Jeanette Jimmerson of the Texas Military Department – Texas State Guard; Darren Fitzgerald of the Texas State Military – Texas State Guard; Joe Cave of the Texas Military Department – Texas State Guard; And Texas Military Department – Texas State Guard v. San Juanita Medeles

ACCEPTED
15-25-00119-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
8/18/2025 11:05 PM
NO.15-25-00119-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK
FILED IN -
15th COURT OF --
---APPEALS
- - -
AUSTIN, --- TEXAS P
- - ---- CA ------
8/18/2025- - 11:05:49
D - PM
) -
--- IN VO THE
I
- - - ----
JEANETTE JIMMERSON OF THE TEXAS CHRISTOPHER -- A. PRINE
----
FIFTEENTH
MILITARY -TEXAS STATE GUARD, ---- Clerk
COURT OF
DARREN FITZGERALD OF THE TEXAS APPEAL
MILITARY - TEXAS STATE GUARD, JOE
CAVE OF THE TEXAS MILITARY
DEPARTMENT -TEXAS STATE GUARD and RECEIVED IN
TEXAS MILITARY DEPARTMENT -TEXAS 15th COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
STATE GUARD
8/18/2025 11:05:49 PM
Appellants CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
V. )
SAN JUANITA MEDELES
) OF
Appellee TRAVIS
COUNTY,
TEXAS

APPELLEE’S SUR-REPLY BRIEF

(In Response to New Issues Raised in Appellants’ Reply Brief)

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE COURT:

San Juanita Medeles, Appellee, respectfully submits this Sur-Reply Brief, pursuant to the Court’s
order permitting further briefing to address new arguments and misrepresentations presented for
the first time in Appellants’ Reply Brief. For the reasons set forth herein, Appellants’ Reply
lacks legal or factual merit and should be denied in its entirety.
I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellants’ Reply Brief introduces new and improper arguments concerning timeliness,
mootness, and declaratory relief that were never briefed in the trial court—nor supported by
binding authority. For the first time, Appellants attempt to manufacture a procedural technicality
as a basis to evade well-founded claims. This effort is not only unavailing under Texas law but
further underscores the Appellants’ continuing attempt to avoid judicial scrutiny of their
undisputed misconduct. Equally concerning, Appellants failed to answer key allegations and
have now twice been denied their plea to the jurisdiction, signaling strongly that their procedural
posturing is an attempt to avoid a full and fair airing of the merits of Appellee’s claims.

