Darryl Heffner v. Janelle Haverkamp, Paul Wright, the Wright Law Firm, L.L.P., Charles Beachley, Beachley Smith P.L.L.C., Christopher Henry, Minor & Jester, P.C., and Tiffany Wright

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-25-00472-CV
___________________________

DARRYL HEFFNER, Appellant

V.

JANELLE HAVERKAMP, PAUL WRIGHT, THE WRIGHT LAW FIRM, L.L.P.,
CHARLES BEACHLEY, BEACHLEY SMITH P.L.L.C., CHRISTOPHER
HENRY, MINOR & JESTER, P.C., AND TIFFANY WRIGHT, Appellees

On Appeal from the 235th District Court
Cooke County, Texas
Trial Court No. CV24-00216

Before Kerr, Bassel, and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach
MEMORANDUM OPINION

The genesis of this appeal stems from earlier litigation involving Appellant Darryl

Heffner’s wife’s estate that included probate proceedings, see Est. of Heffner,

No. 02-21-00419-CV, 2023 WL 3876760, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 8, 2023,

pet. denied) (Heffner 1), and a civil lawsuit between Appellant and members of his family

(Heffner 2). On June 10, 2024, Appellant (acting pro se in the trial court and now on

appeal) filed this lawsuit related to the disposition of Heffner 2. The Appellees are some

of the defendants he sued in this case, consisting of Judge Haverkamp, who presided

over Heffner 2, and several lawyers and law firms that had represented parties adverse to

Appellant in Heffner 1 and Heffner 2.1 Appellant sought declaratory and injunctive relief

against the Appellees, asserting various causes of action including fraud, breach of

fiduciary duty and trust, and to quiet title or trespass to try title. All of the Appellees

filed answers, some filed counterclaims, and all asserted pleas to the jurisdiction.

Appellant did not file responses to the jurisdictional pleas.

On November 13, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the Appellees’

jurisdictional pleas. Appellant did not attend the hearing despite having been duly

notified. The trial court granted the pleas and dismissed Appellant’s claims with

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The other defendants that Appellant sued in this cause and their counterclaims
against Appellant were severed from this case prior to entry of the Final Judgment.
Similarly, all of the Appellees’ counterclaims were non-suited prior to the entry of the
Final Judgment. Appellees Haverkamp and Tiffany Wright did not assert any
counterclaims against Appellant.

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prejudice by interlocutory order. On April 1, 2025, Appellant filed a Rule 12 motion

challenging the authority of Judge Haverkamp’s counsel, the attorney general’s office,

to represent her. After a hearing, the Rule 12 motion was denied. The trial court entered

a Final Judgment on June 13, 2025. This appeal followed. We will affirm.

I. Background

Appellant filed this case on June 10, 2024, related to the disposition of Heffner 2.

Judge Haverkamp recused herself from this case. The case was handled by Senior Judge

Doug Robison sitting by appointment. Appellant amended his claims on June 18, 2024,

and on July 11, 2024. His claims alleged a variety of torts including fraud, breach of

fiduciary duty and trust, and trespass to try/quiet title.

The Appellees filed answers, including pleas to the jurisdiction, based on

immunity. Judge Haverkamp further asserted that Appellant lacked standing to sue her.

On November 13, 2024, the court heard the Appellees’ pleas to the jurisdiction.

Appellant was given notice of the hearing but did not appear. The court granted the

pleas, specifically holding that the Appellees are immune from Appellant’s claims and

also that Appellant lacked standing to sue Judge Haverkamp. The court, by

interlocutory order, dismissed Appellant’s claims against the Appellees with prejudice

on November 13, 2024.2

The trial court also found that Appellant’s petition, originally and as amended,
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was facially groundless in law and in fact as to the Appellees and was filed in violation
of Chapters 9 and 10, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and Rule 13, Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure, as part of its dismissal with prejudice order. Appellant did not

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All counterclaims by the Appellees were nonsuited. All other pending claims

were severed. After conducting a hearing, which Appellant attended, the court

determined that all claims between the parties had been dismissed, non-suited, or

severed into a different cause number and entered a Final Judgment on June 13, 2025.

