In the Interest of K.N., K.L., K.L., and K.L., Children

Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 24-0881
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In the Interest of K.N., K.L., K.L., and K.L., Children

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

JUSTICE BLAND, joined by Justice Lehrmann and Justice Huddle,
dissenting in part.

Father witnessed and participated in his wife’s abuse of a child.
He did not visit his children for over a year and refused to take steps
toward reunification. He engaged in a high-speed police chase while
possessing four grams of methamphetamine, knowing his parental
rights were in jeopardy. He failed to provide a clean drug test. A jury
heard this evidence along with his testimony attempting to justify his
actions. The jury terminated Father’s rights, finding endangerment and
constructive abandonment.
The Court analogizes this case to In re H.S., 1 noting that both
“illustrate the legal standards governing evidentiary-sufficiency
challenges to parental-termination orders.” 2 As in H.S., the Court in this

1 ___ S.W.3d ___, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. June 5, 2026).

2 Ante at 1.
case “disregards considerable evidence supporting the jury’s verdict and,
in doing so, fails to properly defer to the jury’s role as factfinder.” 3 The
Court compounds its error by refusing to consider whether the evidence
supports the jury’s finding of constructive abandonment, delaying
permanency for these children into another year.
As the Court holds, the evidence supports termination of Mother’s
rights. I join that part of its opinion. A proper review requires upholding
termination as to Father, too. Because the Court does not, I respectfully
dissent in part to the Court’s judgment.
I
It is important to provide the complete picture of the evidence as
to Father. Mother and Father share three children: Kimberly, Kayla,
and Keith. 4 Though they do not share Mother’s eldest child, Karen,
Father has been in her life since before she turned one and has “always
taken her as [his] daughter.”
The January 2021 investigation focused primarily on reports of
Mother’s abuse of Karen, but it also revealed Father’s concerning
behavior at the time. The investigator reported that Father was present
during many incidents between Mother and Karen. Mother and Father
each acknowledged that Father was aware of, and sometimes took part
in, Mother’s extreme disciplinary methods. Father’s conversations with
Department employees demonstrated recognition of the gravity of those
incidents. Yet Father told school officials that the children were not

3 H.S., ___ S.W.3d ___ (Lehrmann, J., dissenting).

4 The pseudonyms for the children are those the Court uses. See Tex. R.

App. P. 9.8(b)(2).

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permitted to speak with the Department.
The next investigation began after Karen’s outcry that Mother
“grabs and drags [her] by her hair when she doesn’t listen.” Father
concedes he was present during this incident. Father allowed an
investigator to view the children, but he advised that he and Mother
would not cooperate with the Department. Conversations with Mother’s
family members intensified concerns for the children. Mother’s own
mother and sister witnessed Father’s complicity in Mother’s abuse and
testified against both parents at trial. The children’s maternal
grandmother testified that “[Karen] was treated differently” and faced
“[e]xcessive” discipline. When she raised concerns with Mother and
Father, Mother would “deny . . . access to the kids.” The grandmother
testified that Father “knew what was going on” and promised to “try to
make things better.” Likewise, Mother’s sister testified to the
differential treatment of Karen, noting that she “got the brunt end of the
deal.” She witnessed marks on Karen’s neck resulting from an
“altercation” with Mother. She, too, testified that Father and the other
children in the house knew that Mother abused Karen. When she tried
to talk to Father about the abuse, he responded that “at least it was
[Karen] and not him getting in trouble.”
The following school year, Mother and Father failed to enroll the
children. Upon further investigation, including interviews with the
children’s maternal aunt and grandmother, the Department sought to
terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. The trial court ordered
the children’s temporary removal pending further proceedings. Mother
and Father refused to comply with the court order, instead fleeing to

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Louisiana with the children. 5 They did not enroll the children in school
once there. Eventually, the children were taken into care and placed
with their maternal grandparents.
Upon entering care, the children’s caseworker noticed possible
developmental delays in Kimberly, Kayla, and Keith. Grandmother
testified that Kayla, then age five, had eleven cavities requiring general
anesthesia to treat. Kimberly and Kayla needed glasses. Karen had
warts “all over her hands, and beginning to move to her lips.” Kimberly
had an undiagnosed seizure while in the care of her parents.
As the maternal grandparents worked to remedy these issues,
Mother and Father chose to remain in Louisiana. The Department
provided a service plan. Father refused to participate, including
declining to visit the children from December 2022 to February 2023, at
which time the Court suspended visitation for his failure to engage.
Father justified his absence by telling the jury that the Department was
“going to take [his] information” to “use it against [him] to terminate
[his] rights later.”
In January 2023, Louisiana police initiated a traffic stop against
Father. Father led officers on a twelve-to-fifteen mile chase at speeds of
over 130 miles per hour. The chase ended when Father wrecked his
motorcycle. Police apprehended him as he fled on foot. Officers
discovered four grams of methamphetamine on Father’s person. The
State of Louisiana charged him with three felonies: aggravated flight

5 It is unclear whether the move occurred before or after the hearing.

Mother testified that they moved the month before, but Father testified that
he was still working in Texas when the hearing occurred.

4
from an officer; reckless operation of a motorcycle; and possession of a
schedule II substance.
In August 2023, the parties entered into a mediated settlement
agreement to resume visitation conditioned upon negative drug
screenings of both parents. Father never provided a negative screening,
instead testing positive for amphetamines on two separate occasions.
Father claimed the findings resulted from prescribed medication, but he
refused to permit the Department to verify a prescription. In total,
Father did not see his children for over a year—from their removal in
November 2022 through the December 2023 trial.
The jury found that Father had endangered the children,
constructively abandoned the children, and failed to comply with a court
order establishing the actions necessary for reunification with the
children. 6 The jury further found that termination was in the children’s
best interest, 7 a finding Father does not challenge. The court of appeals
affirmed on the endangerment grounds without reaching the other
statutory grounds that could support the judgment. 8 The Court declines
to review the evidence that supports these alternative grounds. 9
II
“A parent’s fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of
his child is of constitutional magnitude.” 10 “But ‘[j]ust as it is imperative

6 Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O).

7 Id. § 161.001(b)(2).

8 719 S.W.3d 388, 396, 398 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2024).

9 Ante at 35.

10 In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 740 (Tex. 2022).

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for courts to recognize the constitutional underpinnings of the
parent-child relationship, it is also essential that emotional and physical
interests of the child not be sacrificed merely to preserve that right.’” 11
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of termination findings, we
“must take into consideration whether the evidence is such that a
factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the
truth of the matter on which the State bears the burden of proof.” 12 This
heightened standard of review “does not dispel, however, the deference
that an appellate court must grant to the factfinder, who heard the
witnesses and evaluated their credibility.” 13 Thus, we “‘look at all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the finding,’ ‘assume that the
factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable
factfinder could do so,’ and ‘disregard all evidence that a reasonable
factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible’”
without disregarding “‘undisputed facts that do not support the
finding.’” 14 In doing so, we “honor not only the elevated burden of proof,
but also the deference an appellate court must have for the factfinder’s
role.” 15
In its review, the Court disregards evidence that Father
contributed to the abuse in the home. Further, it isolates other evidence

11 In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 240 (Tex. 2013) (alteration in original)

(quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002)).
12 In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 265–66 (Tex. 2002).

13 In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 311–12 (Tex. 2021).

14 J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741 (quoting J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266).

15 In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tex. 2018).

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supporting termination as though each action must individually support
a termination finding, rather than viewing the evidence as forming a
collective pattern of endangerment that the jury reasonably could have
credited.
A
The Court discounts Father’s role in the abuse of Karen, stating
that “the record does not show that [Father] himself abused [Karen] in
the same ways that led to Mother’s termination.” 16 Father testified,
however, that he knew of Mother’s actions and took part in some of
them. The Court’s characterization of this as a view they disagree with 17
does not change that the jury heard Father’s admissions. In the litany
of evidence the Court recites to support termination of Mother’s rights,
Father was the perpetrator of the “painful punishments involving
kneeling on rice”; he was involved in forcing her to “stand[] at a wall for
extended periods”; and he admitted he was present when Karen was
“dragged by her hair.” 18 As the Court recognizes, “the jury heard
competent evidence of . . . ongoing instances of physical abuse,
emotional abuse and food deprivation.” 19 The jury also heard that
Father either participated in, witnessed, or was aware of all of it.
Texas recognizes that the difference between reasonable corporal
punishment and criminal abuse depends on facts specific to the child

16 Ante at 29.

17 Id. at 29 n.4.

18 Id. at 23.

19 Id.

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and the circumstances. 20 In this case, the trial court instructed the jury
on a parent’s statutory right to reasonable discipline. The jury resolved
that Father exceeded the limit.
Such a determination was within its province. First, witnessing
and participating in the abuse of his stepdaughter is evidence the jury
could credit to find endangerment. Father considered leaving with the
children because of Mother’s behavior, but “it never panned out.” The
children’s maternal aunt testified that, after she voiced concerns about
Karen’s treatment, Father said, “at least it was [Karen] and not him
getting in trouble.” Father saw Mother abusing Karen—a child whom
he testified as seeing “no other way” but as his daughter—and did not
attempt to end it. As the Court highlights in its discussion of Mother:
“Karen was beaten and bruised, repeatedly, for years, in incidents
reported by many witnesses who told the jury such violence exceeded
the limits of traditional discipline.” 21 Father stood there while it
happened.
A parent’s conduct toward other children is relevant to whether a
parent has endangered a child. 22 Evidence of an adult permitting child
abuse in his home is relevant to whether that adult endangered other

20 See Stanfield v. State, 43 Tex. 167, 168 (1875).

21 Ante at 23.

22 See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009) (reaffirming that

“endangering conduct is not limited to actions directed towards the child” and
can include actions occurring “while the parent had custody of older children”).

