Roane-Williams Texas Minerals, LLC v. EOG Resources, Inc. and Reagan Smith Energy Solutions, Inc.

NUMBER 13-23-00569-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

ROANE-WILLIAMS
TEXAS MINERALS, LLC, Appellant,

v.

EOG RESOURCES, INC. AND
REAGAN SMITH ENERGY
SOLUTIONS, INC., Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 218TH DISTRICT COURT
OF KARNES COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Cron and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina

In this oil and gas dispute, appellant Roane-Williams Texas Minerals, LLC (Roane)

sued appellees EOG Resources, Inc. (EOG) and Reagan Smith Energy Solutions, Inc.

(Reagan) on various causes of action. By ten issues, Roane contends that the trial court
erred by granting summary judgment in favor of appellees, failing to consider newly

presented evidence, and awarding attorney’s fees to appellees.1 We affirm.2

I. BACKGROUND

Roane, a family business comprised of William A. Roane, Jr., Louis M. Williams,

III, and James F. Roane II, owns an unleased, undivided 1/36 mineral interest in and

under 125 acres in Karnes County, Texas. The federal government owns an undivided

1/4 mineral interest in the same tract that is managed by the United States Bureau of

Land Management (BLM) and which is leased to EOG. The BLM was required to

authorize co-development of the federal government’s mineral interest via a

communitization agreement.3 Reagan agreed to provide consulting services to EOG and

to prepare, circulate for signature, and file a communitization agreement with BLM for

EOG. Reagan coordinated with BLM and the other interest owners, including Roane.4

A. Communitization Documents

In 2017, EOG began planning for the joint mining of minerals in what EOG calls

the “Blanc Unit.” In February 2018, Cheryl McDowell, a Reagan representative, sent

James a memorandum dated February 6, 2018, and a BLM Communitization Agreement

1 We have reorganized and renumbered Roane’s issues for purposes of our analysis.

2 This appeal was transferred from the Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio, Texas pursuant to

a docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001.
3 “Communitization agreements are ‘drilling agreements’ that allow ‘operators who cannot
independently develop separate tracts due to well-spacing or well development programs’ to instead
develop them cooperatively with other lessee operators. Their purpose is to ‘promot[e] conservation and
efficient utilization of minerals.’” Birdbear v. United States, 162 Fed. Cl. 225, 247 (2022) (internal citations
omitted).
4 Nonparties, Assurance Land and Minerals, LLC, Pagewood Interests, LLC, and PetroGulf
Corporation were also part of the communitization agreement with BLM.

2
dated September 15, 2017 (the 2017 CA). The 2017 CA covered 823.150 acres (the

Contract Area) in Karnes County and pertained to the “Blanc Unit #101 Well.” The 2017

CA stated that certain oil and gas interests and leases, including the BLM’s lease with

EOG and Roane’s unleased mineral interest, were set for communitization. The 2017 CA

also included a lease dated January 28, 2009, (the Ranch Lease) for 120.910 acres (Tract

120.910) of a 2,248.14-acre area known as the T Bar L Ranches tract (the Ranch Tract).

Thus, the Contract Area included 702.24 acres aside from Tract 120.910 for a total of

823.150 acres.

After James received the 2017 CA, McDowell sent an email requesting that Roane

sign the 2017 CA, return it to McDowell, and McDowell would then forward it to BLM for

approval. James forwarded the email to Mathew Grey, an EOG landman, for confirmation,

and Grey referred James to Brian Pond, a senior EOG landman. Pond informed James

by email that “[t]he [2017] CA is for the unit we are looking to form and co-develop” and

that “[t]he federal process takes so long that we wanted to get ahead of the process.”

Pond planned on “working on the [Joint Operating Agreement (JOA)] for the Blanc [Unit]

to send and for everyone to review.” The members of Roane signed the 2017 CA as

requested and sent it back to McDowell.5

According to Roane, the Ranch Lease restricts pooling depending on the

percentage of acres that are included; therefore, because Tract 120.910 encompasses

less than the required percentage of acres allowed to be pooled, EOG lacked “authority

5 PetroGulf and Pagewood signed the 2017 CA; however, neither Assurance nor the BLM signed

it.

3
to form the 823.15-acre communitization area described in the 2017 CA.” Thus, sometime

in August 2018, Reagan removed Tract 120.910 from the communitization proposal and

updated the coverage area to exclude Tract 120.910 and to only include the remaining

702.24 acres in an updated communitization agreement with BLM (the 2018 CA). The

2018 CA was then filed with BLM on September 7, 2018, and BLM approved it on July

24, 2019. Roane did not sign the 2018 CA.6

B. The Other Documents

On August 14, 2018, Andrew Shorrosh, an EOG landman, emailed James that

EOG was preparing a JOA for the “new Blanc Unit” that would include Roane’s mineral

interest and requesting that Roane execute and return documents relating to the Blanc

Unit, including the Blanc Unit JOA with exhibits, the Blanc Unit JOA Memorandum, and

the Blanc Horizontal Unit Designation (BHUD).

On August 31, 2018, James received the JOA and accompanying documents in

an email from Jacquelyn Leonard, an EOG senior land assistant. In this email, Reagan

notified James to expect a draft of the BHUD for his review and approval. James also

received the JOA along with several election letters in the mail in early September 2018.

On September 4, 2018, EOG issued well proposals (otherwise identified by the parties as

WPAs) and authorizations for expenses (AFEs) for each well, including Blanc Unit #101H,

Blanc Unit #102H, and Blanc C #103H. The WPAs and AFEs identified Roane’s non-

operating working interest under the JOA. A plat for each well accompanied each

6 Roane claims that it did not receive “a copy of the 2018 CA for review and execution before it

was filed . . . . Instead, Reagan simply and fraudulently removed the signature pages from the 2017 CA
(with the exception of Assurance) and attached the signature pages to the 2018 CA to create an altered
document.”

4
document showing that Tract 120.910 was “not pooled.” The AFEs stated how much

Roane would pay for drilling and completing each well. Roane signed the WPAs and

AFEs on September 13, 2018, electing to participate in the drilling of all three wells.