In the Final Judgment, the court included a detailed recitation of the dismissals,

non-suits, and severances of all claims that had been filed in the case, reflecting that all

claims between all parties had been disposed of. At that hearing, the court also heard

and denied Appellant’s Rule 12 motion challenging the authority of the Texas Attorney

General to represent Judge Haverkamp. On July 14, 2025, Appellant filed a “Motion

for New Trial Regarding the ‘Immunity’ from Equity Issues.” It was overruled by

operation of law. This appeal ensued.

assign any error regarding this finding by the trial court in this appeal. Therefore, even
assuming that Appellant did not waive his appeal by virtue of inadequate briefing, we
would be compelled to affirm the trial court’s judgment. S.W. ex rel A.W. v. Arlington
ISD, 435 S.W.3d 414, 419 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, no pet.) (holding, in an appeal
from an order granting a plea to the jurisdiction, that if an independent ground may
fully support the complained-of ruling or judgment, but the appellant assigns no error
to that independent ground, then we “must accept the validity of that unchallenged
independent ground . . . and thus . . . any error in the grounds challenged on appeal is
harmless because the unchallenged independent ground fully supports the
complained-of ruling or judgment.” (quoting Britton v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 95 S.W.3d
676, 681 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.)). See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code § 9.012(e), and Tex. R. Civ. P. 13, 215.2(b), for the court’s authority to dismiss.

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II. Analysis

a. Jurisdiction

Because Appellant has questioned whether the trial court’s Final Judgment is

actually final, we must first determine whether we have jurisdiction. Reyna v. M&J

Carriers, LLC, No. 04-24-00200-CV, 2025 WL 3019173, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

Oct. 29, 2025, no pet.). Courts will deem a judgment without a conventional trial to be

final “(1) [when the judgment] actually disposes of every pending claim and party or

(2) [when] it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and

parties, even if it does not actually do so.” Guardianship of Jones, 629 S.W.3d 921,

924 (Tex. 2021). We begin by deciding if the judgment is “clearly and unequivocally

final on its face.” Patel v. Nations Renovations, LLC, 661 S.W.3d 151, 154 (Tex. 2023).

No magical words are required to determine the trial court’s intent of finality. Id.

at 155; Bella Palma, LLC v. Young, 601 S.W.3d 799, 801 (Tex. 2020). Rather, “a trial court

may express its intent to render a final judgment by describing its action as (1) final,

(2) a disposition of all claims and parties, and (3) appealable.” Bella Palma, 601 S.W.3d

at 801. “This standard provides an outline of several statements that, while insufficient

when standing alone, together form a clear indication of finality.” Patel, 661 S.W.3d at

155. However, other statements may also convey the trial court’s intent for its judgment

to be final. Id. (holding that a judgment that recites that it is final and appealable but is

silent as to resolving all claims by all parties was still final where it provided that the

Appellee had all writs and processes to aid in execution of the judgment and provided

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that all relief not granted therein was denied). Further, the severance of an interlocutory

judgment into a separate cause makes it final. Sealy Emergency Room, L.L.C. v. Free Standing

Emergency Room Managers of Am., L.L.C., 685 S.W.3d 816, 820 (Tex. 2024) (quoting

Diversified Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Hill, Heard, O’Neal, Gilstrap & Goetz, P.C., 63 S.W.3d 795,

795 (Tex. 2001)); Reyna, 2025 WL at *2.

The Final Judgment in this case recites that it is “meant to be Final Judgment

globally and completely disposing of all claims between the parties asserted in this cause

number.” Like the judgment in Patel, it expressly satisfies two of the three finality

requirements, being final and disposing of all claims between all parties. Patel,

661 S.W.3d at 155. The intent of finality is confirmed by the thorough tracking of the

trial court’s disposition of all claims through severance, non-suit, or dismissal of all

other remaining claims, including those asserted by Appellant against the Appellees. We

hold that the trial court’s Final Judgment is, in fact, final.

b. Inadequate Briefing

Although Appellant is proceeding pro se, he must comply with all applicable

procedural rules. Castro v. Am. Express Nat’l Bank, No. 02-23-00196-CV,

2024 WL 3059046, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 20, 2024, no pet.). A pro se

litigant is held to the same standard that applies to a licensed attorney. Id.; Brown v. Tex.

Emp. Comm’n, 801 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).

No allowance is to be made for the fact that a plaintiff is not a lawyer. Maddox v.

Hutchens, No. 2-02-159-CV, 2003 WL 21983260, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug.

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21, 2003, no pet.); Bailey v. Rogers, 631 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. App.—Austin 1982, no

writ); see also Smale v. Williams, 590 S.W.3d 633, 639 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, no

pet.) (“The law is well settled that ‘[a] party proceeding pro se must comply with all

applicable procedural rules’ and is held to the same standards as a licensed attorney.”

