Spro Corp.

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: April 10, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Spro Corporation
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Serial No. 98383219
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Catherine E. Maxson of Davis Wright Tremaine LLP for Spro Corporation.
Jonathan Watkins, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 131,
Nicholas A. Coleman, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Larkin, Thurmon, and Casagrande,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Larkin, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Spro Corporation (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
standard-character mark SPRO FREESTYLE for “Fishing equipment, namely,
fishing lures, fishing rigs, fishing leaders, fishing snells, fishing swivels, fishing
hooks, fishing rods, hand-held fishing nets, fishing gaffs, fishing line” in International
Class 28.1
1 Application Serial No. 98383219 was filed on January 30, 2024 under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), based on Applicant’s allegation of a bona fide intention
to use the mark in commerce.

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The Examining Attorney has refused registration under Section 2(d) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant’s mark so
resembles the standard-character mark FREESTYLE, registered on the Principal
Register for “fishing tackle” in International Class 28,2 as to be likely to cause
confusion when used in connection with the goods identified in the application.
Applicant appealed when the Examining Attorney made the refusal final, and
Applicant and the Examining Attorney have filed briefs.3 We affirm the refusal to
register.
I. Record on Appeal4
The record on appeal includes USPTO electronic records regarding the cited
registration;5 dictionary definitions of the phrase “fishing tackle” and the words
“tackle” and “freestyle;”6 third-party websites displaying the words “Freestyle,”
“Freestyler,” or “Free Style” in connection with fishing equipment;7 USPTO electronic
records regarding two third-party registrations of FREE-formative marks for fishing
2 Registration No. 3664033 issued on August 4, 2009 to Bass Pro Intellectual Property, L.L.C.
(“Registrant”) and has been renewed.
3 Citations in this opinion to the briefs refer to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing
system. The number preceding TTABVUE corresponds to the docket entry number, and any
numbers following TTABVUE refer to the page(s) of the docket entry where the cited
materials appear. Applicant’s brief appears at 6 TTABVUE and the Examining Attorney’s
brief appears at 8 TTABVUE.
4 Citations in this opinion to the application record are to pages in the downloadable .pdf
version of the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) database of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).
5 August 27, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 6.
6 Id. at TSDR 7-12; January 27, 2025 Final Office Action at TSDR 8-14; November 26, 2024
Response to Office Action at TSDR 42-45.
7 November 26, 2024 Response to Office Action at TSDR 12-34, 46-48.

Serial No. 98383219
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equipment;8 third-party websites displaying articles entitled “Freestyle Jig Fishing”
and “Freestyle Your Way to More Bass From the Coldest Open Water;”9 and third-
party websites displaying various types of fishing equipment.10
II. Analysis of Likelihood of Confusion Refusal
“The Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so resembles a
registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods or
services of the applicant, to cause confusion [or] mistake, or to deceive.” In re Charger
Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (citation omitted) (cleaned up).
Our determination of the likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark
Act is based on an analysis of all probative facts in the record that are relevant to the
likelihood of confusion factors set forth in In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476
F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”). Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1379. We
consider each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument. See, e.g., In re
Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
“Two key factors in every Section 2(d) case are the first two factors regarding the
similarity or dissimilarity of the marks and the goods or services, because the
fundamental inquiry mandated by §2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences
in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.” DC Comics
8 Id. at TSDR 35-41.
9 Id. at TSDR 49-51, 52-54.
10 January 27, 2025 Final Office Action at TSDR 15-186.

