Suzonne Franks v. Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts and Glenn Hegar, in His Official Capacity

Opinion filed May 30, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-23-00154-CV
__________

SUZONNE FRANKS, Appellant
V.
THE TEXAS COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS AND
GLENN HEGAR, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, Appellees

On Appeal from the 91st District Court
Eastland County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CV2246427

OPINION
In 2020, the Ranchland Wind Project Two, LLC (RWP) filed an application
with Baird Independent School District (BISD or the school district) to limit the tax
value of a proposed wind farm under the Texas Economic Development Act
(TEDA). See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 313.001–.171 (West 2015). Per the
requirements of the TEDA at that time, the school district sent a copy of the
application to the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts (the Comptroller). See Act
of May 26, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1304, § 6, sec. 313.025(b), 2013 Tex. Gen.
Laws 3317, 3321 (expired Dec. 31, 2022). The Comptroller then performed an
economic impact evaluation and issued a certificate of limitation on appraised value.
After it received the certificate, the school district approved the application.
Thereafter, Appellant, Suzonne Franks, brought suit against the Comptroller’s
office, as well as Glenn Hegar, in his official capacity as the Texas Comptroller,
seeking among other things a declaratory judgment that the certificate was void. The
Comptroller then filed a plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court granted the plea to
the jurisdiction, and this appeal followed. We affirm.
The Texas Economic Development Act
The TEDA was created to attract manufacturing and other capital-intensive
projects to Texas by temporarily limiting taxes that are imposed on new capital
investments. TAX § 313.002. The majority of the Act expired in 2022. TAX
§ 313.007. However, prior to 2023, the statute provided a means by which property
owners could apply for limitations on the appraised value of their property. See Act
of May 26, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1304 § 6, sec. 313.025(b-1), 2013 Tex. Gen.
Laws 3317, 3321–22 (expired Dec. 31, 2022). Specifically, the TEDA provided that
“[t]he owner or lessee of, or the holder of another possessory interest in, any
qualified property . . . may apply to the governing body of the school district in which
the property is located for a limitation on the appraised value.” Act of May 26, 2013,
83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1304, § 6, sec. 313.025(a), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3317, 3321
(expired Dec. 31, 2022) (emphasis added).
The TEDA did not require an applicant to be the owner of the land itself.
Instead, the TEDA explicitly contemplated that “[q]ualified property” included
(a) land “on which a person proposes to construct a new building or erect or affix a

2
new improvement” that did not exist before the application was submitted, (b) the
new building or improvement itself, and (c) any tangible personal property that
would be “first placed in service” in a new or expanded facility. Act of May 26,
2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1304, § 3, sec. 313.021(2)(A)(ii), (2)(B), (2)(C)(ii), 2013
Tex. Gen. Laws 3317, 3319 (expired Dec. 31, 2022). Thus, persons and entities with
possessory interests in the improvements or tangible personal property that would
first be put into service in a new or expanded facility could likewise apply for a
limitation.
Additionally, “[q]ualified property” included, among other things, property
that was “located in an area designated as a reinvestment zone.” Act of May 26,
2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1304, § 3, sec. 313.021(2)(A)(i), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws
3317, 3319 (expired Dec. 31, 2022). Likewise, the proposed improvement to the
property was required to create at least twenty-five new jobs. Act of May 26, 2013,
83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1304, § 3, sec. 313.021(2)(A)(iv)(b), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3317,
3319 (expired Dec. 31, 2022). However, the school district was authorized to waive
this requirement upon a finding that “the jobs creation requirement exceeds the
industry standard for the number of employees reasonably necessary for the
operation of the facility.” Act of May 22, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 864, § 3,
sec. 313.025(f-1), 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 1830, 1831 (expired Dec. 31, 2022).
The school district was not required to consider an application for a limitation
on appraised value. Act of May 26, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1304, § 6,
sec. 313.025(b), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3317, 3321 (expired Dec. 31, 2022).
However, if the school district elected to consider an application, the school district
was required to request that the Comptroller undertake an economic impact
evaluation of the proposal contained within the application. Id.

