Bexar Appraisal District v. Yvondia Johnson

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 22-0485
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Bexar Appraisal District,
Petitioner,

v.

Yvondia Johnson,
Respondent

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued January 11, 2024

JUSTICE HUDDLE delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Hecht, Justice Lehrmann, Justice Boyd, Justice Devine,
Justice Busby, and Justice Bland joined.

JUSTICE YOUNG filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice
Blacklock joined.

In 2009, the Legislature created a residence homestead tax
exemption for veterans who are 100% disabled. See TEX. TAX CODE
§ 11.131(b). Yvondia Johnson is a 100% disabled U.S. Air Force veteran
who claimed the exemption for her principal residence, a home in
Converse, Texas. It is undisputed that Bexar Appraisal District, which
denied Ms. Johnson’s application for the exemption, would have granted
it if she were unmarried. The question we must answer is whether the
Tax Code bars Ms. Johnson’s claim to the exemption because her
husband, from whom she is separated and who is also a 100% disabled
U.S. military veteran, claims the same exemption for his principal
residence, a home in San Antonio.
The court of appeals refused to engraft a one-per-married-couple
limitation onto the statute. It concluded that the Tax Code bestows the
exemption on each individual 100% disabled veteran who meets
Section 11.131(b)’s express statutory requirements without regard to
whether the veteran’s spouse also claims the exemption on a separate
residence homestead. We hold that the court of appeals’ application of
the statute was correct and thus affirm its judgment.
I. Background
Yvondia and Gregory Johnson are married, and each is a 100%
disabled U.S. Air Force veteran. In 2012, when they lived together in
their jointly owned San Antonio home, Mr. Johnson applied for a tax
exemption under Tax Code Section 11.131(b), which benefits 100%
disabled veterans by exempting the complete value of their residence
homesteads from ad valorem tax. Years later, the Johnsons jointly
bought another home in Converse, Texas. They later separated, with
Ms. Johnson living at the Converse home while Mr. Johnson remained
at the San Antonio residence. Ms. Johnson, herself a 100% disabled
veteran, applied for a Section 11.131(b) exemption for the Converse
residence for the year 2020. But Bexar Appraisal District refused the
exemption, stating as its rationale “[s]pouse claiming exemptions” at the

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San Antonio residence. Ms. Johnson protested the appraisal district’s
decision to the Bexar Appraisal Review Board under Chapter 41 of the
Tax Code. See id. § 41.41(a)(4) (permitting a property owner to protest
the denial of an exemption to the appraisal review board). After the
review board denied her protest, Ms. Johnson sued. See id.
§ 42.01(a)(1)(A) (allowing a property owner to appeal the review board’s
order in district court).
In the trial court, the appraisal district moved for summary
judgment, arguing that Ms. Johnson was ineligible for a
Section 11.131(b) exemption because her husband claimed the same
exemption on a different home they jointly owned. Ms. Johnson also
sought summary judgment, arguing that the evidence conclusively
established she met the exemption’s requirements. The trial court
granted summary judgment for the appraisal district and denied Ms.
Johnson’s motion. Ms. Johnson appealed, and the court of appeals
reversed and rendered judgment in her favor. 683 S.W.3d 92, 99 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2022).
II. Applicable Law
A. Statutory interpretation
In interpreting a statute, we must “ascertain and give effect to
the Legislature’s intent.” Odyssey 2020 Acad., Inc. v. Galveston Cent.
Appraisal Dist., 624 S.W.3d 535, 540 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Entergy Gulf
States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Tex. 2009)). “We look for
that intent first and foremost in the plain language of the constitutional
or statutory provision.” Id. “If the statute’s plain language is
unambiguous, we interpret its plain meaning, presuming that the

