Platform II, LLC and EnPlat II, LLC v. Pegasus Resources, LLC and McMullen Minerals, LLC

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-25-00320-CV
___________________________

PLATFORM II, LLC AND ENPLAT II, LLC, Appellants

V.

PEGASUS RESOURCES, LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the 141st District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 141-361030-25

Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants Platform II, LLC (Platform) and Enplat II, LLC (Enplat) attempt to

appeal from the trial court’s order denying their motion to transfer the venue of

Appellee Pegasus Resources, LLC’s (Pegasus) suit against them. Pegasus filed a

motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that we lack jurisdiction because no

interlocutory appeal lies from the trial court’s venue determination. We agree with

Pegasus. Because Platform and Enplat moved to transfer venue pursuant to Texas

Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 15.002, we do not have jurisdiction over

this interlocutory appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 15.002, .064(a).

Pegasus and McMullen Minerals, LLC (McMullen)1 jointly filed identical suits

in Tarrant County for breach of contract and unjust enrichment against Platform and

Enplat. They alleged homogenous venue facts, contending that venue was proper in

Tarrant County because a substantial part of the events giving rise to their claims

occurred in Tarrant County and that the parties had entered into the contracts in

Tarrant County. See id. §§ 15.002(a)(1), .035. Along with their answer, Platform and

Enplat jointly filed a motion to transfer venue, arguing that “Tarrant County has no

meaningful connection to Plaintiffs’ claims and is not a proper venue under either

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Platform and Enplat do not appeal the trial court’s denial of their change of
venue as to McMullen.

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section 15.002(a) or section 15.035.”2 Platform and Enplat moved to have the entire

case—as to both Pegasus and McMullen—transferred to Lubbock County,

maintaining that Lubbock County was a county of proper venue under

Section 15.002(a)(3) and (b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See id.

§§ 15.002(a)(3) (providing that a lawsuit shall be brought in the county of the

defendant’s principal office), (b) (providing that for the convenience of the parties and

witnesses and in the interest of justice, a court may transfer an action from a county

of proper venue to any other county). Following a hearing, the trial court denied

Platform and Enplat’s motion to transfer venue. Platform and Enplat brought this

appeal but only as to the denial of a venue transfer of Pegasus’s suit.

We generally have appellate jurisdiction only over final judgments. Lehmann v.

Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). While the Legislature has authorized

interlocutory appeals in limited circumstances, we strictly construe statutes permitting

such appeals as narrow exceptions to the general rule. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. v.

Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 841 (Tex. 2007).

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 15.064(a) provides that—but

for a narrow exception in Section 15.003(b)—no interlocutory appeals are permitted

from a trial court’s venue determination. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.

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Section 15.035 provides that “if a person has contracted in writing to perform
an obligation in a particular county, expressly naming the county or a definite place in
that county by that writing, suit on or by reason of the obligation may be brought
against him . . . in that county.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.035.

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§ 15.064(a) (providing that a court shall determine venue questions from the pleadings

and affidavits and that “[n]o interlocutory appeal shall lie from the determination”); In

re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 259–60 (Tex. 2008); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 87(6)

(providing that “[t]here shall be no interlocutory appeals” from determinations made

on motions to transfer venue); Elec. Data Sys. Corp. v. Pioneer Elecs. (USA) Inc.,

68 S.W.3d 254, 257–58 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (recognizing that

“[t]he legislature has provided that no interlocutory appeal is available from a trial

court’s determination of a venue question” and that “[g]enerally, a party must await a

final judgment to appeal an erroneous venue ruling”).

Here, Platform and Enplat expressly moved pursuant to Section 15.002(a)(3)

and (b) to transfer venue as to both Pegasus and McMullen.3 See Tex. Civ. Prac. &

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On appeal, Platform and Enplat attempt to invoke a narrow exception to
Section 15.064(a)’s prohibition on interlocutory venue-determination appeals. This
exception—Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 15.003(b)—permits
interlocutory appeals from a trial court’s venue determination in certain cases in which
there is more than one plaintiff. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.003(b).
However, Platform and Enplat did not move to transfer venue pursuant to this
limited exception, as Section 15.003(b) is not cited or referenced in any of their filings,
pleadings, or motions with the trial court.

Moreover, even if Platform and Enplat had moved to transfer venue pursuant
to Section 15.003(b), our jurisdiction remains a concern. As the Texas Supreme Court
recently explained, Section 15.003(b) is limited and applies only when there are
multiple plaintiffs and when the trial court has made an independent determination of
venue with respect to each plaintiff. See Rush Truck Ctrs. of Tex., L.P. v. Sayre, No. 24-
0040, 2025 WL 1599527, at *1 (Tex. June 6, 2025) (recognizing that the “mere
presence of multiple plaintiffs in front of the [trial court] does not suffice to invoke
appellate jurisdiction” and that “Section 15.003(b) permits interlocutory appeals only
in cases where a plaintiff’s independent claim to venue is at issue”). Here, Pegasus’s

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Rem. Code Ann. § 15.002(a)(3), (b). As outlined above, Texas Civil Practice and

Remedies Code Section 15.064(a) explicitly disallows interlocutory appeals from a trial

court’s venue determination. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.064(a); Tex.

R. Civ. P. 87(6). Therefore, because Platform and Enplat sought to transfer venue

pursuant to Section 15.002, we conclude that an interlocutory appeal challenging the

trial court’s venue determination is unavailable to them.

Because there is not an applicable statutory exception—under the facts of this

case—permitting an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s venue determination,

we hold that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. Accordingly, we grant Pegasus’s

motion to dismiss, and we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R.

App. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).

independent claim to venue was never at issue before the trial court, as the trial court
was not tasked with making an independent determination of venue with respect to
each plaintiff. See id. Section 15.003(b) allows interlocutory appeals only if a trial
court actually and necessarily determines whether each plaintiff independently established
proper venue. Basic Energy Servs. GP, LLC v. Gomez, 398 S.W.3d 734, 736 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.). Pegasus and McMullen asserted identical claims,
based on identical facts, with identical venue grounds. Platform and Enplat’s filings,
pleadings, or motions made no effort to distinguish Pegasus and McMullen nor did
Platform and Enplat seek a specific venue ruling to transfer venue as to Pegasus only.
In fact, throughout the entirety of their motion to transfer venue, they invariably refer
to Pegasus and McMullen collectively as the “Plaintiffs” and never attempt to
individually differentiate the parties by their names or alleged venue facts. Thus, a
challenge to Pegasus’s independent claim to venue was not before the trial court at the
time it denied Platform and Enplat’s motion to transfer venue. See Rush, 2025 WL
1599527, at *1.

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/s/ Brian Walker

Brian Walker
Justice

Delivered: August 28, 2025

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