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children. 23 In evaluating abuse and neglect under Chapter 262, a
factfinder may “examine a parent’s history with other children as a
factor of the risks or threats of the environment” because “[p]art of [the]
calculus” of the finding “includes the harm suffered or the danger faced
by other children under the parent’s care.” 24 The Legislature similarly
recognizes as much by making termination of parental rights as to one
child on endangerment grounds an independent ground for termination
of rights as to other children. 25
“The suitability of a child’s living conditions and the conduct of
parents or others in the home are relevant to a Subsection (D) inquiry.” 26
Thus, a father’s knowledge of a mother’s failure to protect their unborn
child “can contribute to an endangering environment and thus support
an endangerment finding.” 27 Though this Court does not “endorse
attributing any and all known dangers posed to a child . . . to the other
parent,” we nevertheless recognize that disregarding a father’s
knowledge of abuse “would effectively endorse [his] willful ignorance of
the significant risk.” 28

23 See Tex. Fam. Code § 261.001(5)(C) (including “a person with whom

the child’s parent cohabits” in the definition of “[p]erson responsible for a
child’s care, custody, or welfare” in the child abuse context).
24 In re K.N.D., 424 S.W.3d 8, 10 (Tex. 2014) (second alteration in
original) (quoting E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 248) (discussing Tex. Fam. Code
§§ 262.001–.417).
25 Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(M).

26 J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 749.

27 Id. at 749–50.

28 Id. at 750.

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Second, Mother’s abuse is relevant to Father’s case because his
children resided in an abusive household—a condition endangering to
the other children’s emotional well-being. 29 “[P]roximity to
wrongdoing” 30 is relevant when that wrongdoing injures a child, and
Father’s conduct need not be directed at a child to endanger that child. 31
The younger three children witnessed the abuse Mother inflicted. The
maternal aunt and grandmother testified that the other children
reported that Karen was not allowed to eat with the family. A
court-appointed advocate testified that Kimberly had been
“indoctrinated or trained” to watch Karen and report misbehavior to
Mother. Father did nothing to shield his children from witnessing abuse.
Though he “did not need to solve everything on [his] own,” he had “to do
the best [he] could to insulate [his] children from” Mother’s behavior. 32
Setting aside Karen’s abuse and the effect it had on the other
children, the jury heard evidence that the children were neglected in
Father’s care. “[N]eglect can be just as dangerous to the well-being of a

29 Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); see also J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at

271–72 (considering evidence of abuse of a sibling as relevant to termination
of a parent’s rights to other children); see also In re P.N.T., 580 S.W.3d 331,
356 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) (“A parent’s abuse of a
child endangers that child but also endangers other children the parent may
have in his care.” (citing E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 248)).
30 Ante at 30.

31 See Tex. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)

(“[I]t is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child
actually suffers injury.”).
32 H.S., ___ S.W.3d ___ (Lehrmann, J., dissenting).

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child as direct physical abuse.” 33 When the children arrived at their
grandmother’s, Kimberly had eleven cavities and had suffered an
undiagnosed seizure, and Kayla and Kimberly both needed glasses. A
caseworker noticed developmental delays in all three children, and
Father had not enrolled them in school. The Court credits this evidence
against Mother, 34 but Father also bore responsibility to care for his
children’s physical needs.
B
The jury chose the Department as the permanent managing
conservator and Mother as a possessory conservator of the three younger
children while terminating Father’s rights. Evidence of Father’s
post-removal actions harmonizes the difference in the jury’s verdicts as
to Mother and Father. The Court silos Father’s post-removal behavior
into categories, disregarding the weight of the cumulative evidence
against Father.
As a preliminary matter, the Court’s declaration that “[o]ur
precedents have cast doubt on the extent to which post-removal conduct
informs the Paragraph (D) and (E) endangerment predicates” gravely
distorts our endangerment precedent. 35 The Court relies on In re J.W.
to make this contention, but there we expressly declined to hold “that a
parent could never cause his child to be placed in an endangering
environment after removal” because we could not “foreclose the
possibility that Subsection (D) could apply post-removal depending on

33 In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. 1996).

34 See ante at 27.

35 Id. at 31 n.5.

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the facts.” 36 Similarly, the Court points to In re C.E. 37 as “identifying the
‘relevant timeframe’ for endangering conduct under Paragraph (E) as
the time when the parent was the child’s caregiver, before the child was
removed.” 38 To the contrary, the Court in C.E. referred to the mother’s
post-removal conduct as evidence the jury could credit. 39 C.E. imposes
no time limit on endangering-conduct evidence.
Rather, our precedent evaluates evidence during the pendency of
the suit to inform endangerment findings, especially evidence that
“shows a course of conduct which has the effect of endangering” the
child. 40 For example, while describing the father’s course of conduct that
“permitted a reasonable factfinder to find endangerment” in In re J.O.A.,
we noted that the father “missed multiple drug tests after the children’s
removal” and tested positive for marijuana shortly before the final
hearing in the case. 41 Similarly, in In re A.V., 42 we held the evidence
“show[ed] a pattern of continued substantial risk of harm to the child
sufficient to support a trial court’s finding of endangerment,” noting that
the parents’ drug use was ongoing despite knowledge that “their

36 645 S.W.3d at 749 n.12.

37 687 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. 2024).

38 Ante at 31 n.5 (quoting C.E., 687 S.W.3d at 307).

39See 687 S.W.3d at 313–14 (referencing the caseworker’s concerns
about the mother’s inappropriate conduct with the infant during supervised
visits).
40 Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 534.

41 In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 277–78 (Tex. 2024) (emphasis added)

(discussing J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346).
42 697 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. 2024).

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parental rights were subject to termination for continued drug use.” 43
After removal, the Department’s first priority is to reunify the
family except in aggravated circumstances. 44 The trial court cannot
terminate without a showing that “a continuing danger remains in the
home that prevents the return of the child to the parent.” 45 It thus is
proper and at times imperative to consider post-removal conduct in
evaluating the evidence supporting an endangerment ground.
Turning to the evidence, the jury heard that Father led law
enforcement officials on a high-speed chase with four grams of
methamphetamine in his pocket, resulting in three felony charges. For
context, possession of four grams of methamphetamine in Texas is a
second-degree felony carrying a potential prison sentence of between
two and twenty years and a fine of up to $10,000. 46 Then, Father twice
tested positive for amphetamines and refused to permit the Department
to verify a prescription he claimed he had for the drug. Father never
submitted a clean drug test. The jury, as “the sole judge[] of the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony,”47
heard Father’s excuse for his positive tests and could disbelieve it,
particularly when combined with evidence of a 2017 incident

43 Id. at 659 (emphasis added); see also H.S., ___ S.W.3d ___ (Lehrmann,

J., dissenting) (pointing to evidence of a mother’s post-removal drug use as
supporting the endangerment finding).
44 Tex. Fam. Code §§ 161.001(f)(1), 262.2015(a).

45 Id. § 161.001(f)(1).

46 Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 481.102(6), .115(d); Tex. Penal Code

§ 12.33.
47 City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex. 2005).

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culminating in Father’s guilty verdicts for possession of a dangerous
drug and theft of a firearm. 48 While his parental rights hung in the
balance, Father chanced incarceration, knowing it “risked separating
him from” his children “for years.” 49 Father’s drug use in the face of
Mother’s abusive behavior is “particularly concerning” because it
rendered him less capable of protecting the children upon
reunification. 50
While embroiled in this destructive behavior, Father did not
attempt to visit his children for over a year. This is abandonment.
Though Subsection (N) creates an independent statutory ground for
termination on the basis of constructive abandonment, 51 we have
recognized that “[t]he grounds for termination are not mutually
exclusive; rather, the same conduct may support multiple grounds and
a finding that termination of a parent’s rights is in the child’s best
interest.” 52 In recognizing abandonment as an independent ground, the
Legislature has determined that the gravity of such harm can alone
result in termination in certain circumstances. Nothing bars a factfinder

48 See J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346 (noting the “probative value of a long

history of drug use and irresponsible choices” when identifying an endangering
course of conduct).
49 J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 315.

50 See H.S., ___ S.W.3d ___ (Lehrmann, J., dissenting) (“This evidence

is particularly concerning because of the impact that drugs would necessarily
have on Mother’s ability to take action to protect the children under such
circumstances.”).
51 Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(N).

52 J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 314.

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from considering abandonment evidence to support an endangerment
finding. 53 In In re J.F.-G., we declined to accept that incarceration alone
is endangering. 54 We nonetheless held it was relevant to the
endangerment inquiry “when the resulting abandonment presents a
risk, as it did here, to a child’s physical or emotional well-being.” 55 The
father’s absence there “exposed [the child] to physical and emotional
loss, as he did not care for, nurture, or protect her.” 56 Though evidence
of abandonment may not, alone, be sufficient to prove endangerment,
the jury could have credited it together with the other evidence it heard.
The Court asserts that neither Father’s “isolated criminal
misconduct,” nor his failed drug tests, nor his abandonment, standing
alone, support termination. 57 A reasonable factfinder, however, could
link Father’s drug use with his dangerous and felonious conduct, the
abandonment of his children, and his pre-removal neglect to conclude
that Father’s conduct “establish[ed] a substantial risk of harm” to the
younger children. 58
The Court scoffs that this evidence “does not establish that Father
‘used illegal drugs in a manner that created a substantial risk of harm

53 See A.V., 697 S.W.3d at 659 (observing that the parents’ sporadic

visitation and failure to complete their services was some evidence supporting
an endangerment finding).
54 627 S.W.3d at 315.

