Brian Swanson and Scott Faust v. First Command Advisory Services, Inc., First Command Insurance Services, Inc., and First Command Bank

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-25-00203-CV
___________________________

BRIAN SWANSON AND SCOTT FAUST, Appellants

V.

FIRST COMMAND ADVISORY SERVICES, INC., FIRST COMMAND
INSURANCE SERVICES, INC., AND FIRST COMMAND BANK, Appellees

On Appeal from the 141st District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 141-361627-25

Before Birdwell, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants Brian Swanson and Scott Faust appeal the trial court’s order

denying their motion to modify or dissolve a temporary injunction previously entered

by the trial court. In a single issue, Appellants argue that the trial court abused its

discretion by denying their motion, asserting that the temporary injunction does not

comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683 and is therefore void. Because we

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellants’

motion, we affirm.

I. Background

Appellees First Command Advisory Services, Inc. (FCAS), First Command

Insurance Services, Inc. (FCIS), and First Command Bank (collectively, First

Command) provide financial planning, insurance, trust, and investment services. First

Command currently provides its services throughout the United States through a

network of independent contractor financial advisors but began with a focus on

active-duty members of the U.S. military.

Swanson and Faust began working as independent contractor financial advisors

for First Command in 2006 and 2014, respectively. When they began working for

First Command, Appellants signed a “Financial Advisor/Agent Agreement” (the

Agreements), each of which contained confidentiality, non-solicitation, and non-

compete provisions. Appellants were prohibited from “tak[ing] . . . any opportunities

that [we]re discovered through the use of corporate assets, information[,] or position”;

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“us[ing] corporate property, information, or position for improper personal gain”; or

“compet[ing] with the company directly or indirectly.” Appellants were also

prohibited from “tak[ing] advantage of non-public personal information for [their]

own benefit.”

Appellants agreed to follow all First Command policies and procedures,

including the confidentiality, non-solicitation, and non-compete provisions. Upon

termination of the Agreements, Appellants agreed to return to First Command all of

its documents and property and to allow First Command to inspect and purge their

equipment—including their personal cellphones—of any confidential information and

data.

In October or November 2024, Appellants began having “discussions” with

CWM, LLC d/b/a Carson Partners and Diamond Wealth Advisors. On January 31,

2025, Appellants resigned from First Command and immediately began working as

independent contractors for Carson Partners and Diamond Wealth. In their

resignation letters, Appellants preemptively requested that First Command notify

Appellants’ shared attorney of any legal action filed by First Command and demanded

arbitration.

When it received Appellants’ resignation letters, First Command requested that

Appellants turn in their personal cell phones for inspection and purging of First

Command client information. Appellants declined to give First Command their

personal cell phones.

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In the days following their resignations, Appellants set up meetings and phone

calls with First Command clients, including clients whom they had serviced during

their affiliation with First Command. Appellants had compiled a list of First

Command clients and their contact information while they still had access to First

Command’s client database, though they claimed that they had created the list from

memory and whitepages.com. Appellants informed at least sixty First Command

clients that they had begun working for Carson Partners and Diamond Wealth, and

during some of their meetings with First Command clients, Appellants shared

confidential information about changes in First Command’s fees.

On February 4, 2025, First Command filed an original petition and an

application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a temporary injunction.1 In

its petition, First Command asserted causes of action for breach of contract and

tortious interference and alleged that Appellants had conspired with Carson Partners

and Diamond Wealth. The same day, the trial court signed a TRO and set a hearing

on the temporary injunction. Appellants continued to solicit and acquire First

Command clients.

Following the temporary-injunction hearing, the trial court signed a seven-page

temporary injunction (1) enjoining Appellants from soliciting First Command clients

and from using or disclosing any First Command confidential information or trade

First Command also initiated arbitration against Appellants on its claims that
1

do not involve injunctive relief. According to First Command, the arbitration
proceeding remains pending.

