Joshua Brian Huerta v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-25-00010-CR

JOSHUA BRIAN HUERTA, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 1
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1790303

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
MEMORANDUM OPINION

A Tarrant County jury convicted Joshua Brian Huerta of two counts of indecency with a

child, Claire,1 by sexual contact, a second-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 21.11(d).

The trial court sentenced Huerta to three years’ imprisonment on each count, with the sentences

to run concurrently. On appeal,2 Huerta claims the trial court erred in admitting into evidence

certain text messages between Huerta’s wife and Claire’s mother and in admitting evidence that

Huerta falsely claimed to be a police officer. Because we conclude Huerta did not preserve error

regarding the text messages and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting his false

statement, we affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Huerta does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, so

we need not recount the facts of the offenses for which he was convicted. Instead, we give only

a brief factual and procedural background to frame his appellate issues.

Huerta and his wife, Rose, lived in the same apartment complex in North Richland Hills

as Rose’s sister, Sasha, and her family. Huerta was a Fort Worth police officer, and Rose was a

stay-at-home mom. Sasha and her husband, Leon, paid Huerta and Rose to keep their children

while Sasha and Leon were at work.

1
We use pseudonyms for minor children involved in this case and their family members. See TEX. CONST. art. I,
§ 30(a)(1) (granting a “crime victim . . . the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity
and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10(a)(3).
2
This appeal was transferred to this Court from the Second Court of Appeals pursuant to a Texas Supreme Court
docket equalization order. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Supp.). Accordingly, we apply the precedent of
the Second Court of Appeals in deciding this case to the extent that it conflicts with our own. See TEX. R. APP. P.
41.3.
2
In May 2023, Sasha’s children spent one of the first few days of summer vacation at

Huerta and Rose’s apartment. That evening, one of Sasha and Leon’s daughters, Claire, told her

parents about two separate incidents where Huerta touched her inappropriately, one of which had

occurred on that day, and the other a few weeks prior. Sasha called Rose to come over. Claire

told Rose what had happened. After Rose left, Sasha called the police.

Ultimately, the State charged Huerta with continuous sexual abuse of a child and three

counts of indecency with a child by sexual contact. Prior to trial, the State abandoned the

continuous sexual assault charge and one of the indecency charges. Huerta pled not guilty to the

two remaining counts of indecency with a child and proceeded to jury trial. During trial, over

Huerta’s objections, the trial court admitted into evidence certain text messages between Sasha

and Rose, as well as testimony that Huerta told the arresting officers that he was a Fort Worth

police officer, even though he had previously resigned.

The jury found Huerta guilty on both counts of indecency with a child. The trial court

assessed Huerta’s punishment at three years’ incarceration on each count, ordered Huerta’s

sentences to run concurrently, and entered judgments accordingly. Huerta filed a generic motion

for new trial, not complaining of either of the issues he raises now on appeal, which was

overruled by operation of law. See TEX. R. APP. P. 21.8(c).

Huerta appeals.

II. Preservation of Error

In his first point of error, Huerta claims the trial court erred “in admitting . . . certain text

messages between Rose . . . and Sasha which were untimely produced.”

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Huerta states that he filed a motion for production of evidence under the Michael Morton

Act, Article 39.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, almost a year prior to trial. See

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (Supp.). Nonetheless, the trial court allowed the State to

admit into evidence certain text messages between Rose and Sasha in which they discussed,

among other things, the status of the investigation. In particular, Rose questioned whether the

authorities would leave Claire’s family alone if her family moved away. Rose also advised

Sasha that if Sasha’s family moved out of Tarrant County or the city of North Richland Hills,

Child Protective Services and the police would leave Sasha’s family alone.

The record indicates that the State received the text messages from Sasha on Monday,

November 11, 2024. The State uploaded the text messages so they were available to Huerta on

the following day, November 12, one week prior to the trial date of November 19. Huerta then

requested text messages going back to an earlier date, and the remainder of the text messages

were disclosed and available to Huerta on November 14.

Huerta objected to the admission of the text messages on the basis that they were

untimely disclosed. The trial court overruled Huerta’s objection and admitted the text messages

into evidence, stating that the State disclosed the text messages as soon as was practicable after

the text messages were disclosed to the State.

The State argues Huerta failed to preserve his first point of error because he failed to

move for a continuance based on error under Article 39.14. We agree.

The Fort Worth Court of Appeals recently stated, in an appeal involving the State’s

alleged failure to timely disclose text messages, that “[t]o preserve this alleged Article 39.14

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error,” a defendant is “required to seek a continuance [in the trial court].” Wakefield v. State,

Nos. 02-24-00068-CR & 02-24-00069-CR, 2025 WL 2006081, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

July 17, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (collecting cases, including

Rodriguez v. State, 630 S.W.3d 522, 524 (Tex. App.—Waco 2021, no pet.)); cf. Ruffins v. State,

691 S.W.3d 166, 186–87 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, no pet.) (considering untimely disclosed

incriminating evidence and concluding that “a request for continuance is necessary to preserve a

complaint regarding article 39.14 under circumstances similar to those present here because, if

granted, it would afford the defendant ‘the opportunity to avoid the prejudice and impairment’”

(quoting Rodriguez, 630 S.W.3d at 524)).3

Huerta “neither addresses the requirement of requesting a continuance nor explains his

failure to do so. Accordingly, [Huerta] did not preserve his complaint for appellate review.” See

Wakefield, 2025 WL 2006081, at *3.