55 Id.

56 Id.

57 See ante at 30–34.

58 R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278.

15
to his children’ sufficient to support the termination of parental
rights.” 59 Unlike the Court, the jury was persuaded. “It remains the
jury’s ‘responsibility to weigh evidence, draw inferences, and evaluate
witness credibility.’” 60 Because legally sufficient evidence supports the
verdict, we should uphold the jury’s finding that Father allowed his
children to remain in an endangering environment and engaged in
conduct that endangered them. 61
III
Appellate courts should consider alternative grounds for
rendition before ordering a remand. 62 Interests of judicial economy
require that a court render “a judgment moving the case to the greatest
degree of finality.” 63 The Court nevertheless declines to reach ground
(N), an alternative basis for affirming the judgment before it. 64
The Court should not needlessly delay a parental termination
case, where “[f]inality is uniquely important.” 65 “[C]hildren’s lives

59 Ante at 33 (quoting R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 272).

60 H.S., ___ S.W.3d ___ (Lehrmann, J., dissenting) (quoting J.W., 645

S.W.3d at 745).
61 Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).

62See FieldTurf USA, Inc. v. Pleasant Grove Indep. Sch. Dist., 642
S.W.3d 829, 836 (Tex. 2022).
63 Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Pool, 124 S.W.3d 188, 201 (Tex. 2003).

64 Earlier this term, we held that a court of appeals that took a similar

“shortcut” by remanding without considering alternative bases for rendition
committed “reversible error in itself.” Valk v. Copper Creek Distribs., Inc., ___
S.W.3d ___, 2026 WL 1041612, at *1 (Tex. Apr. 17, 2026).
65 In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d 504, 512 (Tex. 2020).

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cannot be ‘kept in limbo while judicial processes crawl forward.’” 66 A
“child’s best interest is inherently threatened by undue uncertainty and
delay in finally determining where the child will live and who will raise
[the child].” 67 We should reach potentially dispositive issues in such
cases, resolving the permanency question for these children.
To that end, the jury heard legally sufficient evidence to support
its finding of constructive abandonment. 68 Father primarily contends
the Department failed to make efforts toward reunification after his
relocation to Louisiana. On the contrary, the caseworker reached out
each month trying to engage the parents in services and repeatedly
notified them that failure to participate could result in termination. The
parents rebuffed these efforts. Contrary to his argument on appeal,

66 Id. (quoting In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 353 (Tex. 2003)); see also

B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d at 353 (stating that “judicial economy is not just a policy—
it is a statutory mandate” in parental termination cases); Tex. Fam. Code
§ 109.002(a-1) (giving appeals from terminations of parental rights precedence
over other civil appeals); Tex. R. App. P. 28.4(a)(1) (identifying appeals in
parental termination cases as governed by the rules for accelerated appeals).
67 In re K.S.L., 538 S.W.3d 107, 115 (Tex. 2017).

68Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) requires a finding that the
parent has:
constructively abandoned the child who has been in the
permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the
Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than
six months, and:
(i) the department has made reasonable efforts to return
the child to the parent;
(ii) the parent has not regularly visited or maintained
significant contact with the child; and
(iii) the parent has demonstrated an inability to provide
the child with a safe environment[.]

17
Father testified that his failure was due to privacy concerns, not a lack
of effort from the Department.
The evidence supports the other elements of (N), too, including
lack of regular visitation or significant contact for the requisite six
months. Father failed to exercise visitation before it was suspended for
his failure to see the children and participate in services. Once the
parties reached an agreement to resume visitation, Father would not
provide the required negative drug screening despite agreeing to do so.
The evidence also demonstrates Father’s inability to provide a
safe environment. He refused to provide the Department with a
Louisiana address or proof of income. Because “[t]he grounds for
termination are not mutually exclusive” and “the same conduct may
support multiple grounds,” 69 the evidence supporting the endangerment
ground also bears on the safe-environment element, including Father’s
criminal activity, drug abuse, and complicity in child abuse.

* * *

69 J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 314.

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As the Court observes, “The jury heard live testimony from fifteen
witnesses . . . and spent nearly eight hours deliberating.” 70 We should
defer to the jury’s credibility determinations because legally sufficient
evidence supports its findings as to Father. Failing that, we should
examine and decide the merit of the independent bases supporting the
trial court’s judgment. As the Court does not, I respectfully dissent in
part.

Jane N. Bland
Justice

OPINION FILED: June 5, 2026

70 Ante at 8.

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Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 24-0881
══════════

In the Interest of K.N., K.L., K.L., and K.L., Children

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

JUSTICE HAWKINS delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Blacklock, Justice Devine, Justice Busby, Justice Young,
and Justice Sullivan joined, and in which Justice Lehrmann, Justice
Bland, and Justice Huddle joined except as to Part V.

CHIEF JUSTICE BLACKLOCK filed a concurring opinion.

JUSTICE BLAND filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which
Justice Lehrmann and Justice Huddle joined.

We consider another case in which the State of Texas seeks to
permanently sever the legal bonds between two parents and their
children. This is the second of two opinions issued this Term in which
we illustrate the legal standards governing evidentiary-sufficiency
challenges to parental-termination orders. As we explained in In re H.S.,
___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (Tex. June 5, 2026), “[f]ew principles in our history
and traditions are as deeply rooted as the sanctity of the family.”
According that principle due respect, we enforce a “strong presumption”
“that termination is not in a child’s best interest,” and we insist that “a
parental-termination order must always be a last resort and never a
first impulse.” Id. at ___. The law demands that every parental-
termination order satisfy the rigorous requirements of the clear-and-
convincing evidence standard. Anything less offends not only our
Constitution and Family Code, but the innate “right and the
corresponding responsibility” of parents “to direct their children’s
upbringing and to be their children’s primary source of protection and
guidance.” Id. at ___.
H.S. demonstrated how those principles apply to the facts that
case presented; we concluded that the record there supported the
termination of one parent’s rights, but not the other’s. We turn now in
this case to another family. The facts here are different, but the outcome
is similar: we find that the record supports the endangerment predicate
grounds for termination as to one parent, but not the other. We trust
that our decisions here and in H.S. provide helpful guidance to our
colleagues on the lower courts who confront countless heartbreaking
cases of struggling, and sometimes broken, families.
I
A
Mother has four children, whom we will pseudonymously call
Karen, Kimberly, Kayla, and Keith. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(1)(A). The
eldest is Karen. Father is the father of Kimberly, Kayla, and Keith.
Karen’s biological father is involved in neither her life nor this appeal.
In February 2020, the Department of Family and Protective
Services received a report from Karen’s school indicating potential
abuse. Karen, then age nine, had presented to the school nurse with

2
bruises on her arm and belt marks ranging from her back to her legs.
Karen told the nurse she incurred these injuries when Mother gripped
her arm and beat her with a belt. The nurse alerted the Department
because these injuries were “out of the ordinary,” and she would later
testify that she had not previously seen discipline-related injuries of this
sort with other children. The Department took no further action at this
time (apparently due to the COVID-19 pandemic that began shortly
thereafter).
Nearly a year later, in January 2021, the Department received
and investigated a second report from the school indicating potential
abuse of Karen. This report included three allegations: first, Karen had
suffered a shoulder injury due to Mother’s methods of physical
discipline; second, Karen was forced to stand with her nose against the
wall for long periods of time; third, Mother did not permit Karen to “eat
like the other” children. An investigator from the Department
interviewed Mother, Father, and the children at their home. Mother
disputed much of the report but admitted that Karen was occasionally
made to stand facing the wall for up to 30 minutes. After the interview,
Father informed the school that he would not permit the Department to
have any further contact with the children.
The Department nevertheless “continued to receive concerns from
family members and school personnel.” The Department’s investigator
attempted to discuss these “extra reports” with the family, but “wasn’t
able to get in contact with them.” So in March 2021, the Department
sought and received in district court an Order in Aid of Investigation
that allowed it to take Karen and Kimberly to a children’s advocacy

3
center where a trained interviewer could conduct a “forensic interview.”
The interviewer noted two concerns. First, Karen indicated a fear of
being placed in a foster home. Second, Karen indicated that Father
forced her to “kneel on rice for approximately ten minutes at a time.”
The Department thereafter urged Mother and Father to agree to
a “parental child safety placement,” i.e., a short-term relocation for
Karen. The parents ultimately agreed to allow Karen to live temporarily
with her maternal grandparents, and it appears Karen did so at some
point in 2021. Mother and Father refused to participate in any
family-based services, such as counseling or parenting classes. The
Department took no further action at that time, and at some point,
Karen returned to live with Mother and Father.
A year elapsed, and regrettably, Karen’s temporary relocation did
not resolve the family’s troubles. On March 4, 2022, the Department
received another report of physical abuse—this time, a claim that
Mother “grabs and drags [Karen] by her hair when she doesn’t listen.”
Karen reported to a teacher that she would hide from Mother “in the
closet” and was “scared to go home.” A Department investigator spoke
to Karen at school; Karen confirmed the allegations in the report, and
added that “she’s scared of her mother due to her mother’s anger.” When
the Department attempted to speak with Mother about the allegations
in the latest report, she refused to speak or otherwise cooperate. The
investigator was able to speak with Father, who “said that things at
home were okay.” Father confirmed, however, “that he and his wife
would not be cooperating with the Department.”