II. REBUTTAL OF NEWLY RAISED ISSUES

A. Appellants’ Jurisdictional Timeline Argument Contradicts Texas Law
Appellants devote substantial attention to the supposed clarity of § 51.014, yet their argument
overlooks both the text of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and governing case law.
Contrary to the Appellants' assertions, the Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that
interlocutory appeals are to be strictly construed; the deadlines and statutory limits imposed by
the Legislature are not mere technicalities but go to the jurisdiction of the court. See Bonsmara
Nat. Beef Co., LLC v. Hart of Texas Cattle Feeders, LLC, 603 S.W.3d 385, 402 (Tex. 2020); City
of Houston v. Rhule, 377 S.W.3d 734 (Tex. App. 2012). This Court should defer to the trial
court’s factual findings unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion, which is not even
alleged here.
Although Appellants argue that no strict 180-day deadline is imposed by § 51.014(c), they fail to
address the reality that, throughout the trial court proceedings, they never raised, briefed, or
secured a definitive ruling on many of the timeliness questions now before this Court. Moreover,
Appellants did not move promptly for relief upon the denial of their first plea to the jurisdiction,
thereby contributing to the procedural posture they now seek to exploit. Delay cannot be
rewarded where the equities and the established record show Appellee has diligently pressed her
claims.
Moreover, rule-based deadlines are designed to promote judicial efficiency and not to afford a
party indefinite or discretionary access to interlocutory review. See City of Dallas v. Albert, 140
S.W.3d 920
B. Mootness Doctrine Does Not Apply—Substantial Controversies Remain
Appellants claim that Appellee’s action is moot due to the unilateral post-litigation modification
of her discharge status, stripping her case of any live controversy. This contention is mistaken for
both factual and legal reasons.
First, Texas law is clear: “A case becomes moot if a controversy ceases to exist or the parties
lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d
137, 55 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 803 (Tex. 2012). But crucially, “Governments should not be able to
evade judicial review…by temporarily altering their behavior.” Id. at 162–63. The Supreme
Court held in Heckman, “a party’s unilateral action does not invariably render a case moot unless
it is absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to
recur.”
Appellee’s “injury”—including reputational harm, due process deprivation, and ongoing
employment repercussions—was not corrected in full, and the Texas Military Department’s
“voluntary cessation” came only after litigation commenced. As In re Kellogg Brown & Root,
Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005), cautions: “the voluntary cessation of the challenged
action does not, in itself, moot a case.” Rather, a case is only moot if it is “absolutely clear that
the challenged conduct could not reasonably be expected to recur.”
Second, Appellants’ own admissions and changes to Appellee’s status confirm that the
challenged conduct could recur and has not been rendered “absolutely clear” or incapable of
repetition. The professional and legal consequences for Appellee remain unresolved, with her
service record and future career prospects still clouded by the process that TMD itself repudiated
only after being sued.
C. Appellee’s Claim for Declaratory Relief Is Justiciable and Supported by Texas Authority
The Appellants acknowledged in the record that they imposed a discharge status requiring a
court-martial without providing that process. This is the quintessential ultra vires act subject to
judicial review. The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that sovereign immunity
does not bar claims to compel state officials to conform their conduct to the law: “Sovereign
immunity does not preclude prospective declaratory or injunctive relief against state officials
who act without legal authority”[Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 621–22
(Tex. 2011); City of Elsa v. M.A.L., 226 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. 2007)].
As the Court stated in City of Elsa: “Governmental entities may be sued for injunctive relief
under the Texas Constitution.” Appellants’ post-facto “correction” was reactive, not remedial:
Appellee still suffers from the original wrongful action, which is not cured by half-measures.
Appellants also contend that all requests for declaratory relief are advisory, as if Appellee seeks
only hypothetical statements. On the contrary, Appellee’s pleadings, consistent with Texas law,
seek concrete, real-world remedies: (1) expungement of wrongful governmental action; (2)
reinstatement; and (3) correction of her service record due to ultra vires conduct.
Appellants argue, incorrectly, that the UDJA is unavailable to Appellee because of an alleged
lack of contractual nexus. In Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., the Texas Supreme
Court clarified, “The UDJA is available to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with
respect to rights, status, and other legal relation… The UDJA is not limited to contractual
disputes”. Furthermore, the Court reiterated, “A declaratory judgment is appropriate only if a
justiciable controversy exists as to the rights and status of the parties and the controversy will be
resolved by the declaration sought”[Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex.
1995)].
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act “is remedial and is to be liberally construed” to provide
relief from “uncertainty and insecurity” regarding legal rights. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air
Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993). A declaratory judgment is not advisory if the
plaintiff is “‘directly aggrieved by the conduct of which [s]he complains’”—even when the
alleged governmental wrongdoing has been “retracted” after suit was filed. Id.; see also City of
Elsa v. M.A.L., 226 S.W.3d 390, 391–92 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (“When the challenged
conduct could recur at the discretion of the defendant, the case is not moot.”).
Here, Appellee’s dispute alleges ongoing harm and incomplete restoration of rights and status;
thus, the controversy remains live and is precisely the type of situation that the UDJA is
equipped to address.
Furthermore, as the Texas Supreme Court explained in University of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. at
Dallas v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 357–58 (Tex. 2004): “A declaratory judgment is
appropriate when a real controversy exists between the parties and that controversy will be
resolved by the declaration sought.” Appellant’s position misreads both Appellee’s requested
relief and settled law.

