Assef Trading Est.

98642858Ttab20 avr. 2026

Texte intégral

This Opinion Is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: April 20, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Assef Trading Est.
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Serial No. 98642858
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Sebastian Lovera Riso, of Ladas & Parry LLP, for Assef Trading Est.
Philip Liu, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 109,
Michael Kazazian, Managing Attorney.
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Before English, Thurmon and Elgin, Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Thurmon, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Assef Trading Est. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
mark shown below
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for “Perfumery; Bleaching preparations for laundry use; Cleaning, polishing, scouring
and abrasive preparations; Essential oils; Non-medicated cosmetics; Non-medicated
dentifrices; Non-medicated toiletry preparations,” in International Class 3.1
The Trademark Examining Attorney issued a final refusal of registration under
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), finding a likelihood of
confusion, based on a Registration of the mark ASSAF, in standard characters, for
“Clothing, namely, hats, caps, and beanies,” in International Class 25.2
The appeal is briefed3 and ready for final decision. We affirm the refusal to
register.
1 Application Serial No. 98642858 was filed on July 11, 2024, under Section 44(e) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1126(e), based on a registration of the mark in Saudi Arabia
(Registration No. 1443026125). The mark is described as follows: “The mark consists of the
wording ‘ASSAF’ in gold stylized font, above Arabic characters in gold, all below a gold shield
with gold bands separating the shield into three components with a gold horseshoe in the
upper left, a gold castle in the upper right, and a gold knight on a gold horse holding a gold
sword on the bottom. The white background is not claimed as part of the mark and represents
a transparent background.” The color gold is claimed as a feature of the mark. The
Application further states that “[t]he non-Latin characters in the mark transliterate to
ASSAF and this has no meaning in a foreign language.”
Citations to the prosecution file are to entries in the USPTO’s Trademark Status & Document
Retrieval (“TSDR”) system in .pdf format. Citations to the appeal record are to TTABVUE,
the Board’s online docketing system.
2 Registration No. 7664349, issued January 21, 2025.
3 Applicant submitted four exhibits containing evidence with its Appeal Brief. The same
materials were submitted during prosecution and, therefore, are part of the record. There
was no need to resubmit such evidence with the Appeal Brief. The record in an application
should be complete prior to the filing of an appeal. Trademark Rule 2.142(d), 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.142(d); see also TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE
§§ 1203.02(e), 1207.01; TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 710.01(c) (Nov.
2025).
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Section 2(d) – Applicable Law
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the
probative evidence of record bearing on a likelihood of confusion. In re E. I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”), cited in B&B
Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138 (2015); see also In re Majestic
Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We must consider each DuPont
factor for which there is evidence and argument. See, e.g., In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912
F.3d 1376, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2019). “Whether a likelihood of confusion exists between
an applicant’s mark and a previously registered mark is determined on a case-by-case
basis, aided by application of the thirteen DuPont factors.” Omaha Steaks Int’l, Inc.
v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2018). When analyzing
these factors, the overriding concerns are not only to prevent buyer confusion as to
the source of the goods or services, but also to protect the registrant from adverse
commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil
Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
“Each case must be decided on its own facts and the differences are often subtle
ones.” Indus. Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d 1197, 1199 (CCPA 1973). Varying
weights may be assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the evidence presented.
See Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
Shell Oil, 992 F.2d at 1206 (“the various evidentiary factors may play more or less
weighty roles in any particular determination”). In any likelihood of confusion
analysis, two key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the
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similarities between the goods or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315,
1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156,
1164-65 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103 (CCPA
1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of
differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the
marks.”).
Likelihood of Confusion – Analysis
The Applicant and the Trademark Examining Attorney focused on the first two
DuPont factors, with some additional argument submitted under factors three and
four. We address factors one through four below.
A. Similarity of the Marks
To evaluate the similarity of the marks under the first DuPont factor, we consider
the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression. See, e.g., Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison
Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371 (citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). “Similarity
in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”
In re Inn at St. John’s LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 170, *13 (quoting In re
Davia, No. 85497617, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 214, *4), aff’d mem., 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed.
Cir. 2019); accord Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA
1968) (“It is sufficient if the similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely
to cause confusion.”) (citation omitted).
