Lamar "Yaka" Jefferson and Jrmar "JJ" Jefferson v. Adam Bazaldua, Carolyn King Arnold, Tennell Atkins, Omar Narvaez, Jamie Resendez, and Eric Johnson

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed August 26, 2024

S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-23-00938-CV

LAMAR "YAKA" JEFFERSON AND
JRMAR "JJ" JEFFERSON, Appellants
V.
ADAM BAZALDUA AND ERIC JOHNSON, Appellees

On Appeal from the 101st Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-23-07425

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Reichek, Goldstein, and Garcia
Opinion by Justice Reichek
In this appeal of two election contests brought by brothers Lamar Jefferson

and Jrmar Jefferson, we consider whether the trial court erred in granting the

prevailing candidates’ pleas to the jurisdiction. Because the Jeffersons were not on

the ballot, we conclude they lacked standing to bring an election contest and affirm

the trial court’s order.

Background

In a municipal election held in Dallas on May 6, 2023, Adam Bazaldua was

elected to the Dallas City Council for District 7 (“District 7”) and Eric Johnson was
elected Dallas Mayor. On June 5, 2023, Lamar Jefferson (“Lamar”) and Jrmar

Jefferson (“Jrmar”) filed a pro se joint original petition, which they amended four

days later, contesting these election results.1 They alleged Lamar was a candidate

for District 7 and Jrmar was a candidate for mayor. The Jeffersons asserted the

election results were inaccurate because election officials counted illegal votes,

prevented eligible voters from voting, failed to count legal votes, engaged in other

fraud or illegal conduct, or made a mistake.

As the Jeffersons acknowledged in their petition, neither Lamar nor Jrmar

appeared on the ballot for the May 6 election. They were both disqualified, Jrmar

for not submitting the required number of valid signatures and Lamar for failing to

meet voter registration requirements. A City of Dallas webpage titled, “Candidates

for the May 6, 2023 General Election,” indicates they both filed for a place on the

May 6, 2023 ballot, but were not qualified. See electCandidates_May2023

(dallascityhall.com) (last visited August 21, 2024) (“Candidates for the May 6, 2023

General Election”). The Jeffersons’ petition includes arguments about why they

should have been on the ballot.

Bazaldua filed a combined answer, plea to the jurisdiction, and motion to

dismiss. By his plea, he asserted that Lamar lacked standing to bring an election

contest because Lamar was not a candidate for District 7. Bazaldua argued that only

1
The petition named other plaintiffs who contested the results of various city council races
and named other defendants, but those parties are not part of this appeal.
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candidates can bring an election contest. Similarly, Johnson filed a plea to the

jurisdiction in which he asserted Jrmar lacked standing to contest the mayoral

election because he was not a candidate.

On September 12, 2023, Judge Charles Stokes, sitting by assignment, granted

Bazaldua’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Lamar’s claims with prejudice. On

September 28, 2023, Judge Stokes granted Johnson’s plea to the jurisdiction and

dismissed “the case” with prejudice.

The Jeffersons filed a joint notice of appeal from the trial court’s order

granting Bazaldua’s plea to the jurisdiction. Jrmar also filed a notice of appeal from

the order granting Johnson’s plea. We consolidated the two appeals because the

interlocutory order granting Bazaldua’s plea merged into the final order granting

Johnson’s plea and dismissing the case.

The Jeffersons, who are also pro se on appeal, have each filed an appellate

brief. Many of their issues and arguments are the same. As we interpret their briefs,

their issues can be divided into the following main categories: (1) arguments that

they have standing to contest the elections because they were candidates; (2)

arguments challenging the fact that they were left off the ballot for the May 6, 2023

election; (3) arguments about the merits of their election contest cases; and (4)

arguments about the trial court’s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of

law.

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Election Contest

The Jeffersons first argue the trial court should not have granted the

contestees’ pleas to the jurisdiction because the Jeffersons have standing to contest

the election. We disagree.

Standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction. Farmers Tex. Cty.

