Carol Johnene Morris v. Midland Central Appraisal District

Opinion filed August 29, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
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No. 11-25-00166-CV
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CAROL JOHNENE MORRIS, Appellant
V.
MIDLAND CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellee

On Appeal from the 238th District Court
Midland County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DTX-24-00088

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Carol Johnene Morris, filed a pro se notice of appeal from the trial
court’s “Order Granting Robert Morris III and Helen Price Plaintiffs’ MCAD and
Midland County Installment Payment Agreement.” In November 2024,
Appellee, the Midland Central Appraisal District (MCAD), filed a suit for the
collection of delinquent property taxes against Appellant, Carol Johnene Morris,
Braggston T. Morris, and Robert James Morris III. The trial court “rendered
judgment in this case on April 15, 2025,” but, on its own motion, set aside its
judgment and reinstated the case the next day. On June 12, Robert Morris entered
into an installment agreement with MCAD. Appellant is attempting to appeal the
installment agreement between those two parties. We dismiss the appeal for want
of jurisdiction.
When this appeal was docketed, we informed Appellant by letter that it did
not appear that the trial court had entered an appealable order in this case, and we
informed her that the appeal was subject to dismissal. Appellant responded and
stated that she was appealing (1) the trial court’s “Order Denying Her Motion to
Dismiss Under Rule [91a] And for Partial Summary Judgment, filed April 15, 2025”
and (2) the installment agreement. For her “GROUNDS,” she listed, among other
things, a timeline of events that began in 1981 and alleged “judicial corruption,”
fraud, conspiracy, and postconviction habeas claims. Appellant has not shown
grounds upon which this appeal may continue.
We also requested a response from MCAD. MCAD responded, clarified the
procedural history of the case below, and agreed that the “informal installment
agreement” from which Morris is attempting to appeal is not a final order or an
appealable interlocutory order. In its response, MCAD requested that we dismiss
the appeal for want of jurisdiction because of the lack of an appealable order.
Unless specifically authorized by statute, appeals may be taken only from
final judgments. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840–41 (Tex.
2007); Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). The purported
order from which Morris attempts to appeal is not an order, but an installment
agreement between MCAD and another party. Moreover, to the extent Morris
attempts to appeal any denial of her Rule 91a motion on “April 15,” the trial court
subsequently set aside its judgment relating to that decision, if it was so made.
Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant’s notice of appeal does not invoke this
court’s appellate jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).
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We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE

August 29, 2025
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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