Preserve Property Co.

99048401Ttab30 sept. 2026

Texte intégral

This Opinion is not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: September 30, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Preserve Property Co.
_____
Serial No. 99048401
_____
Ticora E. Davis of The Creator’s Law Firm,
for Preserve Property Co.
Catherine Lee, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 110,
Loksye Lee Riso, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Goodman, Thurmon and Brock,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Goodman, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Preserve Property Co. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of
the mark PRESERVE PROPERTY CO. (in standard characters, PROPERTY CO.
disclaimed) for “Rental of vacation accommodation” in International Class 43.1
1 Application Serial No. 99048401 was filed on February 19, 2025 based on Applicant’s claim
of first use anywhere and use in commerce since at least as early as October 10, 2024 under
Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a). Applicant had also filed for Class 40
services, but these were deleted in response to a refusal to register by the Examining
Attorney. Earlier Office Actions were handled by a different Examining Attorney.
Page references to the application record are to the .pdf version retrieved from the online
database of the USPTO’s Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) system.
Serial No. 99048401
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The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused registration of Applicant’s mark
under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), based on a likelihood
of confusion with the Principal Register mark THE PRESERVE RESORT (in
standard characters, RESORT disclaimed) for “real estate services, namely, rental of
vacation property” in International Class 36 and “resort lodging services” in
International Class 43.2
When the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed and requested
reconsideration. After the Examining Attorney denied the request for
reconsideration, the appeal was resumed. We affirm the refusal to register.
I. Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so
resembles a registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the
goods or services of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). Our determination of
likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all probative facts
in the record that are relevant to the likelihood of confusion factors set forth in In re
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”). See
also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We consider
References to the briefs on appeal refer to the Board’s TTABVUE docket system. Applicant’s
brief is at 6 TTABVUE; the reply brief is at 9 TTABVUE; the Examining Attorney’s brief is
at 8 TTABVUE.
2 Registration No. 3105268, issued June 13, 2006; Section 8, second renewal.
Serial No. 99048401
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each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument.3 See, e.g., In re Guild
Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019); In re Country Oven, Inc., No.
87354443, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 381, at *2.
In every Section 2(d) case, two key factors are the similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks and the goods or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322
(Fed. Cir. 2017); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165 (Fed.
Cir. 2002); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103
(CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative
effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and
differences in the marks.”). These factors, and others, are discussed below.
A. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Services
The second DuPont factor considers “the similarity or dissimilarity and nature of
the goods or services as described in an application or registration.” DuPont, 476 F.2d
at 1361.
It is sufficient for a finding of likelihood of confusion if relatedness is established
for any service encompassed by the identification within a particular class in the
application or registration. See Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc.,
648 F.2d 1335, 1336 (CCPA 1981).
3 In the appeal brief, the Examining Attorney references arguments Applicant made during
prosecution but did not raise on appeal. However, the Board has previously held that
arguments made during prosecution but not actually raised in the appeal brief are forfeited.
In re Princeton Equity Grp. LLC, No. 97397212, 2025 TTAB LEXIS 242, at *9 (TTAB 2025).
In that case, Applicant sought to incorporate by reference arguments made during
prosecution without actually stating them in the brief. Id. Accordingly, we consider only the
arguments Applicant actually presented in its appeal brief.
Serial No. 99048401
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Applicant’s services are identified as “rental of vacation accommodation.”
Registrant’s services are identified as “real estate services, namely, rental of vacation
property” and “resort lodging services.”
Applicant asserts that the services are distinct and that its “services are centered
on property management and real estate investment, emphasizing long-term
property stewardship” while “Registrant’s services are presented as a luxury resort
experience.”4
However, Registrant’s “rental of vacation property” is at least as broad as, and
encompasses, Applicant’s “rental of vacation accommodation.”5 Thus, Applicant’s and
Registrant’s vacation rental services are legally identical.6 See In re Hughes Furniture
4 6 TTABVUE 13.
5 “Property” is defined as “a piece of real estate,” while “accommodation” is defined as “room
and board; lodging.” August 5, 2025 Office Action p. 9, American Heritage Dictionary,
ahdictionary.com; January 31, 2026 Denial of Reconsideration p. 112, American Heritage
Dictionary.
6 The Examining Attorney also submitted webpages showing that vacation property rental
services and vacation accommodation rental services are offered by the same or related
entities. July 29, 2025 Office Action pp. 13-42; August 5, 2025 Final Office Action pp. 13-20;
September 5, 2025 Office Action pp. 13-19; January 31, 2026 Request for Reconsideration
Denied pp. 37-69. Because the vacation property rental and vacation accommodation rental
services are legally identical, we need not separately consider the relatedness of the cited
registration’s resort lodging services. Tuxedo Monopoly, 648 F.2d at 1336.
