Douglas L. Barr v. BMCFP XIV, LLC

NUMBER 13-25-00103-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

DOUGLAS L. BARR, Appellant,

v.

BMCFP XIV, LLC, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 5
OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices West and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice West

Before the Court is appellee BMCFP XIV, LLC’s “Amended Motion to Reverse

Judgment and Remand Case for New Trial.” Appellant Douglas L. Barr has filed a

response to appellee’s motion requesting the Court to grant appellee’s motion and the

relief sought therein.
The trial court entered a “Judgment in Eviction” in favor of appellee, the landlord.

Appellant, the tenant, subsequently appealed. In the motion before us, appellee asserts

the trial court record is insufficient to determine if this Court has appellate jurisdiction

because no evidence was admitted as to whether the lease at issue had a residential or

commercial purpose. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.007 (“A final judgment of a county

court in an eviction suit may not be appealed on the issue of possession unless the

premises in question are being used for residential purposes only.”); Falcon v. Ensignia,

976 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1998, no pet.) (treating former

§ 24.007 as a jurisdictional statute). Because the Court’s jurisdiction cannot be discerned

from the record, appellee asserts that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed

and remanded for a new trial wherein the parties may present jurisdictional evidence in

accordance with the Texas Property Code. Appellant agrees.

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1 governs the voluntary dismissal of an

appeal in a civil case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1. In relevant part, this rule provides:

(a) On Motion or By Agreement. The appellate court may dispose of an
appeal as follows:

(1) On Motion of Appellant. In accordance with a motion of
appellant, the court may dismiss the appeal or affirm the
appealed judgment or order unless such disposition would
prevent a party from seeking relief to which it would otherwise
be entitled.

(2) By Agreement. In accordance with an agreement signed by
the parties or their attorneys and filed with the clerk, the court
may:

(A) render judgment effectuating the parties’ agreement;

(B) set aside the trial court’s judgment without regard to the

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merits and remand the case to the trial court for
rendition of judgment in accordance with the
agreement; or

(C) abate the appeal and permit proceedings in the trial
court to effectuate the agreement.

Id. Here, appellant has not filed a motion to dismiss the appeal or affirm the trial court’s

judgment, and the parties’ requested relief does not otherwise fall within the options

provided by the rule. See id.; see, e.g., In re Matter of Marriage of McQueen, 597 S.W.3d

53, 54 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.). In short, this rule does not allow

an appellate court to reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case by

agreement. See id.; see also In re Estate of Steward, No. 13-23-00162-CV, 2023 WL

5486230, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 24, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Therefore, we construe appellee’s motion and appellants’ response thereto as an

agreement signed by the parties, and we grant the agreed motion as stated herein. We

set aside the trial court’s judgment without regard to the merits, and we remand the case

to the trial court for any further proceedings deemed necessary and rendition of judgment

in accordance with the agreement. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a)(2)(B); see also In re Estate

of Steward, 2023 WL 5486230, at *1. Because the parties do not have an agreement

regarding costs, costs will be taxed against appellant. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(d).

JON WEST
Justice

Delivered and filed on the
24th day of July, 2025.

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