SINCLAIR, EX PARTE CHESTER v. the State of Texas

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS

NO. PD-0184-22

EX PARTE CHESTER SINCLAIR, Appellant

ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
AND DISCRETIONARY REVIEW ON COURT’S OWN MOTION
FROM THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
BEXAR COUNTY

NEWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which HERVEY, WALKER
and SLAUGHTER, JJ., joined.

As I understand the Court’s holding, a magistrate’s written order

recommending a particular action by the trial court cannot ever become

a “written order” of the trial court even if the magistrate’s order

becomes the decree of the trial court as a matter of law. That means

there are now countless cases in Texas in which trial courts believe they

have denied habeas corpus relief by relying upon a magistrate, but after
Sinclair Dissenting — 2

today, the applications are once again pending. 1 Magistrate statutes

across the State empower a trial court to refer a case to a magistrate

for a hearing and findings and then, if the trial court agrees with the

magistrate’s recommendation, the magistrate’s recommendation

becomes the decree of the court without the trial court having to enter

an additional order. 2 That appears to be the practice in this case at

least. But the Court’s holding that the trial court must enter a written

order separate from the magistrate’s recommendation effectively

invalidates statutory provisions regarding local magistrate judges that

trial courts have been relying upon for decades. 3 There is a more

straightforward approach to resolving this case—the one adopted by the

court of appeals.

1
The Court’s interpretation of the magistrate statutes that a magistrate’s recommendation
merely results in a trial court’s decree of a recommendation will necessarily impact more than
just habeas corpus cases referred to a magistrate. It calls into question any magistrate
recommendation adopted by the trial court in reliance upon the statute. However, I confine
my analysis to the specific type of magistrate order in this case.

2
See, e.g., Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 54.908 (authorizing Bexar County magistrates to hold
hearings and enter findings) & 54.912(b) (providing the action of magistrates becomes the
decree of the court “[i]f the court does not modify, correct, reject, reverse, or recommit an
action of the magistrate”); see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 54.308 & 54.312(b) (same for
Dallas County); §§ 54.658 & 54.662(b) (same for Tarrant County); §§ 54.878 & 54.882(b)
(same for Lubbock County); §§ 54.978 & 54.982(b) (same for Travis County); §§ 54.2207 &
54.2215 (same for Collin County).

3
The Court doubles down on the idea that a magistrate, according to the Court, does not
have authority to enter a ruling. But this interpretation fails to give effect to the statutory
language that authorizes the magistrate to recommend rulings that become the decree of the
trial court if the court does not modify, correct, reject, reverse, or recommit the magistrate’s
action. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 54.908(a)(11), 54.912(b). In this way, the Court effectively
renders these statutory provisions meaningless.
Sinclair Dissenting — 3

In this case, the trial court referred Appellant’s application for

habeas corpus relief to a local magistrate, and the magistrate held a

hearing on the application. Then the magistrate entered an order

holding that Appellant was entitled to relief and recommended to the

trial court that it grant relief. 4 Pursuant to statute and the trial court’s

referral order, fifteen days after the magistrate entered the order, the

magistrate’s written order became the final decree of the trial court

because the trial court did not correct or modify it or enter an order

superseding it. 5

The State could have appealed the order granting habeas relief as

the magistrate’s order became the trial court’s decree fifteen days after

the day the magistrate entered it. 6 Instead, the State chose to file a

4
Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 54.908(11) (empower magistrates to whom a case is referred to
recommend rulings, orders, or judgment to be made in a case).

5
See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 54.912(b). Prior to 2001, magistrates in Bexar County were
specifically prohibited from entering a ruling on any issue of law or fact if that ruling could
result in dismissal or require dismissal of a pending criminal prosecution. See Tex. Gov’t Code
Ann. § 54.908(b) (1997), amended by Act of June 13, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 680, 2001
Tex. Gen. Laws 1286. However, the Legislature deleted this subsection in 2001 after a court
of appeals interpreted this provision as limiting the jurisdiction of the magistrate court. See
Act of June 13, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 680, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1286; see also Ex parte
Brew, 954 S.W.2d 107, 108 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997 no pet.). By amending the
magistrate statute, the Legislature clearly sought to improve the flow of the judicial process
by providing more flexibility for trial courts in relying upon magistrates.

