Tomas Jasso-Sanchez v. the State of Texas

NO. 12-23-00199-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

TOMAS JASSO-SANCHEZ, § APPEAL FROM THE 7TH
APPELLANT

V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLEE § SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Tomas Jasso-Sanchez appeals the trial court’s revocation of his community supervision
and adjudication of his guilt. In his sole issue, Appellant contends the trial court abused its
discretion by denying him the right to confront a witness against him during the hearing on the
State’s motion to adjudicate guilt. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, Appellant pleaded “guilty” to assaulting a member
of his family and household by impeding the victim’s breathing or circulation. 1 The trial court
found the evidence sufficient to find Appellant “guilty” but deferred further proceedings and
placed Appellant on community supervision for six years.
The State subsequently filed a motion to adjudicate guilt, in which it alleged that Appellant
violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision by (1) failing to report and submit
to a random urinalysis and (2) committing another assault against a different victim. At the

1
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2023).
beginning of the evidentiary hearing on the motion, the State informed the trial court that the State
would not call the victim of the alleged new assault to testify at the hearing because the victim
invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege due to a pending charge against him. Appellant pleaded
“true” to the allegation that he violated the terms of his community supervision by failing to report
and submit to a random urinalysis, but he pleaded “not true” to the allegation that he violated the
terms of his community supervision by committing another assault. 2 Defense counsel objected
that the alleged victim’s absence deprived Appellant of his constitutional right to confront his
accuser, but he acknowledged that many courts have concluded that the constitutional right of
confrontation and Crawford v. Washington 3 do not apply to revocation hearings because they are
judicial proceedings rather than prosecutorial proceedings. The trial court proceeded to hear
evidence, including the testimony of an eyewitness to part of an altercation between Appellant and
the victim, who sustained a laceration on his cheek. According to the eyewitness, the victim
indicated that the injury caused him pain.
The trial court ultimately found that Appellant violated the conditions of his community
supervision, revoked his unadjudicated community supervision, found him “guilty” of assaulting
a member of his family or household by impeding the victim’s breath or circulation, and assessed
punishment at six years of confinement. This appeal followed.

REVOCATION OF COMMUNITY SUPERVISION
In issue one, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying him the
right to confront the alleged victim during the hearing on the motion to adjudicate guilt.
Applicable Law
We review a trial court’s order revoking community supervision for an abuse of discretion.
Caddell v. State, 605 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). At a revocation
hearing, the State has the burden to establish the alleged violations by a preponderance of the
evidence. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Cobb v. State, 851

2
The trial judge stated at the revocation hearing that the State’s motion to adjudicate contains three
paragraphs, and he asked Appellant to plead “true” or “not true” to paragraphs one, two, and three. Appellant pleaded
“true” to paragraphs one and three and pleaded “not true” to paragraph two. However, the clerk’s record indicates
that paragraph one of the State’s motion does not allege a violation; rather, it merely recites that defendant pleaded
guilty and received deferred adjudication community supervision, the terms of which required him to (1) commit no
offense and (2) submit to urinalysis as directed by his supervision officer.
3
541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004).

2
S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Proof of a violation of a single term or condition of
community supervision is sufficient to support a trial court’s decision to revoke community
supervision. Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). Moreover,
a defendant’s plea of “true,” standing alone, is sufficient to prove the alleged violation and to
support revocation. Moses v. State, 590 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Cole v. State,
578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979).
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The U.S. Supreme Court held that this procedural guarantee
precludes a court from admitting a witness’s testimonial statements if the witness does not appear
at trial unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a previous opportunity to
cross-examine the witness. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1369, 158
L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004). “Judicial restraint cautions that when a case may be decided on a non-
constitutional ground, we should rest our decision on that ground and not wade into ancillary
constitutional questions.” VanDevender v. Woods, 222 S.W.3d 430, 432 (Tex. 2007); see
Rodriguez v. State, 538 S.W.3d 623, 631 n.57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (citing holding in
VanDevender “reaffirming the ‘well-settled prudential doctrine that cases should be decided on
narrow, non-constitutional grounds whenever possible’”). “[T]he cardinal principle of judicial
restraint – if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more – counsels us to
go no further.” VanDevender, 222 S.W.3d at 433.
Analysis
Appellant contends his rights were violated because the victim of the alleged assault
invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and therefore was not present at
the hearing on the State’s motion to adjudicate. Because, as explained below, we conclude that
Appellant did not suffer constitutional harm, we need not determine whether Crawford applies to
revocation proceedings and, if so, whether Appellant’s right to confront adverse witnesses was
violated.
Crawford error is subject to a constitutional harm analysis. Langham v. State, 305 S.W.3d
568, 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a). Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 44.2(a) provides that if the alleged error is constitutional error, we must reverse the
judgment unless we determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged error did not contribute

3
to the conviction or punishment. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a); see Woodall v. State, 336 S.W.3d 634,
639 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In determining whether a Crawford violation is harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt, we consider (1) the importance of the hearsay statements to the State’s case,
(2) whether the hearsay evidence was cumulative of other evidence, (3) the presence or absence of
evidence contradicting the hearsay testimony on material points, and (4) the overall strength of the
prosecution’s case. Davis v. State, 203 S.W.3d 845, 852 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
In the instant case, Appellant pleaded “true” to the allegation that he violated the conditions
of his community supervision by failing to report and submit to a random urinalysis, and his plea
of “true” to said violation, standing alone, is sufficient to support the trial court’s revocation of his
community supervision. See Moore, 605 S.W.2d at 926; Moses, 590 S.W.2d at 470; Cole, 578
S.W.2d at 128. Assuming without deciding that (1) Appellant had a right to confront the alleged
victim during the revocation hearing and (2) said right was violated, because Appellant pleaded
“true” to failing to appear and submit a random urinalysis, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that any Crawford error regarding the alleged violation to which Appellant pleaded “not true” did
not contribute to Appellant’s conviction or punishment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2; Rodriguez, 538
S.W.3d at 631 n.57; VanDevender, 222 S.W.3d at 432-33; Davis, 203 S.W.3d at 852; Moore, 605
S.W2d at 926; Moses, 590 S.W.2d at 470; Cole, 578 S.W.2d at 128. Accordingly, we overrule
issue one.

DISPOSITION
Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

GREG NEELEY
Justice

Opinion delivered March 28, 2024.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)

4
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

MARCH 28, 2024

NO. 12-23-00199-CR

TOMAS JASSO-SANCHEZ,
Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee

Appeal from the 7th District Court
of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 007-0660-20)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed herein,
and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this Court that there was no error in the
judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of
the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court below for
observance.
Greg Neeley, Justice.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.