Samuel Adam Aflalo v. Devin Lamar Harris and Meghan Theresa Harris — Memorandum Opinion by Justice Miskel

Affirmed and Opinion Filed October 20, 2026
SIn The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-24-01283-CV
SAMUEL ADAM AFLALO, Appellant
V.
DEVIN LAMAR HARRIS AND MEGHAN THERESA HARRIS, Appellees
On Appeal from the 95th District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-16-00247
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Miskel, Clinton, and Jackson
Opinion by Justice Miskel
Appellant Samuel Adam Aflalo appeals from an unfavorable judgment on his
breach-of-contract claim for damages against appellees Devin Lamar Harris and
Meghan Theresa Harris. Aflalo contends that the Harrises’ breach was established
as a matter of law and seeks a new trial on damages. We conclude that, regardless
of whether breach was established, Rule 279 governs the effect of the jury’s failure
to answer the damages question and supplies a deemed finding that independently
supports the judgment. Accordingly, we affirm.

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I. Background
This is the third appeal arising from a failed residential real-estate transaction
between Aflalo and the Harrises. Our prior opinions recount the underlying facts and
procedural history in detail. See Aflalo v. Harris, 583 S.W.3d 236 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2018, pet. denied) (en banc); Aflalo v. Harris, No. 05-21-01057-CV, 2023
WL 2522206 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 15, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.). We
recount only those facts necessary to resolve this appeal.
The parties entered into an unambiguous contract for the sale of Aflalo’s
home. The contract required closing approximately four weeks after its effective date
and specified the parties’ remedies in the event either side failed to comply. The
Harrises did not close on the contract. Aflalo appeared at closing, signed the deed,
placed it in escrow, demanded performance, and ultimately sued for breach of
contract. Although Aflalo initially sought specific performance, he later pursued
money damages after selling the property to a third party.
By the time of trial, the parties did not dispute the contract’s existence,
validity, or their conduct under it. The principal disputes were whether the Harrises
breached the contract, whether Aflalo sustained benefit-of-the-bargain damages, and
whether the Harrises established their mitigation and election-of-remedies defenses.
Aflalo moved for a directed verdict, arguing that breach was conclusively
established and that no evidence supported the asserted defenses. The trial court
denied the motion.

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The jury charge first asked whether the Harrises failed to comply with the
contract and, only if the jury answered that question “Yes,” what damages Aflalo
sustained. Aflalo objected to submitting the breach question at all, arguing that
breach had been established as a matter of law. He did not, however, object to the
damages question being conditioned on a favorable breach finding, nor did he
request an alternative submission that would have required the jury to determine
damages regardless of its answer on breach.
The jury answered “No” to the breach question and, as instructed, never
answered the damages question. The trial court signed judgment for the Harrises,
awarded their attorney’s fees, and ordered the earnest money released to Aflalo.
Aflalo’s post-judgment motions were overruled by operation of law, and this appeal
followed.
II. Analysis
Aflalo raises three legal-sufficiency challenges on appeal. He argues that the
evidence conclusively established the Harrises’ breach as a matter of law and that
no evidence supports their mitigation and election-of-remedies defenses. Based on
those arguments, he asks us to reverse the final judgment, render judgment on
liability, reject the affirmative defenses, and remand for a new trial on his damages,
attorneys’ fees, and costs.
We need not resolve those issues. Even if we assume that Aflalo is correct that
the Harrises breached the contract as a matter of law, he still is not entitled to a new

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trial on damages. Because Rule 279 treats the unanswered damages question as
omitted and because the record contains some evidence supporting a deemed finding
of no damages, the judgment must be affirmed.1
A. Applicable law: Rule 279
Rule 279 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure governs the consequences of
omitted and unanswered jury issues. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 279; Strauss v. LaMark, 366
S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tex. 1963); see also In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 262–63 (Tex.
2002). The rule is “designed to avoid remands resulting from omissions to the
charge.” Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Low, 79 S.W.3d 561, 565 (Tex. 2002). In other
words, Rule 279 seeks to avoid unnecessary retrials when a claim or defense is
submitted to a jury but a necessary finding is not obtained. See id. at 565–66. The
application of the rule depends on the diligence of the parties at the charge and post-
verdict stages. Id. at 565.
When a submitted claim or defense is missing a necessary element, and the
party who would benefit from a finding on that element fails to preserve the omission
through a proper request or objection, the missing finding does not require a remand.
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 279; Gulf States, 79 S.W.3d at 565. Instead, the parties are
deemed to have waived a jury determination of the omitted element and to have
1 The Harrises raised a related cross-point arguing that the trial court should have granted their
motion for directed verdict because Aflalo failed to present legally sufficient evidence of
damages. Because Rule 279 independently requires affirmance, we need not address that issue.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

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submitted the element to the trial court. TEX. R. CIV. P. 279; Gulf States, 79 S.W.3d
at 565. Upon request, the trial court may make written findings on such an omitted
element before judgment is rendered. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 279; In re J.F.C., 96
S.W.3d at 262–63. If it does not, however, the omitted element is deemed found in
the manner necessary to support the judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 279; In re J.F.C.,
96 S.W.3d at 262–63. We must uphold such a deemed finding if it is supported by
some evidence. Ramos v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 784 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. 1990); In re
J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 262–63, 276 n.69.
These principles apply not only when an element is omitted entirely from the
charge, but also when a necessary issue goes unanswered because it was submitted
conditionally. Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 222 S.W.2d 985, 990 (Tex.
1949); Strauss, 366 S.W.2d at 557; Harmes v. Arklatex Corp., 615 S.W.2d 177, 179
(Tex. 1981); see also Pfeiffer v. Berg, No. 01-24-00242CV, 2026 WL 232956, at
*21–23 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 29, 2026, no pet.) (Gunn, J.,
concurring). If a party needs a finding on a conditionally submitted issue but does
not object that the conditioning is improper or otherwise request a submission that
would require the jury to answer the downstream issue, the party waives any
complaint about the absence of that finding. Little Rock, 222 S.W.2d at 990; see also
Pfeiffer, 2026 WL 232956, at *21–22; cf. Strauss, 366 S.W.2d at 557–58.
Because a predicate issue that is conclusively established as a matter of law
has no place in the jury charge, the party entitled to the downstream finding must

