Novel Brands USA LLC v. Zerodensity Yazilim Anonim Sirketi

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: July 27, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
Novel Brands USA LLC
v.
Zerodensity Yazilim Anonim Sirketi
_____
Opposition No. 91254798
_____
Glenn Gundersen, Jennifer Insley-Pruitt, and Thomas Kienzle of Dechert LLP,
for Novel Brands USA LLC.
Jeffrey H. Greger of Hauptman Ham, LLP
for Zerodensity Yazilim Anonim Sirketi.
_____
Before Wellington, Elgin, and Lavache,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Wellington, Administrative Trademark Judge:
On September 24, 2018, Zerodensity Yazilim Anonim Sirketi (“Applicant”) filed
an application seeking a registration for the standard character mark REALITY
ENGINE in connection with the following services in International Class 42:1
1 Application No. 79254744 is a request for extension of protection of International
Registration No. 1456671, pursuant to the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement
Concerning the International Registration of Marks (as amended) (the “Madrid Protocol”),
implemented in the United States under Trademark Act Sections 60-74, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1141-
1141n. The request for extension of protection was filed on September 24, 2018; however,

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Scientific and industrial analysis and research services in
the fields of visual design, architectural design,
engineering; engineering; engineering and architectural
design services; testing, analysis, and evaluation services
of the goods and services of others for the certification of
quality and standards in the field of engineering,
architectural design, software design, computer
programming; computer services, namely, computer
programming, computer virus protection services,
computer system design, creating, maintaining and
updating websites for others, computer software design,
updating and rental of computer software, providing
search engines for the internet, hosting websites,
consultancy in the design and development,
implementation and use of computer hardware, rental of
computer hardware; industrial design services, namely,
computer network design for others, computer website
design, computer system design and architectural design;
graphic arts designing.
Applicant has disclaimed the word ENGINE.
Novel Brands USA LLC (“Opposer”) opposes registration of Applicant’s mark on
the basis that, at the time Applicant filed its application, it lacked a bona fide
intention to use the mark in commerce for all identified services as of the filing date
of the application. Opposer also opposes registration on the ground that the mark is
merely descriptive of the identified services under Section 2(e)(1) of the Act.2
Applicant answered denying the salient allegations of the opposition.3
under the Madrid Protocol and pursuant to Section 67 of the Act, the application is accorded
a priority filing date of June 25, 2018.
2 8 TTABVUE (Opposer’s amended Notice of Opposition). Citations in this opinion to the
briefs and other materials in the case docket refer to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing
system. The number preceding TTABVUE corresponds to the docket entry number, and any
numbers following TTABVUE refer to the page(s) of the docket entry where the cited
materials appear.
3 11 TTABVUE (Answer to amended Notice of Opposition).

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The parties have briefed the opposition.
For the reasons discussed herein, we sustain the opposition in part as to certain
services on the lack-of-bona-fide-intent ground, and otherwise deny the opposition on
that ground. We sustain the opposition on the mere descriptiveness ground as to all
services listed in the application.
I. The Record
The record consists of the pleadings, and, by operation of Trademark Rule
2.122(b)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b)(1), the file history of the involved application.
In addition, Opposer introduced the following:
• Testimonial Declaration of Thomas R. La Perle, a Manager at Opposer, with
exhibits.4
• Notice of Reliance on Internet documents.5
• Second Notice of Reliance (on rebuttal) on Internet documents.6
• Third Notice of Reliance (on rebuttal) on statements made by Applicant in the
trial brief for Board proceeding ZeroDensity Yazilim Anonim Sirketi v. Apple
Inc., Opp. No. 91266285 (TTAB).7
Applicant submitted the testimonial declaration of its Vice President for Research
and Development, Kuban Altan, with exhibits.8
4 12 TTABVUE.
5 13 TTABVUE.
6 44 TTABVUE.
7 45 TTABVUE.
8 22 TTABVUE; 23-24 TTABVUE (exhibits designated “confidential”).