III. The Appellants’ Failure to File an Answer or to Join Issue on the Merits
Rather than joining issue on the facts or defending the fairness of their actions on the merits,
Appellants have repeatedly avoided a substantive answer—opting instead for serial pleas to the
jurisdiction, now denied twice by the trial court. Appellants accuse Appellee of delay, yet it is
Appellants who, by failing to file any substantive factual answer and by pursuing repetitive
jurisdictional challenges, have blocked progress and sought to insulate themselves from a merits
determination.
Similarly, as the Supreme Court made clear in Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133
S.W.3d 217, 229 (Tex. 2004), the jurisdictional inquiry must not be a tool for evasion of a full
and fair airing of disputed facts, especially when “the pleadings and evidence raise a fact issue
regarding jurisdiction.” Here, the trial court’s repeated denial of Appellants’ jurisdictional pleas
underscores that there are substantial, unresolved fact issues suitable only for trial.

IV. THE APPELLANTS’ ADMISSION OF WRONGDOING AND THE ABSENCE OF A
GOOD FAITH DEFENSE
Appellants have already admitted by conduct—unilaterally amending Appellee’s discharge
status post-litigation—that their original discharge was ultra vires. “Actions taken without legal
authority are not protected by immunity,” Heinrich v. City of Houston, 284 S.W.3d 366, 378
(Tex. 2009). Post hoc administrative “corrections” do not erase liability for harm already done;
instead, they confirm the existence of the ultra vires claim and bolster Appellee’s standing to
demand judicial relief.
As the Supreme Court made clear in Heckman: “Merely voluntarily ceasing a challenged action
does not deprive a court of the power to determine the legality of the practice.” 369 S.W.3d at
162.
V. APPELLANTS FAIL TO REBUT ALLEGATIONS OF RETALIATION AND DUE
PROCESS VIOLATIONS
Appellants have not addressed—or have flatly ignored—multiple allegations of retaliation,
violations of due process, and the concrete consequences suffered by Appellee. The failure to
provide a sufficient answer in the district court and the failure to rebut with record evidence
further underscores the weakness of Appellants’ merits. As the Supreme Court has indicated,
procedural missteps and failure to join issues on critical points weigh heavily against the party
seeking to overturn adverse trial court findings[City of Desoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389, 393
(Tex. 2009)].

VI. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
In sum, Appellants’ Reply Brief is devoid of merit, founded on mischaracterizations of both the
facts and controlling Texas law, and continues a pattern of procedural avoidance. The denial of
the plea to jurisdiction by the lower court was correct and should be affirmed. The Court should
set this case for trial on the merits, where the facts—admitted or undisputed—can finally be
adjudicated.

Appellee respectfully prays that this Honorable Court:
1. Deny Appellants’ attempted interlocutory appeal;
2. Affirm the denial of the plea to jurisdiction;
3. Remand this case to the trial court for consideration on the merits; and
4. Grant any further relief at law or in equity to which Appellee may show herself justly
entitled.

Dated: August 18, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

TARA P. ENAHORO, ESQ.

TPC Enahoro Law Group, PLLC

1642 Crescent Drive

Tarrytown, NY 10591
Tel: (212) 470-4080

tara@tpcenahorolaw.com

Texas Bar No. 24136188

Attorney for Appellee, San Juanita Medeles

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on August 18, 2025, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Leave to File Sur-
Reply Brief was served via the Court’s electronic filing system on:

Denver Burris

Assistant Attorney General

Office of the Attorney General

P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station

Austin, TX 78711-2548

denver.burris@oag.texas.gov

Counsel for Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), I certify that this motion contains 1,943 words,
excluding the caption, signature blocks, certificates, and headings. This document complies with the type-
volume limitation and formatting requirements under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Tara Enahoro on behalf of TARA ENAHORO
Bar No. 24136188
tara@tpcenahorolaw.com
Envelope ID: 104531764
Filing Code Description: Other Brief
Filing Description: Sur reply
Status as of 8/19/2025 7:07 AM CST

Case Contacts

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Michelle Norred michelle.norred@oag.texas.gov 8/18/2025 11:05:49 PM SENT

Denver Burris Denver.Burris@oag.texas.gov 8/18/2025 11:05:49 PM SENT

denver burris denver.burris@oag.texas.gov 8/18/2025 11:05:49 PM SENT

Tara Enohoro tara@tpcenahorolaw.com 8/18/2025 11:05:49 PM SENT

Tara Peaches Enahoro tara@tpcenahorolaw.com 8/18/2025 11:05:49 PM SENT