Farm to Fun LLC

This Opinion is not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: September 14, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Farm to Fun LLC
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Serial No. 98753836
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Farm to Fun LLC, pro se.1
Leah Guzick, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 136,
Megan Askew, Managing Attorney.
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Before Wellington, Cohen, and Stanley, Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Cohen, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant Farm to Fun LLC seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
mark SNOWY THE MOUSE (MOUSE disclaimed) in standard characters for “plush
toys; jigsaw puzzles” in International Class 28.2
1 A revocation of attorney of Scott Landsbaum of Scott Landsbaum Inc. was filed by Applicant
and is noted. 6 TTABVUE. Our records will be updated accordingly.
2 Application Serial No. 98753836 was filed on September 16, 2024, under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), based on an allegation of use anywhere and in commerce
of September 16, 2024 for “plush toys” and an allegation of bona fide intent to use under
Section 1(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) for “jigsaw puzzles.”
Citations to the prosecution file refer to the USPTO’s TRADEMARK STATUS & DOCUMENT
RETRIEVAL (“TSDR”) system and identify the documents by title, date, and page in the
downloadable .pdf version. Citations to the briefs and other materials in the appeal record
refer to the Board’s TTABVUE online docket system.

Serial No. 98753836
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The Examining Attorney has refused registration under Section 2(d) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant’s mark, when used
in connection with the identified goods, is likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake,
or to deceive because it resembles the registered mark SNOWY for “stuffed toys” in
International Class 28.3
When the refusal was made final, Applicant sought reconsideration of the refusal,
which was denied. Applicant appealed and the appeal is fully briefed. We have
reviewed the evidence and arguments properly made of record, although we do not
necessarily address all of them in this opinion. For the reasons explained below, we
affirm the refusal to register.
I. Evidentiary Matter
In its appeal brief, Applicant references third-party registrations that include the
term SNOWY, including SNOWY PIER GAMES, SNOWY LANE, and other third-
party registrations that purportedly show marks sharing common terms including
WOW WEE, WOW TOYS, PAW PATROL, PAW PALS, BABY, BABY VAMPYRES,
BABY BABY, and BABY-U.4 The Examining Attorney objected to this evidence as
untimely.5
The evidentiary record in an application should be complete prior to the filing of
an ex parte appeal to the Board. Trademark Rule 2.142(d), 37 C.F.R. § 2.142(d); see
3 Registration No. 3171278 issued on the Principal Register on November 14, 2006 and has
been renewed.
4 7 TTABVUE 5-9.
5 9 TTABVUE 2.

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In re Midwest Gaming & Entm’t LLC, No. 85111552, 2013 WL 1442237, at *2 n.3
(TTAB 2013) (new evidence submitted with brief is “untimely and therefore not part
of the record for this case”). Also, the Board does not take judicial notice of
registrations, and the third-party registrations to which Applicant refers are not of
record. See Edom Labs Inc. v. Lichter, No. 91193427, 2012 WL 1267961, at *4 (TTAB
2012) (“Board does not take judicial notice of registrations or applications residing in
the Office, and further, with respect to the applications, they are evidence of nothing
more than that they were filed with the USPTO”) (citations omitted). Additionally,
the lists of third-party registrations are of little, if any, probative value because we
do not know whether the registrations are active, what specific goods or services are
identified in the registration, whether the marks are in continued use, who currently
owns the registrations, or whether the registrations issued on the Principal Register
as opposed to the Supplemental Register. Moreover, many of the listed marks appear
to contain substantial additional matter, or because the specific goods have not been
identified by Applicant, may be registered for goods that have not been shown to be
similar to the relevant goods. See Omaha Steaks Int’l, Inc. v. Greater Omaha Packing
Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (error to rely on third-party evidence of
similar marks for dissimilar goods, as Board must focus “on goods shown to be
similar”); Edom Labs, 2012 WL 1267961, at *4.
Thus, we do not consider Applicant’s unsupported arguments related to these
registrations. Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(“Attorney argument is no substitute for evidence.”) (citation omitted).