No. 91254798
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II. Entitlement to a Statutory Cause of Action
Establishing an entitlement to a statutory cause of action is a requirement in
every inter partes case. See Corcamore, LLC v. SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d 1298, 1303 (Fed.
Cir. 2020); Australian Therapeutic Supplies Pty. Ltd. v. Naked TM, LLC, 965 F.3d
1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Opposer must prove its entitlement by a preponderance
of the evidence, see, e.g., Made in Nature, LLC v. Pharmavite LLC, No. 91223352,
2022 TTAB LEXIS 228, at *8, by demonstrating that it has: (1) an interest falling
within the zone of interests protected by the statute, and (2) a reasonable belief in
damage proximately caused by the registration of the mark. Curtin v. United
Trademark Holdings, Inc., 137 F.4th 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (citing Lexmark Int’l,
Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 129-34 (2014)).
Opposer has introduced a copy of its application to register the standard character
mark REALITY ENGINE for “downloadable and recorded computer software.”9 The
USPTO issued an Office Action with an advisory that registration of Opposer’s mark
may be refused based on likelihood of confusion with Applicant’s applied-for mark
that has an earlier filing date.10 See, e.g., Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Ahmad, No.
91177036, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 350, at *4-5 (“Applicant’s application for his
9 Application Ser. No. 88608328, filed on September 7, 2019. La Perle Dec. ¶ 3; Dec. Ex. A;
12 TTABVUE 7-8.
10 12 TTABVUE 10-12, La Perle Dec. ¶ 4; Ex. B. The Office Action specifically states that “[i]f
… the mark[ ] in the referenced application[ ] register, [Opposer’s] mark may be refused
registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion with the
[Applicant’s] registered mark(s).” 12 TTABVUE 11.

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NATIONSTAR mark has been cited as a potential bar to the registration of the marks
in opposer’s applications, as shown by the copies of opposer’s applications placed in
the record. This is sufficient to demonstrate that opposer has a real interest in this
proceeding.”) (citations omitted). Opposer has demonstrated that it may suffer injury
should Applicant’s mark mature to registration. It has thus established its
entitlement to a statutory cause of action. See Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222
F.3d 943, 945 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Corcamore, 978 F.3d at 1306.
We further note that Applicant does not contest or even mention Opposer’s
entitlement to a cause of action in its trial brief.
III. Claim of Lack of Bona Fide Intent to Use Mark in Commerce
As mentioned above (see Note 1), Applicant’s application is a request for extension
of protection to the United States filed under Trademark Act Section 66(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1141f(a). Like an application filed on an intent-to-use basis under Section 1(b) of
the Act, Section 66(a) requires that a request for extension of protection to the United
States include “a declaration of bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce.” See
also TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE (TMEP) § 1904.01(c) (May
2026). Accordingly, the case law regarding lack of bona fide intent, generally
developed in the context of Section 1(b) applications, is also applicable to
determinations of bona fide intent under Section 66(a). See Societe Des Produits
Nestle S.A. v. Taboada, No. 91232597, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 267, at *28.
“Whether an applicant has a bona fide intent to use a mark in commerce is an
objective inquiry based on the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at *39. And the

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circumstances must indicate that the applicant’s intent to use the mark is “firm” and
“demonstrable.” M.Z. Berger & Co. v. Swatch AG, 787 F.3d 1368, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir.
2015); see also Tequila Cuadra S. de RL de CV v. Manufacturera de Botas Cuadra,
S.A. de C.V., No. 91282327, 2025 TTAB LEXIS 207, at *12 (“A determination of
whether an applicant has a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce is an
objective determination based on all the circumstances.”) (quoting Boston Red Sox
Baseball Club L.P. v. Sherman, No. 91172268, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 67, at *16). The
record “must reflect an intention to use the mark …. ‘in the ordinary course of trade
…. and not …. merely to reserve a right in a mark.’” Commodore Elecs. Ltd. v. CBM
K.K., No. 91086336, 1993 TTAB LEXIS 6, at *12 n.7 (quoting Trademark Act Section
45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127).
Opposer bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence
that Applicant lacked a bona fide intent to use the mark in U.S. commerce for the
services recited in the involved application when the extension request was filed with
the USPTO. See Tequila Cuadra, 2025 TTAB LEXIS 207, at *12-13; Nestle, 2020
TTAB LEXIS 267, at *28-29. Opposer may satisfy this burden by showing, inter alia,
an absence of any documentary evidence regarding such intent on Applicant’s part.
See Nestle, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 267, at *29; Rsch. in Motion Ltd. v. NBOR Corp., No.
91179284, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 673, at *12 (citing Commodore Elecs., 1993 TTAB
LEXIS 6, at *13). For example, in Nestle, the Board concluded that “[w]hen we
consider the record as a whole, we have Applicant’s repeated discovery responses
demonstrating the absence of documentary support for his bona fide intent to use the