Serial No. 98383219
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v. Cellular Nerd LLC, No. 91246950, 2022 WL 17832492, at *10 (TTAB 2022)
(internal quotations and quotation marks omitted).
Applicant’s statement of the “Issues on Appeal” in its brief, 6 TTABVUE 5, focuses
entirely on the first DuPont factor and the sixth DuPont factor, the “number and
nature of similar marks in use on similar goods,” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361, and
Applicant devotes the Argument section of its brief to these factors. 6 TTABVUE 5-
19.11
Because the second and sixth DuPont factors may affect the degree of similarity
between the cited FREESTYLE mark and Applicant’s SPRO FREESTYLE mark
required under the first factor for confusion to be likely, we will begin our analysis
with these factors, as well as with the channels of trade and classes of consumers.
See, e.g., Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Franklin Inv. Corp., No. 92066927, 2024 WL
3771168, at *19 (TTAB 2024) (“[w]hen marks would appear on virtually identical
goods or services, the degree of similarity between the marks necessary to support a
conclusion of likely confusion declines”) (quoting Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v.
Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); Apex Bank v. CC Serve Corp.,
156 F.4th 1230, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (“Because commercial impression informs the
analysis under the first DuPont factor, we must . . . vacate the Board’s analysis here
11 Applicant includes a discussion of the claimed conceptual and commercial weakness of the
cited mark under its argument heading “Confusion is not likely because the marks at issue
are different in appearance, pronunciation, and meaning,” which nominally invokes the first
DuPont factor. 6 TTABVUE 5-13 (emphasis deleted). The possible weakness of a mark should
instead be analyzed under the sixth DuPont factor. Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 71 F.4th 1355,
1363 (Fed. Cir. 2023).

Serial No. 98383219
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because reconsideration of the sixth DuPont factor may result in a different
determination of the mark’s commercial strength or weakness and affect the overall
commercial impression”); Heil Co. v. Tripleye GmbH, No. 91277359, 2024 WL
4925901, at *17 (TTAB 2024) (“Because it affects the scope of protection to which it
is entitled, we commence by addressing the strength or weakness of Opposer’s
registered 3RD EYE mark.”).
A. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Goods, Channels of Trade, and
Classes of Consumers
“The second DuPont factor considers ‘[t]he similarity or dissimilarity and nature
of the goods or services as described in an application or registration . . . .” In re Detroit
Athletic Co., 903 F.2d 1297, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2018). “This factor considers whether ‘the
consuming public may perceive [the goods or services] as related enough to cause
confusion about the source or origin of the goods or services.’” In re St. Helena Hosp.,
774 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press,
Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
“The Examining Attorney need not prove, and we need not find, similarity as to
each product listed in the description of goods” in the application. In re St. Julian
Wine Co., No. 87834973, 2020 WL 2788005, at *5 (TTAB 2020). “‘[I]t is sufficient for
finding a likelihood of confusion if relatedness is established for any item
encompassed by the identification of goods within a particular class in the
application.” Id. (internal quotation and quotation marks omitted). See also Tuxedo
Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336-37 (CCPA 1981).

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“Apparently conceding the issue [as to the similarity or dissimilarity of the goods
and the similarity or dissimilarity of trade channels], Applicant did not address these
du Pont factors in its brief, so we offer only a brief explanation of our conclusion.” In
re Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla, No. 90522364, 2025 WL 2953731, at *3 (TTAB 2025)
(quoting In re Morinaga Nyugyo K.K., No. 86338392, 2016 WL 5219811, at *2 (TTAB
2016)).
The goods identified in the cited registration are “fishing tackle,” which “consists
of all the equipment that is used in the sport of fishing, such as fishing rods, lines,
hooks, and bait.”12 The goods identified in the application are “Fishing equipment,
namely, fishing lures, fishing rigs, fishing leaders, fishing snells, fishing swivels,
fishing hooks, fishing rods, hand-held fishing nets, fishing gaffs, fishing line.” The
goods identified in the application include four of the examples of “fishing tackle”
included in the definition of that phrase, as well as other types of fishing equipment
that also fall within the full scope of the goods identified in the cited registration as
“fishing tackle.”13 The involved goods are thus identical because the goods broadly
12 August 27, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 7 (COLLINS DICTIONARY). The Board may take
judicial notice of dictionary definitions, including definitions from online dictionaries that
exist in printed format or have fixed regular editions, see, e.g., In re Nursecon, LLC, No.
88052194, 2024 WL 5265079, at *10 n.64 (TTAB 2024), and we take judicial notice that
“equipment” means “the set of articles or physical resources serving to equip a person or
thing: such as (1): the implements used in an operation or activity: apparatus sports
equipment.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (merriam-webster.com, last accessed on
March 30, 2026) (emphasis in bold here in italics in the original).
13 In that regard, we must construe the goods identified as “fishing tackle” in the cited
registration as broadly as reasonably possible and resolve any ambiguities regarding their
coverage in favor of the cited registrant given the presumptions afforded the registration
under Section 7(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b). In re OSF Healthcare Sys., No.
88706809, 2023 WL 6140427, at *5 (TTAB 2023) (citations omitted).

