In Re Christopher M. Perricone v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed October 23, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
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No. 11-25-00288-CV
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IN RE CHRISTOPHER M. PERRICONE

Original Mandamus Proceeding

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Relator, Christopher M. Perricone, 1 has filed a petition for writ of mandamus
requesting that we order Respondent, the Honorable Mike Moore, the presiding
judge of the 29th District Court of Palo Pinto County, to vacate an order to seal court
records that it signed on January 9, 2020, in the underlying suit affecting the parent-

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Relator appeared pro se in the trial court proceedings below and is continuing to proceed on appeal
without the assistance of counsel. Despite this, Relator, in proceeding in such a capacity, is nonetheless
held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and is required to comply with all applicable laws and rules
of procedure. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978); Barrientos v.
Barrientos, 675 S.W.3d 399, 404 n.2 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied); Aaron v. Fisher, 645 S.W.3d
299, 312 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, no pet.).
child relationship (SAPCR) and subsequent modification suit. We deny the petition.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a).
Relator and his ex-wife, Katie Beth Perricone, 2 were appointed joint
managing conservators of their four children following their divorce in 2020. See
In re Perricone, No. 11-25-00078-CV, 2025 WL 1184127, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Eastland Apr. 24, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Katie filed a motion to seal
court records on January 7, 2020, and the trial court signed an order granting the
motion two days later. In June 2024, Katie filed a petition to modify the SAPCR
order in which she sought appointment as sole managing conservator of their
children. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.001 (West 2014); Perricone, 2025 WL
1184127, at *1. Relator filed a motion to declare the sealing order “unconstitutional
and void” on May 31, 2025, and an amended motion in July 2025. The trial court
signed an order on August 4, 2025, denying Relator’s request for relief. The trial
court’s order states that “one or both counsel for [Relator] were fully aware of the
sealing order,” and “[h]aving full knowledge of the existence of the sealing order,
counsel for [Relator] at no time attempted to have the [trial court] vacate, amend,
modify, or even address the sealing order.” The trial court thus found that Relator’s
request to have the sealing order declared void ab initio was without merit.
Mandamus is an “extraordinary” remedy that is “available only in limited
circumstances.” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding). A writ of mandamus will issue only if the trial court clearly abused its
discretion, and the relator has no adequate remedy on appeal. In re Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). “A trial court
abuses its discretion ‘if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to
amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.”’ In re Cerberus Cap. Mgmt., L.P.,

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Because Relator and Katie have the same last name, we will refer to Katie by her first name.

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164 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (quoting Walker,
827 S.W.2d at 839). It is the relator’s burden to provide the reviewing court with a
sufficient record to establish the right to mandamus relief. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3,
52.7; see Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 837; In re Pentland, No. 03-22-00717-CV, 2023
WL 307476, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 19, 2023, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
In certain circumstances, mandamus relief is appropriate without a showing
that the relator lacks an adequate remedy on appeal. For example, when a trial court
signs an order that is “beyond its jurisdiction,” the order is void ab initio. In re
Panchakarla, 602 S.W.3d 536, 539 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam) (quoting In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam)). Relator contends that the trial court’s 2020 sealing order
is void ab initio because he did not sign or approve it, nor did he agree to seal the
trial court’s file. “An order is void when a court has no power or jurisdiction to
render it.” Urbish v. 127th Judicial Dist. Court, 708 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex. 1986)
(orig. proceeding). “Mandamus will issue to correct a void order of a trial court.”
In re Orsagh, 151 S.W.3d 263, 265 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2004, no pet.). But it may
not be used “to correct a merely erroneous or voidable order of the trial court.”
Urbish, 708 S.W.2d at 431.
Katie filed the petition for divorce in December 2019, and Relator was served
with the petition on January 7, 2020. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 22. Because the trial court
granted Katie’s motion and signed its sealing order while the divorce proceeding
was pending, it had the jurisdiction to act and render it. Urbish, 708 S.W.2d at 431;
see also P.I.A. of Fort Worth, Inc. v. Sullivan, 837 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 1992, no pet.) (trial court had no jurisdiction to seal the parties’ divorce
records nine months after the suit had been voluntarily dismissed).