We overrule Huerta’s first point of error.

3
Because Wakefield is an unpublished opinion, it is not precedent we are required to follow. See TEX. R. APP. P.
41.3, 47.7(a). However, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals has stated that it “consider[s] unpublished opinions with
similar facts instructive and cite[s] them in agreement with their guidance as to the application of settled law.”
Thetford v. State, 643 S.W.3d 441, 451 n.19 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2022, pet. ref’d) (op. on remand); see Cain v.
State, 621 S.W.3d 75, 81 n.8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. ref’d). We consider the Fort Worth court’s position
in Thetford, along with its reliance in Wakefield on Rodriguez, a published case, and the Austin court’s reliance in
Ruffins, also a published case, on Rodriguez, in coming to the same conclusion in this transfer case.

Conversely, our Court has previously considered the State’s argument that the “requirement to seek a continuance
before being entitled to any relief for the alleged late disclosure of material evidence has continued to apply in cases
even after the Michael Morton Act went into effect.” Taylor v. State, No. 06-19-00179-CR, 2020 WL 4643962, at
*10 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug. 12, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We noted that the
State “[c]it[ed] several unpublished cases” and declined to determine “the issue of waiver as it relates to . . .
objections under the Michael Morton Act,” deciding the appeal instead on the evidence’s lack of materiality. Id.
Because our Court has recently considered but not decided this issue, the outcome may have been different had we
“not been required to decide the case in accordance with the [Fort Worth] court’s precedent.” TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
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III. Admission of Evidence

In his second point of error, Huerta urges that the trial court abused its discretion in

admitting evidence that, while being arrested, he falsely claimed he was a City of Fort Worth

police officer even though he had previously resigned.

Andrew Bray, a patrol sergeant with the North Richland Hills Police Department

(NRHPD), testified that he was assisting with executing a search warrant at Huerta’s residence

on July 28, 2023. Bray testified that as the officers were trying to make contact at the front door,

knocking loudly and announcing themselves as the “North Richland Hills Police Department,”

Huerta was attempting to leave through the garage. Another NRHPD officer detained Huerta,

and, pursuant to the outstanding arrest warrant issued during the investigation, Bray arrested

Huerta. Bray testified that as he was putting handcuffs on Huerta, Huerta said, “I’ll say again,

I’m Fort Worth PD.” Before Bray testified as to Huerta’s statement, Huerta renewed his

relevance objection previously made outside the presence of the jury. Huerta argued that the

State was offering his false statement for the sole purpose of questioning his credibility. The

trial court overruled Huerta’s objection and allowed Bray to testify as to Huerta’s false statement

during his arrest.

Tiffany LaPenna, a detective with the NRHPD, testified that during her investigation of

Claire’s allegation of sexual assault against Huerta, she obtained a search warrant for Huerta’s

apartment. LaPenna also testified that Huerta had resigned as a Fort Worth police officer on

July 25, 2023.

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Huerta argues that his false statement to Bray was irrelevant, as the only use for that

statement was “to sully his reputation in the minds of the jury.”

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

“We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of

discretion.” Bluntson v. State, No. AP-77,067, 2025 WL 1322702, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App.

May 7, 2025). “An abuse of discretion does not occur unless the trial court acts ‘arbitrarily or

unreasonably’ or ‘without reference to any guiding rules and principles.’” Id. (quoting State v.

Lerma, 629 S.W.3d 63, 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021)). “We must uphold the trial court’s ruling

unless the determination ‘falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.’” Id. (quoting

Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)). “An evidentiary ruling will be

upheld if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.” Id.

“[Texas] Rule [of Evidence] 402 states that ‘[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except

as otherwise provided’ and that ‘[e]vidence which is not relevant is inadmissible.’” Kirk v. State,

421 S.W.3d 772, 782 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. ref’d) (third and fourth alterations in

original) (quoting TEX. R. EVID. 402). “Relevant evidence is defined as ‘evidence having any

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the

action more probable or less probable.’” Id. (quoting TEX. R. EVID. 401).

“A defendant’s conduct after the commission of a crime which indicates a ‘consciousness

of guilt’ is admissible to prove that he committed the offense.” Hance v. State, 714 S.W.3d 775,

816 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2025, no pet.) (quoting Hedrick v. State, 473 S.W.3d 824, 830

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] no pet.)). “A ‘consciousness of guilt’ may be one of the

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strongest indicators of guilt.” Id. (quoting Lee v. State, 866 S.W.2d 298, 302 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 1993, pet. ref’d)). And an accused’s false statements indicate a consciousness of

guilt. See King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

B. Analysis

Huerta acknowledges that “[l]ying to the police reveals . . . a consciousness of guilt and,

as such, is circumstantial evidence of guilt.” That is a true statement of the law, and for that

reason, his argument on this point fails. As demonstrated through the cases cited above, an

accused’s false statements may indicate a consciousness of guilt, making those statements

relevant and admissible. As such, the trial court was within the zone of reasonable disagreement

when it admitted into evidence Huerta’s false statement to the police, and the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in so ruling.

We overrule Huerta’s second point of error.

IV. Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Jeff Rambin
Justice

Date Submitted: August 4, 2025
Date Decided: September 9, 2025

Do Not Publish

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