No. 91254798
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[ ] mark in commerce before, at the time of, and for a considerable time after the filing
of his [ ] application.” 2020 TTAB LEXIS 267, at *48. The Board also pointed to
evidence showing the applicant’s “lack of demonstrated capacity or experience needed
to manufacture or otherwise offer the vast array of goods identified in the
[application].” Id.
If Opposer satisfies this initial burden of proof, the burden of production shifts to
Applicant to offer additional evidence showing its bona fide intent to use its mark in
U.S. commerce in connection with the identified services. Saul Zaentz Co. v. Bumb,
No. 91156452, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 236, at *13 (citing Commodore Elecs., 1993 TTAB
LEXIS 6, at *13 n.11).
A. Judgment, in Part, as to Certain Services
Applicant correctly states the law in that “an application will not be deemed void
for lack of a bona fide intention to use absent proof of fraud, or proof of a lack of bona
fide intention to use the mark on all of the goods identified in the application,
not just some of them,” citing The Wet Seal, Inc. v. FD Mgmt., Inc., No. 91157022,
2007 TTAB LEXIS 21, at *7 (emphasis added by Applicant). Rather, in Wet Seal, the
Board stated that we “decide this issue in terms of whether the [goods or services], if
any, for which opposer has shown applicant’s lack of bona fide intention to use the
mark should be deleted from the application.” Id. at *8.
In this regard, and for the first time in its trial brief, Applicant highlights certain
services listed in the application and states that these “were intended for use and in

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use prior to the filing date of the application in 2019.”11 With respect to the services
that are not highlighted, Applicant “concedes it has no evidence to support intent to
provide these services and others.”12 Applicant requests that “for simpler analysis,
the Board should delete the unhighlighted [services] and consider the highlighted
overall core services in the description.”13 The services that Applicant requests be
deleted from the application are as follows (“the Deleted Services”):
• “scientific and industrial analysis and research services in the fields of visual
design, architectural design, engineering;”
• “testing, analysis, and evaluation services of the goods and services of others
for the certification of quality and standards in the field of engineering,
architectural design, software design, computer programming;”
• “computer services, namely, computer programming, computer virus
protection services, … creating, maintaining and updating websites for
others, computer software design, updating and rental of computer software,
providing search engines for the internet, hosting websites … rental of
computer hardware;” and
• “industrial design services, namely, … computer website design.”
Trademark Rule 2.133(a) provides that “[a]n application subject to an opposition
may not be amended in substance … except with the consent of the other party or
parties and the approval of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, or upon motion
granted by the Board.” “To allow Applicant to delete [services] from the application
at this late date is unfair to Opposer.” Monster Energy Co. v. Lo, No. 91225050, 2023
TTAB LEXIS 14, at *12-13. Thus, to the extent Applicant’s request is construed as
11 51 TTABVUE 9.
12 51 TTABVUE 9.
13 51 TTABVUE 9-10.

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an unconsented motion to amend the application to delete certain services, it is denied
as untimely.14
However, in view of Applicant’s statement that it has no evidence to support its
intent to use the mark in commerce in connection with the aforementioned services
it requests to be deleted from the application, this concession establishes Opposer’s
burden as to its lack of intent to use claim. See Nestle, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 267, at *29.
In other words, Opposer may set forth a prima facie case by demonstrating an absence
of any evidence regarding such intent on Applicant’s part, and Applicant expressly
concedes just that with respect to these particular services.
Accordingly, judgment is granted on the ground of lack of a bona fide intent to
use the mark in commerce as to the Deleted Services. See Grand Canyon W. Ranch,
LLC v. Hualapai Tribe, No. 91162008, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 82, at *8 (finding that in
moving to amend its application to delete those services for which opposer claimed
applicant did not use the mark as of the filing of the application, “applicant has
essentially agreed to accept judgment with respect to those services”).
B. Analysis as to Remaining Services
For sake of clarity, the services that Applicant highlighted and believes “should
remain in the application as having a bona fide intent to use”15 are as follows
(together, the “Remaining Services”):
• engineering;
14 Opposer did not file a reply brief or otherwise address Applicant’s request that the services
be deleted.
15 51 TTABVUE 10.

