yielding to law enforcement authority.

Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d 227, 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc).

ANALYSIS

In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its

discretion when it overruled his motion to suppress and found the officer had reasonable

suspicion to believe Appellant had violated section 545.051 or 545.060 of the

Transportation Code. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 545.051, .060. Because the

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record shows specific articulable facts from which the officer could have reasonably

concluded that Appellant committed an offense under section 545.060, we overrule his

issue.4

As relevant here, a person commits a traffic offense if, while driving on a multi-lane

roadway, the person fails to “drive as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane” and

his “move[ment] from the lane” is unsafe. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.060(a). Section

545.060(a) is violated if the person “fails to maintain a single marked lane of traffic in an

unsafe manner.” Hardin, 664 S.W.3d at 876.

The evidence in this case supports the trial court’s finding that the officer had

reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant for a traffic violation. At the suppression hearing,

Officer Camacho testified that he first noticed Appellant’s vehicle as it exited a corner

store parking lot. The road had two lanes in each direction with solid double-yellow lines

in the center of the road. The officer observed Appellant driving on the double yellow

lines. According to the officer, the driver’s side tires were on top of the double yellow

lines. This movement occurred just prior to Appellant approaching a red light. After the

officer activated his overhead lights, Appellant signaled a left turn and crossed the double

yellow lines to make a left turn off the roadway. In this instance, Appellant maneuvered

into a turn lane designated for oncoming traffic before entering the center turn lane which

allows left turns by either direction of traffic. Appellant then completed his turn off the

4 Because we conclude the trial court did not err by determining Officer Camacho had reasonable

suspicion to initiate a traffic stop based on Appellant’s failure to maintain a single marked lane of traffic in
a safe manner, we need not address the portion of Appellant’s issue challenging the justification for the
stop under section 545.051 of the Transportation Code. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

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roadway and stopped in a parking lot. The officer described Appellant’s movement across

the double yellow lines as he began his left turn as unsafe.

Appellant contends that Officer Camacho’s statement about the movement being

unsafe was conclusory and the officer did not articulate specific facts establishing that the

driving was unsafe. However, a video recording of the traffic stop, taken from the patrol

vehicle’s dashboard camera, was admitted into evidence. The video depicted Appellant’s

car being followed and corroborated the officer’s description of the events. The video

showed multiple vehicles on the road, including an oncoming motorcycle, van, and small

SUV approaching Appellant’s vehicle as he moved across the double yellow lines to make

his turn. As such, the “officer’s failure to relate every minute detail of the video did not

render his testimony conclusory.” See Adams v. State, No. 02-24-00249-CR, 2025 Tex.

App. LEXIS 3903, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, June 5, 2025, pet. filed) (mem. op., not

designated for publication). The trial court is permitted to draw inferences, such as safety

concerns, from the video and facts presented. Id. Moreover, at the conclusion of the

suppression hearing, the trial judge’s remarks make clear he found Officer Camacho

credible. We are to defer to that determination. See Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24–25.

On the record in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s

ruling, we conclude the officer had objective facts and rational inferences from those facts

to support a reasonable suspicion of a violation of section 545.060 of the Transportation

Code.

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CONCLUSION

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant’s

motion to suppress. We overrule his issue on appeal and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Judy C. Parker
Justice

Do not publish.

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