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“The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead
whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression
such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection
between the parties.” Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning, LLC, 668 F.3d 1356,
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who
normally “retains a general rather than a specific impression of marks.” In re
i.am.symbolic, llc, No. 85916778, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 281, *11.
The applied-for mark includes as its sole English word the entire cited
mark ASSAF. For consumers familiar with the cited mark, the additional features of
the applied-for mark may be viewed merely as an extension of the ASSAF mark. We
have found marks similar in prior cases where one mark subsumes the other. See,
e.g., China Healthways Inst. Inc. v. Wang, 491 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(applicant’s mark CHI PLUS is similar to opposer’s mark CHI both for electric
massagers). We find the marks are visually similar because of the shared ASSAF
element.
The additional elements of the applied-for mark distinguish the two marks, but
not in a way that is likely to reduce the risk of confusion. The non-Latin script in
Applicant’s mark transliterates to ASSAF, so consumers who can read the English
word ASSAF and the Arabic script will not find that this script distinguishes the
marks, but instead will see the literal elements of the mark as ASSAF ASSAF. For
those consumers who cannot read Arabic, the Arabic script will likely be viewed as
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another design element of the mark, one that does not provide much distinction from
the cited ASSAF mark. The shield design is distinctive and is likely to be noticed and
remembered by consumers. But words matter, and the only English word in the
applied-for mark is identical to the cited mark. This type of similarity can lead to
consumer confusion, even when one of the marks contains a design element. The
marks are similar in appearance.
Perhaps most importantly, the marks are identical in sound for consumers who
do not attempt to pronounce the Arabic script in Applicant’s mark. These consumers
will use the ASSAF literal element of Applicant’s mark to ask for the goods. When
the goods are promoted or discussed, the literal ASSAF element of Applicant’s mark
will be used. It is unlikely that consumers will describe the shield design to ask for or
promote Applicant’s goods. For those consumers who understand both English and
Arabic, Applicant’s mark may be spoken as ASSAF ASSAF, which is also similar to
the cited mark. Or these consumers may “shorten” the literal parts of Applicant’s
mark to just ASSAF. For all relevant consumers, the marks are highly similar in
sound.
The word ASSAF has no established meaning in English, but because the same
word is used in both marks, the marks will share the same meaning. In re Embiid,
No. 88202890, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 168, at *20-21 (finding no evidence to support a
different meaning of the applied-for mark with different goods). Applicant’s mark
includes a rider on a horse and a horseshoe within the shield design, and these
elements are absent from the cited mark. These additional elements of Applicant’s
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mark create a commercial impression somewhat different from that of the cited mark.
But the dominant, and sole English literal element, of both marks is the word ASSAF,
so the dominant or primary commercial impression created by the two marks will be
the same. When the marks are considered in their entireties, the commercial
impressions created are also similar.
Applicant argues that its mark focuses on horses, which, according to Applicant,
are used in the branding for exclusive and expensive goods.4 We offer no view on how
common horses are as elements of third-party marks, as we lack sufficient evidence,
but we have considered the horse-related elements of the applied-for mark. While
these elements create some difference between the marks, the dominant element of
Applicant’s mark is the word ASSAF. For the reasons set out above, we find the
design elements of Applicant’s mark do not significantly distinguish the marks.
Indeed, consumers familiar with the cited mark, may view the applied-for mark as a
more complete version of the ASSAF mark (i.e., a version showing additional
elements connected with registrant), and as a result, may conclude that Applicant’s
mark with the horse-themed shield design is being used by the registrant.
Finally, we note that if Applicant is correct about the common use of horses in
trademarks for similar goods, then the horse elements in its own mark are less
4 6 TTABVUE 16 (“For instance, luxury fashion houses (e.g. Hermès, Coach, Polo Ralph
Lauren and Burberry) and luxury automotive brands (Ferrari and Porsche), incorporate
horse imagery in their brand logos to evoke luxury and pedigree.”). Applicant provided
evidence that these brands use horses as part of their marks, but no evidence concerning the
practices of other businesses in the same markets (fashion houses or luxury automobiles).
There is not enough evidence to provide the needed context to determine whether horses are
commonly used in luxury brands.
