Allie Jaramillo v. City of Odessa Animal Control

Opinion filed July 11, 2024.

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-23-00117-CV
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ALLIE JARAMILLO, Appellant
V.
CITY OF ODESSA ANIMAL CONTROL, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law
Ector County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CCL-22937

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Allie Jaramillo, proceeding pro se, appeals the trial court’s order
requiring that her dogs be euthanized pursuant to Section 822.042(e) of the Texas
Health and Safety Code. The trial court found that Appellant failed to comply with
the requirements that apply to the owner of a “dangerous” dog. See TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 822.042 (a), (e) (West Supp. 2023). On appeal, Appellant
asserts that the trial court (1) lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear this case,
(2) violated her constitutional right to due process, (3) erred when it concluded that
her dogs were “dangerous” under the terms of the controlling statute, and (4) erred
when it determined that she failed to comply with the statutory requirements that are
applicable to the owner of a “dangerous” dog. We affirm.
I. Factual Background
On December 8, 2022, Appellant’s dogs escaped from their enclosure on
Appellant’s property and attacked several teenage victims. Upon arriving at the
scene, Appellant identified herself as the owner of the dogs and signed owner-
surrender forms, thereby releasing ownership of each animal to Appellee, the City
of Odessa Animal Control. Appellee filed four “Report of Potentially Dangerous
Dog” forms and requested that a determination of the dogs’ dangerousness be set for
a hearing before the municipal court. At this hearing, the municipal court ordered
Appellant to comply with the applicable requirements of Section 822.042—
requirements that apply to owners of dangerous dogs—before the dogs could be
returned to her.
After more than eleven days had elapsed, the municipal court set a hearing to
determine whether the dogs should be euthanized or returned to Appellant; the
release of the dogs to Appellant was contingent on her compliance with the
municipal court’s previous order. See HEALTH & SAFETY § 822.042(e). There, the
municipal court found that Appellant was aware that she was the owner of
“dangerous” dogs because her dogs had engaged in multiple, unprovoked attacks
outside their enclosure. Additionally, the municipal court determined that more than
thirty days after Appellant’s awareness of this circumstance, she failed to comply
with the applicable owner requirements. See id. § 822.042(a). As a result of
her noncompliance, the municipal court ordered that the dogs be euthanized. See id.

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§ 822.042(e). Appellant subsequently appealed the municipal court’s order to the
county court at law, which affirmed the municipal court’s findings. This appeal
followed.
II. Analysis
Appellant is a pro se appellant. Therefore, we construe her brief liberally. See
Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978); Aaron v.
Fisher, 645 S.W.3d 299, 312 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, no pet.). Nevertheless,
Appellant is still held to the same standards as any licensed attorney and is required
to comply with all applicable rules of procedure. Mansfield State Bank, 573 S.W.2d
at 184–85; Aaron, 645 S.W.3d at 312. We may not consider evidence that is not
included in the appellate record or factual assertions that appear solely in the
appellate briefs that were not presented to the trial court for determination. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 34.1; Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex. 1998). Therefore,
even with a liberal construction, we will only address the issues that Appellant has
preserved for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.
A. Municipal Court Jurisdiction
In her first issue, Appellant claims that the municipal court lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
Before a court may decide a case, it is essential that the court possess subject-
matter jurisdiction. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553–54 (Tex.
2000). Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a case is a question
of law that we review de novo. Harris Cnty. v. Annab, 547 S.W.3d 609, 612 (Tex.
2018) (citing Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.
2004)); Ector Cnty. v. Breedlove, 168 S.W.3d 864, 865 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2004,
no pet.).

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Although a municipal court’s jurisdiction is generally limited to criminal
matters, it also has jurisdiction to consider certain civil disputes that involve
dangerous dogs. In re United Services Auto. Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 302 n.1 (Tex.
2010). Texas law specifically authorizes municipal courts to determine whether a
dog is dangerous and whether a dangerous dog’s owner complies with the applicable
statutes. See HEALTH & SAFETY § 822.042(c), (g)(2).
Therefore, the municipal court had subject-matter jurisdiction to consider and
decide this dispute. Accordingly, Appellant’s first issue is overruled.
B. Due Process
In her second issue, Appellant claims that the trial court violated her
constitutional right to procedural due process.
Notice is “[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process.”
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). The United
States Constitution’s Due Process Clause and the Texas constitution’s Due Course
of Law Clause require that adequate procedural due process be afforded to all parties
to a judgment, which includes notice of trial court proceedings. Mitchell v. MAP
Res., Inc., 649 S.W.3d 180, 188–89 (Tex. 2022). Such notice must be “reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise [all] interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. That opportunity “must be granted at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
When parties are not afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard, “the remedy for
a denial of due process is due process.” Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. at Hous. v. Than,
901 S.W.2d 926, 933 (Tex. 1995).
Appellant asserts that Appellee’s failure to follow the procedures outlined in
Section 822.0421(a) violated her right to due process. Section 822.0421(a) outlines