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identified as “fishing tackle” in the cited registration encompass all of the forms of
“fishing equipment” identified in the application, and the second DuPont factor
strongly supports a conclusion that confusion is likely. OSF Healthcare, 2023 WL
6140427, at *9.
The third DuPont factor considers the “similarity or dissimilarity of established,
likely-to-continue trade channels.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. In addition, “[i]t is
relevant to consider the degree of overlap of consumers exposed to the respective
[goods] . . . .” In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Because the
goods are identical, and their respective identifications do not contain any limitations
regarding channels of trade and classes of consumers, the identical goods “are
presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In
re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard, 281
F.3d at 1268 (internal citation omitted)). Thus, the identity of the trade channels and
classes of consumers also strongly supports a conclusion that confusion is likely. OSF
Healthcare, 2023 WL 6140427, at *9.
B. The Number and Nature of Similar Marks in Use on Similar
Goods
The sixth DuPont factor, “‘[t]he number and nature of similar marks in use on
similar goods’ . . . is a measure of the extent to which other marks weaken the
assessed mark.” Spireon, 71 F.4th at 1362 (quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361 and
citing Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396
F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).

Serial No. 98383219
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“There are two prongs of analysis for a mark’s strength under the sixth factor:
conceptual strength and commercial strength.” Id. (citation omitted). “Conceptual
strength is a measure of a mark’s distinctiveness . . . and distinctiveness is often
classified in categories of generally increasing distinctiveness[:] . . . (1) generic; (2)
descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful.” Id. (citation, quotation, and
quotation marks omitted). “Distinctiveness is relevant to a mark’s overall strength in
the likelihood of confusion analysis.” Id. (citation omitted). “Commercial strength, on
the other hand, is ‘the marketplace recognition value of the mark.’” Id. at 1363
(quoting 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 11:80 (5th ed. 2023)).
Applicant claims that the cited FREESTYLE mark is both conceptually and
commercially weak because the word “‘Freestyle’ has an understood meaning that is
relevant to fishing, and thus is a highly suggestive, and not a strong, trademark,” 6
TTABVUE 6, and because “the marketplace for fishing equipment is cluttered with
third parties using ‘Freestyle’ as or in their trademarks,” and because “[m]arks that
operate in crowded fields are each relatively weak and subtle differences among the
marks are sufficient to distinguish them.” Id.
The Examining Attorney responds that Applicant’s arguments relating to the
weakness of the cited mark amount to an impermissible collateral attack on the
registration. 8 TTABVUE 6. With respect to conceptual weakness, the Examining
Attorney argues that “Applicant fails to introduce even a single third-party
registration into the record which utilizes the wording ‘FREESTYLE’ in connection

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with the goods at issue,” id. at 7, and with respect to commercial weakness, the
Examining Attorney argues that Applicant’s Internet evidence is insufficient in both
quantity and quality. Id. at 7-8.
1. Conceptual Weakness
We begin with the issue of conceptual weakness. “Where, as here, [a] mark is
registered without a Section 2(f) claim of acquired distinctiveness, the mark is
presumed to be inherently distinctive.” Brooklyn Brewery Corp. v. Brooklyn Brew
Shop., 17 F.4th 129, 146 (Fed. Cir. 2021); see also Heil Co., 2024 WL 4925901, at *16
(where a mark “is registered on the Principal Register, with no claim of acquired
distinctiveness under Section 2(f), we presume it is inherently distinctive, i.e., that it
is at worst suggestive of the goods.” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b)).14 The cited mark is
thus presumptively entitled to at least “‘the normal scope of protection to which
inherently distinctive marks are entitled.’” Sage Therapeutics, Inc. v. Sageforth
Psych. Servs., LLC, No. 91270181, 2024 WL 1638376, at *10 (TTAB 2024) (quoting
Bell’s Brewery, Inc. v. Innovation Brewing, No. 91215896, 2017 WL 6525233, at *9
(TTAB 2017)).
Third-party registrations of marks containing a cited mark or an element of a cited
mark are one form of evidence of conceptual weakness. They “can bear on a mark’s
conceptual strength,” Spireon, 71 F.4th at 1363 (citing Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS
Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015)), because they “can show that that
14 We note in that regard that Applicant did not voluntarily disclaim the exclusive right to
use FREESTYLE in its SPRO FREESTYLE mark, and was not required to do so.

