In the Interest of C.F., a Child v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed April 30, 2026

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-25-00321-CV
__________

IN THE INTEREST OF C.F., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 90th District Court
Stephens County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CV33606

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an accelerated appeal from the trial court’s order terminating the
parental rights of the mother 1 and father of C.F. 2 Appellant presents a single issue
on appeal in which he challenges the trial court’s finding that termination of his

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The mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to C.F. prior to the final termination
hearing. The trial court signed an interlocutory decree of termination, which became final when it signed
its order that terminated the father’s parental rights to C.F. Only the father appealed.
2
To protect the identity of C.F. and C.F.’s family and relatives, we use pseudonyms or initials to
refer to them. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b).
parental rights is in C.F.’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)
(West Supp. 2025). We affirm the trial court’s order.
I. Termination Findings and Standards
The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. Id. To terminate one’s parental rights, it must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent has committed one of the acts listed in
Section 161.001(b)(1), and that termination is in the best interest of the child. Id.
Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce
in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the
allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007 (West 2019).
In this case, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence
established that Appellant: (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed C.F. to
remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional
well-being of C.F.; (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed C.F. with persons
who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of
C.F.; and (3) constructively abandoned C.F. who had been in the permanent or
temporary managing conservatorship of the Texas Department of Family and
Protective Services (the Department) for not less than six months, and despite the
Department’s reasonable efforts to return C.F. to Appellant, he did not regularly visit
or maintain significant contact with C.F., and demonstrated an inability to provide
C.F. with a safe environment. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N). The trial court
further found that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in C.F.’s best interest.
See id. § 161.001(b)(2).
In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether “a
reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding
was true.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022). Cognizant of the required

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appellate deference to the factfinder, “we look at all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the finding, assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor
of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a
reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not disregard ‘undisputed
facts that do not support the finding,’” and the factfinder is “the sole arbiter of the
witnesses’ credibility and demeanor.” Id. (first quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256,
266 (Tex. 2002); and then quoting In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021)).
As such, when considering the credibility of the evidence presented, we may not
substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 316.
In assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient, we weigh the
disputed evidence that is contrary to the finding against all the evidence that favors
the finding. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We give due deference
to the finding and determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could
reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations against
the parent. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d
17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002); In re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2023, pet. denied).
With respect to the best interest of the child, no unique set of factors need be
proved. L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d at 513; In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2010, pet. denied). Further, the best interest determination does not restrict
the proof to any specific factor or factors. In re J.S., 687 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.). However, courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley
factors to shape their analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex.
1976). These include, but are not limited to: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the
emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional

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and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of
the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals
to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these
individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or
proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the
existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts
or omissions of the parent. Id.
To support a best interest finding, the Department is not required to prove
each Holley factor; in some circumstances, evidence of the presence of only one
factor will suffice. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). Additionally, the same evidence that proves one
or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute sufficient, probative
evidence illustrating that termination is in the children’s best interest. C.H., 89
S.W.3d at 28; C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.
The absence of evidence of some Holley considerations does not preclude the
factfinder from reasonably inferring or forming a strong conviction or belief that
termination is in the children’s best interest, particularly if the evidence indicates
that the parent-child relationship and the parent’s conduct has endangered the safety
and well-being of the children. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. This is so because the best
interest analysis evaluates the best interest of the children, not the parents. J.S., 687
S.W.3d at 548; In re E.C.R., 638 S.W.3d 755, 767 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, pet.
denied) (citing In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d 918, 927 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no
pet.)).
In this regard, the factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by his or
her past conduct in determining whether termination of a parent’s parental rights is
in the children’s best interest. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re Z.R.M., 665 S.W.3d

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825, 829 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. denied); In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379,
384 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). The factfinder may infer that a parent’s
past conduct that endangered the safety and well-being of the children may recur in
the future if the children are returned to the possession of the parent. In re J.D., 436
S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); May v. May, 829
S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1992, writ denied).
Moreover, the factfinder may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet the
children’s physical and emotional needs an inability or unwillingness by the parent
to meet the children’s physical and emotional needs in the future. J.D., 436 S.W.3d
at 118; see also In re A.S., No. 11-16-00293-CV, 2017 WL 1275614, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Eastland Mar. 31, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
II. The Evidence Presented at Trial
The Department received a report in November 2024 that Appellant and the
mother were using methamphetamine while caring for C.F., who was less than two
months old. Appellant was also suspected of abusing the mother based on visible
injuries to the mother’s face and head. At that time, he was on deferred adjudication
community supervision for the offense of retaliation, a third-degree felony, that he
committed in 2023. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.06 (West Supp. 2025). During
its investigation, the Department learned that C.F., C.F.’s mother, and Appellant
were living in a “fifth wheel camper” on Appellant’s “buddy’s property.”
Appellant’s brother—a methamphetamine user who was also on probation—and
Appellant’s mother were believed to reside in the camper as well.
After unsuccessful attempts to assess the safety of the home, the
Department sought and was granted temporary managing conservatorship of C.F. on
November 20, 2024. C.F. was removed the same day and placed in the care of his
maternal grandparents, K.W. and J.W.

