Kyler Patrick Koch v. the State of Texas

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-24-00101-CR

KYLER PATRICK KOCH, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the County Court
Hemphill County, Texas
Trial Court No. 5656, Honorable Lisa Johnson, Presiding

January 6, 2025
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant Kyler Patrick Koch appeals his conviction for the offense of resisting

arrest, search, or transportation.1 By his sole issue, Appellant argues that the evidence

is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

1 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.03(a).
BACKGROUND

Appellant was charged by information with “prevent[ing] or obstruct[ing] Michael

Foreman, a person [Appellant] knew to be a peace officer, from effecting the

transportation of [Appellant], by using force against the peace officer.” The following

evidence was presented at Appellant’s jury trial.

On April 30, 2023, law enforcement officers were dispatched to a residence in

Canadian in reference to a domestic violence dispute between Appellant and his mother.

Appellant’s mother reported that he had mental health issues and was suicidal. After

arguing with her and breaking a glass door in the residence, Appellant left in his car only

to return a short time later. Earlier that day, one of the responding officers, Hemphill

County Sheriff’s Deputy Michael Foreman, was present during a separate incident when

Appellant overdosed on prescription medication and was combative with emergency

personnel. During that incident, Foreman assisted with restraining Appellant and getting

him into an ambulance so that he could be taken to the hospital for treatment.

When law enforcement officers arrived at the residence in response to the

domestic violence dispatch, Appellant was sitting in his car in the driveway. Foreman

asked him to step out of the vehicle for Appellant’s safety and that of the officers. After

he exited his vehicle, Foreman placed Appellant in handcuffs. Appellant repeatedly asked

Foreman if he had a warrant and Foreman assured him he was not under arrest, telling

him, “We’re just here to talk to you.” Appellant asked, “Why are you detaining me?”

Foreman replied, “Because your mother said you were making suicidal thoughts—or

saying suicidal things.” During their efforts to detain him, Appellant resisted to such an

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extent that Foreman’s body-worn camera was dislodged. Another officer assisted

Foreman in placing Appellant in the back seat of the patrol vehicle.

After speaking to Appellant, Appellant’s mother, and the other officers, Foreman

decided to take Appellant to the local hospital and seek an emergency detention order.2

When Foreman informed Appellant of his decision, Appellant objected. As Foreman was

buckling Appellant’s seatbelt, Appellant got up on his knees and lunged at Foreman with

his shoulder. Appellant hit Foreman with sufficient force to knock his body-worn camera

off his chest. With the other officers assisting, they were able to push Appellant back into

the vehicle. Appellant continued kicking his legs in an attempt to keep the door open,

trying to get out of the vehicle. The entire encounter with Appellant was recorded on the

officers’ body-worn cameras and played for the jury.

Appellant was transported to the Hemphill County Hospital and an emergency

detention order was obtained directing Appellant’s transport to the Pavilion in Amarillo. 3

After Foreman obtained the emergency detention order, several hours elapsed while

waiting for Appellant to be medically cleared and accepted by a mental health facility.

However, there were no beds available at the Pavilion or any alternate mental health

facility. After hospital staff informed Foreman that Appellant would be released, Foreman

arrested him for resisting arrest, search, or transportation.

2 Foreman testified that it was the standard procedure of the Hemphill County Sheriff’s Office to

transport a person to the local hospital and then obtain an emergency detention order. Once the emergency
order is granted, the officer waits until the person is medically cleared before transporting the person to the
mental health facility named in the emergency order.
3 The Pavilion is a psychiatric hospital in Amarillo and the “nearest appropriate inpatient mental

health facility.” See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 573.001(d)(1)(A).

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A jury found Appellant guilty and the trial court assessed punishment at 180 days

in jail. This appeal followed.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

The standard we apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support

a conviction is the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct.

2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App.

2010). Under that standard, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to

the verdict and determine whether, based on the evidence and reasonable inferences

therefrom, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense

beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d

616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). Sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the

elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Thomas v.

State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240

(Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). In our review, we must evaluate all the evidence in the record,

both direct and circumstantial, regardless of whether that evidence was properly or

improperly admitted. Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016);

Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We are also required to

defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge

of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Winfrey v. State,

393 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). When the record supports conflicting

inferences, we presume that the jury resolved any conflicts in favor of the verdict and will

defer to that determination. Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App.

2012).

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A person commits the offense of resisting transportation if he intentionally prevents

or obstructs a person he knows is a peace officer from effecting transportation of the actor

by using force against the peace officer. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.03(a); Hartis v.

State, 183 S.W.3d 793, 797 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) For the

purposes of section 38.03, “using force against” a peace officer means “violence or

physical aggression, or an immediate threat thereof, in the direction of and/or into contact

with, or in opposition or hostility to, a peace officer . . . .” Finley v. State, 484 S.W.3d 926,

928 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). It is no defense to prosecution that the arrest or search was

unlawful. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.03(b); White v. State, 601 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex.

Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). The section creates just one offense that can be committed

in three different ways; it does not create three separate offenses. See Hartis, 183

S.W.3d at 799.