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secrets and (2) ordering Appellants to return any and all First Command records or

documents and to provide to First Command for inspection and purging all

equipment and devices, including their personal cell phones. Appellants did not

appeal from the trial court’s order granting the temporary injunction.

Less than two months later, First Command filed a motion for contempt and

sanctions against Appellants, alleging that they had continued to violate the TRO and

had violated the trial court’s temporary injunction. The trial court signed an “Order to

Show Cause” and ordered Appellants to appear for a show-cause hearing. 2 In

response, Appellants filed a “Motion to Modify or Dissolve Temporary Injunction,”

asserting that the temporary injunction was void because it failed to comply with

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683.

The trial court heard Appellants’ motion to modify or dissolve the temporary

injunction and denied it, and Appellants filed this interlocutory appeal of the trial

court’s denial. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(4).

II. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s order on a motion to modify or dissolve a temporary

injunction for an abuse of discretion. See Tober v. Turner of Tex., Inc., 668 S.W.2d 831,

834 (Tex. App.—Austin 1984, no writ) (citing Marshall v. Good Times, Inc., 537 S.W.2d

536, 538 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1976, writ dism’d)). The trial court abuses its

2
First Command’s motion for contempt and sanctions remains pending in the
trial court.

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discretion only if it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles—that is, if

its act is arbitrary or unreasonable. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); Cire

v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838–39 (Tex. 2004). The movant has the burden to

show that the trial court abused its discretion. Tober, 668 S.W.2d at 834 (citing

Marshall, 537 S.W.2d at 538).

The scope of our review is limited to the trial court’s decision to grant or deny

the motion to modify or dissolve; we do not review the propriety of the trial court’s

original decision to grant the temporary injunction. Conlin v. Haun, 419 S.W.3d 682,

685, 686 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.); see Tober, 668 S.W.2d at 834;

Marshall, 537 S.W.2d at 538. We presume that the temporary injunction was not

improvidently granted and that the record supports the trial court’s decision to grant

it. Murphy v. McDaniel, 20 S.W.3d 873, 877 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.) (citing

Tober, 668 S.W.2d at 835). Indeed, the purpose of a motion to dissolve a temporary

injunction “is not to give an unsuccessful party an opportunity to relitigate the

propriety of the original grant.” Tober, 668 S.W.2d at 836.

III. Rule 683

When determining if a temporary-injunction order is sufficiently specific to

comply with Rule 683, we look no further than the order itself. Powell v. Baker, No. 04-

22-00653-CV, 2023 WL 5418810, at *10 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 23, 2023, no

pet.) (mem. op.); AutoNation, Inc. v. Hatfield, 186 S.W.3d 576, 582 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). A temporary-injunction order that does not

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strictly satisfy Rule 683’s requirements is void. In re Luther, 620 S.W.3d 715, 722 (Tex.

2021) (orig. proceeding); Bellefeuille v. Equine Sports Med. & Surgery, Weatherford Div.,

PLLC, No. 02-15-00268-CV, 2016 WL 1163364, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Mar. 24, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).

To satisfy Rule 683’s requirements, a temporary-injunction order must “set

forth the reasons for its issuance” and “be specific in terms.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 683. The

order must also “describe in reasonable detail and not by reference to the complaint

or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained” and state precisely why the

applicant would suffer irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction preserving the

status quo pending a trial on the merits. Id.; Williams v. NE CS First Nat’l, LP, No. 02-

23-00086-CV, 2023 WL 4781174, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 27, 2023, no

pet.) (mem. op.). An unsupported or conclusory statement that irreparable harm

would occur without the injunction is insufficient to satisfy Rule 683. Williams, 2023

WL 4781174, at *2. Accordingly, “we cannot infer the reasons for an injunction from

the pleadings, evidence presented at the hearing on the application, or the trial court’s

oral pronouncement.” Home Asset, Inc. v. MPT of Victory Lakes Fcer, LLC, No. 01-22-

00441-CV, 2023 WL 3183322, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 2, 2023, no

pet.) (mem. op.).