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• engineering and architectural design services;
• computer services, namely, … computer system design, … [and]
consultancy in the design and development, implementation and use
of computer hardware;
• industrial design services, namely, computer network design for
others, … computer system design and architectural design; and
• graphic arts designing.
Opposer argues that “Applicant has failed to introduce any objective evidence that
it intended to use the REALITY ENGINE mark for the identified services at the time
that it filed the Application.”16 Opposer contends that “Applicant’s sole source of
evidence is the testimonial declaration of its corporate witness [Kuban Altan],” and
that “[t]his declaration does not even mention most of the listed services.”17
As explained above, it is Opposer’s burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of
the evidence that Applicant lacked a bona fide intent to use the mark at the time it
filed the extension request. See Tequila Cuadra, 2025 TTAB LEXIS 207, at *12-13.
Opposer may satisfy this burden by demonstrating an absence of any documentary
evidence regarding such intent. See Nestle, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 267, at *29. Put
simply, Applicant’s burden is to come forth with evidence to rebut any initial showing
by Opposer.
Here, Opposer did not submit any evidence to support its lack-of-bona-fide-intent
claim. Indeed, Opposer appears to place the evidentiary burden entirely on Applicant
16 46 TTABVUE 14.
17 46 TTABVUE 14.

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to come forward with evidence demonstrating its intent. To be clear, Opposer did not
introduce any discovery responses from Applicant regarding its activity whereby we
could objectively gauge the existence or non-existence of such intent. Nor do we have
any cross-examination testimony of Applicant’s witness, if it took place, whereby
Opposer may have delved into Applicant’s intent to use its mark in connection with
the listed services at the time it filed its application.18
Applicant’s witness, Kuban Altan, testified that Applicant (a Turkish company)
currently provides “complementary engineering, design, consultancy, software
development, training, rental, and production services.”19 Altan also testified that
Applicant is “comprised of skilled video production and computer professionals
experienced in the fields of production studio design (such as Cyclorama construction
consultancy, lighting setup, configuring cameras, calibrating lenses), designing and
configuring computer systems, software, hardware, networking, IT Security
configurations (such as antivirus, firewall software settings) and computer systems
architectural design, including but not limited to computer graphics.”20 Altan further
testified that The Weather Channel (TWC) has been a customer of Applicant “using
the Reality Engine system in their daily shows” since 2019.21 Also, as early as “April
4, 2016, ZD formed Zero Density Inc., (ZDI) in the United States as a distributor and
18 In several filings, Opposer indicated that it was electing to cross-examine Applicant’s
witness, Kuban Altan, via written questions. See 33 TTABVUE. However, if taken, no cross-
examination testimony was introduced.
19 22 TTABVUE 12 (Altan Dec. ¶ 39).
20 22 TTABVUE 2 (Altan Dec. ¶ 3).
21 22 TTABVUE 5 (Altan Dec. ¶ 21).

No. 91254798
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authorized entity to enter into contracts with third party resellers for licensing the
Reality Engine broadcast compositing system.”22 Taken together, these
uncontroverted averments indicate that Applicant had the demonstrated capacity or
experience to provide the Remaining Services at the time the application was filed.
Cf. Nestle, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 267, at *48. See also Swatch AG (Swatch SA) (Swatch
Ltd.) v. M.Z. Berger & Co., No. 91187092, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 515, at *45 (TTAB 2013)
(Board has “repeatedly found” a lack of bona fide intent to use a mark when there is
not a “demonstrated capacity” to produce the goods or render services in application.)
Accordingly, we find Opposer has not met its burden of demonstrating that
Applicant lacked a bona fide intent to use its mark in commerce in connection with
respect to the Remaining Services.
IV. Mere Descriptiveness Claim
Section 2(e)(1) bars registration of a proposed mark that is merely descriptive
when used on or in connection with an applicant’s identified services. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(e)(1).23 A term is merely descriptive “if it immediately conveys knowledge of a
quality, feature, function, or characteristic of the goods or services with which it is
used.” In re Chamber of Com. of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(quoting In re Bayer AG, 488 F.3d 960, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2007)); see also In re TriVita,
Inc., 783 F.3d 872, 874 (Fed. Cir. 2015). By contrast, a mark is suggestive if
“imagination, thought, or perception is required to reach a conclusion on the nature
22 22 TTABVUE 12 (Altan Dec. ¶ 58).
23 Applicant has not pleaded or argued that its mark has acquired distinctiveness and thus
registrable under the provisions of Section 2(f) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f).