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 598 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. 2020). We review the pleas to

the jurisdiction de novo. Id. In applying a de novo standard of review to a standing

determination, we construe the pleadings in the plaintiffs’ favor, but we also consider

relevant evidence offered by the parties. Id.

Election contests are creatures of statute, and the power of a trial court to

consider such contests exists only to the extent authorized by statute. Nichols v. Seei,

97 S.W.3d 882, 883 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). Title 14 of the Texas

Election Code governs election contests. Any candidate in an election may contest

the election. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 232.002. The purpose of an election contest

is to determine whether the outcome of an election is correct. Rodriguez v. Rangel,

679 S.W.3d 890, 903 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. denied). A trial court

hearing the contest shall attempt to ascertain whether the outcome of the contested

election, as shown by the final canvass, is not the true outcome because illegal votes

were counted, or the election officer or other official prevented eligible voters from

voting, failed to count legal votes, or engaged in other fraud or illegal conduct or

made a mistake. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 221.003(a). If a contestant meets his

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burden of proof and the trial court can ascertain the true outcome of the election, it

shall declare the outcome; however if the court cannot ascertain the true outcome, it

must declare the election void. Id. § 221.012. With limited exceptions, the candidates

in a new election ordered by a court in an election contest are the same candidates

who were in the contested election. Id. § 232.042.

Title 14, which authorizes “any candidate in an election” to bring an election

contest, does not define “candidate.” If a term in a statute is not defined, we interpret

the term according to its ordinary meaning. Broadway Nat’l Bank v. Yates Energy

Corp., 631 S.W.3d 16, 24 (Tex. 2021). We further consider statutes as a whole,

rather than their isolated provisions. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340

S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011). We presume the Legislature chooses a statute’s

language with care, including each word chosen for a purpose, while purposefully

omitting words not chosen. Id. We will not give an undefined term a meaning that

is out of harmony or inconsistent with the other terms in the statute. State v.

$1,760.00 in U.S. Currency, 406 S.W.3d 177, 180 (Tex. 2013). If a different, more

limited, or precise definition is apparent from the term’s use in the context of the

statute, we apply that meaning. Id. Therefore, when an undefined term has multiple

common meanings, the definition most consistent within the context of the statute’s

scheme applies. Id. at 180–81.

The Jeffersons contend the definition of “candidate” found in Title 15 of the

election code applies. Title 15 pertains to “Regulating Political Funds and

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Campaigns,” and requires candidates to report political contributions and

expenditures. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 254.061. It broadly defines “candidate” as

“a person who knowingly and willingly takes affirmative action for the purpose of

gaining nomination or election to public office.” Id. § 251.001(1). The election

code uses a similar definition of candidate in several places in Title 3, which governs

election officers and observers. See id. §§ 31.035(c), 32.053(c), 32.054(c),

32.055(b), 33.032(b) (“candidate” is “a person who has taken affirmative action, as

described by the law regulating political funds and campaigns, for the purpose of

gaining nomination or election.”).

The Jeffersons would have us read into § 232.002 words that are not there.

Title 14 and Title 15 serve different purposes. If the legislature had intended for the

broad definition of candidate found in Title 15 of the election code to apply to

election contests, it would have included that definition in Title 14. Because it did

not, we presume the Legislature intended a different, more limited, definition of

candidate to apply in an election contest. Defining “candidate” to mean a person

whose name appears on the ballot for an office on Election Day is consistent with

the purpose of an election contest, which contemplates a new election with the same

candidates if it is shown that the outcome as shown by the final canvass was not the

true outcome of the election. It would be illogical in this context to permit a person

who was not on the ballot to overturn an election. Because they were disqualified

and did not appear on the ballot, the Jeffersons were not candidates for purposes of

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Title 14 of the election code. They therefore lacked standing to bring an election

contest.

The Jeffersons also argue the merits of their election contest. They assert the

election process suffered from fraud, irregularities, and administrative errors.

Because they lacked standing to contest the election results, these issues were not

before the trial court or us on appeal.