3
The Comptroller was then tasked with two requirements. First, the
Comptroller was required to consider whether the project was “reasonably likely to
generate . . . tax revenue” in accordance with certain standards that were set out in
the TEDA. Act of May 26, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1304, § 7, sec. 313.026(c),
2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3317, 3324 (expired Dec. 31, 2022). Second, the Comptroller
was required to consider whether “the limitation on appraised value [was] a
determining factor in the applicant’s decision to invest capital and construct the
project.” Id. If those two criteria were met, the Comptroller was required to issue a
certificate. Act of May 26, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1304, § 6, sec. 313.025(d),
2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3317, 3322 (expired Dec. 31, 2022). If the criteria were not
met, the Comptroller was required to provide a “written explanation of the
comptroller’s decision not to issue a certificate.” Id. However, even if the criteria
were not met, the Comptroller was still authorized to issue a certificate “if the
comptroller [made] a qualitative determination that other considerations associated
with the project result in a net positive benefit to the state.” Act of May 26, 2013,
83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1304, § 7, sec. 313.026(f), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3317, 3324
(expired Dec. 31, 2022).
If a certificate was issued by the Comptroller, the school district was charged
with either approving or disapproving the application. Act of May 26, 2013, 83rd
Leg., R.S., ch. 1304, § 6, sec. 313.025(b), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3317, 3321 (expired
Dec. 31, 2022). The school district was further authorized to designate an area
within the school district as a reinvestment zone at the same time it granted the
limitation on appraised value. TAX § 312.0025(a).
Background Facts
The RWP is a wind energy facility that is located in the easternmost portion
of Callahan County. Franks filed suit as a resident and landowner in Eastland

4
County. She filed the underlying suit in Eastland County alleging that venue was
proper because the RWP affected her property in Eastland County.
On August 24, 2020, the RWP submitted an Application for Appraised Value
Limitation on Qualified Property to BISD. Thereafter, the school district forwarded
the application to the Comptroller. The application described the “qualified
property” at issue as turbines, a substation, transmission line, and other proposed
improvements to the land on which the facility would be located. Likewise, it
explicitly indicated that the proposed qualified property would not consist of land.
The application also included a letter requesting a partial waiver of the TEDA jobs
requirement, indicating that the facility would “create 3 full time permanent
positions” and that the number of jobs was “congruent with industry standards for
renewable energy facilities.”
The Comptroller’s analysis showed that the proposed project would likely
generate sufficient tax revenue to offset the losses resulting from the agreement, and
that the limitation on appraised value was a “determining factor in the applicant’s
decision to invest capital and construct the project.” As such, the Comptroller issued
a certificate for a limitation on the appraised value of the property. Thereafter, on
February 22, 2021, the school district and the RWP entered into an agreement
limiting the appraised value of the property.
Franks filed suit against the Comptroller on August 30, 2022, asserting a claim
under the Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act (the Property Act). See
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 2007.001–.045 (West 2016). In her petition, she
complained that the RWP’s application did not meet the statutory requirements to
be approved for a tax limitation, and requested a declaratory judgment that the
certificate issued for the RWP is void.

5
Franks further alleged that the Comptroller’s action in issuing the certificate
was an ultra vires act that was attributable to Hegar in his official capacity. See Tex.
Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2011) (Ultra vires is an
exception to sovereign immunity “under which claims may be brought against a state
official for nondiscretionary acts unauthorized by law.”).
Notably, Franks did not bring suit against the school district, challenge the
school district’s findings in support of the agreement, or request any relief restricting
the manner in which ongoing taxes are collected from the RWP.
After Franks brought suit, the Comptroller filed a plea to the jurisdiction,
which was granted by the district court. This appeal followed.
Statutory Construction
“We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo, as they are
questions of law.” Butler v. City of Big Spring, 652 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2022, pet. denied). When interpreting a statute, we must “ascertain and
give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” Bexar Appraisal Dist. v. Johnson, 691
S.W.3d 844, 847 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Odyssey 2020 Acad., Inc. v. Galveston Cent.
Appraisal Dist., 624 S.W.3d 535, 540 (Tex. 2021)); Butler, 652 S.W.3d at 152. “We
look for that intent first and foremost in the plain language of the constitutional or
statutory provision.” Odyssey, 624 S.W.3d at 540; see also Butler, 652 S.W.3d at
152. “If the statute’s plain language is unambiguous, we interpret its plain meaning,
presuming that the Legislature intended for each of the statute’s words to have a
purpose.” Johnson, 691 S.W.3d at 847 (quoting Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 579
S.W.3d 53, 59 (Tex. 2019)); see also Butler, 652 S.W.3d at 152 (“[O]ur objective is
to ‘ascertain[] and giv[e] effect to the legislature’s intent as expressed by the plain
and common meaning of the statute’s words.’” (quoting Wichita Cnty. v. Bonnin,
268 S.W.3d 811, 817 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied))). Statutory terms

