Daniel Loya v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________

No. 02-24-00175-CR
___________________________

DANIEL LOYA, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 1
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1775686

Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

A jury convicted Appellant Daniel Loya of aggravated assault in retaliation, a

first-degree felony, and assessed his punishment, enhanced as a repeat offender, at

twenty-five years’ imprisonment. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.42(c),

22.02(b)(2)(C). In one point, Loya contends that the evidence was insufficient to

support his conviction. Because sufficient evidence supports the verdict, we overrule

Loya’s sole point and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

II. BACKGROUND1

John Hanning, a widowed veteran who was eighty-eight years old at the time of

trial, was the victim of two drive-by shootings at his home.

In the first shooting, which occurred in February 2022, Hanning was walking

down the hallway of his home to go to church when he heard eight to ten shots and

realized that he had been shot in the leg. Loya was later linked to and charged with

that shooting.

The second drive-by incident occurred a year later, in February 2023. Around

12:30 or 1:00 a.m. on February 2, Hanning was watching television in bed when he

heard shots fired. Hanning heard the Venetian blinds to his storm door shatter and

1
Because Loya’s sufficiency challenge rests almost exclusively on evidence that
he contends refutes the State’s evidence, we limit our discussion to those portions of
the State’s evidence that Loya contested at trial.

2
thought that two shots went into a bedroom. Hanning’s neighbor, after hearing the

gunshots, looked outside and saw a Dodge Caravan. Another neighbor’s surveillance

video showed the suspect Dodge minivan. A detective was later able to determine the

minivan’s license plate number and further determined that the minivan showed up

on surveillance video at the Budget Suites where the police knew Loya lived.

Prior to the 2023 shooting, while awaiting trial in the 2022 case, Loya had

jumped bond and was hiding out in a hotel room that his mother had rented. But just

a few days after the 2023 shooting, the U.S. Marshals Fugitive Unit located Loya and

arrested him based on a warrant related to the 2022 shooting. In a subsequent search

of Loya’s hotel room, the police found Loya’s cell phone and a handgun. A digital

forensics examiner who later examined the cell phone was able to place it on

Hanning’s street—which a video tracking the phone’s movement shows was only two

blocks long—from 12:37 a.m. until 12:38 a.m. on February 2, 2023, which

corresponded to Hanning’s estimated time of the shooting. A firearms examiner

determined that the handgun recovered from the hotel room was the one used in the

shooting. According to the State’s theory of the case, Loya was responsible for the

2023 shooting, his motive being retaliation because the charge against him for the

2022 shooting was still pending and because Hanning was a witness to that shooting.2

2
Hanning testified at Loya’s trial. Other than confirming that someone had
shot at his house twice (wounding him the first time), Hanning said that he had no
idea who was responsible for the shootings or why they occurred.

3
This appeal relates only to Loya’s conviction for the second shooting.

At trial for the 2023 shooting, Loya testified. He denied knowing anything

about either of the two shootings.

Loya’s friend, Jesse Godoy, also testified as a defense witness.3 According to

Godoy, after he learned about Loya’s legal troubles due to the 2022 shooting—a

shooting that Godoy believed Loya had been falsely accused of committing—he

decided to help Loya with his problem by shooting at Hanning’s house a second time.

And, according to Godoy, he committed this crime without Loya’s knowledge or

participation. Godoy also explained that the reason he was admitting to this was

because he did not want Loya to be convicted of something that Godoy himself had

done.

No one disputed that Loya’s cell phone was at the scene of the shooting, but

Godoy insisted that the reason it was there was because Godoy had taken Loya’s

jacket to the shooting that night, and, according to Godoy, Loya’s cell phone

happened to be in the jacket’s pocket. When the prosecutor asked Godoy whether

the phone had rung while it was in his possession, Godoy provided conflicting

testimony, “I remember turning it on because—but I think it was dead. But I do

remember—I think there might have been a phone call, but I—I didn’t answer. I

On appeal, Loya relies almost exclusively on Godoy’s testimony and the theory
3

that Godoy was responsible for the second shooting. The majority of the brief—over
twenty pages—is Godoy’s verbatim testimony from the trial.

4
didn’t want to answer it.” Summing up his testimony, the prosecutor asked, “So it

was dead, or [maybe it wasn’t], or maybe you answered the call, or something like

that,” to which Godoy replied, “Yeah, I know I had it, though.”

As a rebuttal witness, the digital forensics examiner testified that at or near the

time of the offense, several calls were made and received on Loya’s cell phone and,

more specifically, two calls—one at 12:34 a.m. and the other around 1:00 a.m.—were

outgoing calls made to a number listed in the phone as “Mom.” Other evidence

connected that number to Loya’s mother.4

Godoy maintained that the gun was his and that he had brought the gun with

him from El Paso. But the State offered evidence that a little over twelve hours after

the 2023 shooting, text messages were sent from Loya’s cell phone trying to sell the

gun that was used in the shooting. Loya and Godoy again provided conflicting

explanations as to why Loya would be trying to sell Godoy’s gun after the shooting.