4
In the subsequent weeks, Mother twice threatened the teacher
who had made this latest report. On one occasion, Mother tracked the
teacher down at a Walmart and “just kind of went off.” Mother “blocked”
the teacher’s path and told her to “stay away from her daughter.” Mother
then began “screaming” obscenities at the teacher, calling her a “b***h”
and saying that she “needed to watch [her] back.” The teacher “t[ook]
that as a threat.” A grand jury later indicted Mother for “intentionally
and knowingly threaten[ing]” harm to the teacher.
In late March 2022, the Department received yet another report
from Karen’s school. This time, Karen had passed a note to a different
teacher, claiming that Mother was still dragging her by the hair. An
investigator followed up, but Karen said she could not talk to the
investigator because she had “gotten in trouble” for speaking with her
and had been forced to sit against the wall for “days.” Mother continued
to refuse to speak with the Department and both Mother and Father
refused voluntary services.
At that point, the Department escalated its intervention. It filed
a petition requesting a court order for Mother’s participation in services
and Karen’s participation in counseling. In April 2022, following a
hearing, the associate judge signed a Temporary Order for Required
Participation in Services. The order found “sufficient evidence” of either
abuse or neglect, risk of abuse or neglect, or that Mother represented a
“continuing danger” to Karen, and that “services are necessary to ensure
the physical health or safety of the children.” Among other things, the
order directed Mother to participate in counseling, anger-management

5
classes, and a psychological evaluation. The court also ordered Karen to
participate in counseling.
But the order did not produce its desired results. Mother and
Karen failed to participate in any of the court-ordered services, and
Mother and Father continued to refuse to let the Department contact
any of the children. After the beginning of the new school year, the
Department received a call concerning the children’s well-being because
they were not enrolled in school. The Department sent an investigator
to check on the children; he was unable to make contact, but he later
testified that law enforcement had been at the home and had seen the
children.
B
That led to the court proceeding now before us. In August 2022,
invoking the trial court’s temporary emergency jurisdiction, see TEX.
FAM. CODE § 152.204(a), and home state jurisdiction, see id. § 152.201,
the Department filed its original petition. Among other things, the
Department requested an order terminating Mother’s parental rights as
to all four children and Father’s parental rights as to his three biological
children—Kimberly, Kayla, and Keith. The petition further asked the
court to appoint the Department the children’s sole managing
conservator. The trial court promptly entered an order for protection,
finding “an immediate danger to the physical health or safety of the
children.” It appointed the Department the temporary managing
conservator of all four children and issued writs of attachment. The next
month, following an adversarial hearing, the court ordered Mother to

6
turn the children over to the Department no later than 5:00 p.m. on
September 26.
Mother and Father did not comply. Instead, they took the children
to Louisiana in late September 2022. On October 7, 2022, the
Department filed in district court a status report indicating that Mother
had “kidnapped the children” and could not be found. Weeks later,
Mother was arrested in Louisiana “for kidnapping her 4 children.”
Louisiana Child Protective Services returned the children to Texas,
where they were placed with their maternal grandparents,
Grandmother and Grandfather. Mother and Father remained in
Louisiana.
The parents’ journey from there includes ups and downs. In a
positive development, Mother notified the court that she had
successfully participated in counseling and parenting classes in
Louisiana. She passed a drug test. Father, regrettably, did not. In
January 2023, he was arrested and charged with multiple felonies in
Louisiana, including drug possession, following a high-speed chase with
police. The activities leading to that arrest took place in Louisiana, while
all the children were in Texas. Father blamed the failed drug test on an
Adderall prescription, but he declined to sign a waiver allowing the
Department to verify that prescription. Because of the failed drug test
and Father’s decision not to sign the waiver, Father was not able to visit
the children. And although Mother satisfied the drug-test requirement,
she did not exercise her right to in-person visitation, and participated in
only one phone call with the children, in September 2023.

7
C
The Department’s termination petition proceeded to a jury trial
in December 2023. The jury heard live testimony from fifteen
witnesses—described in greater detail below—and spent nearly eight
hours deliberating. On the fifth day of trial, the jury returned its verdict,
finding predicate grounds for termination as to both Mother and Father
because they endangered the children, constructively abandoned them,
and failed to comply with the court’s order establishing the actions
necessary for return of the children. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D),
(E), (N), (O). The jury found that termination of Father’s parental rights
was in all of the children’s best interests. Id. § 161.001(b)(2). It also
found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Karen’s best
interest but not in the best interests of the other children. The trial court
rendered judgment on the verdict. Although Mother’s parental rights to
Kimberly, Kayla, and Keith were not terminated, the court appointed
the Department as permanent managing conservator for the children;
Mother was limited to possessory conservatorship.
That same day, a caseworker attempted to schedule an in-person
visitation between Mother and the three younger children. Mother
stated that she and Father had already left the area to return to
Louisiana and would not participate in visitation. All four children were
initially placed with their grandparents, but were removed in January
2024 because the grandparents “did not wish to be [a] long term
placement.” The children were then placed with fictive kin who have
expressed an interest in adopting the children.

8
Mother and Father appealed. 719 S.W.3d 388 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2024). The court of appeals concluded that the record contained
sufficient evidence that Mother endangered Karen, that termination of
Mother’s rights was in Karen’s best interest, and that the trial court
acted within the bounds of its discretion by appointing the Department
managing conservator over the other children. Id. at 393-95. The court
also affirmed the termination of Father’s rights as to his three biological
children. Id. at 396. It found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s
endangerment findings as to the predicate grounds in Paragraphs (D)
and (E), and the jury’s best-interest findings. Id. at 396-97. The court of
appeals did not consider the portion of the trial court’s judgment
regarding the predicate grounds in Paragraphs (N) and (O). Id. at 393.
Mother and Father independently sought our review. Mother
challenges the Department’s appointment as managing conservator of
Kimberly, Kayla, and Keith, and the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying the trial court’s endangerment finding as to Karen. Father
likewise challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
endangerment predicates under Paragraphs (D) and (E). Neither parent
challenges in our Court the trial court’s best-interest findings, and
neither parent challenges the termination predicates under Paragraphs
(N) and (O).
We granted each petition. We limit our review today to the issues
actually presented to us. We express no view on the issues decided in
the lower courts that Mother and Father did not press in our Court.

9
II
As an initial matter, Mother and Father challenge the trial court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction over this dispute. Jurisdiction always comes
first, and we must assure ourselves of our jurisdiction before proceeding
to the merits. See Rush Truck Ctrs. of Tex., L.P. v. Sayre, 718 S.W.3d
233, 237 (Tex. 2025) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523
U.S. 83, 93-102 (1998)).
The trial court below exercised jurisdiction under Section 152.204
of the Family Code, also known as the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. Paragraph (a) confers “temporary
emergency jurisdiction” on our State’s courts “if the child is present in
this state,” subject to some conditions. TEX. FAM. CODE § 152.204(a).
According to the parents, the trial court lacked “temporary emergency
jurisdiction” because the children were not “present in th[is] state” on
the date the protective order issued. Instead, the children were in
Louisiana. The parents believe this renders the resulting termination
orders “void.”
The parents never made that argument below. The first time they
suggested any jurisdictional defect came in their petitions for review in
this Court. We therefore must consider a question we have not yet had
occasion to answer: does Section 152.204(a) implicate subject-matter
jurisdiction, that is, a court’s “power to decide a case”? Tex. Right to Life
v. Van Stean, 702 S.W.3d 348, 352 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Bland Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553-54 (Tex. 2000)); see also United
Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 306 (Tex. 2010). If so, the parents’
challenge is properly before us. A defect in subject-matter jurisdiction

10
“can be raised at any time,” without regard to the ordinary rules
requiring proper issue preservation. Van Stean, 702 S.W.3d at 356
(quoting Alfonso v. Skadden, 251 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Tex. 2008)). If not, then
the parents’ challenge is forfeited because it was not preserved.
Whether a statutory provision implicates subject-matter
jurisdiction can be difficult to assess due to the “intemperate” use of the
term “jurisdiction”—“‘a word of many, too many, meanings.’” United
Servs., 307 S.W.3d at 306 (quoting Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 90). Sometimes,
the term “jurisdiction” might refer to what we have come to call “genuine
subject-matter jurisdiction.” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 90; see also Dubai
Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 74-75 (Tex. 2000) (noting that a
“judgment may properly be rendered against a party only if the court
has authority to adjudicate the type of controversy involved in the
action” (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 11 (1982))). This
“genuine subject-matter jurisdiction” implicates a court’s “power to
decide the case.” See United Servs., 307 S.W.3d at 306. Other times,
“jurisdiction” might simply refer to “statutory prerequisites” that
“implicate[] the right to relief, not the jurisdiction of the court.” Tex.
Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 694 S.W.3d
752, 759 (Tex. 2024). This use of “jurisdiction” does not implicate a
court’s power to issue a judgment on the merits.
We have attempted to alleviate this doctrinal difficulty through
the adoption of a clear-statement rule. Under our precedents, we will
not “read statutory mandates to be jurisdictional prohibitions absent
clear indication that failure to comply with the mandate also deprives a
court of the power to decide the claim.” Id. (citing Dubai Petroleum, 12

11
S.W.3d at 76-77). When a statute’s requirements do not provide
dismissal as a remedy for noncompliance, “it is clear the Legislature did
not mean [the requirement invoked] subject-matter jurisdiction.”
Morales v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 241 S.W.3d 514, 516 n.1 (Tex. 2007).
This approach is laudable for several reasons, including that it
“reduce[s] the vulnerability of final judgments to attack on the ground
that the tribunal lacked subject matter jurisdiction.” Tex. Disposal Sys.,
694 S.W.3d at 759 (quoting Dubai Petroleum, 12 S.W.3d at 76).
The clear-statement rule demands special force in the context of
suits affecting the parent-child relationship. Our precedents recognize
the “overarching objective of expediency and stability,” and the need to
“prevent manipulation of the system and undue complication of child-
custody disputes.” In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d 504, 513 (Tex. 2020). Of course,
the need for stability and finality are “even more pronounced in child-
custody cases.” Id. at 520 (Lehrmann, J., concurring). And we have
stressed that a “child’s best interest is inherently threatened by undue
uncertainty and delay in finally determining where the child will live
and who will raise her.” In re K.S.L., 538 S.W.3d 107, 115 (Tex. 2017).
Our law strives to avoid placing children in the crossfire of procedural
gamesmanship, which disrespects the “sanctity of the family,” H.S., ___
S.W.3d at ___, and the best-interest-of-the-child standard at the heart
of our Family Code. When a trial court has issued an otherwise lawful
judgment, we will not uproot children and deny them the stability our
law demands absent an unmistakable directive from the Legislature
that that trial court never had the power to issue that judgment in the
first place.