Serial No. 98383219
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element has ‘a normally understood and well-recognized descriptive or suggestive
meaning.’” Id. (quoting Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH v. New
Millenium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). Applicant offers no
relevant third-party registrations,15 but other evidence, such as dictionary definitions
and third-party uses, may also show conceptual weakness because such evidence may
show that a mark or an element of a mark “has a normally understood and well-
recognized descriptive or suggestive meaning.” Id. (quotation and quotation marks
omitted).
Applicant cites a dictionary definition of the word “freestyle” as “a sports
performance or routine featuring relatively free, unrestricted movement, or intended
to demonstrate an individual’s special skills or style,” 6 TTABVUE 12,16 and argues
that “[g]iven this meaning, it is unsurprising that the term is used in connection with
unconventional, versatile fishing styles and also with bait having less restricted
movement.” Id. Applicant further argues that
“Freestyle jig fishing” and “Freestyling” are the names of
fishing techniques and fishing strategies that use a
particular type of jig. . . . Notably, Registrant is aware of
and promotes the “freestyle” style of fishing: the record
contains an article regarding “Freestyle jig fishing” that is
from the website operated by Registrant (Bass Pro Shops).
15 Applicant made of record use-based third-party registrations of FREE SWIMMER for
“fishing reels” (Reg. No. 7081136) and FREESEA for “fishing tackle.” (Reg. No. 6295008).
November 26, 2024 Response to Office Action at TSDR 36-41. Neither of these registrations
contains the word FREESTYLE that is common to the marks here, and they have no
probative value regarding the conceptual weakness of that word. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC,
No. 87075988, 2018 WL 2734893, at *4 (TTAB 2018) (discounting probative value of third-
party registrations “contain[ing] the nonidentical term ‘Fifth”’ in showing that the cited
registered mark 5IVESTEAK was weak), aff’d mem., 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
16 November 26, 2024 Response to Office Action at TSDR 43 (dictionary.com).

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Id. at 12-13 (citations omitted).17 Applicant also notes that “the owners of some of the
previously cited FREESTYLE trademarks use the term in the textual descriptions of
their FREESTYLE-branded products.” Id. at 13.18
Applicant concludes that “[t]he meaning of the term ‘Freestyle’ – as reflected in
the dictionary and the third-party uses associated with fishing – is highly suggestive
of the fishing equipment offered by SPRO and Registrant, and is a further reason to
treat the registered mark as a weak trademark.” Id.
The Examining Attorney does not address Applicant’s dictionary evidence. With
respect to the cited evidence from Registrant’s website, the Examining Attorney
argues that “[c]ontrary to Applicant’s contention that this fact demonstrates a
weakness of the mark, evidence from Registrant’s website establishes that Registrant
appears to continue in its use of the mark, either directly or through licensees.” 8
TTABVUE 8. The Examining Attorney also argues that
as a market in which relatively low-cost, high-volume
goods are sold by a wide variety of vendors, in a wide
variety of marketplaces, the market for fishing tackle is
likely a difficult market in which to police unauthorized
use of a mark. Some extent of unauthorized usage of a
mark in this context is likely unsurprising, if not
inevitable. A mere eight examples of third-party Internet
usage of the shared term, two of which appear on
Registrant’s own website and support Registrant’s own
usage of the mark, is therefore unpersuasive and
17 We take judicial notice that in the context of fishing, a “jig” is “any of several fishing devices
that are jerked up and down or drawn though the water.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY
(merriam-webster.com, last accessed on March 31, 2026).
18 We also discuss these uses below in our discussion of the possible commercial weakness of
the cited mark.