6
that are not defined by the legislature “usually bear their common, ordinary
meaning.” Johnson, 691 S.W.3d at 847. Furthermore, when interpreting a statute
that an agency is charged with enforcing, the agency’s interpretation is entitled to
“‘serious consideration,’ so long as the construction is reasonable and does not
conflict with the statute’s language.” R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe
Future & Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d 619, 624 (Tex. 2011) (quoting First Am. Title
Ins. Co. v. Combs, 258 S.W.3d 627, 632 (Tex. 2008)).1
The Issue in Dispute
In her sole issue on appeal, Franks complains that the trial court erred when it
granted the Comptroller’s plea to the jurisdiction.
In its plea to the jurisdiction, the Comptroller argued that Franks did not have
standing to assert claims against the Comptroller and that Franks’s claims were
barred by sovereign immunity. Franks argues that the trial court erred in granting
the judgment because (1) sovereign immunity does not apply to her ultra vires claim,
(2) sovereign immunity has been waived by the State under the circumstances of this
case, and (3) she has pleaded the facts necessary to establish standing.
Ultra Vires
“Sovereign immunity and its counterpart, governmental immunity, exist to
protect the State and its political subdivisions from lawsuits and liability for money
damages.” Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex.
2008); AIM Media Tex., LLC v. City of Odessa, 663 S.W.3d 324, 333 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2023, pet. denied). However, “an action to determine or protect a private
party’s rights against a state official who has acted ultra vires–that is, without legal
or statutory authority—is not a suit against the State that sovereign immunity bars.”

1
In this instance, the TEDA required the Comptroller to “adopt rules and forms necessary for the
implementation and administration” of the Act. Act of May 26, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1304, § 12,
sec. 313.031(a)(1), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3317, 3326–27 (expired Dec. 31, 2022).
7
Phillips v. McNeill, 635 S.W.3d 620, 628 (Tex. 2021) (citing Fed. Sign v. Tex. S.
Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 404 (Tex. 1997)); City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d
366, 368 (Tex. 2009).
“[G]overnmental immunity bars suits complaining of an exercise of absolute
discretion” by a government official. Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. City of
Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154, 163 (Tex. 2016) (emphasis omitted). However,
government officers that are given limited discretion to interpret and apply the law
act “without legal authority” when they exceed the bounds of their granted authority
or act in conflict with the law itself. Id. at 158.
“[A]s a technical matter, the governmental entities themselves—as opposed
to their officers in their official capacity—remain immune from suit.” Heinrich, 284
S.W.3d at 372–73. As such, lawsuits alleging that public officials have acted ultra
vires must be brought against the public officials themselves, rather than the entities
with which the officials are associated. Id. at 373.
Franks maintains that sovereign immunity does not apply because Hegar was
acting ultra vires2 when the certificate was issued. Specifically, Franks argues that,
because the properties that were the subject of the application did not satisfy the
TEDA’s definition of “qualified properties” at the time the application was
submitted, Hegar was acting without legal authority.
The tax limitations that were available under the TEDA were available only
for “qualified properties.” See Act of May 26, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1304, § 6,
sec. 313.025, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3317, 3321 (expired Dec. 31, 2022). A
“qualified property” was in turn defined as a property “that is located in an area
designated as a reinvestment zone under Chapter 311 or 312 [of the Tax Code] or