Godoy explained that he told Loya that he needed some extra money and requested

that Loya ask around to see if anyone wanted to purchase his gun. Loya, on the other

hand, testified that he had told Godoy that he did not want a gun in his home and

that he had been telling Godoy that he needed to sell the gun.

4
The officer who executed the search warrant for the hotel room where Loya
was living testified that, while executing the warrant, he had asked Loya’s mother to
help him locate Loya’s phone among several in the room. Although Loya’s mother
indicated the phone was not present in the hotel room, she offered to call Loya’s
phone, and when she did, a phone in the room rang and said “Mom” on the screen.

5
During the State’s cross-examination of Godoy, the State questioned that if

indeed this had been a solo endeavor, as Godoy claimed, how would he have known

where Hanning lived. Godoy denied that Loya gave him a street address, but he

explained that Loya had told him the street name and had described the house—a

description that Godoy no longer remembered at the time of trial—and that he got

“lucky” and shot up the correct house. The State then inquired on cross-examination

of Loya that if he had not been involved in the 2022 shooting, as he had claimed, how

he would have known the location and description of Hanning’s house. Loya

explained that he learned where the 2022 shooting occurred from his attorney and

from watching the news.

It was the opinion of the detective who investigated the 2023 shooting that

both Loya and Godoy were involved, although he testified that he was not able to

determine who was the shooter and who was the driver. At the conclusion of the

trial, the jury was charged on the law of parties. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 7.01(a)

(“A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is

committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally

responsible, or by both.”).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

In our evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found

6
the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.5 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2017). This standard gives full play to the factfinder’s responsibility to

resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct.

at 2789; Harrell v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

The factfinder alone judges the evidence’s weight and credibility. See Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04; Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2021). We may not re-evaluate the evidence’s weight and credibility and

substitute our judgment for the factfinder’s. Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. Instead, we

determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based on the evidence’s

cumulative force when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Braughton v.

State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227,

232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“The court conducting a sufficiency review must not

engage in a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all

5
Appellate counsel recites the factual sufficiency standard of review, relying on
Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 135–36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), overruled by Brooks v.
State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895, 911–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). As noted in the citation,
Clewis was overruled more than a decade ago. Counsel’s brief, however, does not
reflect that Clewis was overruled. We have noted Clewis’s overruling in previous
opinions. See Howard v. State, No. 02-24-00075-CR, 2025 WL 18308, at *2 n.3 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Jan. 2, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(same appellate counsel); Alami v. State, 333 S.W.3d 881, 885 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2011, no pet.) (same appellate counsel).

7
the evidence.”). We must presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting

inferences in favor of the verdict, and we must defer to that resolution. Braughton, 569

S.W.3d at 608. Jurors may choose to believe or disbelieve all, some, or none of the

evidence presented. Edward v. State, 635 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

B. Applicable Law

A person commits an assault if the person intentionally or knowingly threatens

another with imminent bodily injury. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(2). A person

commits an aggravated assault if the person commits an assault under Section 22.01

and the person uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault.

Id. § 22.02(a)(2). And if the aggravated assault is committed “in retaliation against or

on account of the service of another as a witness, prospective witness, informant, or

person who has reported the occurrence of a crime,” the offense is a first-degree

felony. Id. § 22.02(b)(2)(C).6

Under the law of parties, the State can enlarge a defendant’s criminal

responsibility to include acts in which the defendant may not have been the principal

actor. Bleil v. State, 496 S.W.3d 194, 202 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref’d).

“A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed

6
In Loya’s case, the indictment alleged that on or about February 2, 2023, Loya
intentionally or knowingly threatened Hanning with imminent bodily injury in
retaliation against or on account of Hanning’s service as a prospective witness and
that Loya used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault,
namely, a firearm.

8
by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible,

or by both.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 7.01(a). A person is criminally responsible for

another’s conduct if, “acting with the intent to promote or assist the commission of

the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person

to commit the offense.” Id. § 7.02(a)(2). The factfinder may look at events occurring

before, during, and after the commission of the offense and may rely on the

defendant’s actions that show an understanding and common design to do the

prohibited act. Padilla v. State, 698 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2024, pet. ref’d).

C. Analysis

Loya argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because

Godoy admitted committing the offense without Loya’s knowledge or participation

and because Loya denied committing the offense. The jury, however, did not have to

believe anything that Godoy and Loya said. See Edward, 635 S.W.3d at 655.

Moreover, other evidence undermined both Godoy’s and Loya’s credibility and tied

Loya to the shooting.

