Moir Watershed Services, LLC v. Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, PLLC and Spencer Hofmann

Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-25-00177-CV

Moir Watershed Services, LLC,
Appellant

v.

Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, PLLC and Spencer Hofmann,
Appellees

On appeal from the
40th District Court of Ellis County, Texas
Judge Bob Carroll, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. 115615

JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Moir Watershed Services, LLC appeals from the trial court’s order

dismissing its legal malpractice suit against the Law Office of Heath Gurinsky,

PLLC and Spencer Hofmann. In its sole issue, Moir contends the trial court

erred in granting Appellees’ special appearance. We affirm.
BACKGROUND

Moir retained the Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, a New York firm, to

represent it regarding Moir’s indebtedness on three loans. In its petition

against Appellees, Moir identified Hofmann as an attorney at the firm,

although the record shows he is a paralegal employed by the Law Office of

Heath Gurinsky. Moir alleged causes of action for negligence, breach of

contract, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, asserting

that “venue is proper as the cause of action arose in Ellis County, Texas.”

Appellees filed a special appearance alleging that the trial court did not

have jurisdiction over them. They asserted that they are residents of the State

of New York, do not have minimum contacts with Texas, lack continuous and

systematic contacts with the State of Texas, and have not personally availed

themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within the State of Texas.

Finally, they asserted that the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court over

them would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,

depriving them of due process. They filed a brief in support of the special

appearance and included affidavits of Gurinsky and Hofmann.

Moir filed a response and attached the retainer agreement and Moir’s

consent for the Law Office of Heath Gurinsky to work on his behalf with his

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lenders. After a hearing, the trial court sustained Appellees’ special

appearance.

SPECIAL APPEARANCE

In its sole issue, Moir asserts the trial court erred in granting Appellees’

special appearance and dismissing Moir’s lawsuit.1 Moir contends that it

contracted with Appellees for legal work, the contract was to be partly

performed in Texas, and Appellees purposefully availed themselves of Texas

jurisdiction. Further, it argues, because the claims made arose out of or are

related to the contacts, that is the contract, the special appearance should have

been denied.

Standard of Review

To render a binding judgment, a court must have both subject matter

jurisdiction over the controversy and personal jurisdiction over the parties.

Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 871 (Tex. 2010). Whether a court has

personal jurisdiction over a defendant is determined as a matter of law, which

appellate courts review de novo. Id. When, as here, the trial court does not

issue findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its special appearance

1 Moir does not specify whether it is attacking the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence. Based
on its argument and a complete lack of authorities referencing sufficiency standards of review, we
construe the challenge to be only a legal sufficiency challenge. See Rischer v. State, 85 S.W.3d 839,
842-43 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.) (reviewing courts look to argument and authorities presented
in party’s brief to determine whether an issue challenges legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence or
both).

Moir Watershed Servs., LLC v. Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, PLLC Page 3
determination, we presume that all factual disputes were resolved in favor of

the trial court’s ruling unless they are challenged on appeal. Luciano v.

SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2021). These implied

findings are tested by evidentiary sufficiency standards. See BMC Software

Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002). For legal sufficiency

points, if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding, the

no evidence challenge fails. Id.

Applicable Law

Texas courts have personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant

when the Texas long-arm statute authorizes such jurisdiction, and its exercise

comports with federal due process guarantees. Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 8.

Consistent with federal due process protections, personal jurisdiction over

nonresident defendants is constitutional only when 1) the defendant has

established minimum contacts with the forum state, and 2) the exercise of

jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice. Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 872.

A defendant’s contacts with a forum can give rise to either general or

specific jurisdiction. Id. General jurisdiction exists when a defendant’s

contacts are continuous and systematic, even if the cause of action did not arise

from activities performed in the forum state. Id.

