KC Childress v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed January 15, 2026

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-24-00189-CR
__________

KC CHILDRESS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 70th District Court
Ector County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. A-21-1267-CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, KC Childress, was charged with four counts of aggravated sexual
assault of a child, each a first-degree felony offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 22.021(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B), (e), (f)(1) (West Supp. 2024). The jury found
Appellant guilty on all counts. For punishment purposes, the State alleged that
Appellant had previously been finally convicted of a sexual offense against a child.
The jury found that enhancement allegation to be “true” and assessed his punishment
for each offense at life imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice. See PENAL § 12.42(c)(2) (West Supp. 2025). The
trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly and ordered that his sentences be served
consecutively.
In a single issue, Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to
support two of his four convictions: (1) the super aggravated sexual assault of Z.M.
(Count Three); and (2) the aggravated sexual assault of K.M. (Count Four).1 We
affirm.
I. Factual Background
K.M.’s and Z.M.’s mother (Mother) had four children (B.F., T.M., K.M., and
Z.M.) prior to her relationship with Appellant, which began sometime in 2020.2
Appellant is a registered sex offender, and Mother was aware of this while they were
dating. At some point, Mother and her four children began cohabiting with
Appellant after she became pregnant with Appellant’s child, N.C. Appellant had
unsupervised access to the children at various times during his relationship with
Mother. Sometime in July 2021, a family friend of Mother, Kristina Bishop, became
aware that one of Mother’s children, B.F., had been sexually abused by Appellant.
Bishop reported this incident to law enforcement who, in turn, initiated an
investigation. During the investigation, B.F. made an outcry, and Appellant was
subsequently arrested for aggravated sexual assault of a child. At the time of trial,
B.F. was around sixteen, K.M. was ten, and Z.M. was around six.

To protect the identities of the child victims and the other minor children, we refer to them by
1

pseudonyms or initials. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(a)(1); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10(a)(3).
2
Before Appellant’s trial, Mother had been indicted for (1) aggravated sexual assault of a child; and
(2) child endangerment, a second-degree felony offense. See PENAL §§ 22.021, 22.041. Mother pled guilty
to the child endangerment offense in exchange for testifying against Appellant at trial. Pursuant to a
negotiated plea agreement, Mother was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment for the child
endangerment offense, and the aggravated sexual assault charge was dismissed. Additionally, Mother’s
parental rights to the children were terminated and her aunt and uncle adopted the children.
2
Georgina Polanco, a forensic interviewer at the Harmony Home Children’s
Advocacy Center in Odessa (Harmony Home), testified that she began forensic
interviews with K.M. and Z.M. on July 9, 2021. According to Polanco, it was
standard protocol to interview children who were between the ages of three and
eighteen, depending on the child’s developmental level and ability to communicate
with the interviewer. Polanco testified that she briefly interviewed K.M. that day.
She recalled that K.M. was “barely able to tell [Polanco] her name” and could not
“identify body parts[,] answer in complete sentences, [or] answer in real words.”
Because of this, Polanco believed that K.M. was “nonverbal” and unable to converse
with Polanco for the purposes of the forensic interview.
Polanco recalled that Z.M. was three at the time of her forensic interview and
that she could converse “slightly” better than K.M. 3 Polanco testified that Z.M. was
able to use visual and anatomical drawing aids to identify all of the body parts of a
female child’s body, including the genitalia; however, Z.M. used the term “leg” to
refer to the vagina as depicted in the anatomical drawing. During the interview,
Polanco asked Z.M. if “anybody ha[d] ever touched [Z.M.’s vagina].” Z.M.
responded that “Tetta” had. Polanco then inquired about the identity of “Tetta” and
Z.M. informed her that “Tetta” was a boy who lived in her house. Upon further
questioning, Z.M. identified other members of her family who lived with her, such
as her brother (T.M.) and her sister (B.F.). Polanco believed that “Tetta” and T.M.
were “two different people” based on Z.M.’s statements. Polanco recalled that Z.M.
appeared “to be done” with the interview and asked to leave the room after
answering these questions, so Polanco terminated the interview.