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Relator further asserts that the trial court failed to comply with Rule 76a of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which sets forth the standard for sealing “court
records,” and permits an appeal from any order “relating to sealing or unsealing court
records.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(1), (8). Rule 76a defines “court records” as “all
documents of any nature filed in connection with any matter before any civil court,”
however, “documents filed in an action originally arising under the Family Code”
are excepted. Id. R. 76a(2)(a)(3). Suits for the dissolution of marriage, suits
affecting the parent-child relationship, and suits to modify an order that provides for
the conservatorship, support, or possession of and access to a child clearly arise
under the Family Code. See FAM. § 6.402 (West 2020), § 102.001–.002 (West
2019), § 156.002.
Here, because the underlying dispute flows from a SAPCR and subsequent
modification filings, Rule 76a’s requirements for sealing documents do not apply.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(2)(a)(3). It logically follows that subsection (8) of this rule,
which deems that an order relating to the sealing or unsealing of court records is a
final judgment and thus appealable, is likewise inapplicable. See Hirczy de Mino v.
Paxton, No. 05-25-00981-CV, 2025 WL 2697296, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Sept. 22, 2025, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (dismissing the appeal of a sealing order in a
pending divorce suit as interlocutory and thus not appealable because Rule 76a
“excludes [it] from its ambit”); In re B.H., No. 14-22-00068-CV, 2023 WL 5236040,
at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (Rule 76a does
not apply to an order relating to sealing or unsealing documents filed in an action
originally arising under the Family Code, so it “is not deemed severed or final and
appealable under Rule 76a(8).”). Consequently, we will presume that Relator lacks
an adequate remedy on appeal.

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To establish that the trial court abused its discretion by sealing the records at
issue, Relator must show that the trial court could reasonably have reached only one
decision. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839–40. “Even if the reviewing court would have
decided the issue differently, it cannot disturb the trial court’s decision unless it is
shown to be arbitrary and unreasonable.” Id. at 840. Generally, judicial records and
documents are open to the public, but the trial court has the discretion to seal the
record in appropriate circumstances. In re M.A.M., No. 05-14-00040-CV, 2015
WL 5863833, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 8, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
“Certain personal matters fall within a ‘constitutionally protected zone of privacy,’
including matters related to ‘[m]arital relationships, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing and education, and medical records.’” In re
Srivastava, No. 05-17-00998-CV, 2018 WL 833376, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Feb. 12, 2018, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (quoting Nguyen v. Dallas Morning
News, L.P., No. 02-06-00298-CV, 2008 WL 2511183, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
June 19, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.)). “[T]here is a presumption under Texas law that
the public has no legitimate interest in private embarrassing facts about private
citizens.” Id. However, whether a matter is one of public concern “depends on the
factual context of each particular case, the nature of the information, and the public’s
legitimate interest in its disclosure.” Id.
In support of his petition, Relator provided e-mail communications between
him and Katie’s attorney in which Relator expressed his opposition to the motion to
seal. His contention rests not on the trial court’s discretion to seal the records but
instead that he did not agree to Katie’s motion. There is nothing before us that
challenges or undermines the trial court’s determination that “a specific, serious and
substantial interest which clearly outweigh[ed] [the] presumption of openness.” See
Srivastava, 2018 WL 833376, at *5 (quoting Boardman v. Elm Block Dev. Ltd.

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P’ship, 872 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1994, no writ)). We are likewise
without authority in a mandamus proceeding to either make factual determinations
regarding disputed or unsupported facts, or to substitute our opinion for that of the
trial court. See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839–40. Here, the record does not show that
the trial court clearly abused its discretion—irrespective of whether the parties in
fact agreed—when it ordered the sealing of all documents that were filed in the
parties’ 2020 divorce and custody suit.
Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that Relator has met his burden to show
that the trial court clearly abused its discretion when it (1) signed its sealing order in
2020, or (2) denied Relator’s amended motion to declare the sealing order void and
unconstitutional. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8; Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839–40. Relator has
therefore failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to mandamus relief.
Accordingly, we deny Relator’s petition.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

October 23, 2025
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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