2
The Latin phrase “ultra vires” means “beyond the powers (of),” and as a legal term, refers to an
act that is “[u]nauthorized” or “beyond the scope of power allowed or granted . . . by law.” Ultra vires,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024).
8
as an enterprise zone under Chapter 2303” of the Texas Government Code. Act of
May 26, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1304, § 3, sec. 313.021(2), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws
3317, 3319 (expired Dec. 31, 2022). Likewise, the TEDA indicated that a “qualified
property” must be the subject of a proposal to “make a qualified investment” of a
specified minimum amount, which also creates twenty-five new qualifying jobs. Id.
Franks argues that that Hegar acted without legal authority when he issued the
certificate because the application did not describe a “qualified property” as required
by the statute. Specifically, Franks asserts that the application did not describe a
“qualified property” because: (1) it was not located in a reinvestment or enterprise
zone at the time the certificate was issued, (2) the RWP was not an owner, lessee, or
holder of any other possessory interest in the property at the time of the application,
and (3) it did not propose to create at least twenty-five new qualifying jobs.
Franks misapprehends the Comptroller’s purpose and role in the approval
process. In issuing the certificate, the Comptroller’s role was limited to undertaking
the economic impact analysis, determining whether the project would generate
sufficient revenue, and ascertaining whether the approval of the exemption would
be a determining factor for the RWP. See Act of May 26, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S.,
ch. 1304, § 7, sec. 313.026(c), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3317, 3324 (expired Dec. 31,
2022). By contrast, the Comptroller was not required to consider any of the factors
that are enumerated by Franks.
The limited role that was played by the Comptroller in issuing the certificate
is further underscored by our reading of the statute, which contemplates that
realization of the statutory requirements described by Franks may not occur until
after the parties have entered into an agreement for limitation of value.
First, while the TEDA required a property with a limitation on value to be in
a reinvestment or enterprise zone, it did not require that the reinvestment or

9
enterprise zone exist at the time the application was submitted. See Act of May 26,
2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1304, § 3, sec. 313.021(2)(A)(i), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws
3317, 3319 (expired Dec. 31, 2022). Likewise, it did not require that the zone exist
at the time a certificate was considered or issued by the Comptroller. See id. Instead,
the language of the Tax Code indicated that the school district could have first
recognized an investment zone at the time the application was granted. Under
Section 312.0025(a) of the Tax Code, a school district “may designate an area . . . as
a reinvestment zone if the governing body finds that, as a result of the designation
and the granting of a limitation on appraised value . . . the designation is reasonably
likely to . . . contribute to the expansion of primary employment . . . or . . . attract
major investment.” TAX § 312.0025(a) (emphasis added). This language
contemplated that the “designation and the granting of a limitation” may occur
simultaneously. Id. As such, Hegar was not acting ultra vires when he issued a
certificate in connection with property that was not yet located in an investment or
enterprise zone.
Franks argues that, because Section 312.0025(a) anticipates future
employment and investment, the statute is “forward looking” and that it must
therefore, be contemplating that the reinvestment or enterprise zone would exist
before the certificate is issued. This argument is unpersuasive. The realization of
employment opportunities and major investment, as described in the statute, need
not (and often will not) occur until after the school board gives final approval to the
project. As such, the designation of a reinvestment or enterprise zone will almost
always be “forward looking,” regardless of whether it occurs before the application
process or at any point during the application process.
Second, with respect to Franks’s argument that the RWP was not an owner,
lessee, or holder of a possessory interest in the property at issue, we note that the

10
TEDA contemplated that the property that was the subject of the application might
not exist at the time the application and/or certificate was issued. Specifically, the
statute recognized that new improvements and buildings that are “propose[d]” at the
time of application constituted qualified property. See Act of May 26, 2013, 83rd
Leg., R.S., ch. 1304, § 3, sec. 313.021(2)(A)(ii), (B), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3317,
3319 (expired Dec. 31, 2022). Furthermore, since buildings and improvements, as
well as tangible personal property could meet the definition of “qualified property,”
the applicant was not required to hold a possessory interest in the land itself at any
time, much less at the time the certificate is issued by the Comptroller. See Act of
May 26, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1304, § 3, sec. 313.021(2), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws
3317, 3319 (expired Dec. 31, 2022). Accordingly, we likewise conclude that Hegar
was not acting ultra vires when he issued a certificate in connection with proposed
ownership of improvements.
Finally, we note that, because the school district ultimately had the authority
to waive or alter the statutory jobs requirements, and because the application itself
indicated that a waiver was requested, Hegar was not acting ultra vires based on the
application’s failure to signal that the project would not create twenty-five jobs. See
Act of May 22, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 864, § 3, sec. 313.025(f-1), 2007 Tex.
Gen. Laws 1830, 1831 (expired Dec. 31, 2022).
The Comptroller maintains that “the TEDA’s requirements may be satisfied
after the certificate issues.” The Comptroller’s reading of the TEDA is consistent
with our own, and we conclude it to be reasonable and free of conflict with the
language of the TEDA. See Tex. Citizens, 336 S.W.3d at 624. As such, we hold that
Hegar was not acting ultra vires when he issued the certificate.

