Servpro Industries, LLC v. Reed Gaskin and Brittany Gaskin

ACCEPTED
15-25-00193-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
11/17/2025 2:20 PM
NO. 15-25-00193-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK
FILED IN
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 15th COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
FIFTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 11/17/2025 2:20:08 PM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
SERVPRO INDUSTRIES, LLC,
Appellants
v.
REED GASKIN AND BRITTANY GASKIN
Appellees

ON APPEAL FROM THE 453RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

Respectfully submitted,

Christopher D. Knudsen
Texas Bar No. 24041268
cknudsen@serpeandrews.com
SERPE ANDREWS, PLLC
2929 Allen Parkway, Suite 1600
Houston, Texas 77019
Telephone: (713) 452-4400
Facsimile: (713) 452-4499

Attorneys for Appellant,
Servpro Industries, LLC

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

In accordance with Rule 38.1(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure,

Servpro Industries, LLC (“Appellant” or “SIL”) provides the following list of parties

and counsel to the trial court’s judgment that forms the basis of this appeal.

Appellant Servpro Industries, LLC

Christopher D. Knudsen, Appellate and Trial Counsel
Texas Bar No. 24041268
SERPE ANDREWS, PLLC
2929 Allen Parkway, Suite 1600
Houston, Texas 77019
Telephone: (713) 452-4400
Facsimile: (713) 452-4499
Email: cknudsen@serpeandrews.com

Appellees Reed Gaskin and Brittany Gaskin

Lawrence Chang, Appellate and Trial Counsel
State Bar No. 24072892
CHOATE & ASSOCIATES
13010 N US 183 #104
Austin, Texas 78759
Telephone: (512) 297-9124
Facsimile: (512) 330-0286
Email: Law.Chang@choateaustin.com

Co-Defendants CTX1 Restoration, LLC d/b/a Servpro of
San Marcos and Servpro Franchisor, LLC

Christopher D. Knudsen, Trial Counsel
Texas Bar No. 24041268
SERPE ANDREWS, PLLC
2929 Allen Parkway, Suite 1600
Houston, Texas 77019
Telephone: (713) 452-4400

ii
Facsimile: (713) 452-4499
Email: cknudsen@serpeandrews.com

Co-Defendant Perry Homes, LLC

James Rudnicki, Trial Counsel
State Bar No. 24006148
james@brstexas.com
Roel Garcia, Trial Counsel
State Bar No. 24078535
rgarcia@brstexas.com
Jennifer Taylor, Trial Counsel
State Bar No. 24102559
jtaylor@brstexas.com
BUSH, RUDNICKI, SHELTON, P.C.
2508 Ashley Worth Blvd., Suite 200
Austin, Texas 78738
Telephone: (512) 263-8408
Facsimile: (512) 263-2562

Co-Defendant Howard Environmental, LLC

Christopher L. Johnson, Trial Counsel
Texas State Bar No. 24069999
chris@johnson-attorneys.com
Jordan R. Corn, Trial Counsel
Texas State Bar No. 24101649
jordan@johnson-attorneys.com
JOHNSON & ASSOCIATES,
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, PLLC
303 East Main Street, Suite 100
League City, Texas 77573
Telephone: (281) 895-2410
Facsimile: (409) 263-1020

Co-Defendant Argus Environmental Consultants, LLC

No appearance

iii
Co-Defendant Radiant Remediation, LLC

No appearance

iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ........................................................... ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................... v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................vi
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................ix
ORAL ARGUMENT ................................................................................................ix
ISSUE PRESENTED ................................................................................................ix
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................ 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................ 3
ARGUMENT & AUTHORITY ................................................................................ 4
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW ..................................................................................... 4
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING SIL’S
SPECIAL APPEARANCE ...................................................................................... 5
A. Federal Due Process Must Be Satisfied To
Exert Personal Jurisdiction .................................................................... 5
B. Texas Rule Of Civil Procedure 120a .................................................... 6
C. SIL Does Not Have Sufficient “Minimum Contacts”
With Texas ............................................................................................ 7
1. The trial court lacks general jurisdiction over SIL ..................... 8
2. The trial court lacks specific jurisdiction over SIL
because SIL has not performed any conduct related
to the allegations in this lawsuit ................................................ 12
CONCLUSION & PRAYER ................................................................................... 14
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................... 15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 16

v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases:

American Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman,
83 S.W.3d 801 (Tex. 2002) ................................................................................. 5
BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand,
83 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2002) ................................................................................. 4
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of California, San Francisco Cnty.,
582 U.S. 255 (2017) .......................................................................................... 12
Burger King v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462 (1985) .......................................................................................... 13
Chufen Chen v Dunkin’ Brands, Inc.,
954 F.3d 492 (2d. Cir. 2020) .......................................................................10, 11
CSR Ltd. v. Link,
925 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. 1996) ...........................................................................5, 6
Daimler AG v. Bauman,
571 U.S. 117 (2014) ..................................................................................7, 9, 10
Ennis v. Loiseau,
164 S.W.3d 698 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.)........................................... 4
Fidrych v Marriott Int’l, Inc.,
952 F.3d 124 (4th Cir. 2020) ............................................................................. 10
Fields v. Ramada Inn, Inc.,
816 F. Supp. 1033 (E.D. Penn. 1993)..........................................................10, 11
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ops., S.A. v. Brown,
564 U.S. 915 (2011) ........................................................................................7, 9
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408 (1984) ........................................................................................5, 8
Hertz Corp. v Friend,
559 U.S. 77 (2010). ............................................................................................. 9

vi
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945) ........................................................................................5, 8
Kelly v. General Interior Construction, Inc.,
301 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. 2010) ............................................................................... 6
Labranche v. Embassy Suites, Inc.,
1999 WL 39519 (E.D. La. 1999)....................................................................... 11
Madden v. Petland Summerville, LLC,
2021 WL 5770294 (D. S.C. 2021) .................................................................... 10
Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457 (1940) ............................................................................................ 8
Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
991 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir. 1993) ........................................................................... 11
Nutt v. Best Western International,
2016 WL 6780708 (M.D. Pa. 2016) ............................................................10, 11
O'Brien v. Lanpar Co.,
399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex.1966) .............................................................................. 13
Oddi v. Mariner-Denver, Inc.,
461 F. Supp. 306 (S.D. Ind. 1978) .................................................................... 10
Roman v. Affinity Worldwide, LLC,
2020 WL 8339208 (W.D. Mo. 2020) ................................................................ 10
Walden v. Fiore,
571 U.S. 277 (2014) ......................................................................................8, 12
Western Technologies, Inc. v. Omnivations II, LLC,
583 S.W.3d 786 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.) ......................................... 6
Wright v. American Standard, Inc.,
637 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Penn. 1985).................................................................. 10
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286 (1980) ............................................................................................ 8

Statutes & Rules:

Tex. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042(1) ...................................................... 5

vii
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(7) ....................................................... vii

TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a ................................................................................................... 6

viii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case: Plaintiffs Reed and Brittany Gaskin (“Appellees”)
brought this lawsuit against Defendants Argus
Environmental Consultants, LLC, Radiant
Remediation, LLC, Howard Environmental, LLC,
Servpro Industries, LLC and CTX1 Restoration, LLC
d/b/a Servpro of San Marcos alleging negligent mold
remediation at their house located at 965 Blue Oak
Boulevard, San Marcos, Texas. Appellees assert causes
of action for violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, negligence, gross negligence, and
conspiracy.

Course of Proceedings: Appellant filed a Special Appearance and Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. CR 22, 115.

Trial Court Disposition: The trial court denied Appellant’s Special Appearance
and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction. CR 360; Appx. A. Appellant subsequently
filed this interlocutory appeal pursuant to section
51.014(a)(7) of the Texas Civil Practices & Remedies
Code. CR 364.