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When the Department took custody of C.F., he smelled of cigarette smoke,
his clothes were dirty, and the bottle that the mother had for him smelled of spoiled
milk. His pacifier was also covered in dirt. The mother also admitted to using
methamphetamine with Appellant in the presence of the child. The parents and C.F.
submitted to drug screens soon after the child’s removal, and all tested positive for
methamphetamine. Appellant also tested positive for methamphetamine in
December 2024 and admitted to methamphetamine use.
The Department created a family plan of service for Appellant in December
2024 that the trial court approved and adopted as an order of the court. However,
Appellant was arrested in early 2025 for violating the conditions of his deferred
adjudication and he was incarcerated for the remainder of the proceedings. He was
subsequently adjudicated guilty in March 2025 and sentenced to three years’
imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice (TDCJ). In May 2025, because he had exposed C.F. to methamphetamine,
Appellant was indicted for endangering a child, a state jail felony. See PENAL
§ 22.041.
The trial court held the final termination hearing on October 8, 2025.
Appellant’s child endangerment charges were still pending at the time. During the
hearing, testimony was presented from three witnesses: Appellant, Department
caseworker Jeni Schantz, and Presley Cox, C.F.’s Court Appointed Child Advocate
(CASA). The Department also introduced records showing that Appellant’s
criminal history began in 2020 when he was arrested for committing aggravated
robbery.
Appellant testified telephonically from the Hamilton Unit of TDCJ. Although
he had been released on parole, it was conditioned upon his successful completion
of a six-month inpatient program at the Substance Abuse Felony Punishment Facility

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(SAFPF). Appellant explained that he had been confined in SAFPF for a month and
could not guarantee that he would successfully graduate from the program in the
next five months.
Throughout Appellant’s testimony, which lasted for over two hours, he
“plead[ed] the Fifth” at least sixty times. He did, however, admit to violating the
conditions of his deferred adjudication by using methamphetamine, and stated that
C.F. was removed from his care because he “made a mistake, and . . . couldn’t
provide for [C.F.] like [he] wanted to.” Appellant likewise acknowledged that he
did not complete his required services and failed to maintain employment before his
arrest.
Appellant asked the trial court to allow him to remain, at the very least, as a
possessory conservator to C.F. He intended to live with his father and stepmother
upon his release from SAFPF and assumed that C.F. would “[p]robably” be able to
live in the home with him. But he had only briefly discussed the living situation
with his father, who had met C.F. only once. He then refused to answer whether his
father physically abused his mother, or whether his father had been incarcerated.
Appellant had no contingency plan for C.F. if he were convicted of child
endangerment and sentenced to imprisonment, agreed that he could not provide C.F.
with a safe home environment, and confirmed that it is not in C.F.’s best interest to
live with Appellant’s mother or brother.
Schantz testified that J.W. and K.W. treat C.F. “like their son,” “are very
active with him,” and “are constantly meeting his needs.” C.F. “loves them very
much and is very bonded with them.” C.F. needed ongoing physical therapy and
occupational therapy because he “was having issues with turning his head and the
functioning of it,” which “also affect[ed] the way he walks and his lack of mobility
and crawling.” Schantz explained that “when children are laid on their back[s] for

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extended periods of time . . . it stiffens up muscles and tendons in the neck.” C.F.
had improved—he was “almost crawling on all fours” and was “able to walk with
assistance” at the time of the final hearing—but was still considered delayed.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court terminated Appellant’s
parental rights pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (N), and found
termination to be in C.F.’s best interest. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N),
(b)(2). This appeal followed.
III. The Best Interest of the Child
Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to
support the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in C.F.’s
best interest. “‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing a much broader, facts-
and-circumstances based evaluation that is accorded significant discretion.” In re
Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72). We
reiterate that the trial court, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the witnesses’
credibility. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312. We are not at liberty to disturb the
determinations of the factfinder so long as those determinations are not
unreasonable. Id. at 311–12; In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). Giving
the requisite due deference to the trier of fact, we hold that, based on the evidence in
the record and the application of the Holley factors, the trial court could have formed
a firm belief or conviction that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the
best interest of C.F. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
Evidence of each Holley factor is not required to support a best interest
finding. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 366 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014,
pet. denied); In re S.O., No. 05-22-01019-CV, 2023 WL 2237084, at *11 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Feb. 27, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). In other words, the absence of
evidence regarding some of these factors does not preclude a best interest finding,