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II. Likelihood of Confusion
“The Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so resembles a
registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods or
services of the applicant, to cause confusion [or] mistake, or to deceive.” In re Charger
Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Our determination of the
likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is based on an
analysis of all probative facts in the record that are relevant to the likelihood of
confusion factors set forth in In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357,
1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”); Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1379. We consider each
DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument. See, e.g., In re Guild Mortg.
Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
In any likelihood of confusion analysis, different DuPont factors may play a
dominant role and some factors may not be relevant. Naterra Int’l, Inc. v. Bensalem,
92 F.4th 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (citing Tiger Lily Ventures Ltd. v. Barclays Cap.
Inc., 35 F.4th 1352, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2022)). In addition, varying weight may be
assigned to each factor depending on the evidence presented, and “any one of the
factors may control a particular case.” Id.; see also Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1381.
Two key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the similarities
between the goods or services, which are addressed under the first two DuPont
factors. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko
Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). We discuss
the relevant factors below.

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A. The Goods, Trade Channels and Classes of Consumers
The second DuPont factor concerns the “similarity or dissimilarity and nature of
the goods or services as described in an application or registration...,” and the third
DuPont factor concerns the “similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-
continue trade channels.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. We compare the goods as they
are identified in the relevant registration and the application. In re Detroit Athletic
Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning
LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Likelihood of confusion may be found as to each class in its entirety if it exists as
to any good in that class. Sabhnani v. Mirage Brands, LLC, No. 92068086, 2021 WL
6072822, at *9 n.17 (TTAB 2021) (citations omitted); see also Sage Therapeutics, Inc.
v. Sageforth Psych. Servs., LLC, No. 91270181, 2024 WL 1638376, at *8 n.41 (TTAB
2024) (“It is sufficient for a finding of likelihood of confusion if relatedness is
established for any item encompassed by the identification of goods or services within
a particular class in the application.”).
Applicant’s application includes “plush toys” and the cited registration includes
“stuffed toys.” The identifications, on their face, are essentially identical in-part as

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stuffed toys are also known as plush toys.6 Therefore, Applicant’s and Registrant’s
goods are identical in-part, which Applicant does not dispute.7
Because the goods are identical in-part, we presume that the channels of trade
and classes of consumers for the identical goods overlap. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d
1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (even though there was no evidence regarding channels
of trade and classes of consumers, the Board was entitled to rely on this legal
presumption in determining likelihood of confusion); Am. Lebanese Syrian Associated
Charities Inc. v. Child Health Rsch. Inst., No. 91190361, 2011 WL 4090447, at *6
(TTAB 2011).
The identity of some of the goods and their identical overlapping channels of trade
and classes of consumers not only weigh heavily in favor of finding a likelihood of
confusion but also reduce the degree of similarity between the marks necessary to
6 WIKIPEDIA.ORG, June 12, 2025 Final Office Action at TSDR 25 (“A stuffed toy is … known
by many names, such as plush toys, plushies, lovies and stuffies.”). Although “[t]here are
inherent problems regarding the reliability of Wikipedia entries because Wikipedia is a
collaborative website that permits anyone to edit the entries,” Applicant did not introduce
any evidence to rebut the accuracy of the Examining Attorney’s Wikipedia evidence or
otherwise argue it is unreliable. In re IP Carrier Consulting Grp., No. 78542726, 2007 WL
1751192, at *4 (TTAB 2007) (“[T]he Board will consider evidence taken from Wikipedia so
long as the non-offering party has an opportunity to rebut that evidence by submitting other
evidence that may call into question the accuracy of the particular Wikipedia information.”).
Thus, we have considered it, keeping in mind the inherent limitations of Wikipedia entries.
7 In addition to the presumption that the goods are legally identical, the Examining Attorney
submitted copies of at least four third party webpages offering plush and stuffed toys on the
same website under the same mark, and submitted fifteen subsisting use-based, third-party
registrations registered for plush toys and stuffed toys. March 25, 2025 Office Action at TSDR
9-11, 13-14, 16-22; June 12, 2025 Final Office Action at TSDR 8-19, 41-54, 84-93, 178, ; see
Detroit Athletic Co., 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (crediting relatedness evidence showing that third
parties use the same mark for the goods and services at issue because “[t]his evidence
suggests that consumers are accustomed to seeing a single mark associated with a source
that sells both”). While this additional evidence is not needed given the in-part legally
identical nature of the goods, this evidence provides additional support for the Examining
Attorney’s refusal.