IV. Analysis

Appellants argue that the temporary injunction does not comply with Rule 683

because it fails to (1) set forth the reasons for issuance, (2) specify its terms, and

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(3) describe in reasonable detail the acts sought to be restrained. Referring to the

temporary injunction as a “boilerplate recitation[] of legal principles,” Appellants

contend that the temporary injunction is conclusory, that it fails to set forth any facts

or evidence of their specific conduct that would justify injunctive relief, that it fails to

describe how First Command has a probable right of recovery, and that it fails to

describe First Command’s irreparable injury or harm. Appellants also contend that the

temporary injunction “does not distinguish between persons or accounts” that they

“can and cannot contact” and that determining what conduct violates the injunction

“requires inferences and conclusions about which reasonable persons might differ.”

A. Reasons for the Temporary Injunction’s Issuance

Read in its entirety—rather than the fragmentary language provided in

Appellants’ brief—the temporary injunction adequately sets forth the reasons for its

issuance. Specifically, it states that after reviewing First Command’s

temporary-injunction application and considering the testimony, documents,

evidence, and arguments of counsel, the trial court

finds that First Command has presented evidence showing a probable
right of recovery on [its] causes of action . . . against [Appellants] and
probable injury to First Command in the interim if a [t]emporary
[i]njunction is not entered. . . . First Command’s rights regarding its
(i) proprietary and confidential information, including, but not limited to,
client lists, client contact information, client personal information, client
financial information, and other records used to conduct the business of
First Command, (ii) business relationships with its clients, and
(iii) reputation and goodwill are being, and will continue to be, violated
and harmed by [Appellants], unless [Appellants] are immediately
restrained.

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The [trial c]ourt finds that First Command has established a
probable right of recovery on its claims against [Appellants] for breach
of contract. See[,] e.g., Walling v. Metcalf, 863 S.W.2d 56, 57–58 (Tex. 1993)
(granting request for temporary injunctive relief on plaintiff’s claim for
breach of contract because plaintiff established probable right of
recovery); [K & G] Oil Tool & Serv. Co. v. G&G Fishing Tool Serv., 314
S.W.2d 782, 789 (Tex. 1958) (stating protection of trade secrets is a well-
recognized objective of equity and injunctive relief).

The [trial c]ourt also finds that First Command has presented
sufficient evidence showing that it took reasonable and necessary steps
to protect its confidential information, including, without limitation,
client lists, client contact information, client personal information, client
financial information, and other internal records used to conduct the
business of First Command; that such information is protectable
confidential information; and that [Appellants] misappropriated such
information and are using it to unfairly solicit clients of First Command.
See[,] e.g.[,] Fox v. Tropical Warehouses, Inc., 121 S.W.3d 853, 857–[]58 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2003, [no pet.]) (wholesaler’s price lists, sales reports,
and certain business records constituted “trade secrets,” where
wholesaler did not intend to share information with outside parties and
took steps to limit number of employees with access to information,
information was generally not shared within industry, and information
was important to wholesaler’s business); Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314
S.W.2d 763, 77[6] (Tex. 1958) . . . (trade secrets may include any
“compilation of information which is used in one’s business[] and which
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who
do not know or use it[]” [(quoting Restatement of Torts § 757)]); Hill v.
McLane Co., No. 03-10-00293-CV, [2011 WL 56061, at *7] (Tex. App.—
Austin Jan. 5, 2011, no pet.) [(mem. op.)] (upholding temporary
injunction against defendants who had acquired confidential information
belonging to the plaintiff and finding defendants’ status as an employee
or independent contractor irrelevant); Flake v. EGL Eagle Global Logistics,
L.P., No. 14-01-01069-CV, [2002 WL 31008136, at *4] (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 5, 2002, pet. denied) [(not designated for
publication)] (finding that evidence of a former employee’s receipt of
confidential information, including client lists and pricing information,
and the former employee calling on the company’s accounts was enough
for the trial court to reasonably conclude that the former employee had
breached his nondisclosure agreement).