For example, Loya’s cell phone was tracked to the scene of the offense at the

time of the shooting, which connected Loya’s cell phone to the crime scene but not

necessarily Loya. See Robinson v. State, 368 S.W.3d 588, 601 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012,

pet. ref’d). But other evidence placed Loya with his cell phone and, thus, connected

him to the shooting. Specifically, someone made calls from Loya’s cell phone to

9
Loya’s mother between 12:30 and 1:00 a.m on February 2, 2023—the same time

frame that, according to Hanning, the shooting occurred.

Because Godoy denied using or answering Loya’s phone, his testimony thus

could not account for why someone was using Loya’s cell phone to make the calls to

Loya’s mother during the same time frame as the shooting. A reasonable juror could

have concluded that Loya was using his cell phone to call his mother and, thus, that

Loya was either alone in the car or with Godoy or another person. See generally Lewis v.

State, 448 S.W.3d 138, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (“These

farfetched alternatives, however, do not cast any real doubt on the evidence indicating

appellant had [committed the offense].”); Reynolds v. State, No. 14-00-00557-CR,

2001 WL 664436, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 14, 2001, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[T]he jury clearly did not accept [a

witness’s] farfetched story [that the cocaine had belonged to him, that he dropped it,

and that he just left it on the floor near where the appellant was standing,] and we see

no reason to do so on appeal.”).

Godoy’s and Loya’s testimony was further undermined by the question of how

they knew where Hanning lived. A jury is permitted to draw reasonable inferences

from the evidence presented at trial, provided the evidence produced at trial supports

each inference. Baltimore v. State, 689 S.W.3d 331, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). And

when drawing those inferences, jurors may use common sense, common knowledge,

and personal experience and observations. Id. Here, the jury could have drawn the

10
reasonable inference that Loya knew where Hanning lived because he had been the

person who shot at Hanning’s house in February 2022. The jury was not obligated to

believe Loya’s explanation that he knew how to find Hanning’s house based on

something that his attorney had told him or on a news report that he had watched a

year earlier or that Godoy had found Hanning’s house based on a street name, a

description of Hanning’s house that he no longer remembered, and a little luck. See

Edward, 635 S.W.3d at 655; Gilmore v. State, 397 S.W.3d 226, 241 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2012, pet. ref’d) (“The jury also could have reasonably construed [the

a]ppellant’s version of events as implausible, thereby demonstrating a ‘consciousness

of guilt.’”).

Godoy’s and Loya’s testimony was further discredited and Loya’s guilt was

further evidenced by Loya’s attempts to sell the gun used in the offense shortly after

the shooting. The jury could have drawn the reasonable inference that Loya did so

because he participated in the shooting and wanted to dispose of incriminating

evidence. See Baltimore, 689 S.W.3d at 342; Hammack v. State, 622 S.W.3d 910, 918 n.33

(Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (“We have noted that certain conduct by a defendant can be

construed as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt.”); Moreno v. State,

No. 13-23-00485-CR, 2024 WL 3533412, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

July 25, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[B]elieving law

enforcement had not yet found the gun used, [the defendant] asked an individual to

hide his gun for him. This is . . . circumstantial evidence connecting [the defendant]

11
to the weapon and the weapon’s use.”). The jury did not have to believe Godoy’s and

Loya’s explanation that Loya’s attempt to sell the gun after the shooting was just an

unlucky coincidence. See Lewis, 448 S.W.3d at 145; Reynolds, 2001 WL 664436, at *2.

Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that

a rational factfinder could have found that Loya—as either the shooter or a party to

the shooting—committed the offense of aggravated assault in retaliation beyond a

reasonable doubt.7 See Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622; Padilla, 698 S.W.3d at 594; Bleil,

496 S.W.3d at 202; see also Walker v. State, No. 02-23-00346-CR, 2024 WL 3715011, at

*5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 8, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (holding that submitting law of parties when sufficient evidence supports

a conviction based on the defendant’s actions as a principal is harmless). A rational

factfinder could have found that Godoy’s explanation for the shooting—helping a

friend in need without that friend’s knowledge or participation—was less plausible

than Loya’s motive for the 2023 shooting—to intimidate a witness to the 2022

shooting. Even Godoy admitted that intimidating a witness was the shooting’s

purpose. Similarly, a rational factfinder could have found that Loya was at the scene

of the shooting at the time of the shooting based on Loya’s cell phone’s being there

when the shooting occurred—notwithstanding Godoy’s explanation to the contrary.

7
As noted earlier, the jury was charged on the law of parties.

12
And a rational factfinder could have found that Loya showed consciousness of his

own guilt when he, not Godoy, tried to sell the gun used in the shooting immediately

after the offense occurred. See Hammack, 622 S.W.3d at 918 n.33; Moreno, 2024 WL

3533412, at *3. Although the evidence against Loya is circumstantial, circumstantial

evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt. See Mayfield v. State,

676 S.W.3d 244, 250 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2023, pet. ref’d) (citing Carter v. State,

620 S.W.3d 147, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021)). We overrule Loya’s sole issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Loya’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack
Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: August 21, 2025

13