11
Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
Franks also argues that sovereign immunity is not applicable to her cause of
action under the Property Act because sovereign immunity is expressly waived
therein.
The State retains sovereign immunity from suit to the extent that immunity
has not been abrogated by the legislature. See Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation
Comm’n v. IT–Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 853 (Tex. 2002); AIM Media, 663 S.W.3d at
333. It is within the sole province of the Texas Legislature to waive or abrogate
sovereign immunity. Fed. Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 409; AIM Media, 663 S.W.3d at 334.
The Property Act requires governmental entities, including state agencies, to
conduct a “written takings impact” in connection with certain “proposed
governmental action[s].” GOV’T § 2007.043(a). The “governmental actions” that
are subject to the Property Act are subdivided into the following four categories:
(1) the adoption or issuance of an ordinance, rule, regulatory
requirement, resolution, policy, guideline, or similar measure;

(2) an action that imposes a physical invasion or requires a
dedication or exaction of private real property;

(3) an action by a municipality that has effect in the
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the municipality, excluding annexation,
and that enacts or enforces an ordinance, rule, regulation, or plan that
does not impose identical requirements or restrictions in the entire
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the municipality; and
(4) enforcement of a governmental action listed in Subdivisions
(1) through (3), whether the enforcement of the governmental action is
accomplished through the use of permitting, citations, orders, judicial
or quasi-judicial proceedings, or other similar means.
GOV’T § 2007.003(a). A takings impact analysis is required for categories
(1) through (3), but not for category (4). GOV’T § 2007.043(a). If a governmental
entity fails to conduct the takings impact, an affected private real property owner
12
“may bring suit for a declaration of the invalidity of the governmental action.”
GOV’T § 2007.044(a).
The Comptroller asserts that, when it issued the certificate, it was not engaged
in a “governmental action” that falls within one of the first three categories
in Section 2007.003(a). Franks disagrees, arguing that the issuance of the
certificate was a “regulatory requirement, resolution, . . . or similar measure” under
Section 2007.003(a)(1).
We conclude that the Comptroller’s action in issuing a certificate was
not a “regulatory requirement, resolution, . . . or similar measure” under
Section 2007.003(a)(1). In order to maintain a clear separation of powers in
accordance with the requirements of our constitution, Texas courts have traditionally
divided the functions of administrative agencies into two categories: quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial. TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1 (establishing three branches
of government and stating that “no person, or collection of persons, being of one of
these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the
others”); Key W. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Ins., 350 S.W.2d 839, 848 (1961)
(recognizing the importance of a separation of powers and holding that the State
Board of Insurance was acting in a judicial capacity when it acted to approve a
particular policy form); Macias v. Rylander, 995 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Tex. App.—
Austin 1999, no pet.). “Generally, an administrative agency acts in a legislative
capacity when it addresses broad questions of public policy and promulgates rules
for future application ‘to all or some part of those subject to its power.’” Macias,
995 S.W.2d at 833 (quoting Key W. Life, 350 S.W.2d at 847). “A judicial inquiry,
on the other hand, typically involves an investigation of present or past facts and a
determination of liability based on laws already in existence.” Id.

13
The legislature appears to have had this distinction in mind when it enacted
Section 2007.003(a). Subsection (a)(1), which concerns the adoption of rules and
guidelines, including regulatory requirements, attempts to describe governmental
actions that address broader questions of public policy that apply to a large number
of people. GOV’T § 2007.003(a)(1). On the other hand, subsection (a)(4) concerns
the investigation and application of facts based on laws already in existence,
including “quasi-judicial proceedings.” Id. § 2007.003(a)(4).
“Texas courts have developed a six-factor test to determine whether an entity
‘was acting in a quasi-judicial, or merely an administrative, capacity’ at the relevant
time.” Doe v. Cruz, 683 S.W.3d 475, 496 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, no pet.)
(quoting Vill. of Bayou Vista v. Glaskox, 899 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1995, no pet.)). The factors include:
1) the power to exercise judgment and discretion; 2) the power to hear
and determine or to ascertain facts and decide; 3) the power to make
binding orders and judgments; 4) the power to affect the personal or
property rights of private persons; 5) the power to examine witnesses,
to compel the attendance of witnesses, and to hear the litigation of
issues on a hearing; and 6) the power to enforce decisions or impose
penalties.
Cruz, 683 S.W.3d at 496 (quoting Glaskox, 899 S.W.2d at 829).
In this instance, the RWP applied for a tax limitation, and—as a part of the
application process—the Comptroller was responsible for determining whether to
issue a certificate for limitation on appraised value. See Act of May 26, 2013, 83rd
Leg., R.S., ch. 1304, § 7, sec. 313.026(c), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3317, 3324 (expired
Dec. 31, 2022). The “governmental actions” that are involved in this process include
the exercise of judgment and discretion (factor 1), the power to hear and determine
facts and make decisions (factor 2), the power to make binding decisions (factor 3),
and the power to affect the property rights of private persons (factor 4). The actions

