Rebel Athletic Inc.

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: September 28, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Rebel Athletic Inc.
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Serial No. 98676029
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Neal Massand and Hao Ni of Ni, Wang & Massand, PLLC,
for Rebel Athletic Inc.
Robert King, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 133,
Laurie Kaufman, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Lykos, Heasley and Thurmon,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Lykos, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Rebel Athletic Inc. (“Applicant”) seeks to register on the Principal Register the
standard character mark REBEL SUPER NOVA for “Gemstones; Artificial
gemstones; Glass [jewelry]; Imitation stones for making jewelry all for use with cheer
and dance apparel and equipment” in International Class 14.1
1 Application Serial No. 98676029, filed July 31, 2024, under Section 1(b) of the Trademark
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), alleging a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce.

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The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration on the ground that
Applicant’s mark so resembles the registered standard character mark SUPERNOVA
MOISSANITE (MOISSANITE disclaimed) on the Principal Register for “Gemstones”
in International Class 14, that it is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive
under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).2
After the refusal was made final, Applicant filed a notice of appeal and requested
reconsideration. The Examining Attorney denied the request and maintained the
final refusal. The appeal was resumed and is now fully briefed. For the reasons
explained below, we affirm the refusal to register.
I. Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits the registration of a mark that:
[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a
mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, … as
to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods
Citations to the prosecution file refer to the USPTO’s Trademark Status & Document
Retrieval (“TSDR”) system in Portable Document Format (“PDF”). Citations to the record
also include references to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system.
This opinion cites decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the U.S.
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals by the pages on which they appear in the Federal
Reporter (e.g., F.2d, F.3d, or F.4th). For Board decisions, this opinion uses citations to the
Lexis® legal database, as well as the TTABVUE proceeding number, where available. See
TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (TBMP) § 101.03(a)(2) (2026)
for acceptable citation options to cases.
2 Registration No. 5393621, registered on February 6, 2018 under Trademark Act Section
66(a) pursuant to the Madrid Protocol. The Office accepted Registrant’s combined declaration
of use and incontestability under Sections 71 and 15 on October 3, 2024.
The Examining Attorney also issued a Section 2(d) refusal based on Registration No.
5576756 that was withdrawn after the registration was cancelled on April 18, 2025 for failure
to file a Section 8 declaration. See January 21, 2026 Denial of Applicant’s Request for
Reconsideration. Applicant’s arguments in its appeal brief in connection with this
registration were unnecessary.

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of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to deceive.
15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of
all of the probative evidence of record bearing on the likelihood of confusion. In re E.
I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”), cited in
B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 144 (2015); see also In re
Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023); In re Majestic Distilling
Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We have considered each DuPont factor for
which there is evidence and argument. See In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019). When analyzing these factors, the overriding concerns are not
only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but also to protect the
registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a
newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Varying weights may be assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the evidence
presented. See Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1353 (Fed.
Cir. 2011). “Each case must be decided on its own facts and the differences are often
subtle ones.” Indus. Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d 1197, 1199 (CCPA 1973). In
any likelihood of confusion analysis, two key considerations are the first and second
DuPont factors, the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks and the goods. See In re
i.am.symbolic, LLC, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Herbko Int’l, Inc. v.
Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see also In re Embiid,
No. 88202890, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 168, at *10 (“[T]he fundamental inquiry mandated
by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of

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the goods and differences in the marks.”) (quoting Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort
Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103 (CCPA 1976)). These factors, as well as
others, are discussed below.
A. The Goods and the Established, Likely-to-Continue Channels of Trade
We begin by considering in tandem the second DuPont factor, the “similarity or
dissimilarity” of the goods, and the third DuPont factor, “the similarity or
dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at
1361. The language in the identification of the application and cited registration
guides our analysis for both factors. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307
(Fed. Cir. 2018); Stone Lion Cap. Partners, L.P. v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317,
1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
Applicant contends that the goods are dissimilar because Registrant’s gemstones
are moissanite, a specific type of synthetic gemstone primarily used in fine jewelry.
Applicant contrasts Registrant’s moissanite gemstones with its own gemstones, glass
jewelry, and imitation stones which it characterizes as limited to use in connection
with cheerleading apparel and accessories.
The description of the goods in the application and registration undercuts
Applicant’s assertions. Applicant’s and Registrant’s identifications respectively
include or consist of “gemstones” without any qualifying or limiting language as to
type or use. Each of Applicant’s goods are listed within semicolons, meaning that they
stand independently from the other items in the identification. See In re Midwest