Serial No. 98383219
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insufficient to establish the shared term “FREESTYLE” is
weak in this context, for the particular goods identified.
Id.
The dictionary definition of “freestyle” cited by Applicant does not aid it. In the
context of sports other than swimming and wrestling,19 “freestyle” means “a sports
performance or routine featuring relatively free, unrestricted movement, or intended
to demonstrate an individual’s special skills or style,”20 but the definition gives figure
skating, gymnastics, surfing, and skateboarding as examples of sports involving
“freestyle” performances or routines. The common thread among these sports is that
competitors are evaluated not just for their technical competence, but also for their
style, and the objective of fishing, even competitive fishing, is not to score style points,
but rather to catch fish.
Applicant’s other evidence of conceptual weakness consists primarily of articles
entitled “Freestyle Jig Fishing,”21 and “Freestyle Your Way to More Bass From the
Coldest Open Water.”22 The first article appears on Registrant’s website, but was
posted by Justin Hoffman in December 2012,23 and was updated in September 2019.
Under the heading “The Freestyle Jig Fishing Concept,” the article states that “[t]he
19 In swimming, “freestyle” is an event in which any standard stroke may be used, and in
wrestling, “freestyle” identifies a particular style. November 26, 2024 Response to Office
Action at TSDR 43 (dictionary.com).
20 Id.
21 Id. at TSDR 50-51.
22 Id. at TSDR 49-54.
23 Id. at TSDR 50-51. Mr. Hoffman is identified in the article as “a freelance outdoor writer
and photographer, with a fishing specialty.” Id. at TSDR 50.

Serial No. 98383219
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art of the freestyle jig fishing technique was brought to North America by the anglers
of Japan where the concept originated” and that “[s]imply put – they wanted a rod
that would alleviate the strain put on the forearm that occurs with traditionally
designed jigging rods, grouped with a jig that produces a higher hooking ratio and –
voila! – the freestyle revolution was born.”24 The article displays a photograph of an
angler using an example of what are described as “freestyle rods”:
25
The article also states that “[f]reestyle jigs bring an interesting design to the vertical
spoon market,”26 and it displays the “Bass Pro Shops XPS Freestyle Jig” shown below:
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 We take judicial notice that in the context of fishing, a “spoon” is “something that resembles
a spoon in shape.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (merriam-webster.com, last accessed on
March 31, 2026).

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27
The article concludes that “[t]he freestyle jigging system can bring a new dimension
to your fishing game” and urges readers to “[g]ive the freestyle rod and jigs a try this
coming season – you’ll be glad you did.”28
The second article from January 2020 discusses catching bass in extremely cold
waters. It recounts the development by professional angler Paul Mueller of a fishing
technique called “Freestyling,” involving a “light-line technique” with “perfectly
matched jig heads and soft plastics.”29 The article states that Mr. Mueller “named the
technique for its versatility,” that it was born from his ice fishing and pan fishing,
and that it “shares the same electronics, watching and imparting steady soft shakes
to your lure, creating the most action with the slightest movement.”30 The article
displays the “Freestyling jig head” shown and discussed below:
27 November 26, 2024 Response to Office Action at TSDR 50.
28 Id. at TSDR 51.
29 Id. at TSDR 52.
30 Id. at TSDR 52-53.

Serial No. 98383219
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31
Even though it refers to “freestyling,” not “freestyle,” fishing, this article also has
some probative value regarding the possible conceptual weakness of the cited mark
FREESTYLE.
The two articles, and some of the third-party uses discussed below,32 show that
“freestyle” suggests a particular fishing style or technique, and that “freestyle jigs”
can be used in the “freestyle jig fishing technique.” We find that the cited mark is
suggestive of certain rods, jigs, and bait that can be used in freestyle jig fishing.
2. Commercial Weakness
“The purpose of introducing evidence of third-party marketplace use is ‘to show
that customers have become so conditioned by a plethora of such similar marks that
customers ‘have been educated to distinguish between different [such] marks on the
bases of minute distinctions.”’ Heil Co., 2024 WL 4925901, at *21 (quoting Omaha
Steaks Int’l Inc. v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(quoting Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1374)).
31 Id. at TSDR 53.
32 These uses include a “LIVETARGET Freestyle Frog” bait shown on the Cabela’s website,
id. at TSDR 13-14, “Freestyle” jigs offered on the Eat Me Lures and Fishing Addiction Gear
websites, id. at TSDR 19-22, and an “Offshore Angler Freestyle Jig” shown on Registrant’s
website. Id. at TSDR 47.