Disqualification

The Jeffersons also argue that they should not have been left off the ballot for

the election. To the extent this issue was raised by their amended petition, it is moot,

as we previously held when we dismissed an original proceeding they filed after the

election, asking that their names be placed on the ballot. See In re Jefferson, No.

05-23-00473-CV, 2023 WL 3881077, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 8, 2023, orig.

proceeding) (mem. op.). It is well established that issues regarding the validity of a

person’s application to appear on the ballot become moot once an election

commences. In re Crenshaw, No. 05-17-00330-CV, 2017 WL 1292013, at *1 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Apr. 7, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). A court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction to decide a moot controversy. In re Guardianship of Fairley, 650

S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tex. 2022). The trial court did not err in dismissing any claims

related to the Jeffersons’ omission from the ballot.

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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

In addition, the Jeffersons argue the trial court erred in failing to make findings

of fact and conclusions of law after they timely requested them and filed a notice of

past due findings and conclusions. They contend they are entitled to an automatic

reversal.

Under rule of civil procedure 296, in any case tried in district or county court

without a jury, a party may request the court to state in writing its findings of fact

and conclusions of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 296. A trial court has no duty to file findings

of fact and conclusions of law when a case, like this one, has been dismissed for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction and no evidentiary hearing has been held. Hall v. City

of Bryan, No. 10-10-00403-CV, 2011 WL 4712243, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct.

5, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see IKB Indus. v. Pro-Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440,

443 (Tex. 1997); Primestar Constr, Inc. v. City of Dallas, No. 05-17-01447-CV,

2019 WL 1033978, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas March 5, 2019, pet. denied) (mem.

op.). Here, where it was undisputed the Jeffersons were not on the ballot for the May

6 election and the issues before the trial court were purely legal, the trial court did

not err in failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. Even if it did, the

Jeffersons do not explain how they have been harmed. They have not had to guess

the reason the trial court ruled against them and have been able to present their

argument that they had standing to contest the election results. See Larry F. Smith,

Inc. v. The Weber Co., 110 S.W.3d 611, 614 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied).

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Miscellaneous Issues

The Jeffersons make additional arguments that are inadequately briefed. We

construe liberally pro se pleadings and briefs; however, we hold pro se litigants to

the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with applicable

laws and rules of procedure. In re N.E.B., 251 S.W.3d 211, 211–12 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2008, no pet.). To do otherwise would give a pro se litigant an unfair

advantage over a litigant represented by counsel. Id. at 212. When a party fails to

adequately brief a complaint, he waives the issue on appeal. Id.

The Jeffersons suggest the trial judge’s stated familiarity with the Texas

Election Code somehow called into question his impartiality. Second, Jrmar

contends that counsel for Mayor Johnson violated disciplinary rules in presenting

arguments. They have not supported these contentions with appropriate citations to

the record or legal authority. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). As a result, they have

waived these issues.

Pending Motions

There are two motions pending in this appeal. Shortly before submission, the

Jeffersons filed a motion asking us to take judicial notice of the election page on the

City’s website, various provisions of the election code, case law, and portions of the

record in this case. The Jeffersons also filed a motion requesting a written opinion.

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Because we have issued a written opinion and considered the relevant facts and law,

by this opinion, and by separate order, we deny these motions as moot.

We affirm the trial court’s order dismissing the case with prejudice.

/Amanda L. Reichek/
AMANDA L. REICHEK
JUSTICE
230938F.P05

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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT

LAMAR "YAKA" JEFFERSON On Appeal from the 101st Judicial
AND JRMAR "JJ" JEFFERSON, District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Appellants Trial Court Cause No. DC-23-07425.
Opinion delivered by Justice
No. 05-23-00938-CV V. Reichek. Justices Goldstein and
Garcia participating.
ADAM BAZALDUA AND ERIC
JOHNSON, Appellees

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that appellees ADAM BAZALDUA AND ERIC JOHNSON
recover their costs of this appeal from appellants LAMAR "YAKA" JEFFERSON
AND JRMAR "JJ" JEFFERSON.

Judgment entered this 26th day of August 2024.

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