ORAL ARGUMENT

Appellant requests oral argument. Appellant believes that oral argument will

assist the Court in considering the arguments of the parties.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether the trial court erred in denying Servpro Industries, LLC’s Special

Appearance and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction.

ix
NO. 15-25-00193-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FIFTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SERVPRO INDUSTRIES, LLC,
Appellants
v.
REED GASKIN AND BRITTANY GASKIN
Appellees

ON APPEAL FROM THE 453RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS:

Appellant Servpro Industries, LLC files this appeal from an order denying its

Special Appearance and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction in

Cause No. 25-0760-DCE, Reed Gaskin and Brittany Gaskin v. Argus Environmental

Consultants, LLC, et al., in the 453rd Judicial District Court of Hays County, Texas,

before the Honorable Judge Sherri K. Tibbe.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellees Reed and Brittany Gaskin (“Appellees”) brought this lawsuit

against Defendants Argus Environmental Consultants, LLC, Radiant Remediation,

1
LLC, Howard Environmental, LLC, Servpro Industries, LLC (“SIL”) and CTX1

Restoration, LLC d/b/a Servpro of San Marcos (“CTX1”), incorrectly named D.I.

Management, LLC d/b/a San Marcos Servpro Enterprises, LLC, 1 alleging negligent

mold remediation at their house located at 965 Blue Oak Boulevard, San Marcos

Texas 78666 (“the house”).

In their Petition, Appellees allege they purchased the house from Defendant

Perry Homes, LLC (“Perry”) in September 2022 and that, after purchasing of the

house, they discovered mold. CR 39. The Petition further alleges that Perry

contracted with CTX1 to perform mold remediation, and CTX1’s remediation was

negligent. CR 39. Finally, the Petition alleges that SIL is vicariously liable for

CTX1’s alleged negligence. CR 40.

CTX1 is a franchisee of Servpro Franchisor, LLC (“SFL”), which is a

franchisor of fire and water damage remediation companies throughout the Country.

CR 47. SIL is the manager of SFL. CR 46. SIL is incorporated in Nevada and based

in Tennessee. CR 47. SIL and SFL do not directly provide fire and water damage

remediation services to the general public. CR 47.

SIL never entered into a contract to perform and never performed any work at

Appellees’ house in Texas. CR 48. SIL has never been retained to act as, and has

1
The Petition was served on CTX1. CTX1 is unaware of how Appellees came to believe that
CTX1’s corporate name is D.I. Management, LLC d/b/a San Marcos Servpro Enterprises, LLC,
which it is not.

2
never acted as, a general contractor, contractor, or subcontractor regarding

Appellees’ house in Texas. CR 48.

According to the Authorization to Perform Services and Direction of Payment

contract (“the contract”), CTX1 contracted with Perry on August 29, 2023 to

perform certain services at the house. CR 48, 95–96. Paragraph 1 of the Terms and

Conditions of Service in the contract states that CTX1 is a franchise and that SIL is

not a party to the contract:

The SERVPRO Franchise identified on the front of this Contract (the
“Provider”) is an independent contractor who agrees to perform the
services identified on the front of this Contract (the “Services”) …
Servpro Industries, Inc., the Franchisor, is not a party to any agreement
with Client, is not a guarantor of the Provider’s Services, and is not
subject to liability arising out of such Services.

CR 96 (emphasis added).

Here again, SFL is the franchisor of CTX1. The relationship between SFL and

CTX1 is governed by the Franchise License Agreement they entered into in July

2022. CR 47, 50–94. CTX1 is an independently owned and operated Servpro

franchisee. CR 47. SIL and SFL do not own, operate, or control CTX1. CR 47. SIL

and SFL do not control the day-to-day operations of CTX1. CR 47.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Appellees cannot show that SIL engaged in any conduct or has contacts with

Texas necessary to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction by Texas courts on

3
either a general or specific jurisdiction basis. In the first instance, SIL is not a Texas

corporation and does not have its principal place of business, or any place of

business, in Texas. Rather, SIL’s contacts with Texas are limited to it being the

manager of SFL, which has franchisees in Texas. It is well established that having

franchisees in a state is not grounds for personal jurisdiction against the franchisor.

Finally, SIL has absolutely no connection whatsoever to Appellees’ claims in this

action as they involve alleged negligent mold remediation, which SIL did not have

any contractual relation to, and did not perform, direct, control, supervise or have

any involvement or play any role in.