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It also states that, in granting injunctive relief, the trial court “carefully balanced

the equities and other factors and f[ound] that the limited, narrowly[ ]tailored request

for a temporary injunction [wa]s well-taken due to the significant potential of

irreparable harm to First Command without the temporary injunction and the lack of

harm to [Appellants].”

The temporary injunction further identifies the harm that First Command

would suffer if Appellants continued to violate the terms of the Agreements:

The [trial c]ourt further finds that First Command has demonstrated a
probable injury to First Command in the interim if this [t]emporary
[i]njunction is not granted against [Appellants] and [Appellants] are
permitted to continue to breach their contracts with First Command
[(the Agreements)], continue to use First Command’s confidential
information for the benefit of [Appellants] and/or other competing
financial services companies with which they are affiliated, including,
without limitation, Diamond Wealth Advisors and Carson Partners. See[,]
e.g., Graham v. Mary Kay Inc., 25 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. App.—Houston
[[14th Dist.]] 2000, pet. denied) (loss of goodwill, clientele, marketing
techniques and office stability constitute a “probable injury” for
purposes of obtaining an injunction); Williams v. Compressor Eng[’]g Corp.,
704 S.W.2d 469, 473 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d[]
n.r.e.) (where former agents have and are expected to continue to
disclose information in the future, irreparable injury is established as a
matter of law); Rugen v. Interactive Bus. Sys., Inc., 864 S.W.2d 548, 552 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1993, no writ) (possession of confidential information and
evidence that defendant was in position to use it justified temporary
injunction).

The [trial c]ourt further finds that harm to First Command is
imminent, and if the [trial c]ourt does not issue this temporary
injunction, First Command will be irreparably injured. The wrongful use
and compromise of First Command’s confidential information will
damage its business relationships, reputation, goodwill, and contracts
and result in irreparable harm to First Command. Further, where, as

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here, a former independent contractor probably will disclose the
company’s confidential information in the future to benefit a competitor,
irreparable injury is established. See[,] e.g., K & G Oil Tool & Serv. Co., 314
S.W.2d at 790 (stating that “[t]he protection of a trade secret is a
well[-]recognized objective of equity”); T-N-T Motorsports, Inc. v. Hennessey
Motorsports, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 18, 24 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1998, pet. dism’d) (holding that “[i]njunctive relief is proper to prevent a
party, which has appropriated another’s trade secrets, from gaining an
unfair market advantage” and that “[t]he only effective relief available to
appellee is to restrain appellants’ use of its trade secrets and confidential
information pending trial”); Martin v. Linen Sys. for Hosps., Inc., 671
S.W.2d 706, 710 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ) (finding
that damages could not be readily ascertained from the former
employee’s breach of the noncompetition agreement because “a dollar
value cannot easily be assigned to a company’s loss of clientele, goodwill,
marketing techniques, office stability, etc.”); David v. Bache Halsey Stuart
Shields, Inc., 630 S.W.2d 754, 757 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982,
no writ) (finding that “[o]ne cannot assign a dollar value to a company’s
loss of clientele, good[]will, office stability, commission schedules,
marketing techniques, and investment strategies”).

. . . [T]he wrongful use and dissemination of First Command’s
confidential information and harm to its business relationships,
contracts, and reputation and loss of goodwill cannot be adequately
remedied by an award of damages. The use and disclosure of First
Command’s confidential and/or proprietary information, interference
with First Command’s relationships with its clients, and injury to First
Command’s goodwill cannot be adequately remedied with monetary
damages because such injuries are impossible to calculate. Therefore, no
adequate remedy at law exists. Furthermore, greater injury will be
inflicted upon First Command by the denial of a temporary injunction
than would be inflicted upon [Appellants] by the granting of such relief.

From the context of the entire temporary injunction, it sufficiently states that First

Command has a probable right of recovery; it sets forth the actions or conduct of

Appellants justifying its issuance; and it describes the irreparable injury or harm that

First Command would suffer without its issuance:

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• First Command has presented evidence showing a probable right of recovery.
Specifically, First Command has established a probable right of recovery on its
breach-of-contract claim.