(quoting Paselk v. Rabun, 293 S.W.3d 600, 611 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, pet.

denied)). Thus, we cannot grant Appellant any special accommodation simply because

he is pro se.

We summarized the law regarding briefing requirements in In re J.D.:

Rule 38.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure contains specific
requirements for an appellant’s brief. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1. To comply
with Rule 38.1, an appellant’s brief must, among other things, “contain a
clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate
citations to authorities and to the record.” Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Merely
uttering brief, conclusory statements unsupported by citation to legal
authorities does not satisfy briefing requirements. In re A.N.G.,
631 S.W.3d 471, 476 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.). Indeed,
“[f]ailure to cite legal authority or provide substantive analysis of the legal
issue presented results in waiver of the complaint.” Valadez v. Avitia,
238 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.).

No. 02-24-00515-CV, 2025 WL 2810523, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 2, 2025,

no pet.).

An appellant waives issues on appeal if he does not adequately brief them by

providing supporting arguments, substantive analysis, and appropriate citations to

authorities and the record. Carr v. Claudio, No. 01-22-00815-CV, 2024 WL 3187354, at

*4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 27, 2024, no pet.); Marin Real Est. Partners, L.P.

v. Vogt, 373 S.W.3d 57, 75 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.); Cervantes-Peterson v.

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Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 221 S.W.3d 244, 255 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Huey v. Huey, 200 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no

pet.). Waiver has been held to occur in several circumstances, including

*Kennedy v. Staples, 336 S.W.3d 745, 754 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.)
(concluding issues waived due to inadequate briefing, where appellant’s
complaints lacked coherence);

*Golden v. Milstead Towing & Storage, Nos. 09-21-00043-CV, 09-21-00044-CV,
09-21-00045-CV, 2022 WL 1412303, at *2, *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 5,
2022, no pet.) (holding where briefing contained confusing and disjointed
issues, those issues were waived due to inadequate briefing);

*Massey v. Royall, No. 14-02-01260-CV, 2004 WL 114989, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 27, 2004, no pet.) (holding appellant’s
incomprehensible issue could not be addressed and presented nothing for
appellate court to review);

*Shockley v. Yalk, No. 07-22-00128-CV, 2023 WL 1993683, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo Feb. 14, 2023, no pet.) (declining to address any arguments potentially
raised in briefing, where appellant’s brief was “disorganized, rambling, . . . and
incredibly hard to decipher”); and

*Purse v. DeJesus, No. 01-17-00855-CV, 2019 WL 237751, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 17, 2019, no pet.) (holding appellant waived all issues
where appellant’s brief did not contain any appropriate argument, analysis,
discussion, or support for his purported issues).

In reviewing for briefing waiver, we are to construe briefs liberally so as not to

waive the right to appellate review. In re J.D., 2025 WL 2810523, at *2. But it is not the

court’s responsibility to identify “possible trial court error, searching the record for facts

favorable to a party’s position, or conducting legal research to support a party’s

contentions.” In re J.O.A.M., Nos. 01-23-00691-CV, 01-23-00692-CV,

2024 WL 1169432, at *23 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 19, 2024, no pet.); In

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re J.D., 2025 WL 2810523, at *2. “Were we to engage in such activities, we would be

abandoning our role as judges and taking on the role of advocate for that party.” In re

J.O.A.M., 2024 WL 1169432, at *23.

Appellant’s First Amended Principal Brief raises 29 Issues. Issue one questions

the finality of the Final Judgment. The remaining Issues blend arguments about whether

the assigned judge should have been recused, whether the Attorney General had a right

to represent Judge Haverkamp, whether the court erred in dismissing the claims against

the Appellees based on immunity and lack of standing, the trial court’s exclusion of

multiple exhibits at the hearing on the entry of the Final Judgment and the Rule

12 motion, and challenges to the constitutionality of Rule 91a—which was never

invoked by the Appellees or ruled on by the trial court. The arguments raised by

Appellant are a confusing, disjointed, rambling, and at times belligerent stream of

consciousness that occasionally include case citations but without cogent analysis

regarding their applicability to the case. The same characterization applies to Appellant’s

reply briefs. We hold that Appellant has waived his Issues on appeal. See Shockley,

2023 WL 1993683, at *2; Golden, 2022 WL 1412303, at *2, *4; Purse, 2019 WL 237751,

at *3.

II. Conclusion

Having concluded that the Final Judgment is final for purposes of appeal and

having held that Appellant has waived his Issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of

the trial court.

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/s/ Mike Wallach
Mike Wallach
Justice

Delivered: June 11, 2026

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