Nekki Limited

Mailed: April 22, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
————
In re Nekki Limited
————
Serial No. 98767008
————
Alexander S. Lazouski of Lazouski IP LLC,
for Nekki Limited.
Herb Brown, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 121
Richard White, Managing Attorney.
————
Before Wellington, Larkin, and O’Connor,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Wellington, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Nekki Limited (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
standard character mark SPINE – THIS IS GUN FU (with the term GUN FU
voluntarily disclaimed) for the following goods and services:
Downloadable computer games software; Downloadable computer gaming
software; Downloadable video games software; Downloadable game
software programs for arcade video game machines; Downloadable game
development software; Downloadable game software; Downloadable
computer application software featuring games and gaming; Downloadable
computer programs for video and computer games; Video game discs;
Blank video tapes; Blank audio cassettes [audio]; Blank compact discs; CD-
ROM drives; Recorded data processing software programs recorded on
machine-readable data carriers; Sound recordings featuring music; Video
recordings featuring music; Downloadable interactive entertainment
software for playing video games; Downloadable computer video game
software; Downloadable video game software; Downloadable computer
software to enhance the audio-visual capabilities of multimedia
applications, namely, for the integration of text, audio, graphics, still
THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB

Serial No. 98767008
2
images and moving pictures; Downloadable computer software for the
administration of on-line games and gaming; Electronic publications,
downloadable, in the nature of books, magazines, brochures, articles
relating to games and gaming; Downloadable electronic games software;
Downloadable computer game software for use with on-line interactive
games; Downloadable computer game software for use on mobile and
cellular phones; Electronic publications, downloadable, in the nature of
books, magazines, brochures, articles in the field of entertainment;
Handheld computing devices being computers; Handheld computers;
Downloadable computer game software for use on mobile devices, in
International Class 9;
Toys, games, and playthings, namely, action figures; Home video game
machines; Hand held video games; Hand-held computer games equipment,
namely, game consoles; all the above excluding game controllers, in
International Class 28; and
Publishing of interactive computer and video game software;
Entertainment provided via the internet, namely, online gaming services
in the nature of casinos; Entertainment services, namely, providing on-line
computer games; Providing online, interactive multi-player computer
games via the internet and electronic communication networks;
Entertainment services, namely, multi-player matching services in the
nature of matching users with computer games; Electronic games services,
namely, providing online computer games; Providing online computer
games; Providing online entertainment in the nature of computer game
tournaments; Providing online entertainment in the nature of fantasy
sports leagues; Providing online entertainment in the nature of game
shows; Providing on-line information in the field of computer gaming
entertainment; Online game services in the nature of casinos provided by
means of communications by computer terminals or mobile telephone;
Providing information on-line relating to computer games and computer
enhancements for games; Online electronic games services in the nature of
casinos provided from a computer database or by means of the internet;
Electronic games services, including namely, provision of computer games
on-line or by means of a global computer network; Provision of on-line
electronic publications, namely, books, brochures, newsletters, articles in
the field of games and entertainment; Providing online interactive
computer games, in International Class 41.1
1 Application Serial No. 98767008, filed September 24, 2024, is based on Applicant’s
ownership of a foreign registration, under Section 44(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1126(e), and a claim of
priority based on that registration of August 1, 2024.

Serial No. 98767008
3
The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration of Applicant’s mark
under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act (“the Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the
ground of likelihood of confusion based on the registered standard character mark
GUN FU for the following goods:
Downloadable computer game software via a global computer network and
wireless devices, in International Class 9.2
After the Examining Attorney made the refusal final, Applicant filed an appeal.
Both Applicant and the Examining Attorney filed briefs. For the reasons explained
below, we affirm the refusal.
I. Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Act, in relevant part, prohibits registration of a mark that “so
resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office … as to be likely,
when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion.” 15
U.S.C. § 1052(d). To determine whether confusion is likely, we analyze all probative
evidence relevant to the factors set out in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476
F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”). See In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d
1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
In every Section 2(d) case, two key DuPont factors are the similarity or
dissimilarity of the marks and the relatedness of the respective goods or services,
because the “fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect
of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences
2 Registration No. 4939419 issued April 19, 2016; Section 8 declaration received.

