The Board of Regents of the Texas A&M University System v. BE&K Building Group, LLC

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed February 12, 2026.

In The

Fifteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 15-25-00058-CV

THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY
SYSTEM, Appellant
V.
BE&K BUILDING GROUP, LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the District Court
Brazos County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 20-002171-CV-272

MEMORANDUM OPINION
The Board of Regents of Texas A&M University System (“TAMU”) appeals
the trial court’s denial of its plea to the jurisdiction asserting sovereign immunity.
TAMU filed its plea in response to BE&K Building Group, LLC’s (“BE&K”)
petition seeking damages for an alleged breach of a construction contract. Because
the breach of contract claim falls within the sovereign immunity waiver for state
agencies under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 114.003, we affirm.
BACKGROUND

In August 2016, TAMU hired BE&K to construct the Applied Sciences
Engineering Building on TAMU’s Tarleton State University campus. The parties
entered into a Construction Manager-At-Risk Agreement (the “Agreement”), setting
the project’s maximum price at approximately $40.5 million (later increased to
approximately $41.5 million) and a target substantial completion date of September
29, 2018 (later extended to October 4, 2018).

The Agreement outlines the scope of work, the process for altering the
project’s terms, and the requirements for settling disputes. It is comprised of three
components: (1) the Uniform General Conditions; (2) the Uniform Supplementary
Conditions; and (3) the special conditions. The parties refer to the Uniform General
& Supplemental Conditions together as “the UGSC.”

Relevant here, UGSC Article 9.6.2.2 states that BE&K is “entitled to an
equitable adjustment of time” for certain delays to the project schedule, including
delays due to TAMU’s errors and omissions or changes to work that is critical to
completion. UGSC Article 11.3.1 allows BE&K to recover additional costs incurred
during the project. UGSC Article 10.3 governs TAMU’s duty to pay, along with
documentation requirements, and requires TAMU to reduce or release portions that
it had retained from progress payments—termed “retainage”—once 65% of the
Agreement had been completed. UGSC Article 12 governs the requirements for
TAMU to make final payment. The Agreement also includes a dispute resolution
provision which incorporates the requirements of Chapter 2260 of the Texas
Government Code and requires BE&K to submit written notice of a claim of breach
of contract to TAMU prior to filing suit.

BE&K began construction in April 2017. BE&K asserts that TAMU delayed
the project by making a number of changes to the scope, including storm system and

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roof system redesigns and the addition of a utility-support grid. To accommodate
these changes, BE&K made several time extension requests which TAMU denied.
BE&K claims that it achieved 65% completion of the Project and substantial
completion in 2019, well after the agreed upon substantial completion date. TAMU
refused to release retainage or compensate BE&K for its work.

BE&K sued TAMU under Chapter 114 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code, alleging that TAMU breached the Agreement by failing to equitably
extend the substantial completion date and improperly withholding final payment
and retainage. BE&K identified UGSC Articles 9.6, 10.3, and 11.3 as specific
Agreement provisions it claims TAMU breached. BE&K stated that the balanced
owed to it under the Agreement totaled more than $3.5 million.

In response to BE&K’s petition, TAMU filed a plea to the jurisdiction,
arguing that BE&K’s suit under the Chapter 114 limited waiver provision was
improper. TAMU asserted that (1) BE&K did not allege a breach of an express
provision of the Agreement which required TAMU to pay, (2) BE&K’s failure to
comply with the conditions precedent which would obligate TAMU to pay meant
that no jurisdictional facts existed to establish waiver, and (3) BE&K did not comply
with the notice and alternative dispute requirements before filing suit. TAMU
attached to its plea a copy of the Agreement and an affidavit signed by Brett
McCully, Director at the Office of Facilities Planning & Construction for The Texas
A&M University System. In his affidavit, McCully stated that TAMU had not
received the required documentation for final payment, written consent of the surety
for a request of release of retainage, or any documents required to approve change
orders or time extension requests. Also attached was a claim letter from McCully to
Steven Olson, BE&K’s Chief Operating Officer, addressing BE&K’s alleged failure
to comply with the contractual requirements which would obligate TAMU to grant

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time extensions.