3
Legislature intended for each of the statute’s words to have a purpose
and that the Legislature purposefully omitted words it did not include.”
Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 579 S.W.3d 53, 59 (Tex. 2019). Statutory
terms usually bear their common, ordinary meaning. Id. When a
statute defines one of its terms, however, “[w]e do not look to the
ordinary, or commonly understood, meaning of the term because the
Legislature has supplied its own definition, which we are bound to
follow.” Entergy, 282 S.W.3d at 437.
“Statutory exemptions from taxation are subject to strict
construction because they undermine equality and uniformity by
placing a greater burden on some taxpaying businesses and individuals
rather than placing the burden on all taxpayers equally.” Odyssey 2020,
624 S.W.3d at 540 (quoting N. Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. Willacy
Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 804 S.W.2d 894, 899 (Tex. 1991)). We have held
that “an exemption cannot be raised by implication, but must
affirmatively appear.” Id. (quoting Bullock v. Nat’l Bancshares Corp.,
584 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tex. 1979)). “The taxpayer has the burden to
clearly show that an exemption applies, and all doubts are resolved
against the granting of an exemption.” Id. at 541 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Any doubts, however, must arise “from legal text, not from gut
instincts or guesses.” Miles v. Tex. Cent. R.R. & Infrastructure, Inc., 647
S.W.3d 613, 633 (Tex. 2022) (Young, J., concurring). Our analysis does
not turn on speculation as to whether the Legislature envisioned a
particular result but rather depends on what the statute’s text “clearly
says.” Id. “We must enforce the statute ‘as written’ and ‘refrain from

4
rewriting text that lawmakers chose.’” Jaster v. Comet II Constr., Inc.,
438 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. 2014) (plurality op.) (quoting Entergy, 282
S.W.3d at 443); see also Combs v. Health Care Servs. Corp., 401 S.W.3d
623, 629 (Tex. 2013) (“[W]e read unambiguous statutes as they are
written, not as they make the most policy sense.”). Consistent with that
approach, construing tax “exemptions narrowly does not mean
disregarding the words used by the Legislature.” Odyssey 2020, 624
S.W.3d at 541.
B. Constitutional and statutory benefits of residence
homestead ownership
Since 1866, the Texas Constitution has protected a family’s
homestead from forced sale.1 In considering the nature and scope of this
protection in the 1869 Constitution, we noted that the term “homestead”
“conveys the idea of a house and place connected therewith” and adopted
the dictionary definition as “[t]he place of the house; a mansion-house
with the adjoining land.” Herman Iken & Co. v. Olenick, 42 Tex. 195,
201 (1874) (citation omitted). And we noted that the 1869 Constitution
limited its protection against forced sale to property used for “homestead
purposes”; it did not extend, for example, to a property used only for
commercial purposes. Id. at 202.

1 See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (“The homestead of a family shall be,

and is hereby protected from forced sale . . . .”) (amended 1973); TEX. CONST.
OF 1869, art. XII, § 15 (“The homestead of a family . . . shall not be subject to
forced sale . . . .”); TEX. CONST. OF 1866, art. VII, § 22 (“The Legislature shall
have power to protect by law from forced sale, a certain portion of the property
of all heads of families. The homestead of a family . . . shall not be subject to
forced sale . . . .”).

5
We have also held that the constitutional protection against a
homestead’s forced sale does not extend to every individual. Rather,
Crowder v. Union National Bank of Houston, 261 S.W. 375 (Tex.
[Comm’n Op.] 1924), noted that “[t]he homestead is by our Constitution
given to the family. It is given neither to the husband nor the wife . . . .”
Id. at 377. In other words, Crowder held that the constitutional
protections against forced sale are not doled out en masse or on a
one-per-person basis. Rather, as the text at the time made clear, the
constitutional safeguard protected a family unit. See TEX. CONST.
art. XVI, § 50 (“The homestead of a family shall be, and is hereby
protected from forced sale . . . .”) (emphasis added) (amended 1973).
Thus, spouses could not each separately avail themselves of the
constitutional protection against forced sale because, while married,
they were “constituent members of the same family.” Crowder, 261 S.W.
at 377. The longstanding historical rule thus had been that
constitutional homestead protection against forced sale carries with it a
one-per-family limit.
After Crowder, a different type of benefit afforded to homestead
owners emerged. Whereas earlier constitutional protection had shielded
homestead owners from forced sales, a series of constitutional
amendments beginning in 1932 birthed an entirely new kind of benefit:
the residence homestead tax exemption.2 Moved in 1948 to Article VIII,
Section 1-b, where it remains today, that provision declared:

2 See Tex. H.J. Res. 6, 42d Leg., R.S., 1932 Tex. Gen. Laws 941
(proposing creation of a constitutional amendment to exempt $3,000 of the
assessed taxable value of a residence homestead).