3
The State provided notice to Appellant of their intent to use Polanco as Z.M.’s outcry witness, and
the trial court held a hearing on the State’s outcry notice prior to trial. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 38.072 (West Supp. 2025). At the hearing, the trial court determined that Polanco’s statement was
“reliable based on the time, content, [and] circumstances of the statement.”
3
Jessica Aguilar, a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE), performed a SANE
examination of Z.M. and K.M. in July 2021. Aguilar testified that K.M. was
nonverbal and had the mental capacity of a one or two-year-old child. She recalled
that K.M. appeared happy and playful during the exam until she performed a “head-
to-toe” examination, upon which Aguilar noticed that K.M.’s demeanor changed.
Aguilar noted that during the “head-to-toe” examination, K.M. “allowed [Aguilar]
to pull her little pants down,” but then “sank” her head, and “didn’t want anything
to do with [Aguilar] after that.” Aguilar testified that she terminated the examination
shortly after K.M.’s mood changed, thus she was unable to perform an anogenital
exam for K.M.
Aguilar also testified that she performed an anogenital exam for Z.M., but she
was unable to obtain an oral medical history from Z.M. during her SANE
examination. During Z.M.’s anogenital exam, Aguilar noted that Z.M. had two
linear scars in her vaginal area—which indicated physical trauma in that area—and
that Z.M.’s injuries were like the vaginal scars she had observed on B.F.
Additionally, Aguilar noted that the scars she observed on both B.F. and Z.M. were
“deeper than a regular laceration from consensual sex.” Aguilar opined that these
types of linear scars could be related to damage from multiple acts, including
“penetration,” “touching,” or “scratching.”
Dr. Mohannad Anbarsvrri, a hospitalist at Medical Center Hospital in Odessa,
testified about the contents of K.M.’s medical records and a follow-up visit he
performed on K.M. Dr. Anbarsvrri opined that there are differing severities of
intellectual disabilities for individuals, like K.M., who have Down syndrome. He
testified that, although uncommon, some younger children with Down syndrome
may be nonverbal. Dr. Anbarsvrri testified that K.M. was examined by physicians
on two occasions. During K.M.’s first consultation with another attending
physician, it was noted that K.M. had trauma-based bruises beyond her external
4
genitalia. Dr. Anbarsvrri stated that this type of trauma could result from a sexual
assault, through penetration, and would be “markedly difficult” to result from other
acts, such as falling.
Dr. Anbarsvrri noted that K.M. was “uncooperative, and kicking, and
screaming” during her examination with the first physician, and that she behaved in
a similar manner during his follow-up examination a week later. Dr. Anbarsvrri
stated that K.M. “pushed [him] away” when he attempted to examine her abdomen.
He said that it is common for patients to be “uncooperative” or to “fight[] back” in
circumstances that involve abuse or trauma, and that a child could behave this way
because they believe the physician is an assailant. Additionally, Dr. Anbarsvrri
recalled that a guardian for K.M. told him that she had been “act[ing] out,”
“behav[ing] violently with her siblings[,] and hit[ting] them.” Dr. Anbarsvrri
testified that, based on his experience in treating Down syndrome patients, he
believed that K.M.’s behavior could have been caused from experiencing sexual
trauma.
Stephanie Schoen, the mental health director at Harmony Home and a licensed
clinical professional counselor, testified to recidivism and the behaviors of both
victims of sexual abuse and the perpetrators of sexual abuse. Schoen described the
extent of her experience treating perpetrators and victims of sexual violence,
including child victims of sexual assault. Schoen testified that it is common for a
child victim of sexual abuse to not make an outcry or talk to others about the sexual
abuse, given that only one-in-four sexual offenses are reported, and that sexual
offenses are commonly reported to law enforcement by “friends or siblings” who
were told by the child victim about the sexual abuse.