No. 91254798
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of the [services].” In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (quotation
omitted).
Whether a proposed mark is merely descriptive is not determined in the abstract,
but rather in relation to the services for which registration is sought, the context in
which the proposed mark is being used on or in connection with those services, and
the possible significance that the proposed mark would have to the average purchaser
of the services because of the manner in which it is used or intended to be used. In re
Bayer AG, 488 F.3d at 963; see also DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices
Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The commercial impression that a mark
conveys must be viewed through the eyes of a consumer.”). In other words, the
question is not whether someone presented only with the mark could guess the
services listed in the identification. Rather, the question is whether someone who
knows what the services are will understand the mark to convey information about
them. DuoProSS, 695 F.3d at 1253 (quotation omitted).
Pertinent to this case, “[w]here a mark consists of multiple words, the mere
combination of descriptive words does not necessarily create a non-descriptive word
or phrase.” In re Zuma Array Ltd., No. 79288888, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 281, at *8
(quoting In re Omniome, Inc., No. 87661190, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 414, at *12). “[I]f
each component retains its merely descriptive significance in relation to the goods or
services, the combination results in a composite that is itself merely descriptive.”
Omniome, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 414, at *12. Only where the combination of merely
descriptive terms creates a unitary mark, or a mark with a unique, incongruous, or

No. 91254798
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otherwise nondescriptive meaning in relation to the goods or services is the mark
registrable as suggestive. Id.
Evidence that a term is merely descriptive “may be obtained from any competent
source.” Bayer, 488 F.3d at 964 (competent sources of the purchasing public’s
understanding of a term include dictionaries and newspapers); In re N.C. Lottery, 866
F.3d 1363, 1367 68 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he public’s understanding of a [proposed]
mark can be evidenced by … [w]ebsites, publications, and use ‘in labels, packages, or
in advertising material directed to the goods.’”) (quoting In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588
F.2d 811, 814 (CCPA 1978)).
Finally, in contrast to the lack-of-bona-fide intent to use ground for opposition, we
point out that for purposes of sustaining the opposition as to Applicant’s Class 42
services, we need not find that the mark describes all identified services. See In re
Stereotaxis Inc., 429 F.3d 1039, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Rather, we may sustain the
opposition as to that class if the mark merely describes one of the identified services.
Id. And, even as to one of the services, it is not necessary that the mark describes all
of the purposes, functions, characteristics, or features of the service to be considered
merely descriptive; it is enough if the term describes one significant function,
attribute, or property. Chamber of Com., 675 F.3d at 1300 (quotation omitted). In this
regard, we point out that in view of our denial of any putative motion to amend the
application to delete certain services, our analysis regarding whether Applicant’s

No. 91254798
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mark is merely descriptive is applicable to each and every service listed in the
application.24
Opposer argues that Applicant’s mark is merely descriptive of the services listed
in the application, noting first that Applicant has disclaimed the term ENGINE and
“thereby conced[es] that ENGINE is descriptive.”25 Opposer also points Applicant’s
website and advertising wherein it describes its software using “the most photo-
realistic game engine” and that “[w]hen the talent tracking data acquired by Reality
Engine, the engine positions the talent inside the virtual world in the correct position
and depth.”26 Indeed, the term “engine” is defined as “computer software that
performs a fundamental function especially of a larger program.”27
As to the term REALITY, and in the context of the mark as whole, Opposer
contends that “Applicant makes extensive descriptive use of the terms ‘reality’ and
‘virtual reality’ and the abbreviations ‘AR,’ and ‘VR,’ and ‘XR’ (signifying ‘augmented
reality,’ ‘virtual reality,’ and extended reality, respectively) in reference to its Reality
Engine software.”28 In view thereof, Opposer states that the relevant consumers of
24 We further note that this includes the services for which, as discussed supra, we are
entering judgment based on Applicant’s lack of a bona fide intent to use the mark in
commerce.
25 46 TTABVUE 24.
26 13 TTABVUE 8 (Opposer’s NOR Ex. 1).
27 We take judicial notice of the word “engine,” as defined by MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM
DICTIONARY, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/engine.
Accessed July 22, 2026. In re Cordua Rests. LP, No. 85214191, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 94, at *6
n.4 (the Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, including online dictionaries
that exist in printed format); see also B.V.D. Licensing Corp. v. Body Action Design Inc., 846
F.2d 727, 728 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“dictionaries and encyclopedias may be consulted”).
28 46 TTABVUE 6.