ARGUMENT & AUTHORITY

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

A trial court’s denial of a special appearance is reviewed under a mixed

standard of review. Ennis v. Loiseau, 164 S.W.3d 698, 706 (Tex. App.—Austin

2005, no pet.) (citing BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794

(Tex. 2002)). The appellate court defers to the trial court's resolution of contested

facts so long as the findings are supported by legally and factually sufficient

evidence. Id. The trial court’s application of those facts to the law is reviewed de

novo. Id.

When no findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed by the trial court, as

is applicable here, all relevant facts that are necessary to support the judgment and

4
supported by the evidence are implied. Id. When the appellate record includes the

reporter's record and clerk's record, the implied findings are not conclusive and may

be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency. Id.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING SIL’S SPECIAL APPEARANCE.

A. Federal Due Process Must Be Satisfied To Exert Personal
Jurisdiction.

Texas courts may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident

defendant unless federal due process requirements and the Texas long-arm statute

are satisfied. See Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 806

(Tex. 2002); CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1996); Helicopteros

Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 412–13 (1984); Tex. CIV. PRAC.

& REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042(1). “The Texas long-arm statute reaches as far as the

federal constitutional requirements of due process will allow.” Coleman, 83 S.W.3d

at 806. “Thus, the Texas long-arm statute requirements are satisfied if exercising

jurisdiction comports with federal due process limitations.” Id. As such, federal court

caselaw regarding personal jurisdiction is instructive.

Federal due process requirements are satisfied if (1) the nonresident defendant

has “minimum contacts” with Texas; and (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction

over the nonresident defendant does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice.” See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 412–13; CSR Ltd., 925 S.W.2d at

594 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). The courts

5
examine “minimum contacts” in terms of (1) specific personal jurisdiction; and (2)

general personal jurisdiction. See CSR Ltd., 925 S.W.2d at 595.

B. Texas Rule Of Civil Procedure 120a

Under Rule 120a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure a party may make a

special appearance for the “purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over

the person or property of the defendant on the ground that such party or property is

not amenable to process issued by the courts of this State.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a.

Under Rule 120a(3) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a “court shall determine

the special appearance on the basis of the pleadings, any stipulations made by and

between the parties, such affidavits and attachments as may be filed by the parties,

the results of discovery processes, and any oral testimony.” Id.

Initially, the plaintiff bears the burden to plead sufficient allegations to bring

a nonresident defendant within the provisions of the Texas long-arm statute. Kelly

v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2010). Once the plaintiff

satisfies the initial burden, the defendant challenging jurisdiction has the burden to

negate all bases for personal jurisdiction and focus its arguments to allegations in

the plaintiff's pleading. Western Techs., Inc. v. Omnivations II, LLC, 583 S.W.3d

786, 791 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.).

Personal jurisdiction can be negated on either a factual or legal basis. Kelly,

301 S.W.3d at 659. Factually, “the defendant can present evidence that it has no

6
contacts with Texas, effectively disproving the plaintiff's allegations.” Id. “The

defendant may attack the legal basis for personal jurisdiction in any of the following

ways: challenging the legal sufficiency of the jurisdictional facts; showing that its

contacts do not rise to the level of purposeful availment; for specific jurisdiction,

that the plaintiff's claims do not arise from the defendant's contacts; or that the

exercise of jurisdiction offends the traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice. If a nonresident defendant has presented evidence to disprove the

jurisdictional allegations, the plaintiff must respond with evidence establishing

personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.” Id.

Here, SIL filed a Special Appearance in the trial court requesting dismissal

based on a lack of personal jurisdiction over SIL. As set forth below, the trial court

committed error in denying the Special Appearance. 2

C. SIL Does Not Have Sufficient “Minimum Contacts” With Texas.

Personal jurisdiction can be either general or specific. Daimler AG v. Bauman,

571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ops., S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915

(2011). Under either theory, the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with due

process. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (“a state court’s assertion of jurisdiction exposes

defendants to the State’s coercive power and is therefore subject to review for

2
SIL previously filed an identical Special Appearance in an action that was pending in Tarrant
County District Court seeking dismissal on grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction and the court
granted the Special Appearance and dismissed SIL for lack of personal jurisdiction. CR 98–99.

7
compatibility with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause”) (citing

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980); Milliken v.

Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). The Due Process Clause precludes a court from

exercising jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant unless the defendant has

sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that “maintenance of the

suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Walden

v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014) (quoting Intern. Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).

Where personal jurisdiction relies on the defendant's “minimum contacts”

with the forum state, the extent to which a court can exercise personal jurisdiction

over a non-resident defendant depends on the nature and quality of the defendant’s

contacts with the forum state. In such a case:

a distinction is made between “specific” [or “limited”] jurisdiction and
“general” jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction exists when “a state
exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of
or related to defendant’s contacts with the forum; a court’s general
jurisdiction, on the other hand, is based on the defendant’s general
business contacts with the forum state and permits a court to exercise
its power in a case where the subject matter of the suit is unrelated to
those contacts.

Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414–16.

1. The trial court lacks general jurisdiction over SIL.

An exercise of general personal jurisdiction over a company comports with

due process only if its in-state contacts are “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to

8
render [it] essentially at home” in the forum. Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 122 (citing

Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). A company is “essentially at home” in (1) the state

where it is incorporated, and (2) the state where it operates its principal place of

business. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924. A corporation’s “principal place of business,”

in turn, is “the place where a corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate

the corporation’s activities” and is “normally … the place where the corporation

maintains its headquarters.” Hertz Corp. v Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010).

Although it may be possible that a “corporation’s operations in a forum other than

its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial

and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State,” such a case

would be “exceptional.” Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19.

Here, SIL is incorporated in Nevada and maintains its principal place of

business in Gallatin, Tennessee. CR 46. As such, SIL simply may not be subjected

to general (or all-purpose) jurisdiction in the federal or state courts of Texas.

The contacts Appellees claim SIL has with Texas are no different from those

it has with any other state in which SFL franchisees operate. If contacts are the same

everywhere, they are exceptional nowhere. Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 139 n.20 (“A

corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of

them. Otherwise, ‘at home’ would be synonymous with ‘doing business’….”).

9
It is widely accepted that a franchise system like the one reflected by the

Franchise Licensing Agreement between SFL and CTX1 does not provide general

or specific jurisdiction over the franchisor in every state in which it has franchisees.

See e.g., Fidrych v Marriott Int’l, Inc., 952 F.3d 124 (4th Cir. 2020); Chufen Chen v

Dunkin’ Brands, Inc., 954 F.3d 492 (2d. Cir. 2020); Madden v. Petland Summerville,

LLC, 2021 WL 5770294, *3 (D. S.C. 2021); Roman v. Affinity Worldwide, LLC,

2020 WL 8339208, *5 (W.D. Mo. 2020); Nutt v. Best Western Int’l, 2016 WL

6780708, *3 (M.D. Pa. 2016); Fields v. Ramada Inn, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 1033, 1036–

39 (E.D. Penn. 1993); Wright v. American Standard, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 241, 244-45

(E.D. Penn. 1985); Oddi v. Mariner-Denver, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 306, 310 (S.D. Ind.

1978).

For example, the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that general

jurisdiction did not exist over Marriott in South Carolina. Fidrych, 952 F.3d at 134.

This was so even though Marriott had a Certificate of Authority to conduct business

in South Carolina, had sixty-three South Carolina franchisees, and licensed or

managed twenty-seven other hotels in the state. Id. at 128. The Fourth Circuit agreed

that Marriott’s contacts “certainly qualify as systematic and continuous,” but took

the final required analytical step to nevertheless find that they were “not substantial

enough to ‘render [Marriott] essentially at home in [South Carolina].’” Id. at 134

(quoting Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 139). As the court observed, “there is nothing that

10
would distinguish Marriott’s relationship with South Carolina from its relationship

with any of the other states where it does business….” Id. The Fidrych court pointed

out that a contrary holding “would mean that Marriott would be subject to general

jurisdiction in every state where its hotels are located.” Id. The court further

explained that “[t]he Plaintiffs’ argument is thus precisely the ‘unacceptably

grasping’ argument rejected by the Daimler Court.” Id.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion despite

Dunkin Donuts’ nationwide marketing on behalf of franchisees. 3 Chufen Chen, 954

F.3d at 500. In Chufen Chen v. Dunkin Brands, Inc., the plaintiffs claimed that New