6
Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000) of the assessed taxable
value of all residence homesteads as now defined by law
shall be exempt from all taxation for all State purposes.
TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-b (amended 1973). Quite plausibly,
Section 1-b’s use of the phrase “as now defined by law” incorporated
Crowder’s limitations on the use to which property must be put to
qualify as a residence homestead and on who may claim the exemption.
Further constitutional amendments would bring clarity. In 1973,
Texans again amended the Constitution, resolving any doubt about who
could claim constitutional protection against forced sale. Whereas the
1876 Constitution had afforded it only to the homestead “of a family,”
the 1973 amendments extended this constitutional protection to also
cover a homestead “of a single adult person.” Tex. H.J. Res. 7, 63d Leg.,
R.S., 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 2478 (current version at TEX. CONST.
art. XVI, § 50(a)). This reflected the reality that “Texas ha[d] moved
beyond the traditional protection of the family and the aged, and ha[d]
extended the homestead exemption to single persons who would never
have qualified under the old laws.” Lynda Beck Fenwick, Note, Effects
of Extending the Homestead Exemption to Single Adults, 26 BAYLOR L.
REV. 658, 658 (1974).
A mere five years later, Texans adopted yet another
constitutional amendment—this one regarding the residence homestead
tax exemption. But rather than amend the scope of “residence
homestead” within the Constitution itself as they did with protection
against forced sales in 1973, the People of Texas staked out a different
path for crafting eligibility requirements for residence homestead tax
exemptions: they bestowed the power and duty to define “residence

7
homestead” upon the Legislature. See TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-b(c)
(empowering “[t]he legislature by general law [to] define residence
homestead for purposes of this section”).
The Legislature exercised that power shortly thereafter and it
took a new approach. It defined a “residence homestead” itself3 and
codified it as Section 11.13(j) of the new Property Tax Code.4
Importantly, this statutory definition refers to the necessary
characteristics of the physical structure and to the purposes for which it
is used, but it says nothing about the familial or marital status of its
owner or occupier. Largely unchanged since its adoption, it is this
statutory definition, not Crowder or other cases construing Article XVI,
that defines “residence homestead” for purposes of determining
eligibility for a residence homestead tax exemption:
For purposes of this section:
(1) “Residence homestead” means a structure
(including a mobile home) or a separately secured
and occupied portion of a structure (together with
the land, not to exceed 20 acres, and improvements
used in the residential occupancy of the structure, if
the structure and the land and improvements have
identical ownership) that:
(A) is owned by one or more individuals, either
directly or through a beneficial interest in a
qualifying trust;

3 See Act of May 28, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch. 302, art. 6, § 1, 1979 Tex.

Gen. Laws 680, 689.
4 Act of May 26, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch. 841, § 1, sec. 11.13(j), 1979

Tex. Gen. Laws 2217, 2235.

8
(B) is designed or adapted for human
residence;
(C) is used as a residence; and
(D) is occupied as the individual’s principal
residence by an owner, by an owner’s
surviving spouse who has a life estate in the
property, or, for property owned through a
beneficial interest in a qualifying trust, by a
trustor or beneficiary of the trust who
qualifies for the exemption.
TEX. TAX CODE § 11.13(j).
The work of limiting tax exemptions on a one-per-family or
one-per-couple basis is done elsewhere. Some limitations on who may
claim a tax exemption reside in the provision that creates the exemption
itself. Notably, four residence homestead tax exemptions existed at the
time of Section 11.13(j)’s adoption. See id. § 11.13(a) (general residence
homestead exemption), (b) (school district residence homestead
exemption), (c)–(d) (residence homestead exemptions for individuals
who are disabled or at least sixty-five years of age).5 Each specifies to
whom the exemption is granted. Subsection (a), which derives from
Article VIII, Section 1-b of the Constitution, expressly states who is
entitled to claim a Section 11.13(a) exemption: a “family or single adult.”
Id. § 11.13(a). The other three Section 11.13 exemptions, by contrast,
specify that they benefit and may be claimed by “[a]n adult,” “an adult
who is disabled or is 65 or older,” or “an individual who is disabled or is
65 or older.” Id. § 11.13(b)–(d). These distinctions make clear that the

5 See Act of May 26, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch. 841, § 1, sec. 11.13, 1979

Tex. Gen. Laws 2217, 2234–35.

9
Legislature deliberately decided and specified, with precision, who could
claim each exemption.
Little changed since 1980, these same four exemptions remain in
Section 11.13 today, where they are subject to several limits to prohibit
double-dipping. In particular, Section 11.13(h) forbids use of more than
one of these exemptions for a single residence homestead (i.e., stacking).
It also disallows use of any one of these exemptions for more than one
residence homestead in the same year (i.e., spreading).6 The four
exemptions in Section 11.13 are also subject to a further limitation:
anyone seeking to claim them must state that she “does not claim an
exemption under [Section 11.13] on another residence homestead in this
state.” Id. § 11.43(j)(2).