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find a likelihood of confusion. Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1363; In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601
F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am.,
970 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“When marks would appear on virtually identical
goods or services, the degree of similarity necessary to support a conclusion of likely
confusion declines.”).
B. Strength or Weakness of the Cited Mark
Before we compare the marks, we consider the strength or weakness of the cited
mark8 under the sixth DuPont factor which considers “[t]he number and nature of
similar marks in use on similar goods.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. We do so because
a determination of the strength or weakness of this mark helps inform us as to its
8 The fifth DuPont factor considers the “fame [or strength] of the prior mark,” DuPont, 476
F.2d at 1361. Here, as is normally the case in ex parte proceedings, there is no evidence as to
fame or commercial strength particularly since the owner of the cited registration is not a
party to this proceeding and thus, cannot introduce evidence regarding its use of the cited
mark. See In re Mr. Recipe, No. 86040643, 2016 WL 1380730, at *2 (TTAB 2016); In re
Thomas, No. 78334625, 2006 WL 1258862, at *8 n.11 (TTAB 2006). The lack of evidence of
fame of Registrant’s mark does not make a likelihood of confusion less likely. Indeed, “it is
settled that the absence of such evidence is not particularly significant in the context of an
ex parte proceeding.” In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., No. 77029776, 2009 WL 2420527, at *7
(TTAB 2009). Thus, the fifth factor does not apply.
Applicant also asserts that its mark has received industry recognition in what appears to be
an attempt to assert that its mark is famous. 7 TTABVUE 10-11. Under DuPont’s fifth factor,
we typically consider the “fame of the prior mark,” which, here, is the mark in the cited
registration. See DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361 (emphasis added). Applicant’s assertions are
unsupported by the record as the referenced publications have not been made of record. Even
if Applicant had established that its own mark is famous, that alone would not support
registration of the mark. That is, “fame of either mark increases the likelihood of confusion
by making it more likely that purchasers will remember the famous mark and think of it
when encountering similar goods sold under a similar mark. Of course, such likelihood of
confusion is only a reason to refuse a new registration, not grant one.” In re i.am.symbolic,
LLC, No. 85044494, 2015 WL 6746543, at *8 n.7 (TTAB 2015) (emphasis in bold here in italics
in the original), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Even if the fame of an applicant’s
mark eclipses the renown of the prior registrant, that fame does not entitle the applicant to
usurp a prior trademark owner’s rights where confusion is likely. See id.

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scope of protection. See Made in Nature, LLC v. Pharmavite LLC, No. 91223352, 2022
WL 2188890, at *11-12 (TTAB 2022) (quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361).
Applicant submitted no evidence of third-party registrations we may consider,9
but it also argued that SNOWY is descriptive of an owl, supporting that argument
with dictionary and WIKIPEDIA.ORG definitions10 and evidence of third-party use11
during prosecution. Applicant also argues that based on Registrant’s specimen of use,
SNOWY is used to describe an “Animated Snowy Owl.”12
Applicant did not submit a copy of the specimen during prosecution and we do not
take judicial notice of a registration file in an ex parte appeal. In re Sela Prods. LLC,
No. 77629624, 2013 WL 2951800, at *2 (TTAB 2013) (file of cited registration not
automatically of record). Moreover, we find this argument unavailing because a claim
that a registered mark is descriptive or that a specimen of use does not demonstrate
trademark usage would be an impermissible collateral attack on the cited
registration. See In re Fiesta Palms LLC, No. 76598049, 2007 WL 950952, at *3
(TTAB 2007) (“inasmuch as the cited mark is registered on the Principal Register, we
must assume that it is at least suggestive and we cannot entertain applicant’s
9 As explained, we have given no consideration to the arguments based on the third-party
registrations referenced in Applicant's appeal brief, 7 TTABVUE 5-9, which are not of record.
In any event, “[i]t is axiomatic that the Board must assess each mark on its own facts and
record and that the prior decisions and actions of other trademark examining attorneys in
registering other marks are not binding upon the USPTO and the Board.” In re Korn Ferry,
No. 90890949, 2024 WL 3219482, at *5 (TTAB 2024) (quotation and quotation marks
omitted).
10 May 14, 2025 Response to Office Action at TSDR 12-18, 49-69.
11 Id. at 19-48.
12 7 TTABVUE 11.