Roane signed the JOA on September 14, 2018.7 The JOA requires each party to

pay the amount of all operation costs and burdens of production in proportion to its

ownership interest unless “the Drilling Unit equals the Contract Area.” In that case, the

parties still bear all operation costs in proportion to their own ownership interest, but the

production burdens only for their respective tracts. Pursuant to the JOA, a drilling unit is

“the area fixed for the drilling of one well by order or rule of any state or federal body

having authority.” However, “[i]f a Drilling Unit is not fixed by such rule or order, a Drilling

Unit shall be the drilling unit as established by the pattern of drilling in the Contract Area

unless fixed by express agreement of the Drilling Parties.”

In early 2019, the parties signed the BHUD, agreeing that it became effective on

December 1, 2018. In the BHUD, the parties agreed to “unitize, consolidate, pool, and

combine their interests in the minerals beneath the 702.24-acre tract depicted in Exhibit

C . . . [for] drilling, development, operation, and production of oil [and] gas” from the unit.

Exhibit C depicts the same 702.24-acre area shown in the WPAs and AFEs that would

be pooled and showed that Tract 120.910 is not pooled.

EOG completed the wells. In March 2019, EOG issued two division orders showing

how EOG planned to pay Roane its share of production from the three wells. Roane

7 Assurance, Pagewood, and PetroGulf also signed the JOA. Assurance and Pagewood assigned

their JOA working interest, and by September 1, 2018, the non-working interest owners consisted of Roane,
and other entities not relevant to this appeal.

5
received those payments beginning in January 2019. In mid-2019, EOG sent a second

batch of WPAs and AFEs proposing new wells to be built and asking Roane whether it

would participate in the cost of drilling and completion of those wells. Roane executed the

WPAs and AFEs. The proposed wells were drilled and completed.

C. The Dispute

EOG states that it discovered in early July 2019 that “the net revenue interests

[NRI] reflected in the division order did not properly charge Roane for its proportional

share of all production burdens as required by the” JOA. EOG claimed that the drilling

unit did not encompass the entire Contract Area, and instead, the parties had agreed that

the drilling unit consisted of the 702.24 acres as described in the BHUD. Thus, EOG

asserted it overpaid “Roane on the first three wells.” EOG states that it then “informed

James . . . in writing of this error, explaining Roane’s corrected [NRI] for wells located

entirely within the 702.24-acre Drilling Unit is 0.00331668, not 0.00484148.” Roane

disputed EOG’s calculations, and EOG did not pay the amount Roane demanded.

Roane sued EOG in 2020 for breach of the JOA and the 2017 CA, declaratory

relief, Texas Natural Resources Code (TNRC) § 91.402 violations, fraud by non-

disclosure, negligent misrepresentation, and an accounting. It also claimed EOG had

underpaid because the drilling unit comprised the entire Contract Area of 823.15 acres;

therefore, it was responsible for “the production burdens only for [its] respective tract[].”

Roane also sued Reagan for fraud by non-disclosure and negligent misrepresentation.

D. Motions for Summary Judgment

EOG filed several motions for traditional and no evidence summary judgment on

6
Roane’s claims for breach of the JOA, breach of the 2017 CA, violations of the TNRC,

fraud by non-disclosure, negligent misrepresentation, declaratory judgment, and an

accounting. EOG further challenged Roane’s theory of respondeat superior and request

for exemplary damages. Reagan moved for summary judgment on Roane’s claims

against it. The trial court granted EOG’s and Reagan’s motions for summary judgment,

denied Roane’s motion for reconsideration based on allegedly newly discovered

evidence, and, after a bench trial, awarded attorney’s fees to EOG. This appeal followed.

II. NO EVIDENCE SUMMARY JUDGMENT

By its first issue, Roane contends that it met its summary judgment burden to raise

material issues of fact as to each element of its breach of the 2017 CA claim.

A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

Once the movant files a motion for no evidence summary judgment, “the burden

shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence raising an issue of material fact as to

the elements specified in the motion.” Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582

(Tex. 2006). “We review the evidence presented by the motion and response in the light

most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting

evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary

evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.” Id. (first citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168

S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005); and then citing Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 73

S.W.3d 193, 208 (Tex. 2002)).

A plaintiff asserting a breach-of-contract claim must prove (1) the existence
of a valid contract; (2) the plaintiff performed or tendered performance as
the contract required; (3) the defendant breached the contract by failing to
perform or tender performance as the contract required; and (4) the plaintiff

7
sustained damages as a result of the breach. To prove the first element (the
existence of a valid contract), the plaintiff must establish that (1) an offer
was made; (2) the other party accepted in strict compliance with the terms
of the offer; (3) the parties had a meeting of the minds on the essential terms
of the contract (mutual assent); (4) each party consented to those terms;
and (5) the parties executed and delivered the contract with the intent that
it be mutual and binding. A particular breach-of-contract claim may involve
disputes on any combination of these requirements, as well as on numerous
defenses the defendant may assert.

USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 502 n.21 (Tex. 2018) (cleaned up).

B. Discussion

First, Roane argues it raised material issues of fact concerning the existence of a

valid contract because in the 2017 CA, “EOG submitted an offer to Roane when Reagan,

EOG’s agent, sent the 2017 CA to Roane and requested that Roane sign it,” and Roane

accepted EOG’s offer “to contribute its mineral interest to the communitized area in

exchange for EOG’s agreement to contribute certain oil and gas leases to the same.”

In its petition, Roane asserted that EOG breached the 2017 CA by “its failure and

refusal to properly pay [Roane] all oil and/or gas revenues derived by [EOG] from the sale

of [Roane’s] interests without regard to any consequences under the . . . 2017 CA.”

Roane sought damages “associated with [EOG’s] failure and refusal to abide by the

express terms of the . . . 2017 CA,” which Roane claimed continued to “accrue monthly.”