York could exercise general jurisdiction over Dunkin’ Donuts because it is “a

franchisor with numerous retail establishments in New York” and “governs … and

controls nationwide product labeling and advertising.” Id. The court rejected that

contention as inconsistent with Daimler. Id. As the court observed, there was “no

3
Here, SIL is the manager of the franchisor SFL. Appellees’ primary argument to the trial court
was that a franchisor’s engaging in nationwide advertising on behalf of its franchisees somehow
changes the analysis and confers personal jurisdiction in every state where the franchisor engages
in such advertising. That is simply not the case. See Chufen Chen, 954 F.3d at 500 (holding that
nationwide advertising by a franchisor on behalf of its franchisees is not sufficient to confer
personal jurisdiction over the franchisee in every state where it advertises); Fields, 816 F. Supp. at
1037-38 (same); Nutt, 2016 WL 6780708, *3 (same); Labranche v. Embassy Suites, Inc., 1999
WL 39519, *3 (E.D. La. 1999) (same); see also Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195 (4th
Cir. 1993) (stating that advertising activities within a state are not sufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction).

11
showing that the company’s relationship with New York was in any way significant

or exceptional in relation to the company’s nationwide business activity.” Id.

For the foregoing reasons, SIL simply cannot not be subjected to general (or

all-purpose) jurisdiction in the federal or state courts of Texas.

2. The trial court lacks specific jurisdiction over SIL because
SIL has not performed any conduct related to the allegations
in this lawsuit.
In order for a court to exercise specific jurisdiction, “the suit must arise out of

or relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum” such that there is “an affiliation

between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, an activity or an

occurrence that takes place in the forum State.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super.

Ct. of California, San Francisco Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017) (internal citations

omitted). The due process “inquiry focuses on the relationship among the defendant,

the forum and the litigation.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 283 n.6, 287 (2014) (citation

omitted).

“For a State to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the

defendant's suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum

State.” Id. at 284. Appellees must demonstrate (1) that SIL purposefully established

contacts with the State of Texas (“purposeful availment”); (2) that their causes of

action arise out of or are related to SIL’s contacts with Texas; and (3) that the trial

court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction in this matter comports with recognized

12
concepts of “fair play and substantial justice” (the “reasonableness” requirement).

See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-478 (1985).

The Supreme Court of Texas applies a three-pronged test in determining the

constitutional reach of the state's jurisdiction over nonresidents who maintain only a

single or few contacts with Texas. To maintain jurisdiction over nonresidents such

as SIL:

(1) the nonresident defendant or foreign corporation must purposefully
do some act or consummate some transaction in the forum state; (2) the
cause of action must arise from, or be connected with such act or
transaction; and (3) the assumption of jurisdiction by the forum state
must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,
consideration being given to the quality, nature, and extent of the
activity in the forum state, the relative convenience of the parties, the
benefits and protection of the laws of the forum state afforded the
respective parties, and the basic equities of the situation.
O'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966)

Appellees must satisfy all three of these requirements in order to establish that

this Court has specific jurisdiction over SIL. Id. Thus, this Court cannot exercise

specific jurisdiction over SIL unless Appellees show a substantial connection

between the allegedly tortious conduct and SIL’s contacts with Texas.

Here, Appellees cannot satisfy these constitutional requirements. Appellees’

claim does not arise out of SIL’s conduct within the State of Texas. SIL has never

performed work or services at or contracted with an entity or person to perform work

or services at the house and SIL employees were never at the house. CR 48. The

13
contract was entered between CTX1 and Perry; SIL is not a party to the contract. CR

48. In fact, Paragraph 1 of the Terms and Conditions of Service of the contract

expressly states that the only party to the contract is the franchise:

The SERVPRO Franchise identified on the front of this Contract (the
“Provider”) is an independent contractor who agrees to perform the
services identified on the front of this Contract (the “Services”) …
Servpro Industries, Inc., the Franchisor, is not a party to any agreement
with Client, is not a guarantor of the Provider’s Services, and is not
subject to liability arising out of such Services.

CR 96.