6
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.01(k) (“The state is entitled to appeal an order granting
relief to an applicant for a writ of habeas corpus under Article 11.072.”).
Sinclair Dissenting — 4

motion to reconsider in the magistrate’s court. 7 So, the court of appeals

addressed the question of whether the State could extend the habeas

court’s jurisdiction through a motion to reconsider. 8 The court of

appeals held that, unlike a grant of a motion to suppress, a grant of

habeas relief is not interlocutory and therefore a motion to reconsider

cannot extend jurisdiction once an order granting relief becomes final. 9

Consequently, the court of appeals held that the habeas court lost

jurisdiction to reconsider the grant of habeas relief once the grant of

relief became final. 10

But instead of evaluating the court of appeals opinion, the Court

confuses the issue by creating a conflict between the Bexar County

magistrate statutes and the Code of Criminal Procedure rather than

harmonizing them. 11 The most natural way of reading the interplay

7
Indeed, once the case was referred to the magistrate, the State never sought an order from
the trial court. This demonstrates the understanding that trial courts, in practice, rely upon
the magistrates and the magistrate statute for the entry of the written order once a case is
transferred to a magistrate.

8
Ex parte Sinclair, No. 13-20-00065-CR, 2022 WL 619146, at *3-4 (Tex. App. – Corpus
Christi-Edinburg, Mar. 3, 2022) (not designated for publication).

9
Id.

10
Id. at *5.

11
Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465, 478 (2023) (recognizing “[b]asic principles of statutory
interpretation require” statutes be construed in harmony); Ex parte Vieira, 676 S.W.3d 654,
658 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (noting the statutory rules of construction require the Court to
“consider other relevant statutory provisions and to harmonize and avoid conflicts”).
Sinclair Dissenting — 5

between the statutes authorizing the use of magistrates in Bexar County

and Article 11.072 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to interpret the

magistrate’s uncorrected order recommending relief as a written order

granting relief that became final by the terms of the trial court’s referral

order. I believe this satisfies the “written order” requirement in Article

11.072. But by failing to harmonize the different provisions, the Court

undoes the work of not only the magistrate in this case, but also puts

at risk the work of numerous trial courts who have relied upon local

magistrates over the years. 12

Article 11.072 of the Code of Criminal Procedure specifically

authorizes trial courts to rely upon magistrates in the resolutions of

applications for writs of habeas corpus in cases which a defendant has

received probation. 13 The use of magistrates in Bexar County is

governed by statute. Texas Government Code Section 54.901

authorizes Bexar County to appoint magistrates with the consent and

approval of the Commissioner’s Court of Bexar County. 14 Section

12
See State ex. rel. Wice v. Fifth Judicial District Court of Appeals, 581 S.W.3d 189, 197 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2018) (“When reading statutes, courts are not prohibited from using logic and
common sense. We presume every word has been used for a purpose and that each word,
phrase, clause, and sentence should be given effect if reasonably possible.”).

Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072, § 6(d) (“The court may appoint an attorney or
13

magistrate to hold a hearing ordered under this section and make findings of fact.”).

14
Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 54.901.
Sinclair Dissenting — 6

54.906 authorizes trial courts to refer a criminal case for proceedings

involving a postconviction writ of habeas corpus. 15 Section 54.908

authorizes magistrates to hold hearings, examine witnesses, rule on

evidentiary admissibility, and recommend rulings, orders, or judgments

be made in the case, except as limited by the order of referral. 16 Section

54.912 recognizes that a referring court may modify, correct, or reject

any action taken by the magistrate. 17 It also provides that if the trial

court does not do any of those things, the magistrate’s action “becomes

the decree of the court.” 18 By referring to the magistrate’s “action” in

this statute, Section 54.912 specifically contemplates that magistrates

can enter written recommendations that become the decree of the trial

court without the trial court having to “recommit” the magistrate’s

action with a written order to that effect. 19

I acknowledge that Section 6 of Article 11.072 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure sets out that the trial court has sixty days after the

State files an answer to an application for a writ of habeas to enter a

15
Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 54.906.