EOG filed a motion for no evidence summary judgment challenging all elements of

Roane’s claim that EOG breached the 2017 CA. Thus, the burden shifted to Roane to

defeat EOG’s motion for summary judgment. See Mack Trucks, Inc., 206 S.W.3d at 582.

The 2017 CA does not set out any of the terms regarding how EOG would “properly

pay [Roane] all oil and/or gas revenues derived by [EOG] from the sale of [Roane’s]

8
interests.” See Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d at 502 n.21. The 2017 CA is a document that

merely purports to pool certain mineral interests for purposes of building a specific well.

It does not mention payment of mineral interests at all. See id. On appeal, Roane

acknowledges that the 2017 CA is a contract to pool mineral interests stating, “The offer

invited Roane to contribute its mineral interest to the communitized area in exchange for

EOG’s agreement to contribute certain oil and gas leases to the same” and that Roane

accepted this offer. Roane does not explain how a contract to pool mineral interests that

does not set out a payment method constitutes a contract for the payment of mineral

interests. Thus, Roane has not shown on appeal that the 2017 CA was a valid contract

concerning payment of royalties for its mineral interest. See id. Instead, Roane argues

that the 2017 CA combined with the JOA constituted the documents that “would govern

the operation of the Blanc Unit Contract Area.” This is the extent of Roane’s argument,

and we are unable to discern how Roane expects us to reverse the summary judgment

on this basis. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).

Next, Roane contends that it “also produced evidence that EOG breached the

2017 CA and that Roane was underpaid as a direct result of EOG’s failure to operate the

communitized area as an entirety and is not allocating production to the interest owners

in accordance with the express terms of the 2017 CA.” This is the extent of Roane’s

argument. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). However, as previously set out above, the 2017

CA does not set out a payment method, and Roane does not explain how by allegedly

failing to pay Roane properly, EOG breached a document that does not set out a method

of payment. See id. Moreover, Roane does not allege in its petition that EOG somehow

9
failed to properly pool the mineral interests. We are prohibited from making arguments on

appellant’s behalf, and we decline to decipher Roane’s argument.8 See id. We overrule

Roane’s first issue.

III. TRADITIONAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

By its second through seventh issues, Roane challenges the traditional summary

judgments.

A. Standard of Review

“Traditional summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material

fact as to at least one essential element of the cause of action being asserted and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Inwood Nat’l Bank v. Fagin, 706 S.W.3d

342, 346 (Tex. 2025). A defendant seeking a traditional summary judgment must either

disprove at least one element of each of the plaintiff’s causes of action or plead and

conclusively establish each essential element of an affirmative defense. Cathey v. Booth,

900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Sanchez v. Matagorda Cnty, 124 S.W.3d

350, 352 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.). A matter is conclusively

established if reasonable people could not differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from

the evidence. Franks v. Roades, 310 S.W.3d 615, 621 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 2010, no pet.) (citing City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 816). The burden then shifts

to the nonmovant to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Zavala v. Franco, 622 S.W.3d

612, 618 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, pet. denied); Amedisys, Inc. v. Kingwood Home

Health Care, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 507, 511 (Tex. 2014). A genuine issue of material fact

8 Roane does not address damages on appeal.

10
exists if there is more than a scintilla of evidence regarding the challenged element. Neely

v. Wilson, 418 S.W.3d 52, 59 (Tex. 2013).

We review the trial court’s granting of a traditional motion for summary judgment

de novo. Franks, 310 S.W.3d 615 at 620 (first citing Provident Life & Accident Ins. v.

Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003); and then citing Branton v. Wood, 100 S.W.3d

645, 646 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.)). Evidence favorable to the

nonmovant will be taken as true in deciding whether there is a disputed issue of material

fact. Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese, 148 S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex. 2004). All

reasonable inferences, including any doubts, must be resolved in favor of the nonmovant.

Id.

B. Breach of Contract

By its second issue, Roane contends that the summary judgment dismissing its

breach of the JOA claim against EOG is erroneous because “[t]here is a question whether

the parties ever expressly agreed to fix a Drilling Unit that was different from the JOA’s

Contract Area” and “[t]o the extent that there was ever a Drilling Unit established, it would

have been established by the 2017 CA or through a pattern of drilling.” Roane asserts

that the evidence shows that the Contract Area is the same as the Drilling Unit, and it

should not be “burdened by its proportionate share of all of the lease burdens, including

the burdens associated with the Ranch Lease, because it is only responsible for its share

of a 1/48 NPRI.” EOG responds that “[t]he plain language of twelve written agreements

conclusively establishes the parties repeatedly expressly agreed to fix the 702.24 acre

tract as a JOA ‘Drilling Unit.’”

11
Our primary concern in construing a written contract is “to ascertain the true

intentions of the parties as expressed in the instrument.” Valence Operating Co. v.

Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 662 (Tex. 2005). Therefore, we must “examine and consider

the entire writing in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the

contract so that none will be rendered meaningless.” Id. We give contract terms “their

plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meanings unless the contract itself shows them

to be used in a technical or different sense.” Id.

The dispute centers on two key provisions of the JOA. First, under the JOA, an

alternate cost-burden allocation applies if the drilling unit “is identical to the Contract

Area,” under which Roane must bear the burdens of production solely for its own interest.

If the drilling unit is not identical to the Contract Area, Roane must bear, equal to its

percentage of ownership, “all burdens on [its] share of the production from the Contract

Area.” This interpretation of the JOA is undisputed by the parties.

Next, the JOA states that the parties may fix a drilling unit either by a pattern of

drilling or “by express agreement.”9 The JOA defines a drilling unit as the area fixed for

the drilling of one well. See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 3.38 (providing that a “drilling

unit” is “[t]he acreage assigned to a well for drilling purposes”). The JOA does not purport

to create a drilling unit for any of the wells. Thus, there is nothing in the JOA stating that

the drilling unit is identical to the Contract Area, and the parties agree we must review

other documents to determine whether the drilling unit is identical to the Contract Area.