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Gaming & Entm’t LLC, No. 85111552, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 55, at *9 (because a
semicolon separated the two relevant clauses in registrant’s identification, its
"restaurant and bar services" is a discrete category of services that stands alone and
independently as a basis for likelihood-of-confusion analysis, and is not connected to
nor dependent on the services set out on the other side of the semicolon); see also
Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (“TMEP”) § 1402.06(a) (May 2026).
Thus, Applicant’s goods identified as “gemstones” are identical to Registrant’s
“gemstones.”
This brings us to the established, likely-to-continue channels of trade and classes
of consumers. Since “gemstones” in both the application and cited registration are
unrestricted as to trade channels and purchasers, we must presume that these
particular goods travel in the same ordinary trade and distribution channels and will
be marketed to the same potential consumers. See In re Viterra, Inc., 671 F.3d 1358,
1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Board was entitled to rely on presumption that, absent
restrictions, legally identical goods travel in the same channels of trade to the same
class of purchasers); In re Yawata Iron & Steel Co., 403 F.2d 752, 771 (CCPA 1968)
(where there are legally identical goods, the channels of trade and class of purchasers
is considered to be the same). “The third DuPont factor—like the second factor—must
be evaluated with an eye toward the channels specified in the application and
registration, not those as they exist in the real world.” Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d
at 1308. For this reason, Applicant’s arguments that the target consumers differ
because “moissanite jewelry consumers are likely looking for a high-end, alternative

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gemstone to diamonds, whereas Applicant’s products are aimed at cheerleading and
dance groups”3 necessarily fail.
Both the second and third DuPont factors weigh heavily in favor of finding a
likelihood of confusion.
B. The Number and Nature of Similar Marks in Use on Similar Goods
Before comparing the marks, we address Applicant’s arguments regarding the
number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods under the sixth DuPont
factor. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. This factor “is a measure of the extent to which
other marks weaken the assessed mark,” Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 71 F.4th 1355,
1362 (Fed. Cir. 2023), and indicates whether the cited mark is “entitled to only a
narrow scope of protection.” Omaha Steaks Int’l, 908 F.3d at 1324 (quoting Palm Bay
Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2005)). “When a field is crowded with similar marks, the theory is that
customers will be more adept at distinguishing marks from each other and are less
likely to be confused by similar marks.” Apex Bank v. CC Serve Corp., 156 F.4th 1230,
1235 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (citing Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334,
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
3 Applicant’s Brief, 6 TTABVUE 16. Applicant embedded in its appeal brief a request to
amend its identification of goods to “Gemstones; Artificial gemstones; Glass [jewelry];
Imitation stones for making jewelry all for use with cheer and dance apparel and equipment.”
The Board treats Applicant’s proposed amendment as a request for remand for further
examination. In re Ox Paperboard, LLC, No. 87847482, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 266, at *7. The
request is denied because Applicant’s proposed new identification of goods is exactly the same
as the current identification.

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“[T]he strength of a mark is not a binary factor” and “varies along a spectrum from
very strong to very weak.” Juice Generation, 794 F.3d at 1338. (internal citations
omitted). “The weaker [the registrant’s] mark, the closer [an applicant’s] mark can
come without causing a likelihood of confusion and thereby invading what amounts
to its comparatively narrower range of protection.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
In determining the strength or weakness of a mark, we consider both its inherent
or conceptual strength, based on the nature of the mark itself, and, if there is evidence
in the record of marketplace recognition of the mark, its commercial or marketplace
strength. Spireon, 71 F.4th at 1362 (“There are two prongs of analysis for a mark’s
strength under the sixth factor: conceptual strength and commercial strength.”)
(citing In re Chippendales USA, Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
Conceptual strength “is a measure of a mark’s distinctiveness, Chippendales, 622
F.3d at 1353, and distinctiveness is ‘often classified in categories of generally
increasing distinctiveness[:] ... (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4)
arbitrary; or (5) fanciful.’” Spireon, 71 F.4th at 1362 (quoting Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992)). “Commercial strength, on the other hand, is
the marketplace recognition value of the mark,” Spireon, 71 F.4th at 1362 (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted), and “whether consumers in fact associate the
. . mark with a unique source.” Id.
The cited mark is registered on the Principal Register without a claim of acquired
distinctiveness, and thus carries a presumption under Trademark Act Section 7(b),
15 U.S.C. § 1057(b), that it is inherently distinctive. See, e.g., New Era Cap Co. v. Pro