Serial No. 98767008
4
in the marks.” Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103
(CCPA 1976). Here, we have considered each DuPont factor that is relevant and for
which there is evidence and argument of record. See In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d
1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Varying weight may be assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the evidence
presented. See Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2011); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[T]he various
evidentiary factors may play more or less weighty roles in any particular
determination.”). Ultimately, however, “[e]ach case must be decided on its own facts
and the differences are often subtle ones.” Indus. Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d
1197, 1199 (CCPA 1973).
A. The Goods and Services; Their Trade Channels and Classes of
Consumers
We turn first to the second and third DuPont factors, which concern the
relatedness of the goods and services, and the channels of trade for the goods and
services. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. In this analysis, we must consider the goods and
services as they are identified in Applicant’s application and the goods in the cited
registration. See Stone Lion Cap. Partners, L.P. v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317,
1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Comp. Servs. Inc., 918
F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). In addition to any evidentiary submissions, the
involved application and cited registration themselves “may provide evidence of the
relationship between the [goods or] services.” In re OSF Healthcare Sys., No.

Serial No. 98767008
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88706809, 2023 TTAB Lexis 353, at *9, (quoting Monster Energy Co. v. Lo, No.
91225050, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 14, at *19).
Moreover, although the Office has the ultimate burden of establishing a likelihood
of confusion, we note that Applicant effectively concedes that the second and third
DuPont factors support a finding of a likelihood of confusion by not addressing the
similarity or dissimilarity of the goods and services, or their trade channels, in its
appeal brief. See In re Morinaga Nyugyo K.K., No. 86338392, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 448,
at *2.
Here, the Examining Attorney did not submit any evidence but argues that the
goods and services, as recited in the application and cited registration, are so broad
that they are either partially encompassing of one another or that there is a close
inherent relationship. The Examining Attorney also argues that “[a]dditionally, the
goods and services of [Applicant and Registrant] have no restrictions as to nature,
type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are ‘presumed to travel in the
same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers,’”3 quoting In re Viterra Inc.,
671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Because the application contains three classes of goods and services, our
assessment of relatedness of the goods and services necessarily involves a separate
3 6 TTABVUE 11. The Examining Attorney’s construction of the Viterra decision is an
incorrect statement as it overplays the decision. In Viterra, the Federal Circuit first noted
that there was no dispute that the goods at issue were identical, and that, in that situation,
it is proper to presume that the goods would be found in the same trade channels and offered
to the same classes of consumers. Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1362. In other words, that presumption
applies only where the goods or services themselves are identical, which is not the case in
every class in this case.

Serial No. 98767008
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analysis as to each class. See G&W Labs., Inc. v. G W Pharma Ltd., No. 91169571,
2009 TTAB LEXIS 2, at *6 (“[A] multiple-class application can be viewed as a series
of applications for registration of a mark in connection with goods or services in each
class, combined into one application”). It is also worthwhile to point out that for a
finding of likelihood of confusion as to each class of goods or services in the
application, it is sufficient if relatedness is established for any one of the recited goods
or services within that class in the application. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills
Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336 (CCPA 1981). We thus discuss the relatedness of goods
and services by each class in the application vis-à-vis the goods in the cited
registration.
Class 9 Goods
Applicant’s goods in Class 9 include “downloadable computer games software” and
these goods are legally identical to the “downloadable computer game software via a
global computer network and wireless devices” identified in the cited registration.
Moreover, as to the channels of trade, we must presume that these legally
identical goods will be offered in the same trade channels to the same classes of
consumers. Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1362 (even though there was no evidence regarding
channels of trade and classes of consumers for identical goods, the Board was entitled
to rely on this legal presumption in determining likelihood of confusion); see also
Genesco Inc. v. Martz, No. 91121296, 2003 TTAB LEXIS 123, at *28 (“Given the in-
part identical and in-part related nature of the parties’ goods, and the lack of any
restrictions in the identifications thereof as to trade channels and purchasers, these

Serial No. 98767008
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clothing items could be offered and sold to the same classes of purchasers through the
same channels of trade.”).
Class 28 Goods
Applicant’s goods in this class include “home video game machines” and “hand-
held computer games equipment, namely game consoles … .”
The Examining Attorney argues that “[w]here evidence shows that the goods at
issue have complementary uses, and thus are often used together or otherwise
purchased by the same purchasers for the same or related purposes, such goods have
generally been found to be sufficiently related such that confusion would be likely if
they are marketed under the same or similar marks,”4 citing In re Martin’s Famous
Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“complementary nature of
bread and cheese cannot be ignored”). And, in this case, the Examining Attorney
contends that “Registrant’s downloadable computer gaming software frequently
requires a gaming device or console to function” and thus “Applicant’s Class 28 goods
serve a complementary function and are considered related to registrant’s
downloadable gaming software.”5 In support, the Examining Attorney cites to prior
Board decisions where it was found that “computer hardware products are related to
computer software products, such that their marketing under the same or similar
marks may be likely to cause source confusion.”6
4 6 TTABVUE 10.
5 6 TTABVUE 11.
6 6 TTABVUE 11, citing inter alia In re TIE/Commc’ns, Inc., No. 73501553, 1987 TTAB
LEXIS 42, at *4.