14
of the Comptroller in this case do not satisfy all of the factors that are considered by
Texas courts when assessing the nature of a governmental action. However, “[a]n
administrative agency need not have all [such] powers to be considered quasi-
judicial.” Parker v. Holbrook, 647 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Rather, “the more of these powers it has, the more
clearly is it quasi-judicial in the exercise of its powers.” Id.
Based on the factors described above, we conclude that the Comptroller was
serving a quasi-judicial function when it issued the certificate.3 As such, a takings
impact assessment was not required. See GOV’T § 2007.043(a).
Furthermore, the Property Act indicates that no takings impact assessment is
required where “the enforcement of the governmental action is accomplished
through the use of permitting . . . or other similar means.” GOV’T §§ 2007.003(a),
2007.043(a). We conclude that the process of applying for a tax accommodation,
together with the process of securing a certificate for limitation on appraised value
is similar to the process for securing a permit, which likewise involves the
consideration of whether a particular party should be permitted to undertake an
activity or be exempted from a requirement. See Tex. Gen. Land Office v. La Concha
Condo. Ass’n, No. 13-19-00357-CV, 2020 WL 2610934, at *8 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg May 21, 2020, no pet.) (“[W]hen a government defendant merely
‘enforce[s]’ another governmental action via ‘permitting, citations, orders, judicial
or quasi-judicial proceedings, or other similar means,’ the [takings impact
assessment] requirement does not apply.” (quoting GOV’T § 2007.043(a))); see also
TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 245.001 (West 2016) (defining a permit, in part, as
an “authorization required by law, rule, regulation, order, or ordinance that a person

3
The school board was likewise serving the same function when it approved the application.

15
must obtain to perform an action or initiate, continue, or complete a project for which
the permit is sought”). As such, even if the issuance of a certificate under the TEDA
were not a quasi-judicial function, we would still conclude that a takings analysis is
not required because the issuance of a certificate is “similar” to the issuance of a
permit.
We conclude that sovereign immunity has not been waived for purposes of
Franks’s claims, since a takings analysis was not required in connection with the
issuance of the certificate and/or the approval of the application.
Standing
In its plea to the jurisdiction, the Comptroller also argued that Franks lacked
standing to bring suit. We note that the El Paso Court of Appeals recently addressed
a similar claim with respect to standing in Green v. Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accts.,
697 S.W.3d 305 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2023, pet. filed). Green also involved a claim
against the Comptroller for the issuance of a certificate of limitation on appraised
value under Chapter 313 of the Tax Code. Id. at 307. The project at issue in Green
was another wind project involving the Baird Independent School District. Id. at
309. The suit in Green was filed in Callahan County, appealed to this court, and
then transferred to the El Paso Court of Appeals by order of the Texas Supreme
Court. Id. at 308 n.1. The El Paso Court of Appeals determined that the taxpayers
in Green lacked standing because they were unable to show that their claimed injury
was fairly traceable to the Comptroller’s actions. Id. at 313.
“Standing is a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining suit in either federal
or state court.” Sneed v. Webre, 465 S.W.3d 169, 179–80 (Tex. 2015) (quoting
Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 178 (Tex. 2001)). Thus, “[a] challenge to a party’s
standing is an attack on the party’s ability under the United States and Texas
Constitutions to assert a claim.” Green, 697 S.W.3d at 311 (quoting Tex. Med. Res.,