• Appellants have violated and harmed—and will continue to violate and harm—
First Command’s rights regarding its proprietary and confidential information,
its business relationship with its clients, and its reputation and goodwill.
Appellants have done so by misappropriating First Command’s confidential
information and by using it to unfairly solicit First Command’s clients.

• Appellants have breached the Agreements by using First Command’s
confidential information for the benefit of themselves and other competing
financial service companies, i.e., Diamond Wealth and Carson Partners.

• If the temporary injunction were not granted, Appellants would continue to
breach the Agreements.

• Without the temporary injunction, Appellants would probably disclose First
Command’s confidential information in the future to benefit a competitor of
First Command.

• Appellants’ continued wrongful use and compromise of First Command’s
confidential information would interfere with and damage First Command’s
business relationships, reputation, goodwill, and contracts and would result in
irreparable harm.

• The harm to First Command cannot be remedied with monetary damages.
And if there were any question about what constitutes “confidential information,” the

temporary injunction defines it in two places as “client lists, client contact

information, client personal information, client financial information, and other

internal records used to conduct the business of First Command.”

Contrary to Appellants’ contention, Rule 683 does not require that the trial

court explain in the temporary injunction its reasons for finding that First Command

has a probable right of recovery. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 683; IAC Ltd. v. Bell Helicopter

12
Textron, Inc., 160 S.W.3d 191, 201 (Tex. App—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.); Martin, 671

S.W.2d at 710. And nothing in Rule 683 requires that the trial court “mention[]” in the

temporary injunction the evidence upon which it relied in granting injunctive relief.3

See Tex. R. Civ. P. 683; cf. Home Asset, 2023 WL 3183322, at *2 (noting that “we

cannot infer the reasons for an injunction from . . . evidence presented at the hearing

on the application”). Rather, Rule 683 requires only that the temporary injunction

explain the reasons why the trial court believes that injury will be suffered in the

absence of injunctive relief. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 683; Home Asset, 2023 WL 3183322, at

*2; Martin, 671 S.W.2d at 710.

We conclude that the temporary injunction, on its face, sufficiently sets forth

the reasons for its issuance. See Spain v. ManPow, LLC, No. 02-24-00154-CV, 2025 WL

1271957, at *12 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 1, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(concluding that injunction order’s irreparable-injury articulation—a probable

likelihood of the company’s losing customers and accounts and suffering

unquantifiable damages to its business reputation and goodwill—was sufficiently

specific to satisfy Rule 683); Miller v. Talley Dunn Gallery, LLC, No. 05-15-00444-CV,

2016 WL 836775, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 3, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(upholding temporary injunction providing that defendant’s conduct had jeopardized

plaintiffs’ confidential information, business relationships, reputation, and goodwill

3
In their brief, Appellants appear to argue that the testimony and sixty-one
exhibits admitted during the temporary-injunction hearing should have been
“mentioned as a basis for the issuance of the temporary injunction.”

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and that because of defendants’ conduct, plaintiffs had suffered and would continue

to suffer irreparable harm for which there was no adequate remedy at law); IAC Ltd.,

160 S.W.3d at 200 (“When a defendant possesses trade secrets and is in a position to

use them, harm to the trade secret owner may be presumed.”); Martin, 671 S.W.2d at

710–11 (concluding that reasons stated in temporary injunction—that relief was

necessary to protect employer’s goodwill and business, that former employee had

violated covenant not to compete and probably would continue to do so, and that

employer would be harmed unless relief were issued—constituted sufficient

compliance with Rule 683); see also K & G Oil Tool & Serv., 314 S.W.2d at 789 (noting

that the protection of trade secrets is a well-recognized objective of injunctive relief);

Intercont’l Terminals Co. v. Vopak N. Am., Inc., 354 S.W.3d 887, 895 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (“Threatened injury to a business’s reputation and

good[]will with customers is frequently the basis for temporary injunctive relief.”); cf.