BE&K responded to the plea, arguing that the only jurisdictional fact required
for Chapter 114’s immunity waiver was BE&K’s claim for breach of an express
contract provision. According to BE&K, TAMU misconstrued Chapter 114 as
requiring BE&K to prove the merits of its claim—an interpretation foreclosed by the
Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Pepper Lawson Horizon International Group,
LLC v. Texas Southern University, 669 S.W.3d 205 (Tex. 2023) (per curiam). BE&K
also argued that it substantially complied with the Agreement’s notice provision,
relying on the McCully affidavit’s references to past correspondence about the
dispute and information that had been submitted to support BE&K’s request for time
extensions. Attached to BE&K’s opposition was (1) a status update letter from
BE&K’s counsel to the trial court asserting that BE&K’s work on the project was
complete, (2) a transcript of McCully’s deposition addressing his affidavit, and (3)
an affidavit of Read Ballew, BE&K’s Senior Vice President and Texas Business
Unit Leader, asserting that BE&K had satisfied all conditions precedent.

TAMU replied to BE&K’s opposition, arguing that immunity had not been
waived, that the notice provision was jurisdictional, and that Ballew’s affidavit was
factually incorrect. TAMU attached an affidavit of Calvin Boydstun, Chief
Executive Officer of TAMU’s independent auditor, asserting that he had not
received a number of required documents from BE&K.

On March 21, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on TAMU’s plea to the
jurisdiction and denied the plea. TAMU appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A plea to the jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity implicates a trial
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and presents a question of law reviewed de novo.

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State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex. 2007); Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife
v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). The court must determine “whether
the plaintiff has met its burden to allege facts affirmatively showing the trial court’s
jurisdiction, but the court ‘may [also] consider evidence and must do so when
necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised.’” Pepper Lawson, 669 S.W.3d
at 211 (alteration in original) (quoting Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d
547, 555 (Tex. 2000)).

A defendant may challenge the court’s jurisdiction through a plea to the
jurisdiction based on either the sufficiency of the pleadings or on the existence of
jurisdictional facts. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226–27. When a plea challenges the
pleadings, the court, construing the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff, must
“determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s
jurisdiction to hear the cause.” Id. at 226. When a plea challenges the existence of
jurisdictional facts, the standard “generally mirrors that of a summary judgment
under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c).” Id. at 228. The plaintiff has the
burden to adduce evidence to “raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue.” Id.
The Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant to
determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Town of Shady Shores v.
Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2019). In determining whether a genuine issue
of material fact exists, we are mindful that we are not permitted to inquire “so far
into the substance of the claims that plaintiffs would be required to put on their case
to establish jurisdiction.” Pepper Lawson, 669 S.W.3d at 211 (citing Bland, 34
S.W.3d at 554).

ANALYSIS

In three issues, TAMU asserts that (1) BE&K could not establish jurisdiction
without presenting evidence of TAMU’s duty to pay as of September 1, 2020, (2)

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BE&K’s failure to comply with a statutory notice provision precludes jurisdiction,
and (3) the inability for the jurisdictional defect to be cured necessitates dismissal.
As discussed below, we overrule each issue.

I. TAMU is Subject to the Sovereign Immunity Waiver Under Chapter
114 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

In its first issue, TAMU argues that BE&K failed to provide evidence of
TAMU’s duty to pay and that Section 114.003’s sovereign immunity waiver
consequently is inapplicable absent a breach of an express provision of the
Agreement. According to TAMU, the trial court was required to grant its plea to the
jurisdiction unless TAMU presented evidence that BE&K had (1) completed the
work required under the Agreement, (2) submitted documents needed to audit costs,
and (3) submitted proper change orders underlying its claims.

BE&K responds that it was not required to present such evidence at this early
juncture, invoking the Texas Supreme Court’s unanimous holding in Pepper
Lawson—a recent opinion involving a similar construction contract suit. BE&K
interprets Pepper Lawson to require only proof that the Agreement is a covered
contract under Chapter 114 and proof that BE&K is suing for breach under a covered
contract. BE&K argues that it is not required to present any proof that its claim is
meritorious at this juncture. Alternatively, BE&K argues that it has presented such
evidence.