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LLP v. Molina Healthcare of Tex., Inc., 659 S.W.3d 424, 440 (Tex. 2023)). In
assessing standing, Texas courts have adopted the federal standing requirements that
are set out in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). Data Foundry,
Inc. v. City of Austin, 620 S.W.3d 692, 696 (Tex. 2021).
“To maintain standing, a plaintiff must show: (1) an injury in fact that is both
concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;
(2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged action; and (3) that
it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision.” Data Foundry, 620 S.W.3d at 696.
Under the first element of the standing test, a plaintiff must normally
“demonstrate that he or she possesses an interest in a conflict distinct from that of
the general public, such that the defendant’s actions have caused the plaintiff some
particular injury.” Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 178–79. However, a taxpayer is
considered to have sufficient interest in the subject-matter of a lawsuit when bringing
“an action to restrain the illegal expenditure . . . of tax money.” Bland Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 556 (Tex. 2000) (quoting Hoffman v. Davis,
100 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1937)). Likewise, the legislature may choose to create
statutory terms that confer standing on a particular class of litigants. See, e.g.,
Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. 1984) (The “general rule of standing is
applied in all cases absent a statutory exception to the contrary.”).
Franks maintains that she has established standing under three separate
principles. First, Franks argues that she has established generalized standing under
the standards enunciated in Lujan and Data Foundry. Second, she argues that she
has standing to bring suit as a taxpayer under the standards set out in Bland. Finally,
she argues that she has established “statutory standing” under the terms of the
Property Act. See GOV’T § 2007.044(a).

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A. Generalized Standing
In support of her argument that she has satisfied the first element of Lujan and
Data Foundry, Franks argues that she has suffered a “concrete and particularized”
injury because (1) “her tax money is being used to subsidize” the project and (2) “the
value of her property has been diminished” by the construction of the project. The
Comptroller does not challenge this argument on appeal.
The second element of the test that is set out in Lujan and Data Foundry
indicates that Franks’s injury must be “fairly traceable” to the actions of the
Comptroller. Data Foundry, 620 S.W.3d at 696; see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. This
element is essential to the analysis because a court can act “only to redress injury
that fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury that
results from the independent action of some third party not before the court.”
Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 155 (Tex. 2012) (quoting Simon v.
E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)).
“[T]raceability does not require a defendant’s action to be the sole cause of
harm.” Grassroots Leadership, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Services,
646 S.W.3d 815, 820 (Tex. 2022). Rather, an action can also be fairly traceable
when it has a “determinative or coercive effect upon the action of someone else.”
Id. (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997)).
In this instance, Franks’s claimed injuries flow out of the alleged misuse of
her “tax money” and an alleged diminution in the value of her property that
(according to Franks) resulted from the construction of the project. These claimed
injuries are the immediate result of the actions of the school board in approving
the tax exemption, not the issuance of a certificate by the Comptroller. See Act of
May 26, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1304, § 6, sec. 313.025(b), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws
3317, 3321 (expired Dec. 31, 2022); see also Green, 697 S.W.3d at 312 (rejecting

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taxpayer’s theory of traceability because “it is the school board—not the
Comptroller—that decides whether to enter a tax-limitation agreement”).
Furthermore, while the actions of the Comptroller may be one of several remote
causes of the alleged injuries, the issuance of the certificate did not have a
“determinative or coercive effect” upon the actions of the school board, which held
the discretion to grant or deny the application, even after the certificate was issued.
See Act of May 26, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1304, § 6, sec. 313.025(b), 2013 Tex.
Gen. Laws 3317, 3321 (expired Dec. 31, 2022); see Grassroots, 646 S.W.3d at 820.
As such, Franks has failed to satisfy the traceability element of the standing test.
The third element of the test for standing requires a showing of redressability.
That is, Franks must establish a “substantial likelihood that the requested relief will
remedy the alleged injury.” Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 155 (quoting Vt. Agency of
Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000)). Thus, for example,
where a plaintiff asserts a claim for injunctive relief, “but the injunction could not
possibly remedy his situation, then [the plaintiff] lacks standing to bring that claim.”
Id.
Franks maintains that she has satisfied the third element because a judgment
declaring the certificate as void would have the effect of “voiding the tax limitation”
and create a “[r]emoval of [the] tax shield.” However, Franks’s arguments relating
to the element of redressability are plagued with problems that are similar to her
arguments relating to the element of traceability. Franks did not come to the trial
court with a request to restrain the school district from collecting the taxes at issue.
She did not even ask the trial court to declare the value limitation agreement itself
as void. Instead, she merely sought a declaration that the Comptroller’s certificate
is void. And while a void certificate might affect the validity of the value limitation
agreement, and—ultimately—the nature of the taxes that are imposed on the RWP,