Williams, 2023 WL 4781174, at *3 (holding that temporary injunction’s stating only

that applicant “ha[d] established a probable right to relief[ ] and probable injury if the

relief requested in the [a]pplication [was] not granted” was a conclusory statement of

probable injury and did not meet Rule 683 requirement that it set forth reasons for its

issuance).

B. The Act or Acts Sought to be Restrained and Specific Terms

The temporary injunction adequately describes the acts to be restrained. It

states that “[b]y granting this temporary injunction, [Appellants] will be required to

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abide by their legal obligations not to (i) breach their agreements with First

Command, and (ii) use First Command’s confidential information.” It then sets forth

specific orders:

[Appellants] . . . are enjoined from directly or indirectly, whether as an
employee, agent or representative of any other person, partnership, firm,
corporation or other enterprise, inducing or soliciting or in any way
attempting to convince, persuade or request in any way any client of
First Command who[m] [Appellants] serviced during [their] affiliation
with First Command or about whom [Appellants] received First
Command confidential information or trade secrets about [sic] to obtain
planning or advisory services of the type sold by FCAS, which includes,
without limitation, accounts similar to the Asset Management Solutions
program, from any other investment advisor or broker/dealer or to
purchase insurance products or services of the type sold by FCIS or
cancel or replace in-force insurance policies or annuities sold by or
through FCIS;

....

[Appellants] . . . are enjoined from using, disclosing, transmitting
or referring to any First Command client information or First
Command’s proprietary business information, confidential information
or trade secrets accessed, made available, used or obtained while
affiliated with First Command in any capacity;

[Appellants] . . . are enjoined from destroying, erasing or failing to
maintain all records or documents, in any form or media (this includes,
but is not limited to, electronic data, electronic mail, correspondence,
phone logs, computer data, notes, documents and email) in either of
[Appellants’] possession, custody or control which relate to (i) any
communication between either of the [Appellants] and any First
Command client and/or account holder about whom either of the
[Appellants] has knowledge because of such [Appellant’s] association
with First Command or with whom such [Appellant] had contact while
associated with First Command; and/or (ii) First Command client
information or First Command’s proprietary business information,
confidential information or trade secrets accessed, made available, used

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or obtained while affiliated with First Command in any capacity[.]
[Numbering omitted.]

The temporary injunction then sets out additional specific terms:

[Appellants] . . . must return to First Command within 24 hours of
receiving constructive or actual notice of the TRO, any and all records,
documents and/or information, whether in original, copy, computerized,
handwritten or any form, and any reproduction thereof, relating to First
Command’s account and/or other First Command client-related
information, and all other First Command confidential information or
trade secrets; [and]

[Appellants] . . . must provide First Command by delivery to
Charles River Associates at [XXXX] North Central Expressway, Suite
[XXX], Richardson, Texas 75080[,] on or before February 21, 2025[,] all
computers or other hardware or devices (including, without limitation,
personal cell phones) owned by any of the [Appellants] . . . that contain
any First Command client data or other First Command confidential
information for imaging and inspection and for removal of First
Command client data or other First Command confidential
information[.]

This [t]emporary [i]njunction shall remain in effect until the earlier
of 60 days after the conclusion of the arbitration of this dispute before
the American Arbitration Association (Case No. [XXXXX]) or the trial
on [First Command’s] [a]pplication for [p]ermanent [i]njunction . . . .

....

Nothing in this [t]emporary [i]njunction shall be construed to
interfere with any client’s request to transfer his or her account.
[Numbering omitted.]

From the context of the entire temporary injunction, it sets forth the acts and conduct

from which Appellants are enjoined and is specific in its terms:

• Appellants must abide by their specific legal obligation of not breaching the
Agreements with First Command.

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• Appellants must abide by their specific legal obligation of not using First
Command’s confidential information.