We agree with BE&K that this issue is controlled by the text of Chapter 114
and the Texas Supreme Court’s Pepper Lawson opinion. Sovereign immunity
protects divisions of state entities, including universities, from lawsuits for damages
except where the Legislature or the Constitution waives that immunity. Pepper
Lawson, 669 S.W.3d at 210. A statute, however, cannot waive immunity except by
“clear and unambiguous language.” Id. (citing Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.034). BE&K

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argues that the Legislature waived immunity for construction-contract suits like this
one by enacting a statute that provides:

[a] state agency that is authorized by statute or the constitution to enter
into a contract and that enters into a contract subject to this chapter
waives sovereign immunity to suit for the purpose of adjudicating a
claim for breach of an express provision of the contract, subject to the
terms and conditions of this chapter.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 114.003. This waiver provision applies to “a claim
for a breach of a written contract for engineering, architectural, or construction
services . . . brought by a party to the written contract, in which the amount in
controversy is not less than $250,000 . . . .” Id. § 114.002. The Texas Supreme Court
has interpreted this statutory language to be a “clear and unambiguous waiver of
immunity for construction-contract suits.” Pepper Lawson, 669 S.W.3d at 209.

The question therefore becomes what a construction-contract plaintiff must
do to defeat a plea to the jurisdiction using Chapter 114’s immunity waiver. Pepper
Lawson answers that question. In that case, construction contractor PLH sued Texas
Southern University—a state university—for breach of a construction contract. PLH
pleaded that TSU breached the construction contract by withholding pay after the
university refused to grant project deadline extensions for delays. Id. at 207–09.
Specifically, PLH “alleged that TSU (1) entered a written contract with PLH for
construction services, (2) did not timely pay the balance owed under the contract,
and (3) did not equitably adjust the contract price and time as contractually required
for excusable delays.” Id. at 211. Although PLH’s pleadings invoked Section
114.003 of the Remedies Code and identified the breached provisions of the
construction contract, TSU asserted sovereign immunity in a plea to the jurisdiction
and argued that PLH failed to “plead facts” showing “breach of an express provision
of the contract.” Id. at 209–10. TSU also argued that PLH “could not prevail on its

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claims under the construction contract and change orders, which were attached to its
plea.” Id. at 211. In response, PLH asserted that its petition “sufficiently invoked
Section 114.003’s immunity waiver by pleading the express contract provisions TSU
allegedly breached and detailing how TSU defaulted on its obligations under those
provisions.” Id. at 210.

The court of appeals had granted TSU’s plea, holding that the breach claim
against TSU was not subject to Chapter 114’s waiver because no express contract
provision required TSU to perform as PLH alleged. Id. at 210. The Texas Supreme
Court reversed, holding that “PLH was not required to prove that ‘the parties’
contract unambiguously waives TSU’s immunity.’” Id. at 211. Nor was PLH
required to show “breach of an express provision of the parties’ contract.” Id. By
requiring such proof, the court of appeals “conflated statutory-construction rules
with contract interpretation,” improperly requiring PLH “to prove its case.” Id.
Rather, the Texas Supreme Court held that PLH “only had to establish that Chapter
114, not the contract, unambiguously waived immunity.” Id. Accordingly, PLH had
carried its burden under Chapter 114 to “allege facts affirmatively demonstrating the
court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause.” Id.

The case before this Court is controlled by Pepper Lawson. Similar to the
contractor in Pepper Lawson, BE&K alleged it in its original petition that TAMU
(1) entered into the Agreement and (2) breached the Agreement by, among other
reasons, refusing time extensions and compensation for delays, failing to pay BE&K
for additional work, and refusing to release retainage. BE&K further identified the
specific contract provisions TAMU allegedly breached––UGSC Articles 9.6, 10.3,
and 11.3. These allegations are sufficient to invoke the immunity waiver of Section
114.003, which only requires TAMU to have entered into a construction services
contract for the purposes “adjudicating a claim for breach of an express provision”

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of the contract. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 114.002–.003; see also Pepper
Lawson, 669 S.W.3d at 211. Thus, BE&K met its burden to “allege facts
affirmatively demonstrating the court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause.” Pepper
Lawson, 669 S.W.3d at 211. 1

Despite the factual commonalities to Pepper Lawson, TAMU argues that,
because its plea challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts instead of the
sufficiency of the pleadings, we should decide this case based on Miranda. In
Miranda, the plaintiff sued the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department for negligence
and gross negligence after a tree limb fell on her in a state park. Miranda, 133
S.W.3d at 220–21. The Department responded by filing a plea to the jurisdiction,
asserting that the claims were “insufficient to invoke a waiver of the Department’s
sovereign immunity under the standard established in the Tort Claims Act and the
recreational use statute.” Id. at 221–22. The Department attached evidence to its
plea, which challenged the factual allegations supporting jurisdiction. Id. at 231.
Because the evidence established that the Department was not grossly negligent, the
court held that the Tort Claims Act’s immunity waiver was inapplicable and,
therefore, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 232.