9 The JOA also allows a drilling unit to be created “by order or rule of any state or federal body

having authority.” It is undisputed that this is inapplicable to the facts of this case.

12
See Rieder v. Woods, 603 S.W.3d 86, 94 (Tex. 2020). The parties disagree about which

documents established the drilling unit. See id.

In its motion for summary judgment, EOG argued that the BHUD, WPAs, and AFEs

conclusively established that the parties agreed that the drilling unit consisted of the

702.24-acre tract. Roane argues that the BHUD does not establish a drilling unit because

although it may be construed with the JOA, it does not “purport to amend or otherwise

indicate any intent by the parties to amend the JOA or to establish a drilling unit.” Roane

further argues that the BHUD merely “pools” the land of the various lessees.

The BHUD, however, states that the parties, including Roane, agree to “unitize”

their interests in the minerals below the 702.24-acre tract depicted in Exhibit C for the

purpose of “drilling, develop[ing], operat[ing], and produc[ing],” oil and gas from the Blanc

Unit (emphasis added). The BHUD created a “unit” that “shall apply to all

production . . . whether from horizontal or vertical wells” (emphasis added). The BHUD

specifically sets out that the parties agree to “combine the acreage covered by the

leases . . . and all mineral, royalty, overriding royalty, and leasehold interest” into one “unit

containing seven-hundred and two 24/100 (702.24) surface acres.” The BHUD also

states, “The unit created hereby is designated as the Blanc Horizontal Unit.” Finally, the

BHUD references Exhibit B. Exhibit B states, “Attached to and made a part of the

designation of the Blanc Horizontal Unit,” and it sets forth the “metes and bounds

description of [the] 702.24 acre Unit.” Exhibit C, entitled “BLANC UNIT CALLED 702.24

ACRES KARNES COUNTY, TEXAS” is a plat showing that Tract 120.910 is not part of

the drilling unit. Furthermore, the attachments to the WPAs for each well, signed by

13
Roane, set out that the area fixed for the drilling of each well is the 702.24 acres and

excludes Tract 120.910. Additionally, EOG attached to its motion for summary judgment

an “As-Drilled Plat” for each well, which show that Tract 120.910 is not included within the

boundary of the drilling unit, not part of the Blanc Unit, and was not pooled. Therefore,

after examining and considering the documents and harmonizing and giving effect to all

the provisions so that none will be rendered meaningless, under their plain, ordinary, and

generally accepted meanings, we conclude that the evidence conclusively establishes

that the parties expressly agreed to fix the drilling unit of each well to the 702.24-acre

tract.10 See Valence Operating Co., 164 S.W.3d at 662. Thus, EOG established as a

matter of law that the drilling unit is not identical to the Contract Area.11 See id.

Next, Roane argues that the parties agreed in the 2017 CA that the drilling unit is

identical to the Contract Area because it “reflects the parties ‘desire to communitize and

pool their respective mineral interests in lands subject to this agreement for the purpose

of developing and producing communitized substances in accordance with the terms and

conditions of this agreement’” and the “plat attached to the 2017 CA as Exhibit A

describes the same acreage in the JOA Contract Area.”12 This is the extent of Roane’s

10 Roane argues that because it does not have a lease, if the parties failed to create a drilling unit,

then the default rule only applies to the non-operating working interest owners with leases. Given that we
have concluded that the drilling unit is not identical to the Contract Area, we reject this argument. Moreover,
Roane did not make this argument in the trial court, and therefore it is not preserved. See Dubose v.
Worker’s Med., P.A., 117 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (“Thus, the
failure to present issues to defeat summary judgment in the trial court waives the issues on appeal.” (citing
Kaye v. Harris Cnty Mun. Util. Dist. N. 9, 866 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no
writ))).
11 Reagan notes in its brief that “[o]f the 11 wells covered by the 11 AFE’s Roane signed, eight of

them were signed after EOG had communicated to Roane that it had overpaid Roane and would be
recalculating Roane’s burden . . . based on the 702 acre Drilling Unit instead of the 823 acre Contract Area.”
12 Roane argues in a separate section of its brief that “pooling” is not the same as creating a drilling

14
argument. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). We are not persuaded by this argument as Roane

has not established that the parties agreed in 2017 CA that the drilling unit of each of the

wells was identical to the Contract Area.13 We overrule Roane’s second issue.14

C. Declaratory Judgment

By its third issue, Roane contends that EOG was not entitled to summary judgment

dismissing its declaratory judgment claim.

1. Applicable Law

Declaratory relief pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) is a

remedy “that may be obtained with respect to a cause of action or other substantive right.”

Craig v. Tejas Promotions, LLC, 550 S.W.3d 287, 298 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, pet.

denied). The trial court may “declare rights, status, and other legal relations, which may

be either affirmative or negative in form.” Id. (cleaned up). The purpose of the UDJA “is

to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status,

and other legal relations and may be deployed where a justiciable controversy exists

regarding those matters that may be resolved with the declaration sought.” Id. (cleaned

up). A request for declaratory relief is moot “if the claim presents ‘no live controversy.’”

unit. However, in this argument, it appears to claim that, by pooling their mineral interests in the 2017 CA,
the parties created a drilling unit. See Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Discovery Operating, Inc., 554 S.W.3d
586, 596 (Tex. 2018) (noting that § 3.40(a) of the Texas Administrative Code “permit(s) operators to pool
acreage to create ‘a drilling unit or proration unit by filing an original certified plat’”).
13 The 2017 CA only pertained to the “Blanc Unit #101 Well.” There are no WPAs pertaining to this

well, and there is nothing in the record showing that this well was built.
14 Roane argues on appeal that “a Drilling Unit was established by a pattern of drilling, which means

the parties could not have intended to have the [BHUD] establish a Drilling Unit.” However, we have already
concluded that the parties set the drilling unit by express agreement. Therefore, we need not address this
argument. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

15
Etan Indus., Inc. v. Lehmann, 359 S.W.3d 620, 624 (Tex. 2011) (quoting Tex. A&M Univ.–

Kingsville v. Yarbrough, 347 S.W.3d 289, 290 (Tex. 2011)). “[D]eclaratory relief is not

warranted unless the claim presents a ‘substantial controversy’ of ‘immediacy and

reality.’” Id. (quoting Yarbrough, 347 S.W.3d at 291).