The Examining Attorney also submitted, as to the cited registration’s resort lodging services,
14 active use-based third-party registrations showing that resort lodging and vacation
accommodation rental services may emanate from the same source under the same mark, as
well as website evidence showing that such services are offered by related entities under
similar marks. January 31, 2026 Request for Reconsideration Denied pp. 8-105, 72-82; July
29, 2025 Office Action pp. 43-73. In addition, the Examining Attorney submitted dictionary
definitions of “accommodation,” “property,” and “resort.” January 31, 2026 Request for
Reconsideration Denied pp. 106-113, American Heritage Dictionary and Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, merriam-webster.com; August 5, 2025 Office Action pp. 9-12, American Heritage
Dictionary; July 29, 2025 Office Action pp. 76-78, American Heritage Dictionary.
While this additional evidence is not needed given the legally identical nature of the vacation
rental services in the subject application and cited registration, this evidence provides
Serial No. 99048401
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Indus., No. 85627379, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 65, at *10 (applicant’s broadly worded
identification of “furniture” necessarily encompasses Registrant’s narrowly identified
“residential and commercial furniture.”).
B. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Trade Channels, Classes of Consumers
and Conditions of Sale
We consider the “similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade
channels” and “[t]he conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e.
‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361.
Looking to the application and cited registration, there are no limitations as to
trade channels or classes of consumers. The classes of consumers are those seeking
to rent vacation properties or accommodations or to stay in a resort.
Because at least Applicant’s services of rental of vacation accommodation and
Registrant’s services of rental of vacation property are legally identical, we presume
they are offered to the same classes of consumers and move through the identical
trade channels. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (even though
there was no evidence of channels of trade and classes of consumers, the Board was
entitled to rely on this legal presumption in determining likelihood of confusion).
Turning to the fourth DuPont factor, conditions of sale, purchaser sophistication
or degree of care may reduce the likelihood of confusion. Conversely, impulse
additional support for the Examining Attorney’s refusal. In re FabFitFun, Inc., No. 86847381,
2018 TTAB LEXIS 297, at *5-6 (due to identical cosmetics goods, additional evidence of
relatedness of non-identical goods unnecessary).
Serial No. 99048401
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purchases of inexpensive items may tend to have the opposite effect. Palm Bay Imps.,
Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed.
Cir. 2005). We must make our determination based on the least sophisticated
consumer. Stone Lion Cap. Partners, L.P. v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
Applicant argues that
[c]onsumers selecting vacation accommodations or
property management services do not act on impulse. Such
consumers routinely compare geographic location,
amenities, and service models before booking. A consumer
seeking property management or real estate investment
services is exercising a high degree of care.7
Applicant further argues that “securing vacation lodging and professional
property management are never casual or spontaneous decisions” but are “high-cost,
intensely scrutinized engagements” with consumers “highly attentive to brand
differences and the identity of the service provider.”8 The Examining Attorney argues,
however, that even sophisticated purchasers are not immune from source confusion.9
To support its points about purchasing conditions, Applicant provided a study that
indicates that vacation accommodation selection is not impulsive but instead involves
a sophisticated decision-making process in which consumers evaluate factors such as
price, location, facilities, cleanliness, and safety.
The study indicates that “[a]ccommodation is a vital aspect
of a guest’s overall travel experience … . Understanding a
guest’s accommodation selection process is a complex
7 6 TTABVUE 13.
8 9 TTABVUE 5.
9 8 TTABVUE 6.
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phenomenon … involving a sophisticated decision-making
process … . Research into hotel selection criteria
highlighted that a combination of personal (customer
service, value for money) and organization (e.g., variety of
facilities offered, location, ambience, cleanliness, safety
and security) factors influence a guest’s accommodation
choice … .”10
We find that consumers seeking vacation rental property or vacation rental
accommodation will exercise some degree of care because they must consider factors
such as price, location, and amenities when selecting vacation rental accommodations
or lodging. This factor weighs against likelihood of confusion.
C. Strength
The sixth DuPont factor considers “[t]he number and nature of similar marks in
use on similar goods [or services].” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361.
Registrant’s mark has a disclaimer of RESORT but has been registered without a
showing of acquired distinctiveness. As a whole, the cited mark THE PRESERVE
RESORT is inherently distinctive, although the strength is somewhat limited by the
disclaimed generic or descriptive term RESORT. See Sock It to Me v. Fan, No.