Key to Miranda’s holding was the “unusual confluence of standards erected
by the Legislature for waiver of sovereign immunity in the Texas Torts Claims Act
and the recreational use statute.” Id. at 221. The Court noted that sovereign immunity
includes two distinct principles: immunity from suit and immunity from liability. Id.
at 224. The Tort Claims Act, however, created a “unique statutory scheme in which
the two immunities are co-extensive.” Id.; see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
§ 101.025(a) (“Sovereign immunity to suit is waived and abolished to the extent of

1
The parties do not dispute that the Agreement is subject to Chapter 114. See Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code § 114.002.

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liability created by this chapter.”). The Act’s waiver of immunity to suit was limited
to the scope of the liability waiver in the recreational use statute. Miranda, 133
S.W.3d at 225; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 101.021, .058. The recreational use
statute and relevant case law had established that a governmental unit waived
sovereign immunity only if it was grossly negligent. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225;
see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 75.002(c)–(d). Thus, Miranda presented a
circumstance “in which the determination of the subject matter jurisdiction of the
court implicate[d] the merits of the parties’ cause of action.” Miranda, 133 S.W.3d
at 228. The Court stated that “[d]ue to the standard erected (gross negligence), the
determination of whether immunity was waived may require consideration of
extrinsic facts after reasonable opportunity for targeted discovery.” Id. at 233.
Though the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to survive a plea to the jurisdiction on
the pleadings, the Department’s extrinsic evidence showed a lack of gross
negligence, and the plaintiff failed to challenge this finding. Id. at 230, 232.

Here, TAMU argued in its plea that jurisdictional facts establishing waiver do
not exist because BE&K did not satisfy the conditions precedent that would obligate
TAMU to pay. These alleged conditions include BE&K’s delivery of written consent
of the surety to release retainage, BE&K’s delivery of the documentation required
for requests for additional costs and time extensions, and BE&K’s obligation to
complete the project prior to receiving payment. TAMU attached evidence to its plea
in the form of the Agreement itself and Brett McCully’s affidavit supporting
TAMU’s claims. TAMU later provided an affidavit from its independent auditor
asserting that the auditor did not receive the required documentation from BE&K.
TAMU also argues on appeal that BE&K failed to provide sufficient evidence of its
compliance with the conditions precedent.

Though TAMU challenges a number of facts asserted in BE&K’s pleadings,

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these challenges go to the merits of BE&K’s cause of action rather than the
jurisdictional inquiry. The only jurisdictional facts required for Section 114.003’s
waiver are (1) TAMU’s entry into a contract subject to the provision, (2) BE&K’s
“claim” for breach of contract, and (3) BE&K’s identification of the express contract
provisions that TAMU allegedly breached. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
§ 114.003. Whether TAMU had an obligation to pay and release retainage pursuant
to the Agreement’s provisions and breached these obligations is a merits inquiry
separate from Section 114.003’s requirements.

Further, unlike the Tort Claims Act and recreational use statute in Miranda,
Section 114.003 does not create a circumstance in which the jurisdictional inquiry
necessarily “implicates the merits” of BE&K’s cause of action. Miranda, 133
S.W.3d at 227. The jurisdictional waiver in Miranda required the Department to
have acted with gross negligence, and an evidentiary challenge to the gross
negligence claim was enough to establish an absence of jurisdiction. See id. at 225
(“[A] governmental unit waives sovereign immunity under the recreational use
statute and the Tort Claims Act only if it is grossly negligent.”). In contrast, the plain
text of Section 114.003 does not condition waiver on whether a breach actually
occurred, but rather on BE&K bringing the claim in the first place. See Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code § 114.003 (waiving immunity for “the purpose of adjudicating
a claim for breach of an express provision of the contract”). BE&K did so.