Serial No. 98767008
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Again, the Examining Attorney did not submit evidence to show the relatedness
of Applicant’s goods in Class 28 with those in the cited registration. Rather, the
Examining Attorney appears to rely instead on other decisions to fill this evidentiary
void. As we frequently point out, mainly to applicants that argue against a finding of
relatedness by relying on other decisions, we are not bound by factual determinations
made in other proceedings with different evidentiary records. Cf., In re Nett Designs,
Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, at 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Even if some prior registrations had
some characteristics similar to Nett Designs’ application, the [US]PTO’s allowance of
such prior registrations does not bind the Board or this court.”). See also, In re
Embiid, No. 88202890, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 168, at *34 (“noting the limited utility of
reliance, in lieu of supporting evidence, on past decisions in which the Board has or
has not found [goods] to be related”); In re Finisar Corp., No. 76300876, 2006 TTAB
LEXIS 57, at *12 (each application for registration must be considered on its own).
Nevertheless, we take judicial notice that it is common knowledge that video game
machines and hand-held computer games equipment, including game consoles,
frequently use computer game software. It is also common knowledge that much of
today’s computer software, including gaming software, may be downloaded via the
Internet. Indeed, there is a strong inherent relationship between these goods because
a “computer game” is one “that you play on a computer or on a small portable piece
of electronic equipment.”7
7 Definition of “Computer Game” from COLLINS COBUILD ADVANCED LEARNER’S
DICTIONARY. Collins English Dictionary Copyright Harper Collins Publishers. We take
judicial notice of this definition and the definition of "marketing. We take judicial notice of

Serial No. 98767008
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Given these established facts, we agree with the Examining Attorney to the extent
that “home video game machines” and “hand-held computer games equipment,
namely game consoles …,” like those described in the application, have a close
intrinsic and complementary relationship with “downloadable computer game
software via a global computer network and wireless devices,” like those identified in
the cited registration. Put simply and in terms of the marks and goods involved
herein, consumers that own Applicant’s SPINE – THIS IS GUN FU branded gaming
machines may look to download gaming software for use on those machines, including
Registrant’s GUN FU branded downloadable game software.
Again, the Examining Attorney did not submit any evidence and thus we cannot
conclude that these particular goods may be found in the same trade channels.
Class 41 Services
With respect to Applicant’s Class 41 services, the Examining Attorney contends
that the “online gaming services,” as listed in the application, “serve an identical
function to … Registrant’s Class 9 downloadable gaming software, as they are merely
a non-downloadable version of the same software.”8 We also observe that Applicant’s
“electronic games services, including namely, provision of computer games on-line or
by means of a global computer network,” bear a very close and self-evident
relationship to Registrant’s “downloadable computer game software.” Indeed,
this definition. See Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imps. Co., No.
91061847, 1982 TTAB LEXIS 146, at *7, aff’d, 703 F.2d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Red Bull
GmbH, No. 75788830, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 136, at *7.
8 6 TTABVUE 11.

Serial No. 98767008
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although Applicant is rendering a service by providing the computer games online,
the same consumer who enjoys these services may seek to download Registrant’s
computer game software for the same purpose of enjoyment, namely, playing the
computer game.
For the aforementioned reasons, Applicant’s services in Class 41, particularly its
“online gaming” and online “provision of computer games” are very closely related to
Registrant’s downloadable computer game software.
Conclusion – Relatedness of the Goods and Services; Trade Channels
In sum, we find Applicant’s goods and services in all three classes are, at the very
least, very closely related to Registrant’s downloadable computer game software. In
particular, Applicant’s Class 9 goods are, in part, legally identical to Registrant’s
goods and such identical goods will be found in the same channels of trade.
Accordingly, the second and third DuPont factors also weigh strongly in favor of
finding confusion likely with respect to Class 9 of the application. And the second
DuPont factor weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion with respect to Classes 28
and 41; and because we make no findings as to the trade channels for these classes,
the third DuPont factor is neutral with respect to these classes.
Finally, we note that Applicant’s goods and services in all three classes and
Registrant’s goods may be offered to the same class of consumers, namely, anyone
interested in playing computer games either online or by downloading the game
software.