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no relief could be granted by the trial court in connection with the ongoing collection
of taxes based solely on Franks’s pleadings.
We conclude that, because she has failed to satisfy the second and third
elements of the test enunciated in Lujan and Data Foundry, Franks has failed to
establish generalized standing.
B. Taxpayer Standing
Franks also maintains that, because she has filed “an action to restrain the
illegal expenditure . . . of tax money,” she has independently established standing as
a taxpayer. See Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 556 (quoting Hoffman, 100 S.W.2d at 96). She
further argues that her standing as a taxpayer exempts her from satisfying the more
generalized elements that are set out in Lujan and Data Foundry. However, the
cases recognizing the taxpayer standing exception consistently limit its application
to the first element of the test. See, e.g., Perez v. Turner, 653 S.W.3d 191, 199 (Tex.
2022) (“Texas law has long recognized an exception to this particularity
requirement for taxpayers seeking to ‘enjoin the illegal expenditure of public
funds.’” (quoting Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 556) (emphasis added)); Williams, 52 S.W.3d
at 179 (“Taxpayers in Texas have standing to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public
funds, and need not demonstrate a particularized injury.”) (emphasis added); Bland,
34 S.W.3d at 556 (“a taxpayer has standing to sue in equity to enjoin the illegal
expenditure of public funds, even without showing a distinct injury.”) (emphasis
added).
In Green, the El Paso Court of Appeals addressed the question of whether the
taxpayer standing exception supplants the traceability element in a matter that, like
this case, involved an effort to void a Comptroller certificate under the Property Act.
697 S.W.3d at 307. Like Franks, the plaintiffs in Green argued that it was not
necessary for the court to determine traceability as a result of their standing as

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taxpayers. Id. at 313. However, the court held that “the Landowners’ taxpayer
standing argument is responsive to the particularized-injury requirement of standing,
not its traceability requirement.” Id. We agree with the El Paso Court of Appeals
and conclude that a plaintiff claiming taxpayer standing must still satisfy the
traceability and redressability elements of Lujan.
Because Franks has failed to establish traceability and redressability in
connection with her standing claims, we conclude that Franks does not have taxpayer
standing.
Finally, we note that taxpayer standing cases require a showing of an illegal
expenditure of public funds. See, e.g., Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 175 (Plaintiffs were
seeking, among other things, to enjoin the expenditure of funds to support a
religious-education program in the Tarrant County Corrections Center.); Bland,
34 S.W.3d at 549 (Taxpayers sought to prohibit payment of installments on an
allegedly illegal lease-purchase agreement.). This principle has been extended to
lawsuits alleging that the collection of certain taxes was itself illegal. Perez,
653 S.W.3d at 200 (“[W]hen the allegation is that the tax itself was unauthorized by
law, a plaintiff who paid the tax may rely on taxpayer standing.”). It has also been
extended to lawsuits alleging that tax funds have been improperly allocated.
Jones v. Turner, 646 S.W.3d 319, 324 (Tex. 2022) (“[W]hen the law requires that a
certain amount of money be directed to a specific service, and the plaintiff alleges
that it is being directed and spent elsewhere, the taxpayer has alleged an illegal
expenditure sufficient to confer taxpayer standing.”). However, it remains unclear
that the application of a value limitation agreement can somehow be characterized
as an “illegal expenditure,” and we do not comment on whether taxpayer standing
might otherwise be conferred on Franks in connection with the first element of the
standing test.

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C. Statutory Standing
Franks also alleges that she has statutory standing because the Property Act
permits a party to bring suit when that party is “affected” by the failure of a
governmental entity to perform an impact assessment that is required by law. See
GOV’T § 2007.044(a).
In this instance, we have already concluded that the Property Act does not
require a takings impact assessment. As such, Franks does not have statutory
standing under Section 2007 of the Government Code.
D. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, we overrule Franks’s sole issue on appeal.
This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE

May 30, 2025
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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