12
Applying this clear-statement rule, we have little difficulty
concluding that Section 152.204(a) does not implicate subject-matter
jurisdiction. As an initial matter, nothing in that paragraph’s plain text
refers to subject-matter jurisdiction, mandates dismissal, or otherwise
uses language implicating the court’s power to decide this type of
dispute. Paragraph (a) refers simply to “temporary emergency
jurisdiction” when the children are “present in this state.” TEX. FAM.
CODE § 152.204(a). But merely affixing the label “jurisdiction” and tying
it to a physical location does not necessarily invoke subject-matter
jurisdiction. E.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ch. 17, subch. C
(“Long-Arm Jurisdiction”). Our Legislature knows how to clearly signal
subject-matter jurisdiction when it wishes to do so. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T
CODE § 23.002 (prescribing “subject matter jurisdiction over a criminal
action”); id. § 311.034 (“Statutory prerequisites to a suit, including the
provision of notice, are jurisdictional requirements in all suits against a
governmental entity.”). That it did not do so here is an important signal.
On top of that, several contextual clues indicate that
Section 152.204 does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction. First, as
one Justice of this Court has cogently explained in a separate writing,
“[t]he UCCJEA was primarily designed to remedy the increasingly
common situation of courts in different states simultaneously exercising
jurisdiction in child-custody cases.” D.S., 602 S.W.3d at 519 (Lehrmann,
J., concurring) (citing Powell v. Stover, 165 S.W.3d 322, 325 (Tex. 2005)).
That is, the statute operates to “prioritize” the jurisdiction of a child’s
“home state” over competing jurisdictional claims from the courts of
other States. Powell, 165 S.W.3d at 325. That contextual background

13
strongly suggests the statute does not constrain the court’s “authority to
adjudicate the type of controversy involved in the action,” Dubai
Petroleum, 12 S.W.3d at 75 (emphasis added) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 11 (1982)), but instead addresses where the suit
should be litigated.
Still more clues point in the same direction. The UCCJEA permits
the “agreement of the parties as to which state should assume
jurisdiction.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 152.207(b)(5). But subject-matter
jurisdiction “cannot be conferred upon any court by consent or waiver.”
Dubai Petroleum, 12 S.W.3d at 76 (citation omitted). And the statutory
scheme permits courts to “decline to exercise” jurisdiction when another
State would be more convenient. TEX. FAM. CODE § 152.207(a). None of
these features fits with our traditional conceptions of subject-matter
jurisdiction, which concerns power, not convenience.
Finally, the Family Code provides that any final custodial order
rendered by a court that lacks continuing, exclusive jurisdiction is
“voidable.” Id. § 155.104(b). But when a court lacks genuine subject-
matter jurisdiction, its orders are void, not merely voidable. Mapco, Inc.
v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990). If anything, the use of
“voidable” operates as a legislative pronouncement against construing
the UCCJEA to implicate subject-matter jurisdiction.
When added up, these textual and contextual considerations are
definitive. Section 152.204 does not implicate subject-matter
jurisdiction. And because the parents did not present this challenge
below, it is forfeited. Aware of no other potential defect in our
jurisdiction, we proceed to the merits.

14
III
We briefly restate the foundational principles that guide our
review of the decisions below.
A
The U.S. and Texas Constitutions both protect parents’ natural
and fundamental right to direct their children’s upbringing. See
Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U.S. 522 (2025); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57 (2000); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Soc’y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923);
H.S., ___ S.W.3d ___; Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1976). So
does our Family Code: “A state agency may not adopt rules or policies or
take any other action that violates the fundamental right and duty of a
parent to direct the upbringing of the parent’s child.” TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 151.003. “This natural parental right” is “a basic civil right of man,”
Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985) (citation omitted), and it
presupposes that the family unit is sacred.
Accordingly, the government may not sever the legal ties between
parents and children without clearing a high bar. A court may terminate
a parent’s right to parent her child if it finds by clear and convincing
evidence both that (1) the parent committed an act prohibited by
Section 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code and (2) termination is in
the best interest of the child. Here, the jury found that four separate
grounds supported termination of the parents’ parental rights, and the
court of appeals affirmed, addressing only two of those grounds.
Accordingly, we limit our review to whether legally sufficient evidence
supports the jury’s finding that the parents:

15
(D) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to
remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the
physical or emotional well-being of the child; [or]

(E) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with
persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the
physical or emotional well-being of the child[.]
TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D)-(E).
In conducting that review, we emphasize that the clear-and-
convincing-evidence standard is unforgiving. It requires a degree of
proof that elicits “a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the
allegations sought to be established.” In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847
(Tex. 1980) (quoting State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1979)).
On appellate review, our precedents direct us to “look at all the evidence
in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a
reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that
its finding was true.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). We
“assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding
if a reasonable factfinder could do so,” and we “disregard all evidence
that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been
incredible.” Id.
B
In late 2025, after the parties filed their merits briefs but before
our Court heard oral argument in this case, the People of Texas ratified
a new Article I, Section 37 of our Constitution, “Parental Rights and
Responsibilities.” It provides:
To enshrine truths that are deeply rooted in this nation’s
history and traditions, the people of Texas hereby affirm
that a parent has the responsibility to nurture and protect
the parent’s child and the corresponding fundamental right

16
to exercise care, custody, and control of the parent’s child,
including the right to make decisions concerning the child’s
upbringing.

TEX. CONST. art. I, § 37. We asked the parties to submit supplemental
briefing on whether, and if so, how, this new provision should impact
our decision today. The parties did so, and we are grateful to have
received additional amicus briefing from a number of well-respected
organizations and stakeholders. 1
There is to date almost no developed jurisprudence on this newly
minted Section 37, and we decline to become among the first to chart its
parameters. We often insist that “we are a court of review, not of first
view,” 1 Coventry Ct., LLC v. Downs of Hillcrest Residential Ass’n, 728
S.W.3d 711, 715 (Tex. 2026), and that when “the court of appeals has
declined to consider an issue, this Court typically declines to do so in the
first instance,” City of San Antonio v. Realme, 731 S.W.3d 342, 355 (Tex.
2026). That practice is “especially crucial” when we confront
“novel . . . constitutional issues with ramifications far beyond this case.”
In re Troy S. Poe Tr., 646 S.W.3d 771, 780-81 (Tex. 2022). In these
situations, “this Court’s preferred process is to decline to address and
defer such questions until after complete vetting of the parties’ potential
arguments in the lower courts.” Id. at 780 (citation omitted); see Point
Energy Partners Permian, LLC v. MRC Permian Co., 669 S.W.3d 796,
812 (Tex. 2023) (“When reversal necessitates consideration of issues

1 The Court thanks the Family Freedom Project, Texas Public Policy
Foundation, Celia M. Wood, Texas Association of Family Defense Attorneys,
Institute for the Advancement of Justice and Human Rights, and Texas
Lawyers for Children for their helpful submissions.