6 The full text of Section 11.13(h) states:

Joint, community, or successive owners may not each receive the
same exemption provided by or pursuant to this section for the
same residence homestead in the same year. An eligible
disabled person who is 65 or older may not receive both a
disabled and an elderly residence homestead exemption from the
same taxing unit in the same year but may choose either if a
taxing unit has adopted both. An eligible disabled person who
is 65 or older may receive both a disabled and an elderly
residence homestead exemption in the same year if the person
receives the exemptions with respect to taxes levied by different
taxing units. A person may not receive an exemption under this
section for more than one residence homestead in the same year.
An heir property owner who qualifies heir property as the
owner’s residence homestead under this chapter is considered
the sole recipient of any exemption granted to the owner for the
residence homestead by or pursuant to this section.
TEX. TAX CODE § 11.13(h).

10
The four Section 11.13 exemptions represented the entire
catalogue of residence homestead tax exemptions for more than three
decades. Then, Texans amended the Constitution again in 2007 to pave
the way for a series of new exemptions, including the one at issue here.
The 2007 amendment to Article VIII authorized the Legislature to
exempt from ad valorem taxation all or part of the market value of a
100% or totally disabled veteran’s residence homestead:
The legislature by general law may exempt from ad
valorem taxation all or part of the market value of the
residence homestead of a disabled veteran who is certified
as having a service-connected disability with a disability
rating of 100 percent or totally disabled and may provide
additional eligibility requirements for the exemption.
TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-b(i).
The Legislature quickly acted, choosing to exempt all—not just
part—of the market value of a disabled veteran’s residence homestead
from taxation.7 Importantly, the Legislature made the exemption
available to an individual “disabled veteran” who qualifies. It did not
limit its availability to “[a] family or single adult” as it did for the general
$3,000 residence homestead exemption. See TEX. TAX CODE § 11.13(a).
And rather than add the new disabled-veteran exemption to

7 The statutory text reads:

A disabled veteran who has been awarded by the [U.S.]
Department of Veterans Affairs . . . 100 percent disability
compensation due to a service-connected disability and a rating
of 100 percent disabled . . . is entitled to an exemption from
taxation of the total appraised value of the veteran’s residence
homestead.
TEX. TAX CODE § 11.131(b).

11
Section 11.13, which would have made it subject to the various
limitations found in Sections 11.13(h) and 11.43(j)(2), the Legislature
placed the disabled-veteran exemption in Section 11.131, outside those
limitations’ reach. See id. §§ 11.13(h) (limiting its reach to exemptions
in “this section”), 11.43(j) (expressly applying to “an application for a
residence homestead exemption . . . authorized by Section 11.13”).
But that is not to say that Section 11.131(b) operates wholly
independent of Section 11.13. On the contrary, Section 11.131 makes
clear that “residence homestead,” as that term is used in
Section 11.131(b), “has the meaning assigned by Section 11.13.” Id.
§ 11.131(a)(2). Section 11.131 thus points to and incorporates the
definition of “residence homestead” in Section 11.13(j)(1).
Since the disabled-veteran exemption was adopted, the
Legislature has codified other residence homestead exemptions.8 Like
Section 11.131(b), these newer exemptions benefit specific classes of
residence homestead owners: partially disabled veterans and surviving
spouses of armed services members or first responders killed in the line
of duty. See id. §§ 11.132 (exemption for the donated residence of a
partially disabled veteran), 11.133 (exemption for the surviving spouse
of an armed services member killed in the line of duty), 11.134
(exemption for the surviving spouse of a first responder killed in the line
of duty). Like the section codifying the 100%-disabled-veteran
exemption at issue here, the Legislature placed these residence

8 These exemptions were also preceded by constitutional amendments.

See TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-b(l), (m), (o).