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the procedures that an animal control authority should follow when investigating
incidents of this nature and later determining whether a dog is dangerous. See
HEALTH & SAFETY § 822.0421(a) (West 2019). However, Section 822.0421(a) is
only applicable in the event that a person reports an incident involving a dog attack;
the animal control authority may then investigate and determine whether the
dog(s) meet the statutory definition of “dangerous dog.” See HEALTH & SAFETY
§ 822.042(g)(3).
Section 822.042(g) defines how a person becomes aware that she is the owner
of a dangerous dog. They are when the owner: (1) “knows of an attack” as described
by Section 822.041(2)(A) or (B); (2) receives notice that a court has found that the
dog is a “dangerous dog” under Section 822.0423; or (3) is informed by the animal
control authority that the dog is dangerous under Section 822.0421. Id.
§ 822.042(g)(1)–(3). Although any subsection of Section 822.042(g) would
apply here, Appellant only complains that Appellee failed to comply with
subsection (g)(3). However, Appellant knew that her dogs had committed
unprovoked acts in the manner described in Section 822.041(2)(A) and (B). At the
scene of the attacks, Appellant signed owner-surrender forms for the dogs that were
involved in the unprovoked attacks. In her brief, Appellant concedes that she
understood the basis of the allegations concerning her dogs, although she disagrees
that this incident constituted an unprovoked attack. Therefore, the record shows that
Appellant was aware on the incident date, that she was the owner of dangerous dogs
under Section 822.042(g)(1).
Any one of the three alternatives listed under Section 822.042(g) is sufficient
to establish that a person has “learned” that she is the owner of a dangerous dog. See
id. Therefore, Appellant’s complaint that her right to due process was violated by
Appellee’s noncompliance with Section 822.0421(a) is without merit.

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The controlling statute clearly sets forth the required procedures. After a
person “learns” that she is the owner of a dangerous dog, she must comply with the
requirements of Section 822.042(a) within the following thirty days. HEALTH &
SAFETY § 822.042(a). An owner who does not comply with the requirements of
subsection (a) shall deliver the dog(s) to the animal control authority no later than
thirty days after she “learns” that she is the owner of a dangerous dog. Id.
§ 822.042(b). The municipal court shall order the dog(s) to be euthanized if the
owner has not complied with subsection (a) on or before the eleventh day after the
date the dog(s) are seized or delivered to the animal control authority. Id.
§ 822.042(e).
Additionally, Appellant argues that she did not receive notice of the hearing
to determine whether her dogs would be euthanized and thus did not have an
opportunity to “defend [her] property.” The record shows otherwise. Although
Appellant signed owner-surrender forms, she subsequently notified Appellee that
she intended to withdraw her signature, and the municipal court provided her with
proper notice of future proceedings in accordance with the statute. See HEALTH &
SAFETY § 822.0423(b)(1). Further, when Appellant claimed that she had not
received proper notice of a hearing, the municipal court rescheduled it to ensure
compliance with due process. The record shows that Appellant received notice of
multiple hearings from the municipal court and that she had ample time and
opportunities to show that she complied with the applicable statute prior to the
municipal court’s determination that the dogs should be euthanized. Similarly,
Appellant had the opportunity to present her arguments, raise objections, and present
evidence when she appealed the municipal court’s order to the county court at law.

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Appellant was provided adequate notice of the necessary proceedings and she
had a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Thus, Appellant’s right to due process
was not violated as she claims. Accordingly, Appellant’s second issue is overruled.
C. “Dangerous” Dogs Finding
In her third issue, Appellant argues that the municipal court erred when it
determined that her dogs were “dangerous” under the terms of the statute.
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Youngkin v. Hines,
546 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. 2018). “When construing a statute, our primary
objective is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” TGS-NOPEC
Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011); see TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN. § 312.005 (West 2013). We begin by examining the plain meaning of
the statute’s language. Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc., 430 S.W.3d
384, 389–90 (Tex. 2014). We derive legislative intent from the statute as a whole
rather than from isolated portions of it. City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111
S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex. 2003). That is, we read statutes contextually to give effect to
every word, clause, and sentence because every word and phrase is presumed to have
been used intentionally, with a meaning and a purpose. Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v.
Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 838 (Tex. 2018). “Words and phrases shall be read in
context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.”
GOV’T § 311.011; Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage
Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d 318, 325 (Tex. 2017).
“If the statute is clear and unambiguous, we must read the language according
to its common meaning ‘without resort to rules of construction or extrinsic aids.’”
Crosstex Energy Servs., 430 S.W.3d at 389 (quoting State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d
279, 284 (Tex. 2006)); but see GOV’T § 311.023 (permitting courts to consider
legislative history and other construction aids regardless of ambiguity). And if a