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The Federal Circuit has held that the “probative value of third-party trademarks
depends entirely upon their usage.” Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1373 (citation omitted).
Where “the ‘record includes no evidence of the extent of [third-party uses] . . . [t]he
probative value of this evidence is thus minimal.’” Id. (emphasis in bold here in italics
in Palm Bay) (quoting Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 236 F.3d 1333, 1338
(Fed. Cir. 2001)). Applicant’s evidence consists of screen shots of eight websites, all
accessed on November 22, 2024 and unaccompanied by any evidence of the duration
and exposure of such uses,33 and, as stated in Palm Bay, the probative value of this
sort of evidence is ordinarily “minimal.”
But in a judicial application of the adage that “quantity has a quality all its own,”34
the Federal Circuit has held that if there is “voluminous,” “extensive,” or
“considerable” evidence of use of third-party marks, the specifics of the uses need not
be shown to make the evidence probative of commercial weakness. See Juice
Generation, 794 F.3d at 1339 (the applicant’s evidence of third-party uses with “no
specifics regarding the extent of sales or promotional efforts surrounding the third-
party marks and, thus, what impact, if any, these uses have made in the minds of the
purchasing public” was “nonetheless powerful on its face” because the “fact that a
considerable number of third parties use similar marks was shown in uncontradicted
testimony”); Jack Wolfskin, 797 F.3d at 1373 (where the applicant “presented
33 November 26, 2024 Response to Office Action at TSDR 12-35. As discussed below, Applicant
made of record a ninth website that we have considered.
34 This adage is often attributed to a comment by Joseph Stalin about the Red Army in World
War II.

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voluminous evidence of paw print design elements that have been registered and used
in connection with clothing” such “extensive evidence of third-party use and
registrations is ‘powerful on its face,’ even where the specific extent and impact of the
usage has not been established.” (quoting Juice Generation, 794 F.3d at 1339)). Citing
Juice Generation, Jack Wolfskin, and the Board’s decision in In re Hartz Hotel Servs.
Inc., No. 76692673, 2012 WL 1193704 (TTAB 2012), 6 TTABVUE 6-8, Applicant
argues that the record here shows that the cited mark “‘Freestyle’ and its formatives
are frequently used in trademarks for fishing equipment, and thus ‘Freestyle’ is a
weak term in trademarks for such goods.” Id. at 8. We must determine what the
record shows as to the number of uses of a FREESTYLE-formative mark for fishing
tackle in the United States market for those goods.35
We begin with the website of Grandpa’s Tackle Box at grandpas-tacklebox.com,
which offers “Custom Made Fishing Tackle,” including a “Freestyle Jig,” made by a
Canadian company located in the province of Ontario.36 The website states that all
prices are listed in Canadian dollars and that “Due to the Canada Post Postal Strike
35 Where, as here, the involved goods or services are identical for purposes of the second
DuPont factor, “the Board should retain the same scope in its consideration of similarity
under the other factors,” Apex Bank, 156 F.4th at 1236 (citations omitted), including the sixth
factor, which considers the number and nature of marks in use in connection with “similar”
goods or services. Accordingly, we must consider third-party uses of similar marks for “fishing
tackle,” which as discussed above encompasses the various forms of fishing equipment
identified in the application, as well as other “equipment that is used in the sport of fishing,”
August 27, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 7 (COLLINS DICTIONARY), and any goods that the
record shows are “similar” to fishing tackle.
36 November 26, 2024 Response to Office Action at TSDR 17-18.

Serial No. 98383219
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there will be delays in shipping and receiving orders,” and offers “Free Customer Pick
up in the Kingston, Ontario Area.”
“Foreign websites may have probative value on the meaning of a term in the
United States under certain circumstances if it is likely that ‘U.S. consumers will
encounter foreign websites in the field in question.’” In re Korn Ferry, No. 90890949,
2024 WL 3219482, at *11 n.28 (TTAB 2024) (quoting In re Well Living Lab. Inc., No.
86440401, 2017 WL 2876809, at *4 n.10 (TTAB 2017)). Here, however, Applicant is
claiming that the Canadian company is a participant in what Applicant calls a United
States “marketplace for fishing equipment [that] is cluttered with third parties using
‘Freestyle’ as or in their trademarks,” 6 TTABVUE 6, but there is no evidence in the
record that United States consumers purchase fishing tackle from this Canadian
company, or visit its website, where there appear to be numerous United States
sellers of the goods, including large retailers with an online presence. In the absence
of such evidence, we find that this website does not have probative value regarding
the possible commercial weakness of the cited FREESTYLE mark for fishing tackle
in the United States.
We turn next to two sets of pages from Registrant’s website.37 By definition, any
of Registrant’s own uses of FREESTYLE-formative marks “are not ‘third-party
[uses],’” Made in Nature, LLC v. Pharmavite LLC, No. 91223352, 2022 WL 2188890,
at *15 (TTAB 2022), but both of the pages that Applicant cites instead involve
37 Id. at TSDR 25-26, 29-30. We discuss below a third page from Registrant’s website
displaying an “Offshore Angler Freestyle Jig.”