Schoen testified that, unlike a teenager or an adult, younger children may not
be able to verbalize or disclose that they are a victim of sexual abuse. According to
Schoen, the disclosure of sexual abuse by a child victim is a process that occurs over
5
a period of time based on (1) the child victim’s ability to verbalize the sexual abuse
they endured, and (2) the preparation and treatment required to allow the child victim
to create a “trauma narrative” of the sexual abuse. Schoen stated that it is common
for child victims to not remember details of sexual abuse during their first meeting
with a forensic interviewer. Additionally, a child victim may be unable to recall
detailed information of a sexual assault because of shame or fear. As such, a child
victim may not remember all the details of a sexual assault until later when they feel
“comfortable and safe.”
Schoen testified that child victims can manifest sexual trauma though their
behavior, such as “acting out.” In other cases, children may engage in “self-harm”
after experiencing sexual abuse through depression, nightmares, “bedwetting,” or by
“shut[ting] down” when discussing their trauma with others. Schoen opined that
children under the age of seven (and children who are “mentally very young
children”) do not have any knowledge of adult sexual behavior. According to
Schoen, it is not normal for a young child to “act out” sexual behaviors, like using
dolls to show that “adults have sex,” and that a child who shows this type of behavior
either learned or was taught about sex from an adult.
Schoen explained that sexual offenders who victimize children of all ages
(“non-discriminate” offenders), are more common than sexual offenders who
victimize children within a discrete age range, such as individuals diagnosed with
“pedophilia” or “hebephilia.” Schoen testified that sexual predators often use
“grooming” behaviors on the children they sexually abuse. Grooming occurs when
an adult fosters a relationship with a child though manipulation to (1) gain the child’s
trust, (2) get the child “comfortable” with the perpetrator by pushing their personal
boundaries, and (3) gain access to the child. Schoen testified that it is common for
a sexual abuser to “groom” a child through their role as a babysitter, stepparent, or
co-parent because these types of roles typically require children to obey the
6
perpetrator. Schoen also stated that perpetrators may groom a child through
(1) negative coercions (i.e., threats of harm or punishment for a child’s failure to
obey the perpetrator in their role as a co-parent), or (2) positive coercions (i.e., gifts
or “love bombing” a child with words of affirmation).
Lee Roy Smith, K.M. and Z.M.’s great uncle, testified about his observations
of the children’s behavior. Smith acquired custody of the children in July 2021, and
Z.M. and K.M. have continued to live with Smith and his wife since that time. Smith
stated that he has known K.M. and Z.M. since birth and recalled that, growing up,
K.M., and all the children “were made to call [Appellant] dad,” while Z.M. would
not refer to Appellant by any name. However, Smith noticed that all the children
stopped referring to Appellant as “dad” after he was arrested; instead, the children
referred to Appellant as “dork head” or avoided mentioning Appellant’s name during
discussions altogether. Smith stated that if someone mentioned Appellant’s name in
conversation, Z.M. would become “very angry” and “go into like a fit.” According
to Smith, Z.M. experiences “nightmares” every night and occasionally “wet[s]” the
bed. Smith also stated that while Z.M. does not talk about what causes her
nightmares, Z.M. had mentioned an instance where she was “locked into a closet.”
Smith testified that K.M. was nonverbal when she first began living with him
and his wife. Smith noted that, because of this, K.M. would often point at things to
communicate her needs, such as pointing her finger towards her mouth if she was
hungry. Smith also noted that, even though K.M. has become more verbal since
living with him, she has continued to use gestures and sign language to
communicate. Smith mentioned a couple of “odd” interactions with K.M. a few
weeks after Appellant was arrested. In the first interaction, Smith recalled that he
was sitting in a recliner watching television with K.M. when she abruptly grabbed
Smith’s head and tried to kiss him on the lips. Smith then “pushed” K.M. away and

7
corrected her behavior. Smith stated that K.M. appeared confused when he told her
that this type of behavior “wasn’t good.”