TAMU responds that the court’s discussion of conditions precedent in Pepper
Lawson may suggest that a proper evidentiary challenge to the breach-of-contract
claim could implicate the trial court’s jurisdiction under Section 114.003. Pepper
Lawson states that “[t]o the extent the jurisdictional inquiry implicated the merits of
PLH’s cause of action, TSU failed to conclusively establish that (1) it did not breach
an express provision of the contract when it refused to equitably adjust the contract

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time and price for ‘additional costs’ incurred for PLH’s alleged excusable delays that
were within TSU’s ‘reasonable control’ and (2) PLH did not follow the procedures
triggering TSU’s obligation to pay.” Pepper Lawson, 669 S.W.3d at 211–12. The
court also discussed TSU’s failure to properly deny that the contractor satisfied all
conditions precedent. Id. at 212 (“Because TSU did not specifically deny that PLH
satisfied all conditions precedent, the court of appeals erred in holding that PLH
failed to plead a cognizable Chapter 114 claim based on any failure to satisfy
contractual conditions precedent to requesting a time extension.”).

We do not interpret the Pepper Lawson court’s discussion as a definitive
statement that Section 114.003’s waiver necessarily implicates the merits of a
breach-of-contract claim. The Texas Supreme Court expressly rejected the court of
appeals’ attempt to decide immunity based on the requirements of the contract rather
than Section 114.003. Id. at 211. (“But PLH was not required to prove that ‘the
parties’ contract unambiguously waives TSU’s immunity from suit for PLH’s
breach-of-contract claim,’ as the court of appeals held. PLH only had to establish
that Chapter 114, not the contract, unambiguously waived immunity.” (internal
citation omitted)). The Texas Supreme Court further reasoned that TSU had
“brought forward a host of contract defenses pertaining to the merits of PLH’s
claims” and attached the contract and change orders to its plea, none of which
convinced the court to rule in TSU’s favor. Id. at 211, 213. Our holding is likewise
based on the text of Section 114.003 rather than the provisions of the Agreement or
any defenses TAMU asserts. Thus, we refrain from “authoriz[ing] an inquiry so far
into the substance of the claims that [BE&K] would be required to put on [its] case
to establish jurisdiction.” Id. at 211.

Even if Pepper Lawson required us to consider evidence of BE&K’s
compliance with conditions precedent to decide jurisdiction, BE&K has met its

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burden to show a genuine issue of material fact. See Swanson, 590 S.W.3d at 550.
BE&K submitted Read Ballew’s affidavit as evidence that BE&K had satisfied the
preconditions to TAMU’s payment, including (1) submitting a payment application,
(2) completing the project, (3) fully complying with TAMU’s audit request, and (4)
satisfying all conditions precedent. Though TAMU offered its own evidence to the
contrary, Ballew’s affidavit is enough to show a fact issue on the satisfaction of the
conditions precedent. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant, id., BE&K has met its burden.

We hold that the Legislature waived sovereign immunity pursuant to Section
114.003 and overrule TAMU’s first issue.

II. BE&K’s Alleged Failure to Comply with Notice Requirements Does
Not Preclude Jurisdiction.

In its second issue, TAMU argues that jurisdiction is precluded by BE&K’s
failure to provide formal notice of its breach of contract claims in accordance with
contractual and statutory requirements. TAMU relies on Section 311.034 of the
Texas Government Code, which states that “[s]tatutory prerequisites to a suit,
including the provision of notice, are jurisdictional requirements in all suits against
a governmental entity.” BE&K responds that any purported failure to comply with
the notice requirements does not preclude TAMU’s waiver of sovereign immunity
under Chapter 114. BE&K also contends that it substantially complied with the
notice requirements.

Chapter 2260 of the Texas Government Code requires units of state
government to include a provision in an applicable contract stating that the dispute
resolution process under the chapter “must be used to attempt to resolve a dispute
arising under the contract.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 2260.004(a). The Agreement
includes such a provision, stating in full:

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The dispute resolution process provided in Chapter 2260, Texas
Government Code, and the related rules adopted by the Texas Attorney
General pursuant to Chapter 2260, shall be used by Owner and
Contractor to attempt to resolve any claim for breach of contract made
by Contractor that cannot be resolved in the ordinary course of
business. Contractor shall submit written notice of a claim of breach of
contract under this Chapter to the Chancellor of The Texas A&M
University System, who shall examine Contractor’s claim and any
counterclaim and negotiate with Contractor in an effort to resolve the
claim.