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Registrant’s resale of fishing tackle produced by other companies whose webpages
are also separately in the record. Registrant’s website offers a Megabass Magdraft
Freestyle Swimbait,38 which is shown elsewhere on a page from the manufacturer’s
website at megabassusa.com,39 and a Savage Gear Freestyler stickbait, which is
shown elsewhere on a page from the manufacturer’s website at savagegear.com.40 The
two pages from Registrant’s website and the two pages from the websites of Megabass
and Savage Gear thus show a total of two third-party uses of “Freestyle” or
“Freestyler” in the United States, and the Savage Gear use of “Freestyler” has no
probative value regarding the possible commercial weakness of the cited
FREESTYLE mark because it does not involve such a mark.
We next consider the Amazon website cited by Applicant, which displays a “Free
Style Fishing Glove Cut to Fit.”41 Applicant lists fishing gloves as a form of “fishing
equipment” in a table of third-party uses in its brief, 6 TTABVUE 8-10, but fishing
gloves, which may be viewed as articles of clothing rather than as one of “the
implements used in an operation or activity: apparatus sports equipment,”
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (merriam-webster.com, last accessed on March 30,
2026), do not fit as comfortably within the broadest reasonable construction of the
goods identified in the cited registration as “fishing tackle” as does equipment such
38 Id. at TSDR 29-30.
39 Id. at TSDR 27-28.
40 Id. at TSDR 23-24.
41 Id. at TSDR 31-34. The page from the Amazon website displays the words “Brand Generic”
under the words “Free Style Fishing Glove Cut to Fit.” Id. at 31.

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as fishing rods, lines, hooks, and bait. For purposes of the sixth DuPont factor, the
similarity between the goods or services identified in a registration and the goods or
services offered in third-party uses must be proven in every case where it is not self-
evident, and such proof is particularly important where, as here, the goods identified
in the application and in the cited registration are identical. Omaha Steaks, 908 F.3d
at 1325 (where the involved goods were identical meat products, the Board erred in
considering third-party uses on other food products that had not been shown to be
“similar” to the identical meat products). Applicant simply assumes, but makes no
effort to show, that fishing gloves are “similar” to fishing tackle for purposes of the
sixth DuPont factor.42 On this record, we find that the display of the “Free Style
Fishing Glove” on the Amazon website has less probative value regarding the
commercial weakness of the cited FREESTYLE mark for fishing tackle than uses
involving items that are obviously “equipment.”
The record contains five third-party uses of the word “Freestyle” in connection
with bait or jigs in addition to the Megabass use discussed above. The Cabela’s
website displays a “LIVETARGET Freestyle Frog” bait,43 the website at baits.com
displays a “Buckeye Lures Freestyle Jighead,”44 the Eat Me Lures website displays a
“Freestyle Jig,”45 and the Fishing Addiction Gear website displays “Freestyle Jigs.”46
42 The missing proof might include third-party webpages showing that companies sell both
fishing equipment and fishing gloves under the same mark.
43 November 26, 2024 Response to Office Action at TSDR 13-14.
44 Id. at TSDR 15-16.
45 Id. at TSDR 19-20.
46 Id. at TSDR 21-22.

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In addition, during prosecution Applicant made of record a page from Registrant’s
website displaying goods described as an “Offshore Angler Freestyle Jig.”47 Like the
Megabass use, these uses display the word “Freestyle” in connection with house
marks, either as a secondary brand or in a non-source identifying manner.
Applicant claims that the record shows “ten third-party marks using similar
wording and associated with fishing products,” 6 TTABVUE 11, including the two
third-party registrations noted above, which are not evidence of use, and that the
claimed 10 uses are sufficient to show commercial weakness under two regional
circuit court of appeal decisions, and two federal district court decisions, involving
third-party uses, 6 TTABVUE 11-12, all of which do not bind us, and a decision of the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in Fleetwood Co. v. Mende, 298 F.2d 797 (CCPA
1962), in which the court found that the weakness of the petitioner’s mark TINTZ for
shampoo and other hair care products was “confirmed by the 11 third party
registrations involving the word ‘tint’ as part of the trademark for similar goods.” Id.
at 799.
As discussed above, the Federal Circuit has held that “voluminous,” “extensive,”
or “considerable” evidence of third-party uses may show commercial weakness even
where, as here, the specifics of those uses have not been shown. The Federal Circuit
has not held that any particular number of such uses is required to show commercial
weakness, but we note that in the recent Apex Bank case, the Federal Circuit
commented that in Juice Generation, the court “refer[red] to 26 third-party marks as
47 Id. at TSDR 46-48.

