Clyde Dale Evans v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed September 25, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-24-00179-CR
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CLYDE DALE EVANS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 29th District Court
Palo Pinto County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 18207

MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Appellant, Clyde Dale Evans, of the offense of evading arrest
or detention with a vehicle, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 38.04(a), (b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2024). The jury found two enhancement
paragraphs to be “true” and assessed Appellant’s punishment at thirty-seven years’
imprisonment. See id. § 12.42(d) (West 2019). In a single issue on appeal,
Appellant contends that “the trial court erred in allowing [jurors] to sit on the jury
who indicated a bias or prejudice without allowing further inquiry into their bias or
prejudice.”1 We modify and affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural History
On July 4, 2023, Mineral Wells Police Officer William Starr was on patrol
when he recognized Appellant’s vehicle and received an alert that Appellant had an
outstanding warrant. Officer Starr observed that Appellant’s vehicle registration
was expired, and the vehicle’s right brake lamp was defective. When Officer Starr
attempted to initiate a traffic stop, Appellant accelerated his vehicle and turned
several times before disregarding a red light. Appellant thereafter abandoned his
moving vehicle and ran toward a nearby residence, where Appellant was
apprehended without further incident.
During voir dire, the State explained that it bore the burden of proof at trial
and that Appellant was presumed innocent. Then, over the course of sixty-six pages,
Appellant’s trial counsel questioned the venire panel, asking the panel whether, he
“should have to,” or they would “require” him to “put on a defense or call witnesses
or ask questions.” To this questioning, the veniremembers answered in terms of
what they would require Appellant’s trial counsel to do, such as present rebuttal
evidence; but notably, the veniremembers were not asked whether they would imply
that Appellant was guilty if his attorney failed to present rebuttal evidence.
Appellant also inquired whether they would be “more apt to believe a law
enforcement officer over a lay witness.”

1
After Appellant’s counsel filed an appellate brief, Appellant filed a pro se brief raising a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Because Appellant is currently represented by counsel, we do not consider
his pro se brief. See Ex parte Taylor, 36 S.W.3d 883, 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (holding that an appellant
is not entitled to “hybrid representation” on appeal) (quoting Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 498 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1995)); see also, e.g., Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 620 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)
(refusing to consider appellant’s pro se brief where appellant was represented by counsel on appeal); Vera v.
State, 496 S.W.3d 293, 295 n.1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. ref’d) (same); Yarbrough v. State,
No. 11-13-00146-CR, 2014 WL 4373997, at *1 n.4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Sept. 4, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (same).
2
At the close of voir dire, outside the venire panel’s presence, the trial court
asked counsel for the parties if they had any challenges for cause. Appellant
challenged thirty-two veniremembers, asserting bias on grounds that they required
him to present a defense or favored law enforcement. The trial court denied all of
Appellant’s challenges for cause, reasoning:
[T]hey clearly said that -- their answers were if they found -- if the
State’s evidence proved your client guilty, they would expect you to do
something, yes, because, again, you have a duty to represent your client,
and that’s essentially all they were saying, is they would expect you to
do your job. That’s essentially all they were saying.
And then the second one was challenging the credibility -- or
giving law enforcement extra credit or credibility, those issues. That’s
not a challengeable for cause issue.
Four of the thirty-two veniremembers that were challenged for cause during trial
were ultimately seated as jurors. Only two of these that were empaneled on the jury
are addressed in Appellant’s brief: Juror Nos. 23 and 25.
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
The United States Supreme Court “has long held that a trial judge has broad
discretion in the manner it chooses to conduct voir dire, both as to the topics that
will be addressed, and the form and substance of the questions that will be employed
to address them.” Jacobs v. State, 560 S.W.3d 205, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
The trial court may also interject and exclude voir dire questions that are confusing,
misleading, vague, or are improper commitment questions. Hernandez v. State, 390
S.W.3d 310, 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
“We review a trial court’s ruling regarding the limitation of voir dire
questioning for an abuse of discretion.” Id.; Espinosa v. State, No. 11-22-00100-
CR, 2024 WL 1862786, at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 30, 2024, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication). “To constitute an abuse of discretion, the trial

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court’s voir dire limitation must ‘render the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.’”
Jacobs, 560 S.W.3d at 212 (quoting Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 425–26
(1991)).
III. Analysis
In his single issue on appeal, Appellant broadly argues that the trial court
should have “permitted him” additional questioning of the panel regarding their bias
or prejudices 2 “after making it clear that it felt Trial Counsel did not have challenges
for cause that were valid.”
“The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a trial before an impartial
jury.” Franklin v. State, 138 S.W.3d 351, 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The right to
question veniremembers to exercise peremptory challenges intelligently is an
essential part of that Sixth Amendment guarantee. Id.; see also Gonzales v. State,
994 S.W.2d 170, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“[T]he right to pose proper questions
during voir dire examination is included within the right to counsel under Article I,
§ 10, of the Texas Constitution.”).
Voir dire is one of the most important portions of any jury trial. See McCoy v.
Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 59 S.W.3d 793, 801 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
Voir dire determines the makeup of the jury that may not only determine guilt but
may also assess punishment. It permeates the entire trial.
The laws that govern jury selection are designed to ensure that juries in
criminal cases are fair to both sides. See Sanchez v. State, 165 S.W.3d 707, 710–11
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The purposes of voir dire include, (1) eliciting information
that would establish a basis for a challenge for cause because the veniremember is
legally disqualified from serving or is biased or prejudiced for or against one of the