Serial No. 98753836
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argument that the registered mark is descriptive of registrant’s services.”); In re
Peebles Inc., No. 74073163, 1992 WL 215315, at *3 n.5 (TTAB 1992) (“[A]n attack on
the validity of registrant’s registration ... is not permitted in an ex parte appeal
proceeding.”). And “[e]ven if [Registrant’s] marks are inherently weak, that is not
fatal to a finding of likelihood of confusion because even weak marks are entitled to
protection against confusion.” Made in Nature, 2022 WL 2188890, at *19; see 15
U.S.C. § 1057(b) (registration is “prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered
mark”).
The sixth DuPont factor is neutral and we accord the cited registration “the
normal scope of protection to which inherently distinctive marks are entitled.” In re
Info. Builders Inc., No. 87753964, 2020 WL 2094122, at *10 (TTAB 2020); see Made
in Nature, 2022 WL 2188890, at *19.
C. Similarity of the Marks
“Under the first DuPont factor, we consider ‘the similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression.’” Sabhnani, 2021 WL 6072822, at *13 (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v.
Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2005)). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks
confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 WL 2734893,
at *5 (TTAB 2018), aff’d 777 Fed. Appx. 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Davia, No.
85497617, 2014 WL 2531200, at *2 (TTAB 2014)). “The proper test is not a side-by-
side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar

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in terms of their commercial impression such that persons who encounter the marks
would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d
at 1323 (quoting Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1368 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
We keep in mind that consumers must depend on their recollection of marks to which
they have previously been exposed and that their memories are fallible. See, e.g., In
re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 751 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Sage Therapeutics, 2024 WL
1638376, at *5 (quoting In re i.am.symbolic, llc, No. 85916778, 2018 WL 3993582, at
*4 (TTAB 2018)).
“No element of a mark is ignored simply because it is less dominant, or would not
have trademark significance if used alone.” In re Electrolyte Labs. Inc., 929 F.2d 645,
647 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Spice Islands, Inc. v. Frank Tea & Spice Co., 505 F.2d
1293, 1295 (CCPA 1974)). On the other hand, “there is nothing improper in stating
that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature
of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in
their entireties.” Detroit Athl., 903 F.3d at 1305 (quoting In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753
F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
The Examining Attorney argues that Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks are
similar in sound, appearance, meaning and commercial impression because both
“share the identical term SNOWY”;13 the addition of THE MOUSE to Applicant’s
mark is not enough to obviate a likelihood of confusion as “both marks may be
13 9 TTABVUE 4.

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perceived as character names when used in the context of the goods”;14 and Applicant
disclaimed the term MOUSE indicating it is descriptive wording, such that SNOWY
“remains the dominant and distinctive portion of the mark[].”15
Applicant argues that the “examining attorney improperly focuses on the shared
word SNOWY”;16 that “the phrase SNOWY THE MOUSE conveys a distinct identity
that differs substantially from the single word SNOWY”;17 and that SNOWY THE
MOUSE identifies a specific character brand.18 These arguments are unavailing.
Both marks lead with the identical and dominant term SNOWY. Generally, first
terms in marks tend to contribute more than terms that follow in creating a mark’s
commercial impression, especially when the following terms are disclaimed,
descriptive terms, as in the case of the term MOUSE in Applicant’s mark. In re Detroit
Athl., 903 F.3d at 1305 (“[T]he non-source identifying nature of the words ‘Co.’ and
‘Club’ and the disclaimers thereof constitute rational reasons for giving those terms
less weight in the analysis.”); In re Code Consultants, Inc., No. 75645560, 2001 WL
1149619, at *4 (TTAB 2001) (disclaimed matter is often “less significant in creating
the mark’s commercial impression”); Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc. No.
74797, 1988 WL 252340, at *3 (TTAB 1988) (first part of a mark “is most likely to be
impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered”).
14 Id.
15 Id. at 5.
16 7 TTABVUE 3.
17 Id. at 4.
18 Id. at 12; 10 TTABVUE 4.