17
raised in but not decided by the court of appeals, we ordinarily remand
the case to that court for further proceedings.” (citing Tex. Comm’n on
Env’t Quality v. Maverick County, 642 S.W.3d 537, 550 (Tex. 2022))).
There is good reason that courts of last resort are so hesitant to
be the first to decide issues: we are more likely to err when we are the
first to weigh in, and as a court of last resort, our errors cannot easily be
undone. Our Court thus functions best when it reviews the decisions of
lower courts that have already “test[ed] competing understandings.”
Perez v. City of San Antonio, 711 S.W.3d 204, 204 (Tex. 2024) (statement
of Young, J.); see Poe Tr., 646 S.W.3d at 781. Prudence, humility, and a
proper respect for our own frailty all caution that “the law is typically
better served when the lower courts review a legal issue before this
Court does.” Rattray v. City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, 869-70 (Tex.
2023).
Heeding that wisdom, we say only that we do not believe that our
decision today, driven by the unique facts of this particular record,
conflicts with Section 37. We leave a more robust discussion of this new
provision of our Constitution for another day, following appropriate
percolation in the lower courts and a better developed body of
jurisprudence that “test[s] competing understandings.” Perez, 711
S.W.3d at 204; see Poe Tr., 646 S.W.3d at 781.
IV
We turn now to Mother. She presents two issues in our Court.
First, she argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the
endangerment predicate grounds for termination of her parental rights
as to Karen. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). Second, she

18
argues that the evidence is insufficient to justify appointing the
Department managing conservator over the three younger children. We
take them in turn.
A
1
On close review, we believe the evidence was sufficient to
establish the Paragraph (D) and (E) predicates underlying Mother’s
termination order. Over the course of a five-day trial, the jury heard
testimony from thirteen witnesses that had personal experience with
the family, including Department investigators and services workers,
law enforcement, school personnel, maternal family members, licensed
children’s counselors, and other childcare and child-development
professionals. The record shows two distinct categories of abuse:
physical and emotional.
First, the jury heard evidence of physical abuse. The first report
from Karen’s school to the Department came from a nurse who testified
that the bruising on Karen’s arms and the belt marks on her posterior
were “out of the ordinary,” beyond the discipline-related injuries seen in
other children. Grandmother offered similar testimony, describing the
punishments that Karen received as inappropriate and “[e]xcessive.” In
one instance of “excessive” punishment, Grandmother observed Karen
to have bruises “down her leg.” Grandmother testified that when she
tried to speak to Mother about her treatment of Karen, Mother would
withhold the children from her.
Mother’s sister testified similarly. Mother’s sister confirmed that
Karen had said she had been forced to stand in her room “for hours.” She

19
also testified that Karen said she was forced to sleep on a large pillow
on the floor—referred to as a “dog bed”—and when that was removed,
she slept with just a blanket and a pillow on the floor. Mother’s sister
also reported seeing marks on Karen’s neck when she was
approximately seven years old that Karen stated were the result of a
physical altercation with Mother.
Mother’s own testimony at trial confirmed much of this evidence.
She admitted to spanking Karen and that Karen “might have had a
bruise or two on her” from Mother “trying to bust her bottom.” Mother
further testified that she gives Karen timeouts that require Karen to sit
or stand against a wall, though she claimed this punishment would last
“[n]o more than thirty minutes.” 2
This physical abuse also took the form of food deprivation. Karen
told school personnel that she was not allowed to “eat like the other”
children. A Department investigator testified that although Mother
would cook for the rest of the family, Karen was given a cold sandwich.
Family members independently reported observing Karen “scarf down
food and want seconds as if she ha[d] not eaten in days.” The
Department received multiple similar reports from school personnel
alleging that Karen was not allowed to eat breakfast at school, “was
usually starving by lunchtime,” and always asked for seconds. Unlike

2 To be sure, Mother’s testimony disputed much of the Department’s
evidence. But as an appellate court, we have no authority to decide which
witnesses were more credible, and which version of events was more likely
true. E.g., City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex. 2005). The jury
was entitled to believe or disbelieve Mother’s testimony, and we have no basis
to overturn its decision so long as it is supported by the record.

20
her sister, Karen never had money to purchase ice cream at school.
Grandmother confirmed that Mother restricted Karen’s food, testifying
that Karen “was not allowed to eat certain foods, and only allowed to eat
at certain times without the family.” Mother’s sister testified that “the
other kids also told [her] that” Karen was not allowed to eat with the
family.
Second, the jury heard evidence indicating Mother emotionally or
psychologically abused Karen. One indication is the disparate
punishment imposed on Karen alone and not the other children. The
jury heard testimony that Karen was the only child regularly subjected
to lengthy wall sits and wall stands, by most accounts lasting for hours
at a time. A Department investigator testified that Karen once told her
she could not speak to the investigator because she had “gotten in
trouble” for speaking to her the first time and was forced to sit on the
wall for “days.” Karen also claimed that “[a]nytime it was nice outside”
she would be forced to sit against a wall and watch her siblings play
outside. Grandmother confirmed that Karen “was kept in her room for
the majority of her time, not allowed to socialize with any of the other
children.” Grandmother also testified that the other children were
aware that Karen was treated differently in the house. In one such
instance, Kayla confirmed that Karen “was never allowed to eat with
[them] at the dinner table.”
The testimony regarding food deprivation, while indicative of
physical abuse, may likewise indicate emotional abuse. When it came to
food, Karen was singled out. She was not allowed to eat what everyone

21
else ate, and she was often forced to eat alone. The jury was entitled to
conclude that this endangered Karen’s emotional well-being.
Karen’s own actions corroborate much of the above evidence, and
the jury was entitled to give her experience substantial weight. For
example, a Department investigator testified that in March 2021, Karen
“was very, very worried” that she would be taken from her parents. The
investigator further testified that Karen “was very emotional” because
Mother told her that a foster home was a “very, very bad place for mean
children.” Yet just a year later, Karen made an outcry to a teacher—
whom she did not know—that she was scared to go home. She
complained that Mother “had been dragging her by her hair.” Karen
reported that Mother coerced her into silence by threatening that if
Karen told anyone of Mother’s abuse, Karen “would go to a foster home
where she was treated worse.” Karen made another outcry detailing the
same behavior a few weeks later. The jury could reasonably infer that
although the mere prospect of placement in a foster home sent Karen
into distress just a year earlier, the abuse at home was severe enough to
lead her to invite that potential consequence. This inference aligns with
live testimony heard by the jury, including Karen’s counselor’s
testimony that Karen’s “biggest fear” was returning home to Mother,
and Grandmother’s similar testimony that Karen was scared of Mother
and “refuse[d]” to go home.
It is notable that so much of the critical testimony came from
Mother’s family members—her own mother, and her own sister, both of
whom testified unequivocally to Karen’s abuse. Due to the naturally
deep bonds between many children and their extended family, our

22
Family Code affirmatively recognizes the “Rights of [a] Grandparent,
Aunt, or Uncle.” TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 153.431-.434. Grandparents in
particular are afforded special solicitude in matters related to child
custody and visitation. Id. § 153.432; see also id. § 102.004. These
relatives, after all, are part of the family unit—and in many cases part
of their grandchildren’s daily life. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63-64.
Grandmother here was Karen’s primary caretaker for a substantial
period of time in 2021. The jury was entitled to give substantial weight
to that experience and believe Grandmother’s and aunt’s testimony that
in their view, Mother is not fit to parent Karen due to excessive and
prolonged instances of physical and emotional abuse.
Summing up, over the course of a five-day trial, the jury heard
competent evidence of repeated and ongoing instances of physical abuse,
emotional abuse and food deprivation. Karen was beaten and bruised,
repeatedly, for years, in incidents reported by many witnesses who told
the jury such violence exceeded the limits of traditional discipline. She
was dragged by her hair. She testified that she hid from Mother in a
closet, and that she was afraid to go home due to Mother’s anger. She
suffered a shoulder injury. She was forced into painful punishments
involving kneeling on rice or standing at a wall for extended periods.
She was denied food repeatedly. She was singled out among her siblings
for special mistreatment.
For all the above reasons, we see no basis to override the jury’s
decision that Mother “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child
to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or
emotional well-being of the child,” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D),

23
and that Mother “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with
persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or
emotional well-being of the child,” id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). 3
2
Before moving on, we pause to caution the lower courts that a
parent’s reasonable reliance on traditional methods of discipline,
including corporal punishment, does not support a termination of
parental rights. Our Family Code expressly authorizes parents to “use
corporal punishment for the reasonable discipline of a child.” Id.
§ 151.001(e)(1). After all, “deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and
tradition[] is the belief that the parental role implies a substantial
measure of authority over one’s children.” Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
638 (1979). But we have always recognized that “cruel, outrageous, and
vicious” discipline “with intent to injure” a child is not parenting—it is
“aggravated assault upon a child.” Stanfield v. State, 43 Tex. 167, 168
(1875).
The record here satisfies us that the jury’s verdict does not
improperly rest on a disapproval of lawful traditional discipline. As
recounted above, there was sufficient evidence to conclude that Mother
crossed the line through physical and emotional abuse. Moreover, the

3The lower courts and the Department highlighted other evidence they
believe support the judgment below. We do not recount that evidence here
because it is not the basis of our judgment. “Appellate opinions in these
important cases” should avoid “reciting every piece of evidence relied upon by
the government,” and focus instead on the evidence that actually does the
work. In re A.M., 630 S.W.3d 25, 27 (Tex. 2019) (Blacklock, J., concurring in
the denial of the petition for review). A kitchen-sink approach risks misleading
lower courts as to what evidence matters.