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“particularly if [the] undisputed evidence shows the parental relationship
endangered the child’s safety.” In re N.T., 474 S.W.3d 465, 477 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2015, no pet.) (quoting In re A.E., No. 05-14-01340-CV, 2015 WL 1184179, at *6
(Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 16, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.)). Consequently,
“evidence relating to one single factor may be adequate in a particular situation to
support a finding that termination is in the best interest[] of the child.” J.S., 687
S.W.3d at 552 (quoting In re K.S., 420 S.W.3d 852, 855 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2014, no pet.)). And evidence that is relevant to Section 161.001(b)(1) termination
grounds may be probative of a child’s best interest. See In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d
239, 249–50 (Tex. 2013) (citing C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28).
Appellant does not contest the trial court’s findings that he endangered C.F.
as set forth in Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), or that he constructively abandoned
C.F. pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1)(N). So long as the evidence supports those
findings, they are valid grounds for termination. See E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249–50;
In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003); J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 552. In this regard,
the evidence that Appellant endangered and constructively abandoned C.F. could be
considered by the factfinder in determining whether termination is in C.F.’s best
interest. See E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249–50; In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.
We first note that the negative inferences that are permitted by Appellant’s
repeated assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
supports the trial court’s best interest finding. “A party may invoke his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a civil proceeding if he
reasonably fears that the answer sought might incriminate him.” In re A.B., 372
S.W.3d 273, 275 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.) (citing United States v.
Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 671–72 (1998)); see U.S. CONST. amend. V. In civil cases,
including involuntary termination proceedings, a factfinder may draw negative

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inferences from a party’s assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination. See
TEX. R. EVID. 513(c); Wilz v. Flournoy, 228 S.W.3d 674, 677 (Tex. 2007); A.B., 372
S.W.3d at 276; In re M.R., No. 05-25-00162-CV, 2025 WL 1785346, at *2 n.5 (Tex.
App.—Dallas June 27, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Here, based on Appellant’s multiple assertions of the privilege, the trial court
could have reasonably inferred that Appellant:
• exposed C.F. to methamphetamine through his and the mother’s
methamphetamine use in C.F.’s presence, which resulted in C.F. testing
positive for methamphetamine;
• was aware that his and the mother’s methamphetamine use in C.F.’s
presence endangered C.F.;
• chose not to take C.F. to his medical appointments out of concern that C.F.
would test positive for methamphetamine;
• continued using methamphetamine after C.F. was removed, and has used
illegal drugs in addition to methamphetamine and marihuana;
• got into a fight on January 17, 2025 outside his camper;
• associated with others who engaged in criminal activity, including his
brother, and used methamphetamine with Appellant’s mother and brother;
and
• physically abused the mother and had law enforcement called because of
domestic violence between him and the mother.
We begin with Appellant’s persistent drug use, which indisputably endangered C.F.
and “implicates most of the Holley factors.” In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595, 607 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied). It is well-established that a parent’s
continuing pattern of drug use can support a best interest finding because of the
“attendant risks to employment, housing, and prolonged absence from the child.” In
re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 279–81 (Tex. 2024); see also In re J.A.R., 696 S.W.3d
245, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, pet. denied) (the parents’ years of
drug use supported the trial court’s best interest finding). And a parent’s decision to

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engage in illegal drug use during the pendency of a termination suit when the parent
is at risk of losing a child is unquestionably contrary to the child’s best interest. See
J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 551; In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 580 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).
As set forth above, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that
Appellant’s mother and brother lived in the camper and used methamphetamine with
Appellant and C.F.’s mother. See In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 109 (Tex. 2006)
(Appellate courts must afford due deference to the factfinder’s credibility
determinations.). Appellant’s brother was on probation and actively used
methamphetamine, while Appellant’s mother is a convicted felon who may have
also been a methamphetamine user. See In re E.A.R., 583 S.W.3d 898, 909 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2019, pet. denied) (“Inappropriate, abusive, or unlawful conduct by
persons who live in the child’s home or with whom the child is compelled to
associate on a regular basis in [the] home is a part of the [child’s] ‘conditions or
surroundings’” under subsection (D).).
In addition to surrounding C.F. with methamphetamine users, Appellant and
the mother avoided taking C.F. to his required medical appointments, were
physically violent with each other, and subjected C.F. to unsanitary living
conditions. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 742 (considering the parent’s unstable and
uncertain living situation in upholding the trial court’s best interest finding); In re
O.E.R., 573 S.W.3d 896, 905 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.) (“Physical
violence in the home leads to an unstable and unpredictable environment for
children.”); In re A.L., 545 S.W.3d 138, 148 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.)
(considering parent’s “extraordinarily unsanitary” home in best interest analysis).
Rather than making the necessary changes for C.F.’s safety, Appellant refused to
accept responsibility for C.F.’s removal and continued his relationship with the