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homestead exemptions outside Section 11.13, beyond the reach of
Section 11.13(h)’s and Section 11.43(j)(2)’s limitations.
III. Analysis
Where the text of a statute is clear, our only role is to apply the
statute as written. Section 11.131(b) of the Tax Code expressly and
unambiguously states that a 100% disabled veteran is entitled to a tax
exemption for her residence homestead as defined by Section 11.13. Id.
§ 11.131(b) (“A disabled veteran who has been awarded . . . 100 percent
disability compensation due to a service-connected disability and a
rating of 100 percent disabled . . . is entitled to an exemption from
taxation . . . .”). The appraisal district agrees that Ms. Johnson is a
100% disabled veteran and concedes that Ms. Johnson’s principal
residence, the Converse home, satisfies Section 11.13(j)(1)’s
requirements for a “residence homestead.” Because the appraisal
district does not contend the statute is ambiguous, that should be
enough to conclude, based on a plain reading of the statutory text, that
Ms. Johnson is entitled to the exemption. Yet the appraisal district
urges that the statute’s defined term—“residence homestead”—means
something more, or something other, than what the statute says. It
argues, first, that this Court’s cases on the constitutional protection
against forced sale of a homestead imbue the statutory term “residence
homestead” with a meaning other than that found in the statute.
Second, the appraisal district argues that statutory limitations that
expressly state they apply to Section 11.13 exemptions must also apply
to the exemption in Section 11.131(b). Finally, various amici echo the
appraisal district’s final reason for asking the Court to depart from the

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statute’s plain meaning: applying the statutory exemption as written,
they contend, will open the floodgates to unmeritorious claims for other
residence homestead exemptions. We address each argument in turn.
A. The Legislature bestowed the Section 11.131(b)
exemption on individual disabled veterans.
Section 11.131(b) of the Tax Code unambiguously states: “A
disabled veteran who has been awarded . . . 100 percent disability
compensation due to a service-connected disability and a rating of 100
percent disabled . . . is entitled to an exemption from taxation of the total
appraised value of the veteran’s residence homestead.” Id. § 11.131(b).
There is no dispute Ms. Johnson is a 100% disabled veteran with a
service-connected disability. Nor is there any dispute that the Converse
home and Ms. Johnson’s use of it satisfy Section 11.13(j)(1)’s express
requirements. See id. §§ 11.131(a)(2) (assigning “residence homestead”
the meaning given in Section 11.13), 11.13(j)(1) (defining “residence
homestead” as, among other things, a structure designed for human use,
used as a residence, and occupied as an owner’s principal residence).
Nevertheless, the appraisal district advances various reasons
that it contends preclude Ms. Johnson from benefitting from the
exemption. The appraisal district first argues that Section 11.131(b)’s
use of the term “homestead” carries a hidden, atextual limitation: one
per family. In support, the appraisal district points us to older cases—
Herman Iken and Crowder—which it claims demonstrate that the term
“homestead” has always borne a one-per-family limitation. Neither case
supports the appraisal district’s “ordinary meaning” argument.
In Herman Iken, we acknowledged that “[t]he leading idea in [a
constitutional homestead] exemption, as we have said, is to furnish a

14
home and shelter to the family.” 42 Tex. at 199. But that was not
because the word “homestead” itself imposed such a limitation. In fact,
Herman Iken did not consider whether a husband and wife each could
claim constitutional homestead protection if they maintained separate
homesteads. Instead, the case arose over a dispute with creditors who
sought to seize property owned by the debtor couple on which they
maintained a commercial warehouse and did not live. See id. at 196.
We said the word homestead “conveys the idea of a house and place
connected therewith” and defined homestead as “[t]he place of the house;
a mansion-house with the adjoining land.” Id. at 201 (citation omitted).
Because the tract at issue was used for commercial rather than
“homestead purposes,” it “was not a part of the homestead.” Id. at
202–03. What Herman Iken says about the meaning of the word
“homestead,” then, is that it necessarily connotes the use of the property
as a place where one lives. The Legislature’s definition of “residence
homestead” in Tax Code Section 11.13(j)(1) is consistent with that
understanding because it requires, among other things, that the
residence homestead be “occupied as the individual’s principal residence
by an owner.” TEX. TAX CODE § 11.13(j)(1)(D). All agree that the
Converse home is Ms. Johnson’s principal residence.
Crowder, on the other hand, actually addressed whether a
husband and wife could establish separate family homesteads. The
court answered “no,” but not because the definition of the word
“homestead” precluded it. Crowder involved a dispute about whether
the western 80 acres of a 160-acre homestead tract—conveyed to the
wife after the couple separated and planned on divorcing—lost its