Smith was concerned about the cause of K.M.’s behavior, so he asked K.M.
about “what [Appellant] did to her,” referring to Appellant as “that man” to avoid
using Appellant’s name. K.M. responded by pointing to Smith’s “groin” and then
pointing to her groin area. 4 Smith asked K.M. what else Appellant had done to her,
and she then gestured to Smith’s groin area a second time before pointing towards
her mouth. Smith testified that because K.M. was nonverbal and did not know the
meaning of the word “sex,” he believed that K.M.’s gestures were her attempts to
communicate to him the sexual trauma and abuse that Appellant had committed
against her. In the second interaction, Smith observed K.M. mimicking “sexual acts”
with her “baby dolls” when she was seven.
Mother testified that there were multiple occasions where Appellant had been
alone with the children while they lived with (1) Appellant’s sister and (2) Mother’s
uncle. Specifically, Mother recalled that Appellant would be alone with her children
when he picked up Mother from work “in the middle of the night” and he would
occasionally bring one or two of the children with him. Mother testified that,
sometime after she and the children began living with her uncle, T.M. told her about
a “concerning” incident he observed between Appellant and B.F. Mother testified
that, while she did not report this incident to the police, she spoke to Appellant about
T.M.’s allegations and Appellant responded that T.M. was “making it up.” Mother
also recalled another incident that she witnessed between Appellant and B.F. where
Appellant took B.F. to the “pool room” in her uncle’s house. Mother said that, after
searching for B.F. in her uncle’s house, she entered the pool room “turned on the

4
The State provided notice to Appellant of their intent to use Smith as the outcry witness for K.M.,
and the trial court later determined at a pretrial hearing that Smith’s outcry testimony was reliable. See
CRIM. PROC. art. 38.072.
8
lights” and saw Appellant—with his pants down—while B.F. was “on all fours”
under the pool table and Appellant was behind B.F. Mother stated that she did not
contact law enforcement about the “pool room” incident because of previous
“altercations” between her and Appellant where he had threatened to kill Mother if
she reported him to the police.
Bishop testified that she and Mother were friends, she had a child who was
around the same age as B.F., and she knew that Mother would leave the children
alone with Appellant. Bishop testified that she was a victim of sexual abuse as a
child, and she noticed “a lot of red flags” related to when Appellant was with the
children, such as (1) changes in B.F.’s clothing, behavior, and demeanor once
Mother began dating Appellant, (2) statements made by Bishop’s daughter about
Appellant’s behavior after spending the night when Appellant was present, and
(3) Bishop’s general observations of Appellant’s behavior toward B.F. Bishop
further stated that she would avoid Appellant while visiting Mother’s residence
because he made Bishop and her husband “extremely uncomfortable.”
B.F. testified at trial about approximately ten incidents of sexual assault
committed by Appellant against her prior to July 2021, which began when she was
twelve. B.F. described the “pool room” incident as well as other instances of sexual
assault committed against her, which occurred when Appellant was alone with B.F.
in his vehicle. According to B.F, Appellant would be alone with her and her siblings
at various times during his relationship with Mother—both when they lived with
Appellant’s sister and Mother’s uncle. B.F. stated that K.M. “struggle[d] with her
speech” and could “[k]ind of” speak in complete sentences. B.F. testified that she
was afraid of Appellant, and she did not make an outcry during her forensic interview
because she was scared that Appellant would hurt her by “either having sex with
[her], or “the gun.” B.F. stated she believed that Appellant was waiting for her

9
outside of Harmony Home. However, B.F. testified that she later made an outcry to
a law enforcement officer in a subsequent interview because she felt safe.
Deputy Heidi Zavala with the Ector County Sheriff’s Office testified that she
spoke to B.F. at the sheriff’s office sometime after B.F. finished her forensic
interview at Harmony Home. Deputy Zavala did not interview either K.M. or Z.M.
during her investigation because they were nonverbal and “too little.” According to
Deputy Zavala, B.F. referred to Appellant as “KC” and described various instances
of sexual abuse inflicted upon her by Appellant. Deputy Zavala testified that
Appellant was “sitting outside” in a vehicle during B.F.’s interview at the Sheriff’s
office, but she did not know if Appellant was waiting outside of Harmony Home
during either B.F.’s, Z.M.’s, or K.M.’s forensic interviews. Deputy Zavala also
testified that during her investigation, she searched Appellant’s vehicle; however,
she did not collect any DNA evidence from it because of (1) the “dirty” condition of
the vehicle, and (2) the time that had elapsed between the date her investigation
commenced and when the sexual assaults occurred.