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distinctive and less likely to be relied upon by consumers than the other elements of
the mark. We make no findings on this point, as we lack sufficient evidence, but if
Applicant’s argument about horses was proven, it could undermine Applicant’s
position in this appeal, rather than support it.
Based on a careful consideration of the marks in their entireties, we find the
marks are similar in appearance, sound, meaning, and overall commercial
impression. This factor supports the Section 2(d) refusal.
B. Similarity or Relatedness of the Goods
We evaluate the second DuPont factor based on the goods identified in the
Application and the cited Registration. See Stone Lion Cap. Partners, LP v. Lion Cap.
LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous. Comput. Servs.
Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1990). It is sufficient for a finding of likelihood of
confusion as to a class of goods in the application if relatedness is established between
any of the goods identified in that class and the cited Registration. Tuxedo Monopoly,
Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336 (CCPA 1981); see also Double Coin
Holdings Ltd. v. Tru Dev., No. 92063808, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 347, *18; In re Aquamar,
Inc., No. 85861533, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 178, *9 n.5. In addition, the goods need only
be sufficiently related that a relevant consumer would be likely to assume, upon
encountering goods marketed under the marks at issue, that the goods originate from,
are sponsored or authorized by, or are otherwise connected to the same source. See
Black & Decker Corp. v. Emerson Elec. Co., Nos. 91158891 and 91158941, 2007 TTAB
LEXIS 50, *25-26.
Serial No. 98642858
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The cited Registration identifies “Clothing, namely, hats, caps, and beanies,” in
International Class 25. The Application identifies “Perfumery; Bleaching
preparations for laundry use; Cleaning, polishing, scouring and abrasive
preparations; Essential oils; Non-medicated cosmetics; Non-medicated dentifrices;
Non-medicated toiletry preparations,” in International Class 3. The identified goods
are distinct. There is no obvious overlap in the goods.
But that does not end the analysis, because we are interested in whether there is
some connection between the goods in the mind of the consuming public. Shen Mfg.
Co., Inc. v. Ritz Hotel, Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[G]oods that are
neither used together nor related to one another in kind may still ‘be related in the
mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods. It is this sense of
relatedness that matters in the likelihood of confusion analysis.”’) (quoting Recot, Inc.
v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). To answer this question, we may look
for evidence in the record showing that these two groups of products, though distinct,
are often sold together under a single trademark. The more often consumers see other
trademarks used with both types of goods, the more consumers will become
conditioned to expect to find such goods sold under a single mark.
The Trademark Examining Attorney submitted evidence showing that marks
used on clothing, including caps and hats, are also often used with perfumes. The
following examples are illustrative of this evidence.
• Perfumes, hats and caps are sold under the Prada mark;5
5 Office Action dated February 12, 2025, at 10-11 (perfume), 12-13 (hats and caps).
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• Perfumes, hats and caps are sold under the Burberry mark;6
• Perfumes and caps are sold under the Nautica mark;7
• Perfumes, hats and caps are sold under the Banana Republic mark;8
• Perfumes and caps are sold under the Ralph Lauren mark;9 and
• Perfumes and caps are sold under the Coach mark.10
The Trademark Examining Attorney also submitted evidence of thirteen third-
party, use-based registrations that identify both perfume (as identified in the
Application) and hats or caps (as identified in the cited Registration).11 Additional
third-party, use-based registrations show essential oils (as identified in the
Application) and hats or caps (as identified in the cited Registration) under the same
mark.12 This is further evidence suggesting that the goods are of a type that may
emanate from a single source.13 See, e.g. In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., No.
74186695, 1993 TTAB LEXIS, *7.
6 Id. at 16-17 (perfume), 14-15 (caps and hats).
7 Final Office Action dated May 17, 2025, at 52 (perfume), 51 (caps).
8 Id. at 61 (perfume), 62 (hats and caps).
9 Id. at 68 (perfume), 67 (caps).
10 Denial of Request for Reconsideration dated August 18, 2025, at 28 (perfumes), 29 (caps).
11 Office Action dated February 12, 2025, at 14-46; Denial of Request for Reconsideration
dated August 18, 2025, at 14-15.