Here, there is simply no relationship between any transaction by SIL and any

of the causes of action alleged by Appellees. Furthermore, as discussed above, SIL’s

association with a franchise operation that has franchisees in Texas is in no way

shape or form grounds for Texas courts to exercise jurisdiction over SIL. As such,

neither general or specific personal jurisdiction can be exercised over SIL without

violating its rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

CONCLUSION & PRAYER

For these reasons, the trial court erred in denying Appellant Servpro

Industries, LLC’s Special Appearance. Appellant respectfully requests that the Court

reverse the trial court’s order denying its Special Appearance and render judgment

in favor of Servpro Industries, LLC dismissing all claims and causes of action

14
against it with prejudice, awarding it with its costs, and providing any other relief to

which it may be entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

SERPE ANDREWS, PLLC

By: Christopher D. Knudsen
Christopher D. Knudsen
Texas Bar No. 24041268
cknudsen@serpeandrews.com
2929 Allen Parkway, Suite 1600
Houston, Texas 77019
Telephone: (713) 452-4400
Facsimile: (713) 452-4499

Attorneys for Appellant, Servpro
Industries, LLC

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that the foregoing Appellant’s Brief is computer generated,
has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-point for text and
12-point for footnotes, contains 3,378 words according to the word count function
of the computer program used to prepare this Brief, excluding any parts exempted
by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1), and otherwise complies with Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.4.

/s/ Christopher D. Knudsen
Christopher D. Knudsen

15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
instrument has been forwarded to all known counsel of record in accordance with
the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure on November 17, 2025.

Christopher D. Knudsen
Christopher D. Knudsen

16
Receiv~d at District Clerk's Office FILED
On 101112025 12: 19 PM 10/15/2025 1:58 PM
Amanda K. Calvert
District Clerk
Hays County, Texas

CAUSE NO. 25-0760-DCE

REED GASKIN AND BRITTANY § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
GASKIN, §
§
Plaintiffs, §
§
V. § HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
ARGUS ENVIRONMENTAL, §
CONSULTANTS LLC, RADIANT §
REMEDIATION, LLC, HOWARD §
ENVIRONMENTAL LLC, SERVPRO §
INDUSTRIES, INC., AND D.I. §
MANAGEMENT, LLC d/b/a SAN §
MARCOS SERVPRO ENTERPRISES, §
LLC §
§
Defendants § 453TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

ORDER DENYING SERVPRO INDUSTRIES, LLC'S
SPECIAL APPEARANCE

After considering Defendant Servpro Industries, LLC's ("SIL") Special

Appearance and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, Plaintiffs'

response, SIL's reply, and the arguments of counsel, the Court finds that SIL's Special

Appearance and Motion to Dismiss should be denied. It is therefore,

ORDERED that SIL's Special Appearance and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Personal Jurisdiction is hereby DENIED .

Signed on the 2 day of [)et , 2025

JUDGE PRESIDING

APPENDIX A 360
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Kimberly Palmer on behalf of Christopher Knudsen
Bar No. 24041268
kpalmer@serpeandrews.com
Envelope ID: 108128180
Filing Code Description: Brief Requesting Oral Argument
Filing Description: Appellant's Brief
Status as of 11/17/2025 2:36 PM CST

Case Contacts

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Jordan Corn jordan@johnson-attorneys.com 11/17/2025 2:20:08 PM NOT SENT

Christopher Johnson chris@johnson-attorneys.com 11/17/2025 2:20:08 PM NOT SENT

Jennifer Taylor jtaylor@brstexas.com 11/17/2025 2:20:08 PM NOT SENT

Roel Garcia rgarcia@brstexas.com 11/17/2025 2:20:08 PM NOT SENT

James Rudnicki james@brstexas.com 11/17/2025 2:20:08 PM NOT SENT

Lawrence Chang Law.Chang@choateaustin.com 11/17/2025 2:20:08 PM NOT SENT

Lawrence chang Law.Chang@choateaustin.com 11/17/2025 2:20:08 PM NOT SENT

Christopher Knudsen cknudsen@serpeandrews.com 11/17/2025 2:20:08 PM NOT SENT

Kimberly Palmer kpalmer@serpeandrews.com 11/17/2025 2:20:08 PM NOT SENT