15
homestead character upon the execution of the deed. 261 S.W. at
376–77. Despite the partition, the Commission of Appeals concluded
there was a fact issue as to whether the tract remained part of the
homestead after the couple reconciled. Id. at 377. It reasoned that “[t]he
homestead is by our Constitution given to the family. It is given neither
to the husband nor the wife . . . .” Id. As a result, “[a] family can have
but one rural homestead.” Id. Because the husband and wife were still
married, they were “constituent members of the same family.” Id.
Merely deeding half of the property’s legal title to the wife as her
separate property, without more, did not constitute an abandonment of
the family’s constitutional homestead protection. Id.
Absent from Crowder is any attempt to give a meaning to the
word “homestead.” To the extent Crowder restricted the ability of a
married couple to establish separate constitutional homesteads, it was
not because of a meaning inherent in the word “homestead,” which we
previously defined in Herman Iken. Instead, Crowder’s analysis turned
on who could establish homestead protection. The who—a family—was
dictated by the text of the Constitution, which at that time explicitly
limited homestead protection to the family. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI,
§ 50 (protecting “[t]he homestead of a family”) (amended 1973); Crowder,
261 S.W. at 377 (“The homestead is by our Constitution given to the
family.”).
Neither Section 11.131(b) of the Tax Code nor Article VIII,
Section 1-b(i) includes such a one-per-family limitation.
Section 11.131(b) plainly states the exemption is awarded not to a
family, a married couple, or a single adult but, simply, to a “disabled

16
veteran,” the individual, without limitation.9 See TEX. TAX CODE
§ 11.131(b) (“A disabled veteran . . . is entitled to an exemption . . . .”).
The appraisal district urges that the references to “family” and
“single adult” found in both Section 11.13(a) of the Tax Code and
Article XVI, Section 50 of the Constitution must inform the meaning of
the term “homestead” in Section 11.131(b). But this ignores the fact that
the Constitution itself gives the Legislature the authority to define the
term “residence homestead” for purposes of defining a property’s
eligibility for homestead tax exemptions. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-b(c)
(“The legislature by general law may define residence homestead for
purposes of this section.”). The Legislature codified that express
meaning in Tax Code Section 11.13(j)(1), and that definition nowhere
mentions a one-per-family or one-per-couple limitation.10

9 The thrust of the dissent is that the mere use of the word “homestead”

necessarily carries with it the one-per-family limit based on how it is used in
other constitutional and statutory provisions. See post at 19 (Young, J.,
dissenting) (citing TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51; TEX. PROP. CODE § 41.002). Yet
this ignores crucial constitutional and statutory text that signals when the
one-per-family limit does and does not apply. For instance, the limit applies
to the forced-sale protection described in Article XVI, Sections 50–52 because
the Constitution specifies that protection applies to “[t]he homestead of a
family, or of a single adult person.” TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50. Similarly, the
Property Code’s exemption of a homestead from creditors’ claims is limited by
the statute’s use of the phrase “homestead of a family or a single, adult person.”
TEX. PROP. CODE § 41.002(a). There is no similar limiting language in Tax
Code Section 11.131(b) or Section 11.13(j)(1). Just as we give meaning to text
where it exists, we must too give meaning to its absence.
10 Our dissenting colleagues question our straightforward textual
approach on the ground that there might be constitutional limitations on the
Legislature’s ability to define a term the Constitution expressly gives the
Legislature the power to define. See post at 26–29 (Young, J., dissenting). Yet
they never explain how the judicial branch would get the power to constrain

17
So even assuming our dissenting colleagues are correct about the
ordinary meaning of “homestead,” it is the statutory definition of
“residence homestead”—not the ordinary meaning of “homestead”—that
controls our analysis. See Entergy, 282 S.W.3d at 437 (“We do not look
to the ordinary, or commonly understood, meaning of the term because
the Legislature has supplied its own definition, which we are bound to
follow.”). Cases construing homestead protection in a different context
(i.e., protection from forced sale) do not answer whether Ms. Johnson
qualifies for the Section 11.131(b) exemption.
Section 11.131(b) is clear: a disabled veteran is entitled to a tax
exemption for his or her residence homestead. Section 11.13(j)(1) is
clear, too, and unambiguously sets forth the requirements property
must satisfy to qualify as someone’s residence homestead. The statute’s
requirements, even strictly construed, are not ambiguous. Ms. Johnson
and the Converse home meet the statutory requirements—the appraisal
district concedes it.
There is thus no basis to deny Ms. Johnson an exemption, as our
dissenting colleagues would, under the guise of strictly construing the
disabled-veteran exemption. See post at 30–32 (Young, J., dissenting).
Strict construction requires us to “accord the language used by the
Legislature a full meaning that will carry out its manifest purpose and
intention in enacting the statute but confine the operation of the law to

how the Legislature exercises its express constitutional authority to define a
term. In any event, we need not and do not decide whether the Legislature’s
definitional authority is unbounded for the simple reason that no party has
hinted, let alone asserted, that the Legislature’s definition of “residence
homestead” in Tax Code Section 11.13(j)(1) is unconstitutional.