24
jury heard evidence that Mother employed corporal punishment to
discipline at least one other child, yet the jury nevertheless declined to
find that termination of Mother’s rights was in that child’s best interest.
And this is not a case where we are concerned that the jury gave a
cursory glance at particularly nuanced facts. Rather, the jury returned
a mixed verdict after nearly eight hours of deliberations, agreeing with
the Department on some issues, and with the parents on others.
B
We now turn to Mother’s challenge to the Department’s
appointment as permanent managing conservator of the three younger
children—Kimberly, Kayla, and Keith. As we explained above, Mother’s
parental rights were terminated only as to Karen. The trial court left
Mother’s parental rights intact as to those younger children, but
appointed her possessory conservator.
Our Legislature has announced a “presumption” that a parent be
appointed managing conservator except where “the court finds that
appointment of the parent or parents would not be in the best interest
of the child because the appointment would significantly impair the
child’s physical health or emotional development.” TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 153.131(a). The Legislature has further implemented “a rebuttable
presumption that the appointment of the parents of a child as joint
managing conservators is in the best interest of the child.” Id.
§ 153.131(b). That presumption is “remove[d]” in cases presenting “a
history of family violence involving the parents of a child.” Id.
Compared to termination, the conservatorship statute “imposes a
more general standard that does not enumerate specific acts or

25
omissions by the parent, but instead requires the court to find that
appointing a parent would not be in the child’s best interest because it
would ‘significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional
[development].’” In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 615-16 (Tex. 2007)
(quoting TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.131(a)). A “significant impairment”
finding must be proven by evidence of particular injurious acts or
omissions. Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Tex. 1990). This
finding is subject to a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, see TEX.
FAM. CODE § 105.005, which is in turn reviewed “only for abuse of
discretion, and may be reversed only if the decision is arbitrary and
unreasonable.” J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d at 616 (citing Gillespie v.
Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982)).
On this record, the trial court did not err in denying Mother
managing conservatorship of the three younger children:
• Mother inflicted physical and emotional abuse on Karen
serious enough to establish an endangerment predicate to
termination. A “parent’s treatment of other children may be
relevant” to a conservatorship determination. In re S.T., 508
S.W.3d 482, 492 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.) (citing
In re S.D., No. 02-14-00171-CV, 2014 WL 6493783, at *15
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 20, 2014, no pet.)).

• On two occasions, Mother ambushed, screamed at, and
threatened one of the teachers who had reported Karen’s
abuse. A grand jury later issued a criminal indictment against
Mother in connection with these actions. Having recognized
that criminal misconduct is a relevant consideration, see
Danet v. Bhan, 436 S.W.3d 793, 797 (Tex. 2014), it follows that
misconduct of a violent nature may be accorded greater
weight.

26
• The record shows that the three younger children suffered
from Mother’s neglect. Grandmother testified that when the
children were placed with her, Kimberly had eleven cavities,
Kayla and Kimberly both needed glasses, Karen had warts on
her hands and mouth that required multiple doctor’s visits,
and Kimberly had suffered a seizure that was never
diagnosed. A parent’s failure to provide for their children’s
basic health needs is an appropriate consideration. See S.T.,
508 S.W.3d at 492 (affirming consideration of neglect and
“parental irresponsibility”).

• After the children were removed to Texas, Mother made
effectively no effort to see them. She remained in Louisiana.
In the months leading up to trial, she participated in only a
single phone call with the children. A parent’s failure to
interact with her children is an appropriate consideration. See
Danet, 436 S.W.3d at 797.

Reasonable jurors could add up these facts and decide, when viewed
cumulatively, that Mother is not an appropriate managing conservator.
However, in light of our disposition of Father’s appeal, which we
explain below, it may be appropriate for the lower courts to reassess
appointment of the Department as managing conservator. The
conservatorship determination is wrapped up with—and accordingly,
dependent upon—the termination of Father’s parental rights to those
children. Father has shown that the evidence does not sufficiently
establish the endangerment predicates under Paragraphs (D) and (E)—
two of the four predicate grounds identified in the termination order. On
remand, following its review of the remaining predicate grounds as to
Father, the court of appeals should reassess managing conservatorship.
See generally J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d at 616.

27
V
We now turn to Father’s petition. He, like Mother, challenges the
evidentiary sufficiency supporting the predicate grounds for termination
under Paragraphs (D) and (E), which concern endangerment.
The Department presents four arguments to support the trial
court’s endangerment findings as to Paragraphs (D) and (E). First,
Father “failed to protect” Karen from Mother’s abuse and “to protect the
other children from being exposed to it.” Second, after the children were
removed to Texas, Father instigated a high-speed police chase in
Louisiana; when he was subsequently arrested, he had on his person
methamphetamine. Third, after removal, Father tested positive for
amphetamine (a different substance from methamphetamine), and
refused to submit medical records verifying a valid Adderall prescription
that would justify the positive amphetamine test. Fourth, Father “made
little effort at reunification.”
Even viewing the jury’s verdict in its most favorable light, these
facts do not establish that Father “knowingly placed or knowingly
allowed” his three biological children “to remain in conditions or
surroundings which endanger [their] physical or emotional well-being.”
TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D). Nor do they show Father “engaged
in conduct or knowingly placed” his three biological children “with
persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or
emotional well-being of” Kimberly, Kayla, and Keith. Id.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(E).

28
A
On this record, we do not agree that Father’s alleged
non-intervention in Mother’s abuse of her child supports the termination
of Father’s parental rights as to his own children. While Father did
participate in some instances of Karen’s discipline, the record does not
show that he himself abused her in the same ways that led to Mother’s
termination. Father was never named in any of the reports Karen’s
school submitted to the Department. He was never ordered to complete
services. 4
To the contrary, the record shows that Father would “take up” for
Karen and attempt to mitigate Mother’s disciplinary methods. He
occasionally rebuked Mother when he thought she went too far—
encouraging her to give Karen her iPad back, giving Karen snacks, and
allowing her to play outside with her siblings. It appears, in other words,
that Mother’s abuse of Karen would have been worse but for Father’s
intervention. And Grandmother and Mother’s sister both testified that
Father acted as a “go-between” in several instances, ensuring they could
see the children when Mother would otherwise withhold them.

4 We respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleagues’ view that
Father himself “participat[ed] in the abuse of Karen” or that he “took part in
some of” Mother’s “extreme actions.” Post at 1, 11, 12, 22 (Bland, J., dissenting).
The record shows that Father participated in disciplining Karen when he
forced Karen to “kneel on rice for approximately ten minutes at a time.” But as
we discussed above, our Family Code expressly authorizes “corporal
punishment for the reasonable discipline of a child.” TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 151.001(e); see also Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 638 (“[T]he parental role implies a
substantial measure of authority over one’s children.”). Father’s own actions
as to Karen, while perhaps disfavored in some communities, plainly fall within
the boundaries of our law.

29
The Department and dissent likewise claim that Father
endangered his three biological children by allowing them to be present
in a home in which Mother abused Karen. But mere proximity to
wrongdoing is insufficient, and we see no evidence that the three
younger children were subjected to abuse. H.S., ___ S.W.3d at ___
(“[W]hen a parent’s rights may be terminated based on a spouse’s
violence, the department should proceed with particular caution[.]”).
Indeed, much of the reason for Mother’s termination order is because
she intentionally singled out Karen for uniquely abusive treatment. See
supra pp. 20-26.
This case thus differs substantially from In re J.W., where a
father failed to protect his own child from the mother’s egregious abuse
of that same child—and even under those circumstances, we concluded
the evidence was insufficient to support an endangerment finding as to
the father. 645 S.W.3d 726, 749 (Tex. 2022). Had Mother abused the
three younger children to the same extent she abused Karen, Father’s
acquiescence would implicate different doctrinal considerations. And, as
noted above, Father does not have and never has had formal parental
rights as to Karen.
B
Next, the Department invokes Father’s dangerous police chase
and possession of methamphetamine months after the children were
removed. Our precedents instruct that when it comes to criminal
malfeasance, termination may be available when the Department can
establish a “course of conduct” that has the effect of endangering the
child. See In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312-13 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Tex.

30
Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533-34 (Tex. 1987)). But
isolated criminal misconduct does not necessarily suffice even when it
results in “imprisonment,” which we have held “will not, standing alone,
constitute engaging in conduct which endangers the emotional or
physical well-being of a child.” Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533. Instead, our
precedents instruct that “the Department bears the burden of
introducing evidence concerning the offense and establishing that the
offense was part of a voluntary course of conduct that endangered the
children’s well-being.” In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 805 (Tex. 2012).
This record does not establish the “course of conduct” necessary
to clear the high bar our precedents set. We of course do not make light
of Father’s criminal misconduct. We merely reaffirm what we have said
in the past: the termination of parental rights implicates foundational
rights and principles that require the government to clear a high bar—
and not all conduct we find reprehensible justifies this most draconian
of sanctions. 5

5 The police chase, arrest, methamphetamine possession, and
amphetamine test all occurred months after the children had been removed
from Father, when they lived in a different State. Our precedents have cast
doubt on the extent to which post-removal conduct informs the Paragraph (D)
and (E) endangerment predicates. See, e.g., J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 749 (observing
that “typically, a parent whose child has been removed and who has only
supervised visitation has no control over the child’s environment, and the
parent’s conduct during that time will thus be unrelated to [Paragraph] (D)”);
In re C.E., 687 S.W.3d 304, 307 (Tex. 2024) (identifying the “relevant
timeframe” for endangering conduct under Paragraph (E) as the time when the
parent was the child’s caregiver, before the child was removed). Our Court has
never declared conclusively that post-removal conduct is categorically
irrelevant to the Paragraph (D) and (E) predicates, and we do not so hold today.
Whatever the answer to that question may be, it is sufficient to resolve this
case to say that the Department has failed to show the endangering “voluntary

31
C
The Department next points to Father’s drug test results, which
occurred months after the children were removed, and which indicated
the use of amphetamine—a substance found in prescription drugs like
Adderall, which differs from the methamphetamine Father possessed at
the time of his arrest. This, too, fails to supply a termination predicate.
Of course, the use of illegal drugs may properly be considered in
a termination proceeding because drug use may constitute endangering
conduct and involve endangering conditions. See In re R.R.A., 687
S.W.3d 269, 278 (Tex. 2024); In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex.
2009). We have confirmed that “[d]rug use during pregnancy supports a
finding of direct injury to the child.” In re A.V., 697 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Tex.
2024). So too have we affirmed the termination of parental rights of
parents who use illegal drugs chronically, or while caring for children.
E.g., R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278 (noting that “a pattern of parental
behavior that presents a substantial risk of harm to the child permits a
factfinder to reasonably find endangerment” (emphasis added)); J.O.A.,
283 S.W.3d at 346 (noting the probative value of “a long history of drug
use and irresponsible choices”). But as we expressly cautioned in R.R.A.,
“illegal drug use alone may not be sufficient to show endangerment”;
rather, a reviewing court “should consider additional evidence that a
factfinder could reasonably credit that demonstrates that illegal drug
use presents a risk to the parent’s ‘ability to parent.’” 687 S.W.3d at 278
(quoting J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345).

course of conduct” necessary to justify the civil death penalty. E.N.C., 384
S.W.3d at 805.