12 Denial of Request for Reconsideration dated August 18, 2025, at 18-50. The two groups of
registrations overlap, as some identify both perfumes and essential oils, plus hats or caps.
13 The Trademark Examining Attorney also submitted third-party, use-based registrations
that identify other goods from the Application (e.g., bleaching preparations) and hats or caps
from the cited Registration. This evidence shows additional examples of relatedness, but
there is no evidence that these other goods from the Application are related to perfume. The
majority of the evidence of record shows perfume and hats or caps sold under a single mark.
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Applicant argues that its goods have a different nature and purpose than hats and
caps. While this is surely true—perfumes are not head coverings, as hats and caps
are—it is largely irrelevant. Differences of this type might be important for some
goods, but as we noted above, the key question here is whether the evidence shows
that these different goods are related in the minds of consumers. The record evidence
shows that these goods are often sold under a single mark, and that is what renders
the goods related for likelihood of confusion purposes. Such a finding says nothing at
all about how the goods are used. Relatedness in the context of a likelihood of
confusion analysis is focused on the confusion issue, not on other characteristics of
the goods.
The evidence shows that the goods are related (i.e., that perfumes, hats and caps
are often sold under the same mark). The second DuPont factor supports the refusal.
C. Trade Channels and Customer Care – The Third and Fourth
DuPont Factors
The third DuPont factor asks whether the trade channels overlap or are similar.
This consideration is important because when goods travel through the same trade
channels, consumers will see the goods together in those channels, thus increasing
consumers’ exposure to both marks. The fourth DuPont factor considers the likely
care exercised by relevant consumers. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361 (considering “[t]he
conditions under which … sales are made, i.e. “impulse” vs. careful, sophisticated
purchasing”).
Most of the third-party evidence we discussed above (i.e., under the second DuPont
factor) came from retail internet sites. This evidence not only shows that perfumes,
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hats and caps are often sold under the same mark, but also that these goods are sold
through the same internet stores. The trade channels, therefore, overlap and the
third DuPont factor supports the refusal.
Applicant also argues that the goods are expensive and that consumers of these
goods are sophisticated and careful.14 This argument fails for two reasons. First and
foremost, the goods identified in the Application and the cited Registration are not
limited to particular price points. Indeed, perfumes, hats and caps appear to be (based
on the record) conventional consumer goods purchased at some point, by almost every
consumer. With no limits on the goods, we find that the perfume goods identified in
the Application may include products at any price point. Similarly, the hats and caps
identified in the cited Registration may include such goods at any price point. The
lack of limitations on the goods effectively refutes Applicant’s consumer
sophistication argument.
The second reason this argument fails is for lack of evidence. The evidence of
record shows these goods actually are sold at varied price points, meaning we can see
no consistent practice of high-pricing for perfumes, hats or caps.15 Arguments
presented without supporting evidence are entitled to little weight in our analysis.
Martahus v. Video Duplication Servs. Inc., 3 F.3d 417, 420 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[M]ere
attorney arguments unsubstantiated by record evidence are suspect at best.”).
14 6 TTABVUE 24.
15 For example, there is evidence of beanie caps selling for less than $10, ball caps for $480
and perfumes with a wide range of pricing. Final Office Action dated May 17, 2025, at 58
(Abercrombie & Fitch beanie for $9.99); Office Action dated February 12, 2025, at 14
(Burberry baseball cap for $480).
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Finally, we are required to base our decision “on the least sophisticated potential
purchasers.” Stone Lion Capital Partners, 746 F.3d at 1325. We find that the “least
sophisticated potential purchasers” of perfumes, hats and caps, which are ordinary
consumer goods, are likely to exercise ordinary care in making purchasing decisions,
which does not alter the likelihood of confusion. The fourth DuPont factor is neutral.
D. Conclusion: Weighing the Factors
We have reviewed and evaluated all the evidence of record and all the arguments
presented. Only the first three DuPont factors are probative in this appeal, and all
three support the Section 2(d) refusal. The marks are similar and the goods are
related. The trade channels overlap. We evaluated the fourth DuPont factor, but find
it neutral. The record supports the refusal. Confusion is likely.
Decision: The Section 2(d) refusal is affirmed.

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