Serial No. 98767008
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B. Alleged Weakness of GUN FU
Before we discuss the first DuPont factor, a key factor in any likelihood of
confusion analysis because it involves the similarity of the marks, we address
Applicant’s argument and evidence regarding the claimed weakness of the registered
GUN FU mark. See, e.g., Heil Co. v. Tripleye GmbH, No. 91277359, 2024 TTAB LEXIS
494, at *47 (“Because it affects the scope of protection to which it is entitled, we
commence by addressing the strength or weakness of Opposer’s registered … mark.”).
Indeed, Applicant’s main argument on appeal is that the marks are dissimilar
because not only did Applicant disclaim the term GUN FU in its mark, but also
because Applicant “introduced evidence on record [showing] that GUN FU is merely
descriptive.”9 Accordingly, even though the cited registered mark, GUN FU, is a term
within Applicant’s mark, this term “is not intended to be the dominant element and,
therefore, does not contribute to confusion with the cited mark.”10
Applicant submitted Internet evidence from two websites.11 The first, from a TV
Tropes website, describes “Gun Fu” as “a catch-all term for stylized firearm-based
combat styles in fictional visual media that combines martial arts with guns.”12 The
second, from the Wikipedia online encyclopedia website, defines “Gun Fu” as:13
… a portmanteau of gun and kung fu (also known as gun kata, bullet ballet,
gymnastic gunplay or bullet arts), [ ] a style of sophisticated close-quarters
gunfight resembling a martial arts combat that combines firearms with
9 4 TTABVUE 6.
10 4 TTABVUE 7.
11 Attached to Applicant’s Response to Office Action, filed June 19, 2025.
12 Response to Office Action, filed June 19, 2025, at TSDR p. 21.
13 Response to Office Action, filed June 19, 2025, at TSDR p. 25.

Serial No. 98767008
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hand-to-hand combat and traditional melee weapons in a roughly 50/50
ratio. It can be seen in Hong Kong action cinema, and in American action
films influenced by it.
Essentially, Applicant is attacking the distinctiveness of the cited registered
mark.
The sixth DuPont factor involves “two prongs of analysis for a mark’s strength …:
conceptual strength and commercial strength.” Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 71 F.4th
1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).14 “Conceptual strength is a measure of
a mark’s distinctiveness . . . and distinctiveness is often classified in categories of
generally increasing distinctiveness[:] . . . (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive;
(4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful.” Id. (citation and quotation and quotation marks
omitted). “Distinctiveness is relevant to a mark’s overall strength in the likelihood of
confusion analysis.” Id. (citation omitted).
In this case, the cited mark is registered on the Principal Register, without a
claim of acquired distinctiveness, and is thus deemed to be inherently distinctive.
Heil Co. v. Tripleye GmbH, No. 91277359, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 494, at *48-49 (when a
mark is “registered on the Principal Register, with no claim of acquired
distinctiveness under Section 2(f), we presume it is inherently distinctive, i.e., that it
is at worst suggestive of the goods [or services].” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b)). See also,
Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea, Inc., No. 91118587, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 330, at
*62. We cannot entertain Applicant’s assertion that the registered mark is
14 Specifically, the sixth factor involves the consideration of “[t]he number and nature of
similar marks in use on similar goods [or services].” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361.

Serial No. 98767008
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descriptive, as this would be an impermissible collateral attack on the registration.15
See In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Nat’l Data
Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1059-60 & n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Nevertheless, we may consider Applicant’s evidence because it may show the
cited mark is suggestive. Indeed, as the Federal Circuit has instructed, where a mark
that is shown to be “highly suggestive,” it may be entitled to an abbreviated scope of
protection because that mark is less likely to cause confusion over source
identification as opposed to “more fanciful” marks. Spireon, 71 F.4th at 1362-63.
Applicant’s evidence helps demonstrate that some of the public will understand
“Gun Fu” as evoking a genre of “fictional visual media that combines martial arts
with guns,” as the TV Tropes website explains. The Wikipedia entry also helps show
“Gun Fu” has a similar meaning in connection with films. In the context of media
combining the use of guns with martial arts, it is certainly strongly suggestive of the
subject matter. As such, Applicant’s evidence, albeit from only two websites, is
probative and tends to show the registered mark has some conceptual weakness.
Finally, as to Applicant’s reliance on the fact that it voluntarily disclaimed the
wording IS GUN FU, this is of no real importance in this proceeding. “The technicality
of a disclaimer in [an] application to register its mark has no legal effect on the issue
of likelihood of confusion. The public is unaware of what words have been disclaimed
during prosecution of the trademark application at the PTO.” Nat’l Data, 753 F.2d
15 An ex parte appeal is not the proper forum for such allegations; they should be brought in
a formal cancellation proceeding. See, e.g., In re Calgon Corp., 435 F.2d 596 (CCPA 1971).