II. Standard of Review
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of
whether it is framed as a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, under the standard of
review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–
89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review
all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d
756, 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).
When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted
at trial, including evidence that may have been improperly admitted. Winfrey v.
10
State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Lee v. State, 676 S.W.3d 912,
915 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, no pet.). We defer to the factfinder’s role as the
sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is to be
afforded. See CRIM. PROC. art. 36.13 (West 2007); Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762 (“[A]
reviewing court does not sit as the thirteenth juror and may not substitute its
judgment for that of the factfinder by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the
evidence.”); Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Dewberry v.
State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). “This familiar standard gives full
play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the
testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts
to ultimate facts.” Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 761 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319);
Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. Therefore, if the record supports conflicting inferences,
we presume the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer
to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762;
Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Clayton, 235
S.W.3d at 778.
Because the standard of review is the same, we treat direct and circumstantial
evidence equally. Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010);
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Ruiz v. State, 631 S.W.3d
841, 851 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d). It is not necessary that the evidence
directly prove the defendant’s guilt; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct
evidence in establishing a defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence can alone
be sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737,
742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13); Lee, 676 S.W.3d at
915. Each fact need not point directly and independently to guilt if the cumulative
force of all incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.
Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Because evidence must be considered cumulatively, we
11
may not use a “divide and conquer” strategy for evaluating the sufficiency of the
evidence. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Rather,
we must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d
227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
Finally, we measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the
charged offense as defined by the hypothetically correct charge for the case.
Morgan v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see also Malik v. State,
953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In this regard, to determine whether
the State has met its burden to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
under the Jackson standard, we compare the elements of the offense to the evidence
adduced at trial. Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing
Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240). The hypothetically correct charge “accurately sets out
the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s
burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and
adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.”
Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240.
III. Analysis
In his sole issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his convictions for the aggravated sexual assaults against Z.M. and K.M.
Specifically, Appellant contends that, while the evidence was sufficient to support
his conviction for the aggravated sexual assault of B.F., the jury acted irrationally
when it found the elements of Counts Three and Four beyond a reasonable doubt
because: (1) neither Z.M. nor K.M. made an outcry of sexual abuse against
Appellant; (2) no witnesses testified that they saw Appellant sexually abuse Z.M. or
K.M.; (3) there is no evidence that Appellant intentionally or knowingly caused his
penis, his finger, or an unknown object to penetrate the sexual organ of Z.M., or that
he intentionally or knowingly caused Z.M.’s sexual organ to contact his penis, as
12
charged in Count Three; and (4) there was no evidence presented to show that
Appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the sexual organ or mouth of K.M. to
contact his penis, as charged in Count Four.
In response, the State argues that the cumulative force of all the evidence
adduced at trial proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the
offenses of aggravated sexual assault of a child against Z.M. and K.M.
As relevant to this case, a person commits the offense of aggravated sexual
assault of a child if he intentionally or knowingly causes a child’s sexual organ
or mouth to contact his penis, and the child is younger than fourteen. PENAL
§§ 22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii), (v), (a)(2)(B). 5 A person commits the offense of super
aggravated sexual assault of a child if he intentionally or knowingly causes the
penetration of the sexual organ of a child by any means, or causes the sexual organ
of a child to contact his penis, and the child is younger than six. PENAL
§ 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (iii), (f)(1); Gutierrez v. State, 710 S.W.3d 804, 807 (Tex.