2. Discussion

Roane argues that the denial of declaratory relief was improper because “[t]he fact

that Roane asserted a claim for breach of contract does not preclude its ability to seek

declarations regarding its rights under the JOA”; “Roane was not simply asking for a

declaration that EOG had breached the JOA”; and “[a] breach of contract claim and a

request for declaratory judgment are not mutually exclusive.”

In the trial court, Roane sought, among other things, declarations that: EOG has

not made proper payment; the drilling unit “was fixed by the express agreement of the

parties to the JOA to be 823.15 acres, being identical to the Contract Area under the

JOA”; “[u]nder the JOA, [Roane] is burdened with only its proportionate share of the 1/48

NPRI burdening its unleased mineral interest”; and Roane’s “royalty and net revenue

interests are not burdened with any other leasehold burdens relating to the JOA.”

In its motion for summary judgment, EOG asserted that because the trial court had

already determined that it had not breached the JOA, the declarations Roane sought

effectively required a finding that EOG breached the JOA failed as a matter of law.15 EOG

stated that Roane’s “declaratory claim is utterly redundant such that no justiciable

15 EOG filed its first motion for summary judgment requesting dismissal of Roane’s breach of
contract claims. The trial court granted that motion. Subsequently, EOG filed its motion requesting dismissal
of Roane’s declaratory judgment claims.

16
controversy exists,” and that the declarations sought were “perfectly subsumed by

[Roane’s] breach of contract claim,” which had already been dismissed by the trial court.

EOG said, “There is simply no basis for allowing [Roane] to proceed on its duplicative

declaratory judgment claim, especially where [Roane’s] requested relief is fundamentally

at odds with” the trial court’s “dismissal of its breach of contract claim.” Finally, EOG

argued the declaratory judgment claim failed on the merits “because all parties to the

Blanc Unit JOA, including [Roane] expressly agreed to establish a 702.24-acre Drilling

Unit under the Blanc Unit JOA.”

In its brief, Roane provides a laundry list of declarations it sought and states, “None

of the declarations ask for a finding that there has been a breach of the JOA. Rather the

declarations sought to address the rights and legal relations of the parties to the JOA,

which is permissible.” Roane then states: “Simply put, Roane’s breach of contract claim

and declaratory judgment claim are somewhat related and the interpretation of the JOA

impacts both claims. However, even if Roane does not prevail on its breach of contract

claim, it is still entitled to a judgment declaring its rights under the JOA.” Although Roane

cites caselaw setting out that a declaratory action and a breach of contract claim can be

brought together, this is the only argument in Roane’s brief regarding this issue.

Roane does not address EOG’s summary judgment argument that its requests for

declarations were redundant and therefore no justiciable controversy exists in light of the

trial court’s previous ruling on the breach of contract claim, and it does not explain with

citation to pertinent authority and legal analysis why, although the breach of contract claim

and declaratory judgment claim are “somewhat related,” and the breach claim has been

17
resolved, it is “still entitled to a judgment declaring its rights under the JOA.” See TEX. R.

APP. P. 38.1(i).

Moreover, in its motion for summary judgment, EOG stated that Roane’s

“requested declarations presume that the Drilling Unit and the Contract Area are identical

in size and that EOG breached the Blanc Unit JOA by obligating [Roane] to bear its

proportionate, fair share of production burdens thereunder” and that because the trial

court had already determined EOG had not breached the JOA, such declarations were

improper. EOG argued that all of Roane’s requests for declarations were barred due to

the trial court’s dismissal of Roane’s breach of contract claim and that no justiciable

controversy exists. Roane has an appellate burden to challenge all bases for the trial

court’s summary judgment. See Gonzales v. Thorndale Coop. Gin & Grain Co., 578

S.W.3d 655, 657 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (“When the appellant

fails to challenge each possible summary-judgment ground, we must uphold the judgment

on the unchallenged grounds.”). Roane does not address each of EOG’s summary

judgment arguments on appeal. Accordingly, we must affirm the trial court’s summary

judgment on those grounds. See Jinsun, LLC v. Mireskandari, 694 S.W.3d 773, 777 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, no pet.) (“If summary judgment may have been

rendered, properly or improperly, on a ground not challenged on appeal, the judgment

must be affirmed.”); Dealer Comput. Servs., Inc. v. DCT Hollister Rd, LLC, 574 S.W.3d

610, 621 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (“When, as in this case, the

order granting summary judgment does not specify the grounds upon which the trial court

relied, we must affirm if an appellant fails to challenge all grounds on which summary

18
judgment may have been granted . . . even if summary judgment may have been

rendered improperly on the unchallenged ground.”). We overrule Roane’s third issue.16

D. TNRC

By its fourth issue, Roane contends that summary judgment was improper on its

claim pursuant to the TNRC because the Contract Area is identical to the drilling unit.

Roane states, “EOG’s ground for summary judgment on this claim was based entirely

upon its erroneous construction of the JOA, i.e., there was a Drilling Unit established that

was different in size than the JOA Contract Area.” We have determined that EOG’s

interpretation of the JOA is correct and affirmed the summary judgment on this basis.

Accordingly, we overrule Roane’s fourth issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

E. Fraud by Non-disclosure and Negligent Misrepresentation

By its fifth and sixth issues, Roane contends that summary judgment is improper

regarding its claims for fraud by non-disclosure and negligent misrepresentation because

fact questions exist regarding whether EOG and Reagan had a duty to disclose and

whether EOG and Reagan “made actionable statements regarding existing facts sufficient

to support a claim for negligent misrepresentation.”