2
A valid challenge for cause may be asserted by a defendant if a potential juror has a bias or
prejudice against (1) the defendant or (2) any law that is applicable to the case and upon which the defendant
is entitled to rely at trial. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.16(a)(9), (c)(2) (West 2006).
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parties or some aspect of the relevant law; (2) facilitating the intelligent use of
peremptory challenges that may be exercised without a reason stated, without
inquiry and without being subject to the court’s control; and (3) establish rapport
with the prospective jury members. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
To the extent that Appellant challenges the trial court’s rulings on his
challenges for cause, he failed to preserve error. In this regard, if the trial court “errs
in overruling a challenge for cause against a venire member, then the appellant must
show that he was harmed because he was forced to use a peremptory strike to remove
the venire person and that he suffered a detriment from the loss of that peremptory
strike.” Buntion v. State, 482 S.W.3d 58, 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing
Chambers v. State, 866 S.W.2d 9, 22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)). To preserve this
error for review, Appellant needed to use all of his peremptory strikes and then to
ask for and be refused additional peremptory strikes. Id. Appellant must also
demonstrate that he had been “forced to take an identified objectionable juror whom
appellant would not otherwise have accepted had the trial court granted his challenge
for cause (or granted him additional peremptory strikes so that he might strike the
juror).” Id. Because Appellant did not request additional peremptory challenges
after the trial court’s rulings on his challenges for cause based on bias or prejudice,
he has not preserved error with respect to the trial court’s rulings. See id. We
therefore express no opinion as to propriety of the trial court’s rulings regarding
Appellant’s challenges for cause.
However, Appellant’s challenge on appeal is that the trial court erred by not
allowing his trial counsel an opportunity to further question the prospective jurors.
Appellant, however, provides no references to where in the record that he requested
and was denied the opportunity to question veniremembers further. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 33.1(a). Having reviewed the record, we find no such requests by Appellant
or limitations imposed by the trial court. Voir dire spans 179 pages of the reporter’s
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record, sixty-six of which contain voir dire conducted exclusively by Appellant’s
trial counsel. The questioning of the venire panel by Appellant’s trial counsel ended
with counsel telling the trial court that he believed he was done. Then, during a
discussion at the bench concerning the parties’ challenges for cause, the State noted
that if Appellant intended to challenge the thirty individuals referenced, the State
would then need the opportunity to “rehab the whole panel.” While Appellant, in
fact, challenged thirty-two veniremembers for cause, Appellant’s requests were
denied, and Appellant did not then similarly request that he have an opportunity to
recall the panel or ask special veniremembers additional questions.
To the extent that Appellant impliedly argues that the trial court had a sua
sponte duty to question the venire or expand the voir dire, he provides no authority
in support of his argument. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Robinson v. State, 685
S.W.3d 217, 220–21 n.2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2024, no pet.) (defendant failed to
adequately brief on appeal argument that trial court had some sua sponte duty to
intervene during voir dire and thus, appellate court would not address the argument).
We find no authority provided for Appellant’s claim of a sua sponte duty incumbent
upon the trial court.
Because Appellant failed to demonstrate that his questioning or the venire had
been limited, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See Hernandez,
390 S.W.3d at 315. We overrule Appellant’s sole issue.
IV. This Court’s Ruling
We have the authority to modify and reform judgments when the necessary
information is available to do so. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); see Bigley v. State, 865
S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609
(Tex. Crim. App. 1992); see also Smith v. State, No. 11-22-00224-CR, 2024
WL 628920, at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 15, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (“This court’s power to modify a judgment is ‘not
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dependent upon the request of any party, nor does it turn on the question of whether
a party has or has not objected in the trial court.’” (quoting Asberry v. State, 813
S.W.2d 526, 529–30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d))). The trial court’s
judgment lists the statute for the charged offense as Sections 38.04(a) and (b)(1) of
the Penal Code. See PENAL § 38.04. However, Appellant was indicted and
convicted of the third-degree felony offense of evading arrest or detention with a
vehicle pursuant to Section 38.04(b)(2)(A) of the Penal Code. See id. § 38.04(a),
(b)(2)(A).
Accordingly, we modify the trial court’s judgment in the section titled
“Statute for Offense” to replace “38.04(a),(b)(1)” with “38.04(a), (b)(2)(A).” We
affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified.

W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
JUSTICE

September 25, 2025
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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