2025) (“Subsection (f) is an element of the offense of super aggravated sexual assault
of a child.”). Count Three of the reindictment alleged that Z.M. was younger than
six when the sexual assault occurred, and that Appellant intentionally and knowingly
penetrated the sexual organ of Z.M. by using either his penis, his finger, or an
unknown object, or caused Z.M.’s sexual organ to contact his penis. Count Four of
the reindictment alleged that K.M. was younger than fourteen when the sexual
assault occurred, and that Appellant intentionally and knowingly caused K.M.’s
sexual organ or mouth to contact his penis.
Under Article 38.072 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a hearsay statement
made to an outcry witness by certain victims of sexual abuse, including child victims

5
As relevant to Count Three of the reindictment, if the victim of the offense “is younger than six
years of age at the time the offense is committed,” then the “minimum term of imprisonment for an offense
under this section is increased to [twenty-five] years.” PENAL § 22.021(f)(1).
13
of a sexual offense, is admissible. CRIM. PROC. art. 38.072; see also Martinez v.
State, 178 S.W.3d 806, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (noting that Article 38.07 deals
with the sufficiency of evidence required to sustain a conviction for certain sexual
offenses, while Article 38.072 concerns the admissibility of outcry evidence that
would otherwise be barred by the hearsay rule); Chapman v. State, 349 S.W.3d 241,
245 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2011, pet. ref’d). The outcry witness is the first person
who is eighteen or older, other than the defendant, to whom the child made a
statement about the details of the sexual offense. CRIM. PROC. art. 38.072; see
Bays v. State, 396 S.W.3d 580, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). “The [child’s]
statement must be ‘more than words which give a general allusion that something in
the area of child abuse is going on’; it must be made in some discernible manner and
is event-specific rather than person-specific.” Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 140
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Garcia v. State, 792 S.W.2d 88, 91 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1990)). As such, a child victim’s outcry statement(s) alone can be sufficient
to support a sexual assault conviction. See Jones v. State, 428 S.W.3d 163, 169 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.); Tear v. State, 74 S.W.3d 555, 560 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2002, pet. ref’d); Anaya v. State, No. 11-17-00076-CR, 2019
WL 1428612, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 29, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication).
We note that Count Three of the reindictment alleged that Appellant
penetrated Z.M.’s vagina with an unknown object. Based on this language, the State
was only required to prove that Appellant penetrated the child’s vagina by any
means, and the State did not need to identify or offer proof of the unknown object
that Appellant used to support the jury’s determination of Appellant’s guilt on Count
Three. See Coe v. State, No. 14-10-00929-CR, 2012 WL 1899179, at *13 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 24, 2012, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (“All the State was required to prove was that appellant penetrated [the
14
child’s] vagina by any means, which could have been an unknown object and not
appellant’s sexual organ.”); see also Garcia v. State, No. 11-12-00091-CR, 2014
WL 1778252, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 30, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication).
Appellant contends that the State failed to present any evidence that either
Z.M. or K.M. made an outcry of sexual abuse. Appellant also contends that there is
no evidence that he (1) used his penis, his finger, or an unknown object to penetrate
Z.M.’s vagina as alleged in Count Three, or (2) caused his penis to contact K.M.’s
vagina or mouth as alleged in Count Four. Appellant is mistaken as to each
contention.
Here, the State provided notice to Appellant and the trial court about the
State’s intention to use Polanco and Smith as outcry witnesses. See CRIM. PROC.
art. 38.072. Following this notice, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s motion
of the reliability of (1) Polanco’s outcry testimony concerning Z.M., and (2) Smith’s
outcry testimony concerning K.M. After a hearing, the trial court determined that
their outcry testimony was reliable, and both testified at trial.