1. EOG

EOG responds that it did not represent that it would develop the Contract Area as

one Drilling Unit and that “[i]f Roane ever had that impression, it could not have justifiably

relied on it as a matter of law” because “Roane agreed to a different Drilling

16 Roane has not challenged another basis for the trial court’s grant of summary judgment—i.e.,

that the declaratory judgment claim failed on the merits “because all parties to the Blanc Unit JOA, including
[Roane] expressly agreed to establish a 702.24-acre Drilling Unit under the Blanc Unit JOA.” See Jinsun,
LLC v. Mireskandari, 694 S.W.3d 773, 777 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, no pet.).

19
Unit . . . twelve separate times.” Finally, EOG argues we must affirm the summary

judgment “because Roane did not challenge all the summary-judgment grounds EOG

asserted for dismissal o[n] these claims.”

EOG moved for summary judgment on Roane’s fraud by non-disclosure and

negligent misrepresentation claims on the grounds that, among other things, Roane’s

reliance on any alleged non-disclosures was not justifiable. Specifically, EOG argued that

the evidence conclusively established that Roane had notice of the drilling unit’s alleged

difference in acres based on the various agreements it signed. Therefore, Roane could

not have justifiably relied on any alleged disclosures to the contrary.

Actual and justifiable reliance is an element of both fraud by non-disclosure and

negligent misrepresentation. Grant Thornton LLP v. Prospect High Income Fund, 314

S.W.3d 913, 923 (Tex. 2010). On appeal, Roane does not address justifiable reliance.

“Unless an appellant has specifically challenged every possible ground for summary

judgment, the appellate court need not review the merits of the challenged ground and

may affirm on an unchallenged ground.” Jinsun, LLC, 694 S.W.3d at 777; Dealer Comput.

Servs., Inc., 574 S.W.3d at 621; see also Vidaurri v. Harris, No. 04-16-00453-CV, 2017

WL 2457079, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 7, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“An

appellant’s failure to specifically challenge every possible ground for summary judgment

waives any error.”); Blue Wave Cap., LLC v. Brownsville Reg’l Hosp., LLC, No. 13–12–

00416–CV, 2013 WL 4769446, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Sept. 5, 2013, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (“If an appellant does not challenge each possible ground on which summary

judgment could have been granted, we must uphold the summary judgment on the

20
unchallenged ground.”). Accordingly, we overrule Roane’s fifth issue.

2. Reagan

Roane sued Reagan for fraud by non-disclosure on the basis that Reagan, acting

as EOG’s agent, “owed an independent duty to Roane to use reasonable care in the

preparation of the communitization agreements” and failed to disclose or concealed

certain facts that are not specified by Roane. Roane sued Reagan for negligent

misrepresentation for making false representations. Roane did not state what damages it

sought in the section of its pleading setting out its various causes of action.

Reagan moved for summary judgment arguing, among other things, that Roane’s

fraud by non-disclosure and negligent misrepresentation claims were barred by the

economic loss rule “as a matter of law because Roane does not claim to have suffered

losses separate and apart from allegedly being underpaid under the JOA,” and “[i]n this

light, the only possible losses Roane could claim under either tort claim are the

‘diminished’ proceeds it purportedly earned under the JOA, i.e., the exact same losses

Roane seeks in connection with its breach of contract claim against EOG.”

By its sixth issue, Roane states the following:

In analyzing whether the economic loss rule bars a claim, courts determine
whether the plaintiff’s claim arises out of the breach of a duty that arises
separate and apart from the parties’ contract. See James J. Flanagan
Shipping Corp. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 403 S.W.3d 360, 366
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.). And if so, the economic loss
rule does not bar the claim. Id.; see also Eagle Oil & Gas Co. v. Shale
Exploration, LLC, 549 S.W.3d 256, 269 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2018, no pet.). Here, much of Roane’s claims are based upon EOG’s and
Reagan’s willful misconduct concerning their dealings with Roane, their
intentional alteration of documents, and the information that they did not
disclose. EOG and Reagan had a common law duty to supply correct
commercial information. Comcast Corp. v. Houston Baseball Partners LLC,

21
627 S.W.3d 398, 421 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021), aff’d, 671
S.W.3d 907 (Tex. 2023). As such, the economic loss rule does not bar the
claims fraud by non[-]disclosure and negligent misrepresentation. See id.

This is the extent of Roane’s argument. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Roane does not

explain how its claims arise out of the breach of a duty that is separate and apart from the

parties’ contract. See James J. Flanagan Shipping Corp., 403 S.W.3d at 366. Moreover,

Roane does not argue nor show that the harm suffered is not the “same exact losses”

that Roane sought in its breach of contract claim. See Sterling Chems., Inc. v. Texaco

Inc., 259 S.W.3d 793, 796 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (“Simply

stated, under the economic loss rule, a duty in tort does not lie when the only injury

claimed is one for economic damages recoverable under a breach of contract claim.”).

Therefore, Roane has not met its appellate burden of showing that the summary judgment

was improper on this basis. See Jinsun, LLC, 694 S.W.3d at 777; Dealer Comput. Servs.,

Inc., 574 S.W.3d at 621; see also Vidaurri, 2017 WL 2457079, at *1; Blue Wave Cap.,

LLC, 2013 WL 4769446, at *6. Accordingly, we overrule Roane’s sixth issue.

F. Respondeat Superior Allegations, Request for an Accounting, and
Exemplary Damages

By its seventh issue, Roane contends that if the summary judgment was improper

on its claims for breach of contract, violation of the TNRC, negligent misrepresentation,

fraud by non-disclosure, and declaratory relief, then summary judgment was improper on

its respondeat superior allegations, request for an accounting, and request for exemplary

damages. Because we have concluded that the summary judgment was proper on these

claims, we overrule Roane’s seventh issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

22
IV. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

By its eighth issue, Roane contends that the trial court abused its discretion by not

reconsidering its grant of EOG’s motion for summary judgment on Roane’s breach of the

JOA claim. Roane argues that it provided the trial court with new evidence that it had not

been able to obtain during discovery, which “showed that the instruments being relied

upon by EOG to establish a 702.24-acre Drilling Unit under the JOA were not express

agreements to do so and could not have modified the JOA.”