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A court has specific jurisdiction over a defendant if its contacts within

the state are purposeful, meaning the defendant has sought some benefit,

advantage, or profit by availing itself of the jurisdiction, and its alleged liability

arises from or is related to an activity conducted within the forum, even if those

contacts are isolated or sporadic. Id. at 873. Thus, where the defendant has

deliberately engaged in significant activities within a state, he manifestly has

availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in that state, invoking

the benefits and protections of its laws. Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 9. Further,

purposeful availment and relatedness are two co-equal components. Moki Mac

River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 579 (Tex. 2007). Accordingly,

there must be a “substantial connection” between the defendant’s conduct and

the operative facts of the litigation. Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 874. The

purposeful availment analysis seeks to determine whether a nonresident’s

conduct and connection to a forum are such that it could reasonably anticipate

being haled into court there. Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414

S.W.3d 142, 152 (Tex. 2013).

In order for a Texas court to obtain jurisdiction over a non-resident

defendant, a plaintiff must first plead allegations sufficient to confer

jurisdiction under the Texas long-arm statute. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-.045; Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc., 414 S.W.3d at 149. The

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pleading requirement is satisfied by an allegation that the nonresident

defendant is doing business in Texas, contracted with a Texas resident and

either party is to perform the contract in whole or in part in Texas, or

committed tortious acts in Texas. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

§ 17.042; Steward Health Care Sys. LLC v. Saidara, 633 S.W.3d 120, 126 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2021, no pet.).

Once the plaintiff meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the

nonresident defendant to negate all potential bases for personal jurisdiction

the plaintiff has alleged. See Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc., 414 S.W.3d at 149; Kelly

v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2010). In ruling on a

special appearance, the court may consider the pleadings, stipulations made

by the parties, affidavits and attachments filed by the parties, the results of

discovery processes, and any oral testimony. TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a(3).

Discussion

In its petition, Moir alleged that Appellees committed negligence, breach

of contract, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and that

those causes of action arose in Ellis County, Texas. In its brief, Moir does not

assert that the trial court had general jurisdiction over Appellees. Moir

contends only that the special appearance should have been overruled because

the requirements for specific jurisdiction were met.

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Moir was referred to the Law Office of Heath Gurinsky by a third-party

service located in Florida. Appellees, residents of New York, do not maintain

a place of business or a registered agent for service of process in Texas. They

do not advertise their services in Texas or engage in business in Texas.

Appellees have no employees or agents in Texas and have not recruited Texas

residents as potential employees. Moreover, where the underlying case

involves a legal malpractice action, the focus for personal jurisdiction purposes

is on where the attorneys performed the legal work at issue. See Abilene

Diagnostic Clinic, PLLC v. Paley, Rothman, Goldstein, Rosenberg, Eig &

Cooper, Chartered, 364 S.W.3d 359, 365-66 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, no

pet.). Moir hired Appellees to assist with lawsuits in New York, Arizona, and

Florida, not in Texas. All work Appellees did for Moir was done in New York.

Merely contracting with a Texas resident does not satisfy the minimum

contacts requirement. Internet Advert. Grp., Inc. v. Accudata, Inc., 301 S.W.3d

383, 389 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). Moir focuses on the fact that its

part in the negotiations and decisions was performed in Texas and advice

rendered by Appellees was received by Moir in Texas, asserting this provides

ample contacts for Texas courts to obtain jurisdiction. However, these acts

occurred in Texas because that is where Moir is located, which is merely

fortuitous and does not establish any purposeful availment of Texas by

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Appellees. See Buffet Partners, L.P. v. Sheffield Square, L.L.C., 256 S.W.3d

920, 924 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (rejecting contention that agreement

to refund security deposit at plaintiff’s offices in Texas established specific

jurisdiction over defendant as it was not conduct directed at the State).

Further, jurisdictionally relevant activities must be the defendant’s own

choice and must justify a conclusion that the non-resident defendant could

reasonably anticipate being called into a Texas court with respect to a

particular claim. See BRP-Rotax GmbH & Co. KG v. Shaik, 716 S.W.3d 98,

104 (Tex. 2025). Here, Appellees have not deliberately engaged in significant

activities within Texas. There is no indication that Appellees sought some

benefit, advantage, or profit by availing themselves of the privilege of

conducting business in Texas. See Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 873; Michiana

Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 785 (Tex. 2005). We

conclude that the evidence negates Moir’s allegation that the district court had

specific jurisdiction over Appellees in this case. We overrule Moir’s sole issue.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled Moir’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s order

sustaining Appellees’ special appearance.

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STEVE SMITH
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: January 29, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Affirmed
CV06

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