Polanco testified that Z.M. made an outcry of sexual abuse by referring to an
anatomical drawing and stated that “Tetta” had “touched” her vagina (which she
referred to as her “leg”) and Tetta was a “boy” who “lived in her house. According
to Polanco, Z.M.’s outcry statements indicated that “Tetta” was a male, and not her
brother, T.M., who lived in her home. Additionally, Mother testified about those
who lived with her and the children in the past, and she stated that Appellant lived
with them at various times and had unsupervised access to the children. Smith
testified that he asked K.M. “what that man did to her,” referring to Appellant, and
K.M. responded by pointing to Smith’s “groin” and her groin. Smith then asked
K.M. what else had occurred between her and Appellant and she again gestured
toward Smith’s groin before pointing to her mouth. Smith testified that, even though
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he did not use Appellant’s name during this conversation, he believed that K.M. was
expressly referring to the sexual trauma that she had experienced because of
Appellant’s sexual abuse. As such, regardless of whether Z.M. or K.M. understood
the meaning of the terms “sex” or “penetration” when they made their outcry
statements, the jury could have reasonably and logically concluded from the outcry
testimony that (1) Appellant penetrated Z.M.’s vagina with an unknown object or
caused Z.M.’s vagina to contact his penis, and (2) Appellant caused K.M.’s vagina
or mouth to contact his penis. See Rodriguez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991) (explaining outcry witness testimony is substantive evidence of
guilt for sufficiency review and is alone sufficient to support a conviction).
Moreover, even though corroboration of a child victim’s testimony by medical
or physical evidence is not required to support the jury’s determination of guilt, the
State nevertheless presented competent medical evidence of vaginal scarring and
bruising on K.M. and Z.M. that were consistent with injuries one would receive from
a penetrative sexual assault. See Wishert v. State, 654 S.W.3d 317, 328 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2022, pet. ref’d); Martines v. State, 371 S.W.3d 232, 240 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); see also Lee v. State, 176 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004), aff’d, 206 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
The medical evidence showed that each child sustained physical injuries and trauma
because of Appellant’s sexual abuse. Dr. Anbarsvrri testified to observing trauma-
based bruises on K.M.’s vaginal area during his examination of her, and he stated
that these types of injuries were likely caused by penetrative sexual abuse rather than
by other acts or means. Dr. Anbarsvrri believed that K.M.’s combative behavior
during his examinations were consistent with persons who suffered from trauma that
was attributable to sexual abuse and not from behaviors associated with Down
syndrome. Similarly, Aguilar testified that she observed linear vaginal scars during
Z.M.’s examination. Aguilar stated that Z.M.’s vaginal scars were (1) related to
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“penetration,” (2) “deeper than a regular laceration from consensual sex,” and
(3) like B.F.’s vaginal scars. As such, this physical evidence corroborated the outcry
testimony.
Further, Schoen testified concerning the behaviors that are typically
associated with children who have experienced trauma because of sexual abuse and
the general behaviors exhibited by sexual predators who are attracted to children.
Testimony was presented from several witnesses that they observed behaviors
exhibited by K.M. and Z.M. that are consistent with the responses that are known to
be expressed by child victims of sexual abuse, which included: (1) Smith’s testimony
that (a) K.M. exhibited inappropriate sexual behavior while living with him and his
wife, (b) Z.M. would become “very angry” and “go into like a fit” if Appellant’s
name was mentioned during a conversation, and (c) Z.M. has “nightmares” every
night and occasionally “wet[s]” the bed; (2) Dr. Anbarsvrri’s and Aguilar’s
testimony concerning K.M.’s demeanor and conduct during their medical
examinations; (3) Bishop’s and Mother’s observations of Appellant’s abusive
behavior toward the children; and (4) B.F.’s testimony that she was afraid of
Appellant and the various instances of sexual abuse committed by him that she had
experienced.
In this case, as in all cases, the jury may believe all, some, or none of any
witness’s testimony. Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992); Reyes v. State, 465 S.W.3d 801, 805 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, pet. ref’d)
(citing Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)); see Winfrey,
393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. As the trier of fact, it is the jury’s
duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at
326; Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899.

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We have reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s
verdicts, and we conclude that the record before us contains sufficient evidence from
which a rational jury could have logically inferred and found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Appellant committed the offenses of super aggravated sexual assault of
Z.M. and aggravated sexual assault of K.M. as charged in Counts Three and Four of
the reindictment, respectively. See PENAL § 22.021(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B), (f)(1);
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Rodriguez, 819 S.W.2d at 873.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal.
IV. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

January 15, 2026
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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