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insist on an unconditional or otherwise independent submission of that issue. See
Little Rock, 222 S.W.2d at 990; see also Pfeiffer, 2026 WL 232956, at *22.
Otherwise, a question the jury never reaches because of an improper conditional
submission is treated, for Rule 279 purposes, as an element omitted from the charge.
Little Rock, 222 S.W.2d at 990; Harmes, 615 S.W.2d at 179; see also Pfeiffer, 2026
WL 232956, at *22; cf. Strauss, 366 S.W.2d at 557. The Rule then treats that omitted
downstream finding as having been made in support of the judgment, so long as the
finding is supported by some evidence. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 279; Little Rock, 222
S.W.2d at 990–91; Ramos, 784 S.W.2d at 668. Accordingly, the failure to obtain a
jury answer to an issue because of an improper conditional submission does not
entitle a party to a new trial when the party who needed the finding failed to secure
it through a proper request or objection.
B. Rule 279 treats the unanswered damages question as omitted
Aflalo bore the burden to obtain a finding on damages, an essential element
of his breach-of-contract claim. See Ramos, 784 S.W.2d at 668; USAA Tex. Lloyds
Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 501 n.21 (Tex. 2018). The jury charge instructed
the jury to answer damages only if it first found breach. The jury found no breach
and therefore never answered the damages question. Assuming Aflalo is correct that
breach was established as a matter of law, the jury should have been required to
answer the damages question regardless of its answer on breach. See Little Rock, 222
S.W.2d at 990.

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Although Aflalo objected to submitting the breach question, he did not object
to conditioning the damages question on a favorable breach finding. Nor did he
request an alternative submission requiring the jury to answer damages regardless of
its answer on breach. Aflalo’s objection to submitting the breach question preserved
his contention that breach was established as a matter of law. But that objection did
not alert the trial court that, if the court rejected that contention and submitted breach
anyway, Aflalo still wanted the jury to determine damages regardless of its answer
on breach. See Little Rock, 222 S.W.2d at 990. To obtain that relief, Aflalo was
required to object to the conditional submission of damages or request an alternative
submission that would ensure a damages finding notwithstanding an adverse answer
to the breach question. He did neither. As a result, the trial court never had the
opportunity to decide whether the jury should answer damages even if it answered
the breach question adversely.
Because Aflalo did not preserve any complaint regarding the conditional
submission of the damages question, he waived any complaint about the absence of
a jury answer on damages after the jury answered the breach question adversely. See
Little Rock, 222 S.W.2d at 990; see also Pfeiffer, 2026 WL 232956, at *21–22. The
unanswered damages question is therefore treated as an omitted issue for purposes
of Rule 279. See Little Rock, 222 S.W.2d at 990; Harmes, 615 S.W.2d at 179; see
also Pfeiffer, 2026 WL 232956, at *22.

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Neither party asked the trial court to make written findings on damages, and
the trial court made none. Rule 279 therefore deems the omitted damages issue found
in the manner necessary to support the judgment if supported by some evidence. See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 279; Little Rock, 222 S.W.2d at 990–91; Ramos, 784 S.W.2d at 668;
see also In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 262–63, 276 n.69.
C. Some evidence supports the deemed no-damages finding
Aflalo sought benefit-of-the-bargain damages, measured by the difference
between the contract price and the property’s market value at the time of breach.
Goldman v. Olmstead, 414 S.W.3d 346, 361 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied).
The contract was admitted into evidence and listed the sales price as $1.45 million.
Assuming that the Harrises breached the contract, the relevant valuation date was
the closing date. See id.
The Harrises presented evidence that the property’s market value at closing
equaled or exceeded the contract price. Their expert appraiser, Mark Milliorn,
testified that he inspected the property shortly before closing and appraised it at
$1.525 million. April Goff, who later purchased the property for $1.13 million about
nine months after the failed closing, testified that the property’s value was between
$1.4 and $1.6 million when she moved in and that she purchased the property
substantially below market value.
Aflalo disputes whether this evidence conclusively establishes the property’s
value. But that is not the question before us. The Rule 279 inquiry is whether some

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evidence supports the deemed finding. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 279; Ramos, 784 S.W.2d
at 668. On that point, Aflalo effectively concedes the evidence was sufficient for a
factfinder to credit. Indeed, he acknowledges that, had the jury reached damages, it
“would have been free to believe all or none of” Milliorn’s and Goff’s testimony.
If credited, Milliorn’s and Goff’s testimony support a finding that the
property’s market value at the time of breach equaled or exceeded the contract price.
Under Aflalo’s own measure of damages, that evidence supports a finding that he
sustained no compensable damages. Accordingly, the record contains some evidence
supporting the deemed no-damages finding, and that finding independently supports
the judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 279; Ramos, 784 S.W.2d at 668; In re J.F.C., 96
S.W.3d at 276 n.69. Thus, even if Aflalo is correct that breach was established as a
matter of law, Rule 279 forecloses the new trial on damages that he seeks. The
deemed finding that Aflalo sustained no compensable damages independently
supports the judgment.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s August 2, 2024 final judgment.
/Emily Miskel/
EMILY MISKEL
JUSTICE