No. 91254798
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Applicant’s services “will understand that the applied-for mark conveys information
about Applicant’s ‘VR [virtual reality] engine.’”29 Relying on evidence and argument
submitted by the examining attorney during the prosecution of the application,
Opposer argues that “as the examining attorney found, Applicant uses ‘reality’ for the
same descriptive purpose as is common in Applicant’s industry, it’s clear that this
individual component word retains its descriptive character in Applicant’s alleged
mark.”30 Opposer also notes that the examining attorney even submitted a copy of a
definition “a dictionary definition of ‘reality engine’: namely, ‘A computer system
which can generate virtual environments and objects based on user interactions,
frequently in real time.’”31
Opposer further relies on evidence that it contends shows “full alleged mark
‘reality engine’ in the same augmented and virtual reality context,”32 including the
following:
29 46 TTABVUE 25.
30 46 TTABVUE 25. As noted, the file of the involved application is of record, including all
evidence submitted therein. In this case, the examining attorney responsible for handling
this application on behalf of the USPTO initially refused registration based on the mark being
merely descriptive of the services. See Office Action issued on March 28, 2019. Applicant
argued against the refusal and, after entering a disclaimer of the term ENGINE, the mark
was allowed to proceed to publication by the examining attorney. While the application file
is of record, the decisions and actions of the examining attorney are not binding upon the
Board and have very little evidentiary value in an opposition proceeding. See August Storck
KG v. Florend Indústria e Comércio De Chocolates LTDA, No. 91277224, 2025 TTAB LEXIS
462, at *16 n.30 (“The Board is not bound by the examining attorney’s findings or decisions.
If we were, there would be no need for statutorily mandated opposition proceedings pursuant
to 15 U.S.C. § 1063.”)
31 46 TTABVUE 26, referring to evidence obtained from the website Holo Light (www.holo-
light.com) and attached to the Office Action issued on March 28, 2019, at TSDR p. 2.
32 46 TTABVUE 26.

No. 91254798
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• “Meta’s AR Engine makes it easier for developers to create engaging
augmented reality experiences that work on almost any device, potentially
reaching millions of users worldwide. … The idea is to make it easier to create
an augmented reality experience that can run on a smartphone.”33
• 2017 article titled “Facebook’s Augmented Reality Engine Brings AI Right to
Your Phone” describing efforts as “In short, Facebook is transforming the
camera on your smartphone into an engine for what is commonly called AR.”34
• 2020 Blog article “Introduction to AR Engine” describing “before the AR Engine
explains, we should talk about the Augmented Reality. What is Augmented
Reality (AR)? Augmented reality (AR) is an interactive experience of a real-
world environment where the objects that reside in the real world are enhanced
by computer-generated perceptual information, sometimes across multiple
sensory modalities, including visual, auditory, haptic, somatosensory and
olfactory.”35
Opposer further submits that a finding that REALITY ENGINE is merely
descriptive of Applicant’s services is “amply borne out by the evidentiary record,
which includes descriptive use by Applicant itself” or third parties discussing the
nature and purpose of Applicant’s computer software design services; that is, services
involving software engines used in the context of augmented or virtual reality. For
example:
• In an article in the Live Production TV website (www.live-production.tv), an
article titled “Panasonic & Zero Density [Applicant] Launch a Cost Effective
Virtual Studio Production Solution for TV Stations,” Applicant’s REALITY
ENGINE software is described as “virtual production software” with
“augmented reality applications.”36
33 From Mixed News website (www.mixed-news.com); printout attached at 44 TTABVUE 58
(rebuttal NOR Ex. 34).
34 From Wired magazine website (www.wired.com); printout attached at 44 TTABVUE 64
(rebuttal NOR Ex. 35).
35 From Medium website (www.medium.com); printout attached at 44 TTABVUE 70 (rebuttal
NOR Ex. 36).
36 Screenshots attached at 13 TTABVUE 62-67 (NOR Ex. 8).