16
Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 54.908(a)(1), (4), (6), & (11).

17
Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 54.912(a).

18
Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 54.912(b).

19
Id.
Sinclair Dissenting — 7

written order granting or denying the relief sought in the application. 20

However, the statute also authorizes a court to appoint an attorney or

magistrate to hold a hearing and enter findings under this section. 21

And, as mentioned above, the statutes governing the use of magistrates

in Bexar County are designed to eliminate the need for a trial court to

enter a written order memorializing its agreement with the magistrate’s

recommendation. 22 Harmonizing Article 11.072 and Section 54.912

leads me to the conclusion that the magistrate’s written order

recommending relief satisfies the “written order” requirement in Article

11.072 when the magistrate’s written order becomes the decree of the

trial court as a matter of law. Otherwise, the statutory provisions

allowing a magistrate’s recommendations to become the decree of the

trial court are meaningless. In this case, the magistrate’s

recommendation granting relief became the written order of the trial

20
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072, § 6(a). I am not as sold as the Court is on the
idea that “shall” in the context of the entire provision requires the trial court to enter a written
order. At least arguably, the statute’s opening of “not later than the 60th day after the day
on which the state’s answer is filed” could suggest that the statute is focused upon a deadline
for the trial court to resolve the case rather than a requirement that the trial court enter a
written order. Nevertheless, even adopting the Court’s interpretation of this provision, I
believe a habeas court satisfies this statutory provision when a magistrate’s written order
recommending a grant of relief becomes the decree of the trial court as a matter of law under
the magistrate statute. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 54.912(b).

21
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072, § 6(d).

22
See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. 54.912(b).
Sinclair Dissenting — 8

court under the terms of the referral order fifteen days after the

magistrate entered its written order concluding that relief was

warranted. Concluding otherwise will add numerous newly pending

cases just like this one to the dockets of trial courts across Texas that

have relied upon similar magistrate statutes.

As for the question we asked to review, I agree with the court of

appeals that our precedent allowing for motions to reconsider in the

context of a trial court’s grant of a motion to suppress is not analogous

to the situation in this case. As the court of appeals pointed out, a

motion to suppress is interlocutory, and a trial court may reconsider its

ruling prior to trial. 23 The magistrate’s order in this case is not on the

same footing.

Similarly, I agree with the court of appeals that the motion for

reconsideration should not be governed by the rules applicable to a

motion for new trial. 24 Those rules apply to direct challenges to a

defendant’s conviction or punishment that have been filed within thirty

days of conviction or punishment. 25 Article 11.072 provides the

23
Sinclair, 2022 WL 619146, at *3 (rejecting the State’s argument that a motion to reconsider
can be filed at any time despite the twenty-day appellate deadline).

24
Id. at *4 (noting that a motion to reconsider is not the functional equivalent of a motion
for new trial and thus does not extend the trial court’s jurisdiction).

25
See Tex. R. App. P. 21.4(a) (“The defendant may file a motion for new trial before, but not
later than 30 days after, the date when the trial court imposes or suspends sentence in open
Sinclair Dissenting — 9

exclusive means by which district courts may exercise their original

habeas jurisdiction, and it does not have a provision analogous to a

motion for new trial after the habeas court’s ruling. 26

We granted review on our own motion to evaluate the court of

appeals’ resolution of the jurisdictional question at the heart of this case.

Rather than answer that question, the Court creates a conflict between

the Government Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure to avoid it.

And the unintended consequences of our holding that Appellant’s

application is still pending will add an unanticipated and unnecessary

burden to the already busy trial court dockets across the State.

With these thoughts, I dissent.

Filed: July 31, 2024

Publish

court.”); Tex. R. App. P. 21.1 (defining a new trial as “the rehearing of a criminal action after
the trial court, has on the defendant’s motion, set aside a finding or verdict of guilt”).

26
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072.