A trial court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. Hermosillo v. K. Hovnanian Homes-DFW, LLC, 329 S.W.3d 181, 185 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without regard

to any guiding rules or principles. Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838–39 (Tex.

2004). To prevail on a motion for reconsideration based on newly discovered evidence,

the movant must show “that he became aware of the evidence after the trial, he could not

have discovered the evidence earlier in the exercise of due diligence, the evidence is not

cumulative, and the evidence is so material that it would probably produce a different

result if a new trial was granted.” Hermosillo, 329 S.W.3d at 185.

In its brief, Roane does not address several of these factors. Roane does not state

on appeal that it could not have discovered the evidence earlier in the exercise of due

diligence, that the evidence is not cumulative, or that the evidence is so material that it

would probably produce a different result if a new trial was granted. Moreover, Roane

does not cite any evidence in the record supporting these elements. See TEX. R. APP. P.

38.1(i). Therefore, Roane has not met its appellate burden of showing that the trial court

23
abused its discretion by denying its motion for reconsideration. See Hermosillo, 329

S.W.3d at 185. We overrule Roane’s eighth issue.

V. ATTORNEY’S FEES

By its ninth and tenth issues, Roane contends that the attorney’s fees are improper

because EOG did not properly segregate its attorney’s fees and “the evidence is

insufficient to support the award of conditional appellate attorney’s fees under Yowell v.

Granite Operating Co., 620 S.W.3d 335 (Tex. 2020).”

A. Segregation

First, by its ninth issue, Roane argues that EOG is not entitled to any attorney’s

fees that were not incurred for the declaratory judgment claims. Roane states that “EOG’s

blanket statement that 98 percent of work through trial was related to the declaratory

judgments is tantamount to asserting that the facts of each of [Roane’s] claims were so

intertwined that segregation beyond two percent was not required.” Roane further

contends that “intertwined facts alone do not make unrecoverable fees recoverable.” EOG

responds that it adequately segregated the attorney’s fees.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Under the UDJA, the trial court may award “reasonable and necessary attorney’s

fees as are equitable and just” in a declaratory judgment action. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE ANN. § 37.009. We review a trial court’s decision to award such fees for abuse of

discretion. Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 20 (Tex. 1998); Ridge Oil Co. v. Guinn

Invs., Inc., 148 S.W.3d 143, 163 (Tex. 2004); see Berry v. Bay, Ltd., 643 S.W.3d 424,

431 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2022, no pet.). A trial court abuses its

24
discretion if it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without regard to guiding legal principles

in reaching its ruling, or if its ruling is not supported by legally or factually sufficient

evidence. See Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 21.

Generally, “if any attorney’s fees relate solely to a claim for which such fees are

unrecoverable, a claimant must segregate recoverable from unrecoverable fees.” Tony

Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 313 (Tex. 2006); CA Partners v. Spears,

274 S.W.3d 51, 81 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied). However, “even

when fee segregation is required, attorneys are not required to keep separate records

documenting the exact amount of time prosecuting one claim versus another.” State Farm

Lloyds v. Hanson, 500 S.W.3d 84, 102 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet.

denied). Instead, “segregation is sufficiently established if an attorney testifies that a given

percentage of the time worked would have been necessary even if the claim for which

attorney’s fees are unrecoverable had not been asserted.” Id.

Whether attorney’s fees need to be segregated “is a question of law, while the

extent to which certain claims can or cannot be segregated is a mixed question of law

and fact.” CA Partners, 274 S.W.3d at 81 (citing Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 312–13).

[T]he fees necessary to prove particular claims often turn on facts [such as]
how hard something was to discover and prove, how strongly it supported
particular inferences or conclusions, how much difference it might make to
the verdict, and a host of other details that include judgment and credibility
questions about who had to do what and what it was worth.

Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313.

2. Discussion

Under the “relaxed standard enunciated in Chapa,” Hanson, 500 S.W.3d at 104,

25
an attorney’s testimony regarding how he segregated the attorney’s fees and testimony

that a certain percentage of its attorney’s fees are recoverable is sufficient evidence of

adequately segregated attorney’s fees. See Alief Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Perry, 440 S.W.3d

228, 247 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). Here, EOG presented

evidence that ninety-eight percent of the attorney’s fees were incurred for work related

directly to defending itself from Roane’s declaratory judgment requests, which the trial

court’s findings explain in detail. See State Farm Lloyds, 500 S.W.3d at 103 (determining

that the evidence established proper segregation of attorney’s fees because there was

testimony that ninety-five percent of the fees were attributable to work for prosecuting the

contract claim). EOG’s expert witness, Corey Wehmeyer, testified that the bulk of work

done related directly to the ever-changing list of requests for declaratory relief; Roane

continuously added more requests for declarations; the declarations sought implicated

the factual and legal matters pleaded in Roane’s multiple petitions; the amended petitions

spanned over three years; Roane resisted dispositive motions; EOG filed a series of

dispositive motions relating to the declaratory judgment claims; and the factual allegations

concerning the declarations sought were “ever-growing and changing.” The trial court

found Wehmeyer credible and noted Roane did not “call a single witness to rebut” any of

Wehmeyer’s testimony.

Therefore, we conclude that EOG presented evidence of how the attorney’s fees

were segregated and of the percentage of attorney’s fees attributable to Roane’s

declaratory judgment claims. See id. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

awarding these fees. See Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 20; Berry, 643 S.W.3d at 431. We

26
overrule Roane’s ninth issue.

B. Conditional Appellate Attorney’s Fees

By its tenth issue, Roane contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient

to support the award of conditional appellate attorney’s fees. See Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d

at 21. Roane states, “For instance, the testimony does not inform the trier of fact what

tasks are anticipated on appeal, such as analyzing the briefing, researching applicable

law, and drafting responsive briefs,” and the testimony “fails to inform the trier of fact who

will perform these tasks.”