Resisting arrest, search, or transportation is in the “obstructing governmental

operation” chapter under the “Offenses Against Public Administration” title of the Texas

Penal Code. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. ch. 38. The gravamen of the offense of resisting

transportation is the use of force to prevent the transportation of oneself. “The force must

occur while the officer is attempting to effectuate an arrest, complete a search, or

transport the actor.” Willis v. State, No. 11-20-00083-CR, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 1938,

at *9 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 24, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication). To establish that an officer was in the process of effecting a transportation,

the State must prove that the officer had a preexisting intent to transport the person and

took some action pursuant to that intent. Malone v. State, No. 14-22-00851-CR, 2024

Tex. App. LEXIS 2797, at *7–8 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 23, 2024, no pet.)

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(mem. op., not designated for publication). The statute is intended to discourage the use

of force against a peace officer. Medford v. State, 990 S.W.2d 799, 810 (Tex. App.—

Austin 1999), vacated by 13 S.W.3d 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

ANALYSIS

RESISTING ARREST, SEARCH, OR TRANSPORTATION

By his sole issue, Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support

his conviction for resisting transportation because a transport must be lawful before

resisting that transport can be sufficient to convict. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.03.4

He contends that his transport was unlawful because he was not under arrest, and Deputy

Foreman did not strictly follow procedures established by Chapter 573 of the Texas

Health and Safety Code. Specifically, Appellant complains that after Foreman took him

into custody, he took him to a hospital rather than taking him immediately to the “nearest

appropriate inpatient mental health facility.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.

§ 573.001(d)(1)(A). The emergency order directed Foreman to take Appellant to the

Pavilion, which never happened.

Peace officers are specifically tasked with investigating emergency situations in

which a person with mental illness is threatening to harm himself. In section 573.001 of

the Texas Health and Safety Code, the Legislature has defined and codified the standard

of probable cause for the situation encountered by the officers when Appellant was taken

into custody. See id.; Trevino v. State, 512 S.W.3d 587, 595 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017,

4 Appellant does not challenge the evidence of his intent, his efforts to prevent or obstruct Deputy

Foreman, or his use of force against Foreman.

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no pet.). Under the probable cause standard, “[a] peace officer, without a warrant, may

take a person into custody . . . if the officer: (1) has reason to believe and does believe

that: (A) the person is a person with mental illness; and (B) because of that mental illness

there is a substantial risk of serious harm to the person or to others unless the person is

immediately restrained; and (2) believes that there is not sufficient time to obtain a warrant

before taking the person into custody.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 573.001(a).

This “reason to believe” standard equates to probable cause. Cantrell v. City of Murphy,

666 F.3d 911, 923 (5th Cir. 2012); Trevino, 512 S.W.3d at 595. Further, the Health and

Safety Code defines mental illness as a “condition” that (1) substantially impairs a

person’s thought, perception of reality, emotional process, or judgment; or (2) grossly

impairs behavior as demonstrated by recent disturbed behavior. Id. § 571.003(14).

Persons considered to be suicidal meet this definition. Trevino, 512 S.W.3d at 595. The

statute further provides that in determining whether there is a substantial risk of serious

harm to the person or others, a peace officer may consider a variety of factors, including

the person’s behavior, evidence of the person’s “severe emotional distress and

deterioration in the person’s mental condition to the extent that the person cannot remain

at liberty.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 573.001(b).

In this case, when the officers arrived at the residence, it was clear that Appellant

had mental health issues, a fact that Appellant admitted during questioning. Deputy

Foreman had probable cause to detain Appellant based upon the suicidal statements and

the officer’s knowledge of Appellant’s mental health issues. See Cantrell, 666 F.3d at

923 (probable cause exists where facts and circumstances within officer’s knowledge at

time of seizure are sufficient for reasonable person to conclude that individual is mentally

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ill and poses substantial risk of serious harm); Trevino, 512 S.W.3d at 595. After Foreman

completed his investigation and determined there was probable cause to transport

Appellant to a mental health facility as required by the Health and Safety Code, Appellant

began engaging in his obstructive conduct. The evidence is undisputed that while

Foreman attempted to secure Appellant in the patrol vehicle, Appellant lunged at

Foreman and hit him with sufficient force to knock his body-worn camera off his chest.

Appellant continued to kick his legs in an attempt to keep the vehicle’s door from closing

as he tried to get out of the vehicle. The elements of the offense were met after Appellant

used force against the officer. As such, Foreman’s later actions do not invalidate that he

was attempting to transport Appellant at the time Appellant resisted. The fact that

Foreman took Appellant to the hospital to have him medically cleared before obtaining

the emergency detention order does not render Appellant’s transport illegal as the offense

of resisting transportation had already occurred.5 Based on the testimony presented, a

rational factfinder could conclude that Appellant’s conduct obstructed Foreman from

performing his duties related to Appellant’s transport. See Mata v. State, Nos. 02-23-

00110-CR, 02-23-00111-CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 9379, at *13 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Dec. 14, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Yadav v. State, Nos.

04-19-00483-CR, 04-19-00486-CR, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 6348, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio, Aug. 12, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We

overrule Appellant’s issue.

5 Because Appellant had already resisted transport before Foreman took any action that might have

rendered the transport unlawful, we express no opinion on Appellant’s argument that an unlawful transport
is a defense to a charge of resisting transport.

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CONCLUSION

Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

Judy C. Parker
Justice

Do not publish.

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