No. 91254798
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• An announcement on NewscastStudio website mentions Applicant will
“feature latest release of Reality at NAB,” stating that “[a]long with software,
[Applicant] will feature a variety of speakers offering talk sessions on a variety
of topics including . . . reality engine in data visualization.”37
• On YouTube, a video includes the following commentary regarding Applicant’s
products at “NAB Show 2023,” stating: “Three Reality Engines run on three
RealityEngine AMPERE workstations…. One Reality Engine is used for
virtual studio, one Reality Engine is used for AR and one Reality Engine is
used for feeding the LED Wall graphics.”38
• Applicant, on its website, claims that “[n]owadays augmented reality is one of
the most popular production techniques. It is achieved when digital content
appears over the real world and composite it correct.” And, Applicant touts
itself as “an international technology company dedicated to develop creative
products for the industries such as broadcasting, augmented reality, live
events and e-sports.”39
Based on the above-mentioned evidence, Applicant’s mark REALITY ENGINE
describes a type of computer software that “performs a fundamental function of a
larger program” in connection with augmented reality or virtual reality applications.
While we are keenly aware that the involved application does not list goods, such as
this type of software, the services listed in the application do include “computer
software design … computer programming … computer system design … [and]
updating and rental of computer software.” And these services are broad enough to
include the use or design or involve augmented reality or virtual reality engine
software as a primary feature or purpose of those services. In which case, the
37 Screenshots from website attached Office Action issued on April 16, 2019, at TSDR p. 6.
38 Screenshots attached at 44 TTABVUE 49 (NOR Ex. 31).
39 Screenshots attached at 44 TTABVUE 49 (NOR Ex. 31).

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REALITY ENGINE mark immediately conveys information about these services to
those who know what they are.
Applicant acknowledges that the term REALITY “is used in connection with a
variety of terms associated with the technology at issue in this case, such as virtual
reality, augmented reality, or extended reality.”40 Nevertheless, Applicant contends
that, upon hearing the mark as a whole, a multi-step thought process is necessary
before a consumer realizes the descriptive significance of the mark:41
The customer would first hear the word reality and may assume it refers
to virtual reality or the more complex technologies such as augmented
reality. This is step one. The next step would be combining that
understanding with the term engine, a software system subcomponent. For
example, a graphics card, as one might put into a computer for gaming
purposes. With these two thought out steps the consumer would have to
make a third step to reach the conclusion that one can obtain a service to
design and configure a broadcast studio comprising cameras, green
screens, televisions, video recorders and video software and many more
components common in media broadcast studios.
Applicant submits the mark as whole requires at least two steps if not
three in the thought process to convey the knowledge that REALITY
ENGINE would be a broadcast studio design service.
We disagree. We find that consumers encountering Applicant’s mark in connection
with “computer software design … computer programming … computer system
design … [and] updating and rental of computer software” services will quickly
understand that the mark imparts information about these services in that they
involve the design, use or rental of virtual or augmented reality engine software.
Because the terms REALITY and ENGINE are merely descriptive of features or
40 51 TTABVUE 14.
41 51 TTABVUE 14-15.

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purposes of Applicant’s services, and these individual terms do not lose their
descriptive significance when combined, consumers aware of Applicant’s services will
immediately understand the mark REALITY ENGINE to convey information about
the services. DuoProSS, 695 F.3d 1253.
In view thereof and based on the entire record, including evidence not specifically
mentioned, we find Applicant’s mark, REALITY ENGINE, is merely descriptive of a
feature or purpose of Applicant’s services and must be refused registration under
Section 2(e)(1) of the Act.
Decision:
The lack-of-bona-fide-intent ground for opposition is sustained, in part, as to the
Deleted Services:
• “scientific and industrial analysis and research services in the fields of visual
design, architectural design, engineering;”
• “testing, analysis, and evaluation services of the goods and services of others
for the certification of quality and standards in the field of engineering,
architectural design, software design, computer programming;”
• “computer services, namely, computer programming, computer virus
protection services, … creating, maintaining and updating websites for others,
computer software design, updating and rental of computer software,
providing search engines for the internet, hosting websites … rental of
computer hardware;” and
• “industrial design services, namely, … computer website design.”
The lack-of-bona-fide-intent ground for opposition is dismissed, in part, as to the
Remaining Services in the application.
The merely descriptive ground for opposition is sustained as to all services
listed in the application.