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statute is unambiguous, we adopt the interpretation that is supported by the
statute’s plain language unless such an interpretation would yield an absurd result.
TGS-NOPEC, 340 S.W.3d at 439 (citing Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory
Servs. v. Mega Child Care, 145 S.W.3d 170, 177 (Tex. 2004)). “A statute is
ambiguous if its words are susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations and
we cannot discern legislative intent from the language alone.” Fort Worth Transp.
Auth., 547 S.W.3d at 838. “If the statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply its
words according to their common meaning in a way that gives effect to each word,
clause, and sentence.” State By & Through City of Dallas v. Dallas Pets Alive, 566
S.W.3d 914, 916 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, pet. denied) (citing First Am. Title Ins.
Co. v. Combs, 258 S.W.3d 627, 631 (Tex. 2008)).
Section 822.041 provides that:
(2) “Dangerous dog” means a dog that:
(A) makes an unprovoked attack on a person that causes
bodily injury and occurs in a place other than an enclosure in
which the dog was being kept and that was reasonably certain to
prevent the dog from leaving the enclosure on its own; or
(B) commits unprovoked acts in a place other than an
enclosure in which the dog was being kept and that was
reasonably certain to prevent the dog from leaving the enclosure
on its own and those acts cause a person to reasonably believe
that the dog will attack and cause bodily injury to that person.
HEALTH & SAFETY § 822.041(2). When we construe the plain and unambiguous
language of Section 822.041(2), there is only one reasonable and logical
interpretation—Appellant’s dogs are “dangerous.” The dogs escaped their enclosure
and attacked, without provocation, five minors who were walking home from school.
Appellant argues that the municipal court should not have found that each of her
dogs were dangerous because the minor-victims only claimed that one of the dogs

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bit them. Contrary to Appellant’s argument, to be considered “dangerous” under the
plain and unambiguous meaning of the statute, it is not necessary that a dog must
have actually caused bodily injury to a person during the attack; rather, a person
need only reasonably believe that the dog will attack him or her and cause bodily
injury to that person during the attack. See id. § 822.041(2)(B). Such is the
circumstance here. In this case, the minor-victims each described (1) being attacked
by a “pack of dogs” and (2) their fear of being injured or harmed by the dogs during
the attack. There is no evidence in the record to the contrary.
Because the minor-victims were attacked by Appellant’s dogs and the minors
reasonably believed that they would suffer harm or bodily injury as a result of the
attack, the dogs are “dangerous” under the controlling statute and neither the
municipal court nor the county court at law erred in so finding. Accordingly,
Appellant’s third issue is overruled.
D. Compliance with Section 822.042
In her fourth issue, Appellant asserts that the municipal court erred when it
found that she failed to comply with the statutory requirements that are applicable
to the owner of a “dangerous” dog because she was unaware that her dogs were
dangerous.
Section 822.042 provides in relevant part:
(g) For purposes of this section, a person learns that the person
is the owner of a dangerous dog when:
(1) the owner knows of an attack described in Section
822.041(2)(A) or (B);
(2) the owner receives notice that a justice court, county
court, or municipal court has found that the dog is a dangerous
dog under Section 822.0423; or
(3) the owner is informed by the animal control authority
that the dog is a dangerous dog under Section 822.0421.

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HEALTH & SAFETY § 822.042(g)(1)–(3) (emphasis added). The question before us
is whether Appellant’s knowledge of the attacks, without more, is sufficient to prove
that she learned that her dogs were dangerous, thus triggering her compliance with
the statutory owner requirements. Appellant argues that she could not have known
she was the owner of dangerous dogs because no one informed her of any declaration
of dangerousness or of any regulations that pertain to dangerous dogs. She
further urges that knowledge of the attack is not enough and that she was
entitled to notification from either the municipal court or Appellee pursuant to
Section 822.042(g)(2) and (3). We disagree.
Because Section 822.042(g) is phrased in the disjunctive, it does not require
that each subsection of the statute must apply before an owner of a dog is deemed to
have learned or become aware of their dog’s dangerousness; rather, only one
subsection must be applicable to invoke Section 822.042(g). See MBank Abilene,
N.A. v. Westwood Energy, Inc., 723 S.W.2d 246, 251 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1986,
no pet.) (“The general rule of statutory construction is that the words ‘and’ and ‘or’
are not interchangeable.”) (citing Bd. of Ins. Comm’rs of Tex. v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of Tex., 180 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Tex. 1944)); Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner,
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 116 (2012) (“Under the
conjunctive/disjunctive canon, and combines items while or creates alternatives.”).
Therefore, in this case, notification from either the municipal court or Appellee was
not required because Appellant learned that she was the owner of dangerous dogs
when Appellee informed her of her dogs unprovoked attacks.
Appellant also attested and acknowledged that her dogs were dangerous when
she signed the owner-surrender forms at the scene. Although Appellant later
intended to withdraw her signature for purposes of retaining ownership of the dogs,
by her signature she acknowledged that the dogs had “bitten, scratched, or attacked

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[someone] in the last ten (10) days.” Because Appellant’s dogs, as she
acknowledged and conceded on the date of the attacks, were outside their enclosure
and attacked, without provocation, the minor-victims, we conclude that Appellant
was aware of and thus “learned” that she was the owner of dangerous dogs. See
HEALTH & SAFETY § 822.042(g)(1). As a result, she was required to comply with
the requirements that are applicable to such owners. Because she did not, the
municipal court and the county court at law did not err when they ordered that
Appellant’s dogs be euthanized. Accordingly, Appellant’s fourth issue is overruled.
III. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the order of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

July 11, 2024
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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