• Appellants are enjoined from inducing or soliciting or attempting to convince,
persuade, or request First Command clients to obtain planning or advisory
services—specifically the type sold by FCAS, including accounts like the Asset
Management Solutions program—from any other investment advisor, broker,
or dealer. If Appellants, during their affiliation with First Command, serviced
the client or received First Command confidential information or trade secrets
about the client, the client is included in this provision.

• Appellants are enjoined from inducing or soliciting or attempting to convince,
persuade, or request First Command clients to purchase insurance products or
services—specifically the type sold by FCIS—or cancel or replace in-force
insurance policies or annuities—specifically those sold by or through FCIS. If
Appellants, during their affiliation with First Command, serviced the client or
received First Command confidential information or trade secrets about the
client, the client is included in this provision.

• Appellants are enjoined from using, disclosing, transmitting, or referring to any
First Command client information or First Command’s proprietary business
information, confidential information, or trade secrets that were accessed, made
available, used, or obtained while Appellants were affiliated with First
Command.

• Appellants are enjoined from destroying, erasing, or failing to maintain all
records or documents in their possession, custody, or control relating to
Appellants’ communications with any First Command client or account holder
about whom Appellants have knowledge because of their association with First
Command or with whom Appellants had contact while associated with First
Command.

• Appellants are enjoined from destroying, erasing, or failing to maintain all
records or documents in their possession, custody, or control relating to First
Command client information or First Command’s proprietary business
information, confidential information, or trade secrets that were accessed, made
available, used, or obtained while Appellants were affiliated with First
Command in any capacity.

• Appellants will be in violation of the temporary injunction if they fail to return
to First Command within a specified time any and all records, documents, and

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information relating to First Command’s account, client-related information,
and confidential information or trade secrets.

• Appellants will be in violation of the temporary injunction if they fail to
provide to First Command—by delivery to a specific address by a specific
date—for imaging and inspection all of Appellants’ computers, hardware, or
other devices (including personal cell phones) that contain any First Command
client data or other confidential information.

• The temporary injunction does not interfere with a client’s request to transfer
his or her account.
And as previously noted, the temporary injunction defined “confidential information”

as “client lists, client contact information, client personal information, client financial

information, and other internal records used to conduct the business of First

Command.”

We conclude that the temporary injunction, on its face, is sufficiently specific in

terms and sufficiently describes the acts to be restrained. See Spain, 2025 WL 1271957,

at *10 (“[T]he order itself contained sufficient information from which it can be

concluded that the customers referenced are those whom the [appellants] directly

interacted with or learned about from their work with [the appellee company],

particularly via its software system.”); Mabrey v. SandStream, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 302, 320–

21 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (holding temporary injunction satisfied

Rule 683 because “confidential information” was defined in the order and necessarily

excluded from its prohibitions information that was not secret nor generally known to

the public and the order was limited to information obtained by defendant during

specific time frame); see also Layton v. Ball, 396 S.W.3d 747, 751–53 (Tex. App.—Tyler

18
2013, no pet.) (reading order as a whole to determine that internal references adequately

described prohibited activities in reasonable detail so as to be sufficiently specific under

Rule 683); Lockhart v. McCurley, No. 10-09-00240-CV, 2010 WL 966029, at *4 (Tex.

App.—Waco Mar. 10, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The order need not identify the clients

by name; it is reasonable to presume that [the enjoined party] is ‘sufficiently familiar with

the employer’s business and its customers to avoid violating the injunction.’” (quoting

Safeguard Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Schaffer, 822 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, no

writ))); cf. Hernandez v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., No. 02-20-00225-CV, 2021 WL 520456,

at *24 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 11, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding

injunction order restraining defendants from contacting clients with whom they had

never dealt or about whom they had not known was insufficiently specific because it

did not identify who could not be contacted by defendants).

V. Conclusion

From the context of the entire temporary injunction, we conclude that it meets

the requirements of Rule 683. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion

by denying Appellants’ motion to modify or dissolve the temporary injunction. We

affirm the trial court’s temporary injunction.

/s/ Wade Birdwell

Wade Birdwell
Justice

Delivered: November 26, 2025

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