Serial No. 98676029
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Era, LLC, No. 91216455, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 199, at *29. This does not, however,
prevent Applicant from disputing the mark’s strength.
Applicant postulates that the term SUPERNOVA is commercially and
conceptually weak, making the cited mark entitled to only a narrow scope of
protection. It asserts that SUPERNOVA is commonly used in connection with jewelry
and gemstones as a descriptor “to evoke brilliance and brightness.”4 It also contends
that SUPERNOVA is an inherently weak laudatory term because it “suggests
brilliance, brightness, and intensity,” characteristics that are “commonly promoted”
in connection with gemstones and jewelry.5 As support, Applicant points to the
following:6
● a hyperlink to the word “supernova” from www.etymonline.com;
● a hyperlink to a blog post entitled “Gemstone clarity scale?” posted on the
website www.diamondrensu.com;
● an assertion that Google search engine results for the term “super nova”
combined with “gemstones” retrieved approximately 299,000 hits; and
● an assertion that a search from “the USPTO trademark search portal reveals no
less than 119 results when searching ‘Super Nova’ with respect to international class
14 alone.”
4 Applicant’s Brief, 6 TTABVUE 10.
5 Id.
6 September 2, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at TSDR 5-6.

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The Examining Attorney objected to Applicant’s evidence as not properly of record
in the Denial of Applicant’s Request for Reconsideration, and reiterates this objection
in his appeal brief.7 We agree and sustain the objection. Providing a hyperlink does
not make the underlying webpages of record. In re Weiss, No. 88621608, 2024 TTAB
LEXIS 277, at *3-4.
In addition, Applicant did not submit a printout or screenshot showing the URL
and access date of any purported Google search engine results. In re I-Coat Co., LLC,
Nos. 86802467, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 171, at *9 (Board will not consider Internet
evidence filed by an applicant in an ex parte proceeding to be properly of record unless
the URL and access or print date has been identified, either directly on the webpage
itself, or by providing this information in a response, except where the examining
attorney does not object.”). And even if Applicant had made of record such search
results, the evidence would have little, if any, probative value. A search result
summary from an Internet search engine does not show the context in which the term
or phrase is used on the listed web pages and may not include sufficient surrounding
text to show the context within which the term or phrase is used. See In re Bayer AG,
488 F.3d 960, 967 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Context is critical when evaluating the impact of
third-party evidence.
Similarly, Applicant’s unsupported assertions regarding the universe of
SUPERNOVA trademarks in USPTO records has no evidentiary value. To make any
7 January 21, 2026 Denial of Applicant’s Request for Reconsideration at TSDR 6-7;
Examining Attorney’s Appeal Brief, 8 TTABVUE 9-10.

Serial No. 98676029
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third-party registrations of record, Applicant should have either submitted copies of
the paper USPTO records of each registration, or a printout showing the URL and
access date from the USPTO’s TSDR database. See In re Jump Designs LLC, No.
76393986, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 209, at *6 (merely submitting a list is insufficient to
make third-party registrations of record).
With no admissible evidence to support Applicant’s arguments, on this record, the
sixth DuPont factor is neutral.
C. The Marks
Having determined that the record lacks evidence that the shared word
SUPERNOVA (or its equivalent SUPER NOVA) is either commercially or
conceptually weak, we now direct our attention to the first DuPont factor, the
similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound,
connotation and commercial impression. See, e.g., Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1380
(citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361); Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1371 (same). “Similarity in
any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In
re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 170, at *13 (quoting In
re Davia, No. 85497617, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 214, at *21-24, aff’d per curiam, 777 F.
App’x 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019)).
“[S]imilarity is not a binary factor but is a matter of degree.” In re St. Helena
Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 751 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d
1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). The proper test regarding similarity “is not a side-by-
side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar

Serial No. 98676029
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in terms of their commercial impression such that persons who encounter the marks
would be likely to assume a connection between [Registrant and Applicant].” Cai v.
Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs. Inc.
v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)).
Our analysis is not predicated on dissecting the marks into their various
components; that is, our decision is based on the entire marks, not just part of the
marks. In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Franklin Mint
Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 1007 (CCPA 1981) (“It is axiomatic that a
mark should not be dissected and considered piecemeal; rather, it must be considered
as a whole in determining likelihood of confusion.”). “No element of a mark is ignored
simply because it is less dominant, or would not have trademark significance if used
alone.” In re Electrolyte Labs. Inc., 929 F.2d 645, 647 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Spice
Islands, Inc. v. Frank Tea & Spice Co., 505 F.2d 1293 (CCPA 1974)).
Nonetheless, there is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more
or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate
conclusion rests on a consideration of the marks in their entireties. In re Nat’l Data,
753 F.2d at 1059. “[O]ne feature of a mark may be more significant than another, and
it is not improper to give more weight to this dominant feature in determining the
commercial impression created by the mark.” Leading Jewelers Guild, Inc. v. LJOW
Holdings, LLC, No. 91160856, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 35, at *14 (TTAB 2007). That is,
more or less weight may be given to a particular feature of a mark provided the

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ultimate conclusion rests on a consideration of the marks in their entireties. Nat’l
Data, 753 F.2d at 1058.
We now compare Applicant’s mark, REBEL SUPER NOVA, with the cited mark,
SUPERNOVA MOISSANITE (MOISSANITE disclaimed), both in standard
characters.
Applicant argues that the marks look and sound different. Applicant contends
that the marks are visually different in structure because its mark is composed of
three words whereas the cited mark is comprised of only two. Applicant contends that
the separation of SUPER and NOVA into two distinct terms in its mark is a
significant difference. Applicant further argues that consumers are likely to focus on
the first word in each mark, and that as the lead word in its mark, REBEL dominates
and creates differences in connotation and commercial impression that distinguish
the marks. Applicant further maintains that REBEL is its house mark and asserts
that this word will call to mind its corporate name Rebel Athletic Inc., “a popular
cheer and dance apparel and accessories business.” Applicant acknowledges that
MOISSANITE in the cited mark is disclaimed, but argues that because this term
symbolizes love and romance it engenders a different meaning and commercial
impression when compared to the applied-for mark.
We acknowledge the general principle that consumers are generally more inclined
to focus on the first word or term in a mark, especially when that term is inherently
distinctive. See Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1372-73. This tenet, however, is merely a guide
and its application depends on the nature of both that first term and any wording

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that comes after the first term in the mark. As explained by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit in Palm Bay, supra, where the Court affirmed the Board’s
holding that the mark VEUVE ROYALE on one hand, and the marks VEUVE
CLICQUOT and VEUVE CLICQUOT PONSARDIN on the other, were similar
overall,
[the] strong distinctive term [VEUVE] as the first word in both
parties’ marks renders the marks similar, especially in light of the
largely laudatory (and hence non source identifying) significance
of the word ROYALE.
396 F.3d at 1372-73 (emphasis added). Such circumstances are not present here.
Unlike in Palm Bay, the term following REBEL in Applicant’s mark, SUPER NOVA,
is neither laudatory, merely descriptive or generic, but a “source identifying,”
inherently distinctive term. And as discussed above, there is no admissible evidence
that SUPERNOVA or SUPER NOVA is weak in connection with gemstones.
Consumers therefore may focus on the shared element SUPER NOVA or its
equivalent SUPERNOVA. Even though Applicant’s mark separates the term into two
words, consumers will see and pronounce that wording in the same way. See Stock
Pot, Inc., v. Stockpot Rest., No. 13157, 1983 TTAB LEXIS 83, at *6, aff’d, 737 F.2d
1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“There is no question that the marks of the parties
[STOCKPOT and STOCK POT] are confusingly similar. The word marks are
phonetically identical and visually almost identical.”).
The inclusion of the descriptive, if not generic, term MOISSANITE in the cited
mark does not eliminate the similarity created by the shared use of
SUPERNOVA/SUPER NOVA. See, e.g., In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405 (Fed.