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While the addition of the disclaimed term MOUSE may be a point of difference in
Applicant’s mark in sound when fully articulated or in appearance, it does not
alleviate confusion. Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1382 (citing Detroit Athl., 903 F.3d
at 1304-05). The disclaimer of MOUSE is an admission of descriptiveness by
Applicant. See In re Zuma Array Ltd., No. 79288888, 2022 WL 3282655, at *7 (TTAB
2022) (“Applicant disclaimed exclusive rights in the term ‘Smart,’ thus conceding that
‘smart’ is merely descriptive of electronic sensor modules.”) (internal quotes omitted)
(citing In re Six Continents Ltd., No. 88430142, 2022 WL 407385, at *8 (TTAB 2022)
(disclaimer of the word SUITES in mark ATWELL SUITES “is a concession that
‘Suites’ is not inherently distinctive”)). Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of a
party’s goods is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.
Detroit Athl., 903 F.3d at 1305. The non-source identifying nature of MOUSE and the
disclaimer thereof constitutes a rational reason for giving the term less weight in our
analysis. Detroit Athl., 903 F.3d at 1305.
Although Applicant’s mark contains additional terms, the dominant portions of
the marks are identical in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression. Cf. In re Bay State Brewing Co., No. 85826258, 2016 WL 1045677, at *3
(TTAB 2016) (the Board has recognized “the penchant of consumers to shorten
marks.”) (citing In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 815 (CCPA 1978) (“the users of
language have a universal habit of shortening full names from haste or laziness or
just economy of words”) (Rich, J., concurring)). Contrary to Applicant’s arguments, if
a portion of both marks is the same, then the marks may be confusingly similar
notwithstanding some differences. See, e.g., Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1382 (“an

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additional word or component may technically differentiate a mark but do little to
alleviate confusion”); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1266
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (similar commercial impressions found even though applicant’s mark
PACKARD TECHNOLOGIES, with “TECHNOLOGIES” disclaimed, did not
incorporate every feature of opposer’s HEWLETT PACKARD marks).
Inasmuch as there is no evidence to the contrary or providing an alternative
interpretation, the marks used on in-part identical goods have the same meaning and
commercial impression. See, e.g., In re Embiid, No. 88202890, 2021 WL 2285576, at
*9 (TTAB 2021) (“[T]here is no evidence here, or other reason to find, that the mark
TRUST THE PROCESS has one meaning when used with shoes, and a second and
different meaning when used with shirts and sweatshirts, based on the nature of the
respective goods.”); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., No. 91176791, 2011 WL
5014005, at *21 (TTAB 2011) (“[W]e must look to the likely consumer perception of
the mark in connection with the identified goods, rather than applicant's intended
connotation.”). Applicant’s and Registrant’s broadly identified goods encompass
legally identical stuffed or plush toys and the general impression conveyed by both
Applicant’s mark SNOWY THE MOUSE and the cited mark SNOWY is likely to be
that of a stuffed toy—possibly a stuffed mouse—named “Snowy.” See S.W. Mgmt., Inc.
v. Ocinomled, Ltd., No. 94002242, 2015 WL 4464550, at *17 (TTAB 2015) (where the
goods in an application or registration are broadly described, they are deemed to
encompass all the goods of the nature and type described therein).

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Applicant’s reliance on its intended use of SNOWY THE MOUSE as a character
name “used across books, animation, toys, puzzles and digital media”19 and on
Registrant’s purported actual use as a descriptive term for “a single toy product”20 is
misplaced. The relevant comparison is between the marks as they appear in the
application and registration, not on extrinsic marketplace uses. Fuente Mktg. Ltd. v.
Vaporous Techs., LLC, 172 F.4th 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2026) (“The correct inquiry
requires comparison only of the applied-for mark ... to [the] registered … marks.”); In
re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, No. 86928469, 2018 WL 1620989, at *4 (TTAB 2018)
(“[W]e do not consider how Applicant and Registrant actually use their marks in the
marketplace, but rather how they appear in the registration and the application. We
must compare the marks as they appear in the drawings, and not [based] on any
[extrinsic materials] that may have additional wording or information.”)
Based upon the above analysis, when comparing the marks overall, they are
similar in sound, appearance, connotation and commercial impression. The first
DuPont factor weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion. See Double Coin
Holdings Ltd. v. Tru Development, No. 92063808, 2019 WL 4877349, at *9 (TTAB
2019).
D. Conclusion
Having considered all evidence and arguments bearing on the relevant DuPont
factors, we find that the in-part identical nature of the goods weighs heavily in favor
19 7 TTABVUE 13.
20 Id.

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of a conclusion of likelihood of confusion; and the similarity of the marks and overlap
in channels of trade and classes of customers also weigh in favor of a conclusion of
likelihood of confusion. The sixth factor regarding strength of the mark in the cited
registration is neutral. No factor supports Applicant’s position.
We conclude that confusion is likely.
Decision: The refusal to register Applicant’s proposed mark is affirmed under
Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).