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mother. His actions suggest an inability or unwillingness to achieve the permanence
and stability that C.F. needs to thrive. See J.A.R., 696 S.W.3d at 257 (“Stability and
permanence are paramount in the upbringing of children.”).
Appellant’s knowledge of the dangerous living conditions in which he placed
C.F., and his refusal to improve these conditions for the benefit of C.F.’s safety,
permitted the rational inference that he was, at minimum, indifferent to C.F.’s
physical health and emotional well-being. Such “evidence of parental indifference
weighs heavily in favor of a factfinder’s finding that termination is in a child’s best
interest.” In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 823 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2023, no pet.); see also In re A.M.R., 652 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Waco 2022,
pet. denied) (considering the parent’s failure to address “anger issues, violent
tendencies, poor relationship choices, . . . and instability in homes and employment”
in best interest determination). Further, Appellant’s drug use, physical violence, and
neglect of C.F.’s medical needs “pose[d] an emotional and physical danger to” C.F.
now and in the future and showed his unwillingness or inability to meet C.F.’s
needs now and in the future. A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d at 823; see Holley, 544 S.W.2d
at 371–72.
Appellant’s minimization of culpability coincides with his failure to complete
the tasks and services required by his service plan, which, like Appellant’s other
conduct and failures, further supports the trial court’s best interest finding. See
E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249 (a parent’s failure to complete court-ordered services can
support a best interest finding); In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 270 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (“A fact finder may infer from a parent’s
failure to take the initiative to complete the services required to regain possession of
his child that he does not have the ability to motivate himself to seek out available
resources needed now or in the future.”). Appellant purportedly participated in

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various courses during his incarceration, including parenting classes and a program
to help manage anger and related issues. However, he could not articulate what he
learned from his parenting classes or other courses, and again “[p]lead[ed] the Fifth”
in response to further questioning on those topics. He also claimed to be engaged in
the 12-step program of Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous (NA/AA)
but was unfamiliar with the first step and then stated he was “going to plead the
Fifth.” When asked whether he knew what C.F.’s needs were, Appellant responded:
“I’m literally in the dark. I’m not sure what he needs as of right now. I mean, I
don’t know physical needs.” Yet, during his incarceration, he made no attempt to
contact C.F. and admitted that he neither inquired about C.F.’s well-being nor sought
any updates from Schantz. Thus, the trial court could have logically concluded that
Appellant failed to properly address the Department’s concerns. See Holley, 544
S.W.2d at 371–72; E.C.R., 638 S.W.3d at 769.
Finally, given the child-centered focus of the best interest inquiry, we do not
discount or minimize C.F.’s positive strides since removal. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at
747; Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. C.F. was just over one at the time of the final
hearing. When a child is too young to express their desires, the factfinder may
consider whether the child has bonded with their caregiver, is well-cared for by them,
and whether the child has spent minimal time with a parent. In re E.J.M., 673
S.W.3d 310, 334 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, no pet.); see also In re N.J.H., 575
S.W.3d 822, 834 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (evidence
showing that a young child had bonded with foster family supported the trial court’s
best interest finding). Although C.F. was too young to articulate his desires, the
evidence demonstrated that he was “very bonded” with K.W. and J.W., who were
“really good parents” to him, met all his needs, and hoped to adopt him. In fact,

13
Appellant agreed that they were adequate caregivers who acted in C.F.’s best
interest.
Appellant, by contrast, proposed his father’s home as a potential living
arrangement for C.F., but his father refused to allow the Department to conduct a
home study. See J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 119–20 (“The fact finder may compare the
contrasting plans for a child by the parent and the Department and consider whether
the plans and expectations of each party are realistic or weak and ill-defined.”).
Appellant had not contemplated childcare if he were to secure employment, nor did
he have an alternative home for C.F. if he was sentenced to imprisonment for child
endangerment. Therefore, the trial court could have rationally inferred that
relinquishing C.F. to Appellant’s care would subject him to a life of uncertainty and
instability, which is contrary to C.F.’s best interest. See In re E.M., No. 11-24-
00310-CV, 2025 WL 1240792, at *10 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 30, 2025, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (citing In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004,
pet. denied)).
The trial court was presented with multiple circumstances from which it may
have reasonably discerned a “pattern of conduct that is inimical to the very idea of
child-rearing.” J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 316 (quoting C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28); Holley,
544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Considering Appellant’s acts and omissions, the emotional
and physical danger to C.F. now and in the future, the emotional and physical needs
of C.F. now and in the future, Appellant’s criminal history, and his history of drug
use, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial
court’s finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in C.F.’s best
interest. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741; Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal.

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IV. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the order of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

April 30, 2026
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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