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Cir. 1997) (disclaimed and generic word less dominant). MOISSANITE denotes a type
of gemstone, meaning that consumers are likely to overlook this word and instead
focus on the source-identifying word SUPERNOVA as dominant. See, e.g., In re Dixie
Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (DELTA, not the disclaimed generic term
CAFE, is the dominant portion of the mark THE DELTA CAFE).
Likewise, to the extent consumers are likely to perceive REBEL in Applicant’s
mark as a house mark as Applicant contends, this difference is only peripheral in
nature because of the common element SUPERNOVA/SUPER NOVA. Cf. In re
Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., No. 79046106, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 447, at *8-9 (holding
VANTAGE TITAN for MRI diagnostic apparatus, and TITAN for medical ultrasound
device, likely to cause confusion, noting that the marks are more similar than they
are different and that the addition of applicant’s “product mark,” VANTAGE, to the
registered mark would not avoid confusion).
Overall, the marks are similar in appearance and sound. “It is sufficient if the
similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely to cause confusion.” Krim-
Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968) (citation omitted).
Consumers “have but dim recollections from having previously seen or heard one or
the other of the involved marks.” Neutrogena Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 410 F.2d
1391, 1393 (CCPA 1969). The first DuPont factor weighs in favor of finding a

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likelihood of confusion.
D. Purchasing Conditions
Lastly, we address the fourth DuPont factor, “[t]he conditions under which and
buyers to whom sales are made, i.e. ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.”
DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. While the third factor addresses whether consumers are
likely to encounter the goods in the same trade channels, the fourth addresses
whether those consumers are likely to exercise sufficient care to distinguish the
sources of the goods. A heightened degree of care when making a purchasing decision
may tend to minimize likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., In re N.A.D., Inc., 754 F.2d
996, 999-1000 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (because only sophisticated purchasers exercising
great care would purchase the relevant goods, there would be no likelihood of
confusion merely because of the similarity between the marks NARCO and
NARKOMED). Conversely, impulse purchases of inexpensive goods may tend to have
the opposite effect. Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1376. In evaluating the fourth DuPont
factor, we focus on the goods which we found to be identical or legally identical with
overlapping trade channels and classes of consumers. In this case, that consists of
“gemstones.”
Applicant argues that the consumers of both Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods
are highly sophisticated, thereby reducing the chance for confusion. Applicant
maintains that “[i]nstitutional athletic team uniform purchasers buying bulk
customized gear under the “REBEL” banner exercise substantial care and

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deliberation” as do “individuals investing in high-end, alternative fine gemstones like
moissanite for bridal jewelry.”8
Applicant’s arguments do not obviate the fact that the cited registration is
unrestricted as to type of purchaser and price. We must therefore assume that
Registrant’s goods are available to ordinary consumers of such products at all price
points. This would include not only institutional purchasers of all types but also
members of the public who are gemstone aficionados as well as novice buyers. While
some of these consumers might be highly sophisticated, knowledgeable and deliberate
in their buying decisions, others may not. Basing our analysis “on the least
sophisticated potential purchasers,” Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1325, this DuPont factor
is neutral.
II. Conclusion – Weighing and Balancing the DuPont Factors
The final step in analyzing likelihood of confusion is to weigh the DuPont factors
for which there is evidence and argument, “explain the results of that weighing,” and
address “the weight [we] assigned to the relevant factors.” Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th
at 1384. “No mechanical rule determines likelihood of confusion, and each case
requires weighing of the facts and circumstances of the particular mark.” In re Mighty
Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Naterra Int’l, 92 F.4th at
1116-17 (“Only the DuPont factors of significance to the particular mark need be
considered in the likelihood of confusion analysis.”).
8 Applicant’s Reply Brief, 9 TTABVUE 8. Although Applicant raised this argument for the
first time in its reply brief, we exercise our discretion to consider it.

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We have carefully considered all of the evidence made of record, as well as all
arguments. The second and third factors weigh heavily in favor of a likelihood of
confusion because the goods are in part identical and therefore presumed to be
marketed in overlapping trade channels to the same classes of consumers. The first
DuPont factor weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion because overall, the marks
are similar in sight and sound. Where, as here, the goods are identical in part, the
degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of
confusion is reduced. In re Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1363; Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v.
Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
The sixth DuPont factor is neutral because Applicant has not shown on the record
before us that the cited mark is conceptually or commercially weak and entitled to
only a narrow scope of protection. The fourth factor is neutral as well. With no factors
weighing against a likelihood of confusion, we conclude that confusion is likely.
Decision: The Section 2(d) refusal is affirmed.