18
cases which plainly fall within its terms as well as its spirit and
purpose.” Miles, 647 S.W.3d at 619–20 (cleaned up). But strict
construction “does not mean disregarding the words used by the
Legislature,” Odyssey 2020, 624 S.W.3d at 541, nor does it require us to
ignore that the Legislature purposefully omitted others. The words the
statute includes and omits, plus context, together demonstrate that the
purpose of Section 11.131(b) was to afford residence homestead
exemptions to disabled veterans. While doubts are resolved against
exemptions, the anti-exemption preference arises only when doubt
arises from the statute’s text. Here, there is no such doubt.
B. The other provisions of the Tax Code do not preclude
Ms. Johnson from benefitting from Section 11.131(b).
The appraisal district argues that even if what it asserts to be the
ordinary meaning of the term “homestead” does not bar Ms. Johnson’s
claim to the Section 11.131(b) exemption, other provisions in the Tax
Code do. First, it asserts that Section 11.13(a)’s use of “family or single
adult” prohibits Ms. Johnson from claiming the Section 11.131(b)
exemption. Second, it argues that Section 11.13(h) prohibits her claim
to the exemption. Third, it contends that Section 11.43(j)(2) bars Ms.
Johnson from claiming the Section 11.131(b) exemption if Mr. Johnson
is claiming an exemption for the San Antonio home. These arguments
fail because none of these other limitations on the use of exemptions in
Section 11.13 applies to the exemption in Section 11.131.
Start with Section 11.13(a). The appraisal district argues that
Section 11.13(a)’s providing a $3,000 general residence homestead
exemption to “[a] family or single adult” demonstrates the Legislature’s
intent that any residence homestead exemption, including that in

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Section 11.131(b), be limited to a family or single adult. The appraisal
district posits that Section 11.13(a)’s use of the word “family” signals
that the Legislature intended all residence homestead exemptions to be
limited to one per family. We draw a different conclusion from
Section 11.13(a): that the Legislature knows how to limit a particular
exemption on a one-per-family basis. The fact that it did so in
Section 11.13(a) but not Section 11.131(b) means that Section 11.131(b)
bears no such limitation. See Ineos USA, LLC v. Elmgren, 505 S.W.3d
555, 564 (Tex. 2016) (noting that when the Legislature uses different
language in different parts of a statute, we assume the Legislature
meant something different). Certainly, the Legislature knows how to
restrict an exemption’s availability to one per family—as it did in
Section 11.13(a)—and it made the decision not to in Section 11.131(b).
Similarly, the Legislature knew how to make Section 11.131(b)
subject to Section 11.13(h)’s prohibitions on stacking and spreading—
yet it did not. The appraisal district is correct that Section 11.13(h) of
the Tax Code, for its part, limits availability of many residence
homestead exemptions found in the Tax Code. It provides, for example,
that “[j]oint, community, or successive owners may not each receive the
same exemption . . . for the same residence homestead in the same year”
and “[a] person may not receive an exemption . . . for more than one
residence homestead in the same year.” Id. § 11.13(h). The appraisal
district argues this shows the Legislature’s intent to prevent a
homeowner from obtaining multiple residence homestead exemptions
for one home or exemptions on multiple homes. That is true, but only
for exemptions “provided by or pursuant to this section [11.13]” and

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“under this section [11.13],” respectively. Id. The exemption Ms.
Johnson seeks, though, is not in Section 11.13 and therefore not subject
to limitations that apply only to Section 11.13. Engrafting
Section 11.13(h)’s restrictions onto Section 11.131 would require us to
ignore the phrase “in this section.” Id. § 11.13(h). We should not. See
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 174 (2012) (“If possible, every word
and every provision is to be given effect . . . . None should be ignored.
None should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to
duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.”).11 Doing so
would nullify what we must presume was the Legislature’s conscious
choice to locate the disabled-veteran exemption outside Section 11.13 so
that it would not be subject to the limitations in Section 11.13(h). See
Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 681 (Tex. 2018) (rejecting “attempts
to add a requirement to [a] statute that does not exist in its text” because
“injecting such a requirement into the [statute] would be disloyal to its
enacted text”).12
Finally, Tax Code Section 11.43(j) poses no bar to Ms. Johnson’s
claim to the exemption. Section 11.43(j) requires an applicant seeking
an exemption under certain Tax Code sections to “state that the

11 See also Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 522

U.S. 479, 501 (1998) (admonishing against interpretations that treat statutory
terms as mere surplusage).
12 That Section 11.13(h) exists is context demonstrating that the
Legislature did not think—or intend—that using the phrase “residence
homestead” inherently supplied the limitations found in Section 11.13(h). If it
did, parts of Section 11.13(h) would be superfluous.