Serial No. 98767008
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1056, 1059.
In sum, the cited registered mark, GUN FU, is inherently distinctive. However,
“Gun Fu” has some conceptual weakness when used in connection with media or
subject matter that involves guns used in martial art combat. We keep these findings
in mind when weighing the other DuPont factors and in our ultimate decision as to
whether confusion is likely.
C. Comparison of the Marks
We turn now to the first DuPont factor, which focuses on the similarity or
dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation,
and commercial impression. See Palm Bay Imps. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison
Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at
1361). Similarity as to any one of these elements may be sufficient to support a
finding that the marks are confusingly similar. See Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Co.,
390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968) (“It is sufficient if the similarity in either form,
spelling or sound alone is likely to cause confusion.”); accord In re Inn at St. John’s,
LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 170, at *13, aff’d mem., 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed.
Cir. 2019).
There is no rule that marks are automatically considered similar where one mark
encompasses the entirety of another; however, the fact that Registrant’s mark GUN
FU is subsumed within Applicant’s mark SPINE – THIS IS GUN FU is a significant
point of similarity between them. See, e.g., In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342,
1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (applicant’s mark ML is similar to registrant’s mark ML
MARK LEES). In addition, while the marks have differences in sight and sound, they

Serial No. 98767008
15
also possess strong visual and aural similarities as a result of Applicant’s inclusion
of Registrant’s entire mark. Thus, while the initial part of Applicant’s mark looks and
sounds different from Registrant’s mark, the latter phrase THIS IS GUN FU is very
similar in those aspects of the marks. Importantly, the words THIS IS further draw
attention to and directly emphasize the GUN FU element.
In terms of meaning, the term SPINE that begins Applicant’s mark has no
demonstrated significance in connection with the involved goods or services. It is
clearly a point of difference in terms of connotation. Furthermore, we acknowledge
that Applicant is correct to the extent that an initial arbitrary element of a party’s
mark generally will play a stronger role in the mark’s overall commercial impression.
Nevertheless, we find the following phrase THIS IS GUN FU, separated by a hyphen,
helps convey a fundamental similarity in terms of the marks’ source-indicating
commercial impressions. This is because the phrase THIS IS GUN FU is likely to be
understood by consumers as projecting a connection or source-affiliation with
Registrant’s GUN FU branded goods. In other words, consumers familiar with
Registrant’s mark, GUN FU, are likely to mistakenly believe Applicant’s goods and
services, being sold under SPINE – THIS IS GUN FU, are a version or extension of
the Registrant’s goods. See, e.g., Double Coin Holdings, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 347, at
*23 (“ROAD WARRIOR looks, sounds, and conveys the impression of being a line
extension of WARRIOR.)”
Accordingly, we find the marks are similar and the first DuPont factor weighs in
favor of a conclusion that confusion is likely.

Serial No. 98767008
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II. Conclusion
The first DuPont factor favors a conclusion of a likelihood of confusion because
Applicant’s mark, SPINE – THIS IS GUN FU, and the cited mark, GUN FU, are
overall similar in sight, sound and connotation. In addition, the second and third
DuPont factors also strongly support a conclusion that confusion is likely as to Class
9 because certain goods listed in Class 9 of the application encompass or are
encompassed by Registrant’s goods and these legally identical goods are presumably
found in the same trade channels. In addition, the second DuPont factor also supports
a conclusion that confusion is likely for Classes 28 and 41 because Applicant’s goods
and services in these classes have a close intrinsic relationship to the Registrant’s
goods. The goods and services in each of these classes will target the same class of
consumers, namely, the general public interested in playing computer games,
whether through downloading or playing online.
Finally, we also keep in mind Applicant’s showing that the registered mark, GUN
FU, has some conceptual weakness to the extent Registrant’s computer games may
involve subject matter that combines guns with martial arts. On the other hand, we
must also bear in mind that the registered mark is presumed to be inherently
distinctive.
Upon weighing all of the aforementioned factors, we conclude that Applicant’s
mark is likely to cause confusion with the registered mark.
Decision: The refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) to register Applicant’s
mark is affirmed.