91230554, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 201, at *30 (SOCK IT TO ME for socks “taken as a
whole, is inherently distinctive, although its strength is somewhat limited by its first
word, SOCK, which is generic for socks.”). Although Registrant’s mark is inherently
distinctive as a whole, we may consider whether an inherently distinctive mark is
10 January 5, 2026 Request for Reconsideration pp. 29-42. Tajeddini, Kayhan, Rasoolimanesh,
S. Mostafa, Gamage, Thillini Chaturika, and Martin Emma (2021) Exploring the Visitor’s
Decision-Making Process for Airbnb and Hotel Accommodations Using Value-Attitude
Behavior and Theory of Planned Behavior. International Journal of Hospitality
Management, 96, p. 102950.
Serial No. 99048401
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“weak as a source indicator” in the course of the DuPont analysis. See, e.g., In re Fat
Boys Water Sports LLC, No. 86490930, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 150, at *23.
Applicant argues that “[w]idespread third-party use of a term [PRESERVE]
demonstrates that it is suggestive or diluted in the relevant field, evoking natural
surroundings or curated environments rather than identifying a single commercial
source.”11
Applicant appears to base this argument on the existence of third-party
registrations which contain the word PRESERVE. Applicant’s argument in reference
to third-party registrations relates to conceptual strength. Tao Licensing, LLC v.
Bender Consulting Ltd., No. 92057132 2017 TTAB LEXIS 437, *47 (“third-party
registration evidence that does not equate to proof of third-party use may bear on
conceptual weakness if a term is commonly registered for similar goods or services.”).
On reconsideration, Applicant submitted an abbreviated TESS search list of third-
party registrations, including the cited registration.12 However, the Examining
11 6 TTABVUE 12.
12 January 5, 2026 Request for Reconsideration p. 7. Applicant explained in the Request for
Reconsideration that it searched the TESS database for the term “PRESERVE” in Class 43
with “Rental OR Vacation OR Accommodation,” returning “919 results, with 346 live
registrations.” January 5, 2026 Request for Reconsideration pp. 7, 72.
Applicant provided a one-page excerpt of search results. We note that, even if considered, the
list would have limited probative value. There are three registrations, and three abandoned
applications shown. Two of the abandoned applications are owned by the same entity, and
one application does not contain a PRESERVE component. An abandoned application is
evidence of nothing more than it was filed in the Office. See Kemi Organics, LLC v. Gupta,
No. 92065613, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 149, at *17-18 (abandoned application only probative to
show it had been filed).
Of the registrations identified in the list, one is the cited registration, one does not contain a
PRESERVE component, and one covers real estate condominium and apartment
management services. Thus, only one third-party registration with PRESERVE as a
Serial No. 99048401
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Attorney objected to the list and advised that the registrations were not made of
record by Applicant’s submission.13 Therefore, we do not consider it.
In addition, third-party use evidence may reflect on conceptual and commercial
strength. Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2015); Tao Licensing, 2017 TTAB LEXIS 437, at *47. As evidence of third-party use
of PRESERVE, Applicant submitted a portion of the results of a Google search of the
terms “The Preserve Resort” to show that there are multiple uses of the combined
terms in a similar geographic area.14
However, search engine results which provide little context may be insufficient
“to determine the nature of the use of a term or the relevance of the search results to
registration considerations.” In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 488 F.3d 960, 967 (Fed.
Cir. 2007). In this case, the Google search results have minimal probative value
because they are too truncated to provide sufficient context regarding third-party use
of “The Preserve Resort” or whether that use is tied to Registrant, a related entity, or
a third party.
We find the record does not show evidence of conceptual or commercial weakness
of the component PRESERVE. This factor is neutral.
component arguably supports Applicant’s position. A lone third-party registration generally
carries limited weight in establishing conceptual weakness.
13 January 31, 2026 Request for Reconsideration Denied p.4.
14 January 5, 2026 Request for Reconsideration pp. 9-11.
Serial No. 99048401
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D. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
Under the first DuPont factor, we consider the similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression. Palm Bay Imps., 396 F.3d at 1371 (citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361).
Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks
confusingly similar. In re Davia, No. 85497617, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 214, at *4.
The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who normally retains a
general, rather than specific, impression of trademarks. See Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v.
Akea, LLC, No. 91196527, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 166, at *17; Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott
Paper Co., No. 91055167, 1975 TTAB LEXIS 236, at *6. The test, under the first
DuPont factor, is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a
side-by-side comparison, but rather, whether the marks are sufficiently similar in
terms of their overall commercial impression that confusion as to the source of the
services offered under the respective marks is likely to result. Coach Servs. v.
Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Applicant’s mark is PRESERVE PROPERTY CO. (with PROPERTY CO.
disclaimed), and Registrant’s mark is THE PRESERVE RESORT (with RESORT
disclaimed).