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applicant does not claim an exemption under that section on another
residence homestead in this state.” TEX. TAX CODE § 11.43(j)(2).
Section 11.43(j), however, covers only “a residence homestead exemption
prescribed by the comptroller and authorized by Section 11.13.” Id.
§ 11.43(j). As just discussed, Section 11.131(b)’s 100%-disabled-veteran
exemption is not authorized by Section 11.13. It resides in a different
home, Section 11.131.
“[T]he whole-text canon . . . calls on the judicial interpreter to
consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and
logical relation of its many parts.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 167.
Like the disabled-veteran exemption, the Legislature chose to house
special residence homestead exemptions for partially disabled veterans,
along with exemptions for surviving spouses of armed services members
or first responders killed in the line of duty, in their own, independent
sections of the Tax Code. TEX. TAX CODE §§ 11.131–.134. By doing so,
the Legislature removed those exemptions from the reach of otherwise
generally applicable limitations in Tax Code Section 11.13(h). The
Legislature’s choice is a reasonable policy choice. It certainly was one
the Legislature had the discretion to make.
C. Today’s decision does not expand the availability of
other homestead exemptions.
The appraisal district, along with various other appraisal
districts as amici, also conjures a parade of horribles for appraisal
districts across the state. But we do not ignore a statute’s text to impose
our “own judicial meaning” to reach a certain result, even if amici—or
we—think the statute unwise. Silguero, 579 S.W.3d at 59. Instead, we
must “refrain from rewriting text that lawmakers chose.” Jaster, 438

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S.W.3d at 562 (quoting Entergy, 282 S.W.3d at 443). The plain text of
Section 11.131 makes clear that Ms. Johnson is eligible for a disabled-
veteran residence homestead exemption for her principal residence in
Converse, and we cannot avoid that result merely out of concern for its
consequences.
In any event, we believe the appraisal districts’ concerns about
the proverbial floodgates are unfounded. First and foremost, nothing in
the Court’s decision should—or can—be read to expand the availability
of constitutional forced-sale protection. As demonstrated above,
constitutional forced-sale protection is a distinct concept that remains
limited to a “family [or] single adult.” TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a).
Second, the Legislature’s definition of “residence homestead”
restricts qualification to a structure “occupied as the individual’s
principal residence by an owner.” TEX. TAX CODE § 11.13(j)(1)(D). A
taxpayer seeking an exemption must still establish—as the appraisal
district concedes Ms. Johnson has here—that the home for which she
seeks the exemption is her “principal residence.” Id. It goes without
saying that one cannot have more than one principal residence.
Third, but for its limitation to “this section,” Section 11.13(h)’s
prohibition against homeowners spreading exemptions among multiple
residences would have barred Ms. Johnson from obtaining the
exemption she seeks in this case. So long as Section 11.13(h) remains
in its current form, no recipient of a Section 11.13 exemption may obtain
an exemption on more than one home—even a married person living
apart from his or her spouse.

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Finally, “[t]he Legislature is adept at qualifying its tax
exemptions.” Tex. Student Hous. Auth., 460 S.W.3d at 144. If it wishes
to preclude Ms. Johnson and similarly situated disabled veterans from
receiving residence homestead exemptions, we trust it will amend the
statute.
IV. Conclusion
The analysis of whether Ms. Johnson is entitled to the
Section 11.131(b) exemption should begin and end with the statute’s
plain text. When, as here, the Legislature supplies an express definition
for a term the statute employs, the statutory definition displaces the
term’s historical or ordinary meaning, and we are bound to give that
term the meaning the Legislature ascribed it. Ms. Johnson satisfies the
express, unambiguous requirements of Section 11.131(b) and therefore
is entitled to the benefit of the tax exemption for 100% disabled
veterans. The court of appeals correctly concluded that Ms. Johnson’s
summary judgment motion should have been granted. We affirm the
court of appeals’ judgment.

Rebeca A. Huddle
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: June 7, 2024

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