The trial court found, a finding not challenged by Roane on appeal, that

“Wehmeyer discussed his qualifications as a licensed attorney in the State of Texas in

good standing since 2006, educated at the Texas Tech University School of Law, and his

work since 2006 in energy litigation process.” Wehmeyer presented evidence that he is

board certified in oil, gas, and mineral law and civil trial by the Texas Board of Legal

Specialization, and is “one of five attorneys in the State of Texas to hold that double board

certification.” Wehmeyer stated that he is familiar with reasonable attorney’s fees and is

responsible for billing this case and familiar with the services performed. Wehmeyer

testified that he has presented oral argument in the appeals court in San Antonio, El Paso,

Eastland, and Beaumont, Texas and has presented oral argument in the Texas Supreme

Court twice.

Wehmeyer further testified as follows:

So in terms of having a sense of what does it cost for a case such as this
one on appeal through the San Antonio Court of Appeals, which is where
this would likely go . . . and it would be no different anywhere else[.] [I]t is
my opinion that with respect to defending this Court’s final judgment on the

27
declaratory judgment relief, a reasonable fee that should be contingently
awarded . . . would be $50,000.

[I]f this unsuccessful plaintiff goes past the San Antonio intermediate
court of appeals and takes a petition for review, if the Supreme Court orders
us to respond to that, it’s my opinion that it would be a reasonable and
necessary fee of $10,000 that should be contingently awarded to EOG in
responding to that petition for review.

If the Supreme Court sees enough in the petition for review that it
orders full merits briefing, it’s my opinion that $30,000 should then be
contingently awarded to EOG through the merits briefing stage at the
Supreme Court of Texas, specifically . . . attributable to affirming this
Court’s final judgment on the declaratory judgment.

And then, if there’s not a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court of
Texas will usually summon you for oral argument. In terms of preparing for
that oral argument . . . I have presented oral argument twice to the Supreme
Court of Texas. It’s my opinion that a $10,000 contingent fee award should
be assessed there if we go all the way through the stage of the Supreme
Court of Texas requesting oral argument and EOG being put all the way
through that.

Through the first stage of appeal, which is a court of right . . . an
appeal of right to the San Antonio Court of Appeals, $50,000 in reasonable
and necessary and equitable and just attorneys’ fees to EOG on the
declaratory judgment. Through the petition for review stage at the Supreme
Court of Texas, $10,000 reasonable and necessary, equitable and just to
EOG attributable to the declaratory judgment.

Through the merits briefing stage, $30,000 reasonable and
necessary, equitable and just at the Supreme Court of Texas. And through
oral argument . . . and that is to the declaratory judgment. And then, through
oral argument, an additional $10,000 reasonable and necessary, equitable
and just attributable to the oral argument . . . and to just talk very high level
the types of activities.

The reason I’m opining on $50,000 [as opposed to a higher amount]
here is because these concern matters of . . . questions of law, albeit
through four rounds of summary judgment fuss. But these are questions of
law, and so we don’t know exactly what the appeal’s going to look like, but
we don’t have the jury issues, the charge issues, motions for new trial, all
that sort of thing that go with it. So that’s why I think . . . and this permeates
to the Supreme Court of Texas stage as well. I’ve opined higher on that.

28
Basically, what that is doing is receiving their opening appellant’s
brief, preparing a response to that. And I have a board-certified appellate
attorney that typically heads those efforts for us. But it’s basically looking at
that matter of law, getting a handle on the clerk’s record and the reporter’s
record here and then packaging that up in response . . . in a responsive
way.

And then it’s basically the same at the Supreme Court of Texas with
just the additional thread . . . there’s typically argument in those briefings
about why this isn’t a matter of importance and why the Supreme Court
shouldn’t waste their time on it.

Wehmeyer testified that the hourly rate at his firm is $225 to $375 per hour.

“There is no certainty regarding who will represent the appellee in the appellate

courts, what counsel’s hourly rate(s) will be, or what services will be necessary to ensure

appropriate representation in light of the issues the appellant chooses to raise.” Yowell,

620 S.W.3d at 355. However, the party seeking conditional appellate attorney’s fees must

still present sufficient evidence regarding the services believed to be reasonably

necessary to defend the appeal. Id. at 354. “The party seeking attorneys’ fees bears the

burden of proof and must supply enough facts to support the reasonableness of the

amount awarded.” Id. We must reverse a trial court’s award of attorney’s fees if there is

insufficient evidence in the record. Id.

The San Antonio Court of Appeals found the following evidence to support the trial

court’s award of appellate attorney’s fees:

I am familiar with reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees for preparing,
presenting, and addressing post verdict motions and any appeal in this type
of case. I have handled appellate cases in various Courts of Appeal in
Texas including the Fourth Court of Appeals throughout my forty[-]five (45)
year practice. My opinion is that reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees
for an appeal to the Court of Appeals in this case will be Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($50,000), and Thirty Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000) in the event

29
a Petition for Review is filed with the Supreme Court of Texas and the Court
asks that the matter be briefed, and an additional Fifteen Thousand Dollars
($15,000) in the event the Petition for Review is granted and an additional
Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($12,500) in the event oral
argument is scheduled. The above appellate fees are contingent on being
successful on appeal.

Gibbons & Bravos Surveying L.L.C. v. Gibbons, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___, No. 04-24-00249-

CV, 2025 WL 2326062, at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 13, 2025, no pet.). The court

further stated, “Moreover, sister courts have held there is no need to go into specific

services required at each stage because ‘all appeals involve researching, preparing, and

drafting a brief, so remanding this case for a more specific description of particular

services would provide little if any benefit.’” Id. at *7.

Wehmeyer testified as to his hourly rate and what he believed would be the costs

at each stage of an appeal. Thus, Wehmeyer’s testimony is similar to the testimony that

the San Antonio Court of Appeals found sufficient. See id. Therefore, we conclude that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding conditional appellate attorney’s fees.

See Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 20; Berry, 643 S.W.3d at 431. We overrule Roane’s tenth

issue.

VI. CONCLUSION

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

JAIME TIJERINA
Chief Justice

Delivered and filed on the
6th day of November, 2025.

30