32
Here, the Department does not claim that Father used drugs
while he was with the children. The Department never argues that
Father exhibited a course of drug use while parenting. The Department
does not claim chronic use or addiction that creates “related dangers to
the child.” Id. And the Department acknowledges that the drug at
issue—amphetamine—would not even be unlawful if prescribed by a
physician, which Father claims (but did not prove) is the case here. This
does not establish that Father “used illegal drugs in a manner that
created a substantial risk of harm to his children” sufficient to support
the termination of parental rights. Id. at 272; cf. J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at
346 (“While the recent improvements made by [Father] are significant,
evidence of improved conduct, especially of short-duration, does not
conclusively negate the probative value of a long history of drug use and
irresponsible choices.”). 6
D
Finally, the Department posits that Father endangered his
children because he “made little effort at reunification.” The
Department barely develops this argument, noting Father “also made
little effort to visit the children during his periods of visitation, and
made virtually no effort to comply with his service plan.” This evidence
is primarily probative here to the extent that it relates to the
now-repealed Paragraph (O), which is not before us today and which the
court of appeals may consider on remand. See TEX. FAM.

In a footnote, the Department notes (and the dissent echoes) Father’s
6

2017 conviction “for dangerous-drug possession.” The record provides no
further details, and the Department does not claim it establishes a pattern of
drug use that harmed the children.

33
CODE § 161.001(O) (repealed 2025) (allowing termination where a
parent has “failed to comply with the provisions of” a court-ordered
service plan). The Department’s brief offers no reason to conclude that
poor efforts at reunification amount to “endangerment.”
To the extent the Department argues that Father’s abandonment
is a form of endangerment, the record here shows that the four children
have been cared for by family members (including Grandmother) and
fictive kin. We of course agree that there are situations—many
situations—in which an act of abandonment may in fact endanger the
child, but the record does not support that conclusion here.
* * *
We stress the limited nature of our holding. The trial court found
termination predicates under Paragraphs (D), (E), (N), and (O), and it
found that the children’s best interests supported termination of
Father’s parental rights. All we have decided today is that the evidence
does not establish the Paragraph (D) and (E) predicates as to Father—
the sole merits issue raised in Father’s petition for review in our Court.
We express no view on the trial court’s determinations as to Paragraphs
(N) or (O), nor do we address the evidence and judgment related to the
children’s best interests. 7

7 The dissent faults us for declining to reach Paragraph (N) as an
alternative basis to affirm the judgment below. But the Department’s brief
never asks us to treat Paragraph (N) as an alternative basis to affirm. The
closest it comes is to claim that Father’s appeal is “futile,” and the entirety of
its discussion of Paragraph (N) in our Court consists of a single paragraph with
one record citation. We believe Paragraph (N) requires more analysis, and we
are confident the parties and court of appeals will give the issue due
consideration on remand. Regardless, “[w]hen reversal necessitates

34
VI
As to Mother, we hold that legally sufficient evidence supported
the Paragraph (D) and (E) predicates that led to the termination of her
parental rights as to Karen. We further find no reversible error in the
trial court’s order failing to appoint Mother permanent managing
conservator. However, in light of our disposition of Father’s appeal, the
lower courts should reassess the appointment of the Department as
permanent managing conservator as to Kimberly, Kayla, and Keith
after the remainder of Father’s appeal is resolved. The judgment below
as to Mother is affirmed in part and vacated and remanded to the court
of appeals in part.
As to Father, we hold that the evidence was legally insufficient to
establish the endangerment predicates under Paragraphs (D) and (E).
We express no view on the issues not before us, including whether
sufficient evidence established the predicates under Paragraphs (N) and
(O), and the best-interest determination. The judgment below as to
Father is reversed, and this case is remanded to the court of appeals for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

consideration of issues raised in but not decided by the court of appeals, we
ordinarily remand the case to that court for further proceedings.” Point Energy
Partners Permian, LLC v. MRC Permian Co., 669 S.W.3d 796, 812 (Tex. 2023);
see also In re N.L.S., 715 S.W.3d 760, 766-67 (Tex. 2025).

35
Kyle D. Hawkins
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: June 5, 2026

36

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 24-0881
══════════

In the Interest of K.N., K.L., K.L., and K.L., Children

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

CHIEF JUSTICE BLACKLOCK, concurring.

I join the Court’s judgment and its opinion. The government’s
case against Father, which is largely derivative of Mother’s failings, is
clearly insufficient to support termination of Father’s parental rights. I
find Mother’s case much more difficult. She treated her daughter
“Karen” egregiously, but her defense is that she did so to discipline a
misbehaving child, not to abuse or harm her. The government’s case
against Mother thus runs up against my conviction that parents are
constitutionally entitled to discipline their children as they see fit. In re
A.M., 630 S.W.3d 25, 27 (Tex. 2019) (Blacklock, J., concurring)
(“However far out of favor . . . traditional disciplinary measures may
have fallen in some quarters, a parent’s choice to employ them should
be afforded no weight in a termination proceeding.”). I nevertheless
agree with the Court that termination of Mother’s rights should be
affirmed.
I do so on the basis of a crucial distinction, deeply rooted in the
law, on which the Court rightly relies. Ante at 24–25. As reflected in an
1875 decision of this Court, the law has long recognized that a parent’s
“cruel, vicious, and outrageous” disciplinary actions with “intent to
injure” may amount to “aggravated assault upon a child,” which
“exceed[s] the boundary of [the parent’s] legal right as guardian under
the law, and place[s the parent] in the attitude of a stranger and not a
parent to the child.” Stanfield v. State, 43 Tex. 167, 167–68 (1875).
When a parent accused of mistreating her child responds that she was
acting to discipline the child, as Mother does here, the question becomes
whether the parent acted with criminal intent. An essential, threshold
inquiry must be whether the parent acted with a genuinely parental
motive (to modify the child’s behavior or provide moral instruction) or
with an illicit criminal motive (to injure the child).
It is not enough—not nearly enough—for a judge or jury to
conclude, based on their personal opinions about disciplining children,
that a parent’s methods were excessive. The evolving sensibilities of
modern judges and juries about appropriate disciplinary methods must
not be permitted to encroach on the fundamental right of Texas parents
to discipline their children as they see fit. This fundamental right is not
evolving. It was fixed in place in the nineteenth century under societal
norms highly deferential to parental authority, and it was recently
reaffirmed by a constitutional amendment designed to “enshrine truths
that are deeply rooted in this nation’s history and traditions.” TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 37.

2
However, if clear and convincing evidence indicates that the
parent acted against the child with a malicious, criminally culpable
mental state—rather than a genuinely parental one—then forced
severance of the legal bond between parent and child may be justified,
assuming all other prerequisites for that harshest of remedies are met.
In this case, I agree with the Court that the jury heard clear and
convincing evidence that Mother’s harsh, even vicious, treatment of her
daughter was the product of malice and a desire to harm, rather than of
genuine parental care and concern. That is why I join the Court’s
opinion and judgment.
***
If a mother or father acts with parental intent rather than
criminal intent, the family’s internal affairs are generally none of the
government’s business. In another case, unlike this one, in which
genuine parental intent is not questioned but the government merely
alleges that the parent’s choice of disciplinary methods was unduly
harsh, we may need to rethink our usual approach to appellate review
of the evidence. In such a case, protection of the parent’s constitutional
prerogatives may require appellate courts to apply something like the
reverse of the typical presumption in favor of a jury’s findings.
We normally uphold a verdict if any reasonable juror could have
reached it. But when the excessiveness of parental discipline is the
question before the jury, surely the rule cannot be that appellate courts
will uphold the termination of parental rights if any reasonable juror
could have thought the parent’s actions crossed the line into child abuse.
Reasonable people in today’s world have wildly divergent opinions on

3
that topic. What sounds like reasonable old-fashioned discipline to
jurors in Longview may sound like child abuse to jurors in Austin, but
the constitutional rights of Texas parents do not vary from one jury pool
to another.
A better rule may be the reverse of the conventional one: The
courts must defer to a parent’s fundamental right to discipline and
control a child unless no reasonable observer could think the parent’s
actions fall within the bounds of legitimate discipline. What should
matter is whether, objectively, a parent’s disciplinary actions are
altogether outside our society’s historical conception of the broad realm
of parental authority—not whether a parent’s disciplinary actions are
excessive in the opinion of the jurors (or the judge) who happen to be
asked the question.
I hope we never need to confront this dilemma. This case does
not require the Court to confront it because there is clear and convincing
evidence that Mother acted out of criminal malice rather than parental
love. If the question arises in the future, we should be prepared to
rethink our conventional, deferential approach to appellate review of
fact-findings. Parental-rights litigation must not be an invitation for
judges and juries to second guess a parent’s exercise of the constitutional
right to discipline and direct a child.

James D. Blacklock
Chief Justice

OPINION FILED: June 5, 2026

4