Applicant argues that the Examining Attorney has improperly focused on the
shared term PRESERVE and ignored the other components in the marks.15
15 6 TTABVUE 3; 9 TTABVUE 3.
Serial No. 99048401
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Applicant is correct that marks must be considered in their entireties, including
any disclaimed matter, and the analysis may not be based on dissecting the marks
into separate components. In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir.
1985). But there is nothing improper about according greater weight to the dominant
portion of a mark where, as here, the remaining wording is descriptive or otherwise
non-source-indicating. Id.; Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 947 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (“descriptive component of a mark may be given little weight in reaching a
conclusion on likelihood of confusion”); In re Allegiance Staffing, No. 85663950, 2015
TTAB LEXIS 180, at *11 (“Because descriptive words have little source-indicating
significance, it is appropriate that we give less weight.”).
Here, PRESERVE is the dominant element of both marks. In Applicant’s
mark, PROPERTY CO. is disclaimed and merely identifies the type of business or
enterprise involved (a property company); it has little, if any, source-indicating
significance. In re Allegiance Staffing, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 180, at *11; In re Wm. B.
Coleman Co., No. 77067861, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 67, at *14 (“‘company’ is simply a
designation for a type of entity without source-identifying capability”).16 In the cited
mark, THE is a definite article with no trademark significance, and RESORT is
disclaimed as descriptive, if not generic, of at least some of the identified services. In
re Thor Tech, Inc., No. 78634024, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 253, at *3; In re Dixie Rests. Inc.,
105 F.3d 1405, 1407 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (dominant portion of THE DELTA CAFÉ and
16 The Examining Attorney submitted a dictionary definition showing that “Co.” is an
abbreviation for “company.” July 29, 2025 Office Action p. 77, American Heritage Dictionary.
Serial No. 99048401
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design mark is DELTA as the generic term CAFÉ has been disclaimed); In re Place,
Inc., No. 76436826, 2005 TTAB LEXIS 451, at *2-3 (“[W]e find that the definite article
THE and the generic term BAR are not distinctive terms, and they add no source-
indicating significance to the mark [THE GREATEST BAR] as a whole.”). As a result,
the shared term PRESERVE is the portion most likely to be remembered and used
by consumers to identify source.
Applicant argues that the marks have “structural and phonetic differences” and
are different in sound and appearance.17 As to connotation, Applicant argues
“PROPERTY CO. suggests a property-focused enterprise, namely property
management and real estate services. By contrast, THE PRESERVE RESORT clearly
connotes a destination resort operation, emphasizing a unified hospitality
experience” and “destination lodging.”18 Applicant also argues that THE PRESERVE
RESORT “creates the commercial impression of a singular, specific physical
destination. It denotes a unified physical location offering on-site leisure amenities.”19
Applicant submits that its mark “creates the commercial impression of a corporate
entity, management firm, or real estate business, rather than a specific physical
destination.”20
The marks are highly similar in appearance and sound because they share the
identical term PRESERVE. The additional wording in each mark does little to
17 6 TTABVUE 13; 9 TTABVUE 3.
18 6 TTABVUE 12.
19 9 TTABVUE 4.
20 9 TTABVUE 4.
Serial No. 99048401
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distinguish them because this wording is subordinate, disclaimed, descriptive or
generic, or otherwise has no source indicating significance. The marks are also
similar in connotation and commercial impression because each mark evokes a source
identified primarily by PRESERVE, with the additional wording merely describing
the nature of the business or services. When viewed in their entireties, the differences
in the remaining wording are insufficient to overcome the strong similarity created
by the shared dominant term.
Moreover, consumers frequently shorten marks in use and recollection. In this
case, both marks may be shortened to PRESERVE, increasing the risk of confusion.
See In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 815 (CCPA 1978). Overall, we find the marks
are similar in their entireties.
II. Conclusion
As a final step, we “weigh the DuPont factors used in [our] analysis and explain
the results of that weighing.” In re Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th 1375, 1384 (Fed. Cir.
2023) (emphasis omitted). The similarity of the marks, the legally identical services,
and the trade channels for the legally identical services weigh in favor of a finding of
likelihood of confusion. The strength of the mark is neutral.
The conditions of sale weigh against likelihood of confusion. Although the
conditions of sale slightly diminish the likelihood of confusion, this factor is
outweighed by the similarity of the marks, the legal identity of the services, and the
overlapping trade channels for the legally identical services. We find confusion likely.
Serial No. 99048401
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Decision: The refusal to register Applicant’s mark PRESERVE PROPERTY CO.
is affirmed.

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