Relatedly, Section 2260.051(b) of the Texas Government Code requires a
contractor to “provide written notice to the unit of state government of a claim for
breach of contract not later than the 180th day after the date of the event giving rise
to the claim.” In addition, Section 114.005 of the Remedies Code states that
“[a]djudication procedures, including requirements for serving notices or engaging
in alternative dispute resolution proceedings before bringing a suit . . . that are stated
in the contract subject to this chapter . . . are enforceable. . . .”

This Court has addressed a similar issue in Texas Southern University v.
Westwood Restoration, LLC, No. 15-24-00064, 2025 WL 2078670 (Tex. App.—
15th Dist. July 24, 2025, no pet.). In Westwood, a contractor, invoking the immunity
waiver under Chapter 114 of the Remedies Code, sued TSU for breach of contract.
Id. at *1. TSU filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the immunity waiver did
not apply partly because the contractor “failed to comply with its contractual
obligations to use the ADR [alternative dispute resolution] procedures set out in
Chapter 2260 of the Government Code before filing suit.” Id. at *2. We held that the
contractor’s failure to comply was not a jurisdictional defect. Id. at *3. We reasoned
that while Chapter 114 makes the ADR requirements “enforceable,” it does not make
the requirements “jurisdictional.” Id. (“Yet while Section 114.005 makes these

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contractual ADR provision [sic] ‘enforceable,’ it does not say they are
jurisdictional.”).

We reiterate our holding in Westwood. Although the Agreement incorporates
the dispute resolution process of Chapter 2260, this suit invokes the immunity
waiver of Chapter 114. Section 114.005 states that all “adjudication procedures” in
an applicable contract, including both ADR proceedings and “serving notices,” are
“enforceable.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 114.005. Similar to the ADR
provisions in Westwood, Section 114.005 therefore only makes the notice provisions
of the Agreement “enforceable” as well, and we refrain from characterizing the
Agreement’s notice requirement as “jurisdictional” under Chapter 114 when the
statute does not require us to do so. Thus, any failure of BE&K to comply with the
notice requirements would not preclude jurisdiction.

Further, TAMU’s reliance on Section 311.034 of the Government Code is
misplaced. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.034 (“Statutory prerequisites to a suit,
including the provision of notice, are jurisdictional requirements in all suits against
a governmental entity.”). Chapter 114 concerns contractual pre-suit procedures, not
statutory prerequisites to suit. Westwood, 2025 WL 2078670, at *3 n.22 (“Since
Chapter 114 enforces only contractual pre-suit ADR procedures, state law making
statutory prerequisites to suit jurisdictional does not apply.”). Thus, any enforceable
pre-suit procedures under Chapter 114 cannot function as a statutory prerequisite
under Section 311.034.

TAMU also argues that Chapter 114 does not preclude a notice requirement
for jurisdiction. TAMU contends that the Legislature did not “clearly and
unequivocally consent[] to suits that lack a pre-suit notice.” According to TAMU,
Chapter 114 “does not eliminate the jurisdictional import of notice provisions,” and
because Chapter 2260 is required in all construction contracts with the state, finding

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jurisdiction here would mean that notice contracts would be effectively nullified
state-wide. These arguments fail. As stated above, Chapter 114 concerns contractual
pre-suit procedures, not statutory prerequisites. See Westwood, 2025 WL 2078670,
at *3 n.22. Our holding does not nullify the notice requirements under the Agreement
or Chapter 114. Rather, it recognizes such notice requirements to be only matters of
enforcement, not jurisdiction.

We hold that any alleged failure to comply with the notice requirements does
not preclude subject-matter jurisdiction. We therefore overrule TAMU’s second
issue.2

III. Dismissal is Not Warranted.

In its third and final issue, TAMU argues that dismissal is proper when the
evidence disproves jurisdiction. See Young v. Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, No. 15-
24-00052-CV, 2025 WL 1200947, at *7–8. (Tex. App.—15th Dist. Apr. 24, 2025,
pet. filed). Because we hold that BE&K has demonstrated jurisdiction under Chapter
114 by alleging breaches of what is indisputably a construction contract, dismissal
is not warranted on this ground. We overrule TAMU’s third issue.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s denial of TAMU’s plea to the jurisdiction.

/s/ April Farris
April Farris
Justice

2
Because our resolution disposes of the issue entirely, we do not reach the arguments of
whether BE&K failed to provide notice or whether BE&K substantially complied with the notice
requirements.

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Before Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris.

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