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‘a considerable number,’” Apex Bank, 156 F.4th at 1235 (quoting Juice Generation,
794 F.3d at 1337 n.1), and that in Jack Wolfskin, the court “highlight[ed] fourteen
‘notable examples of third-party registration and use.’” Id. (quoting Jack Wolfskin,
797 F.3d at 1373 n.2).48 Obviously there can be no bright-line number because the
number of third-party uses necessary to show that the relevant “customers have
become so conditioned by a plethora of such similar marks that customers have been
educated to distinguish between different such marks on the bases of minute
distinctions,” Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1374, will depend on the facts of each case,
including the number of sellers in the United States market for the involved goods or
services, and other factors. See generally Indus. Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d
1197, 1199 (CCPA 1973) (“Several other cases have been cited as precedents to be
followed. As we have said innumerable times, prior decisions on other marks for other
goods are of very little help one way or the other in cases of this type. Each case must
be decided on its own facts and the differences are often subtle ones.”).
But here, there are at most eight third-party uses of a FREESTYLE-formative
mark in connection with fishing tackle, and, as Applicant itself notes, 6 TTABVUE
13, several of them use the word in text in a non-trademark sense. Even if we consider
all eight to be uses of third-party marks, that number is well below the number of
third-party uses in Juice Generation, which involved at least 26 third-party uses for
restaurants, and Jack Wolfskin, which involved at least 14 third-party uses for
48 In Apex Bank itself, the applicant made of record 51 uses of third-party marks. Apex Bank,
156 F.4th at 1235.

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clothing, as well as in Hartz Hotel, where the applicant offered 17 uses of marks for
hotel services containing the words “Grand/Grande Hotel.” Hartz Hotel, 2012 WL
1193704, at *2-3. See also Sage Therapeutics, 2024 WL 1638376, at *12-14 (16
relevant uses of third-party SAGE-formative marks for mental health services in the
form of screenshots of websites found “not sufficiently probative to contract the scope
of protection based on commercial weakness”); In re FabFitFun, Inc., No. 86847381,
2018 WL 4043156, at *4 (TTAB 2018) (“ten third-party uses of SMOKIN’ HOT
formatives as marks for cosmetics in general, and, in particular, eye makeup of
various colors and shades,” “reflect[ed] a more modest amount of evidence than that
found convincing in Jack Wolfskin and Juice Generation,” and was not “as persuasive
as that in either Juice Generation or Jack Wolfskin.”). In the context of this case, we
find that the eight third-party uses of the words FREESTYLE in connection with
fishing tackle are not evidence that is “powerful on its face” in the manner of the
evidence in Juice Generation. Juice Generation, 794 F.3d at 1339.
To summarize, the record shows that the cited FREESTYLE mark is somewhat
conceptually weak but not that it is commercially weak. The sixth DuPont factor
weighs slightly against a conclusion that confusion is likely.
C. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
Under the first DuPont factor, “we consider the ‘similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression.’” Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla, 2025 WL 2953731, at *4
(quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be

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sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” Sage Therapeutics, 2024 WL
1638376, at *5 (quoting Inn at St. John’s, 2018 WL 2734893, at *5); accord Krim-Ko
Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968) (“It is sufficient if the
similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely to cause confusion.”)
(citation omitted).
“The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead
whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression
such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection
between the parties.” Sage Therapeutics, 2024 WL 1638376, at *5 (quoting Coach
Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir 2012)). The
“marks ‘must be considered . . . in light of the fallibility of memory’ and ‘not on the
basis of side-by-side comparison.’” St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d at 751 (quoting San
Fernando Elec. Mfg. Co. v. JFD Elecs. Components Corp., 565 F.2d 683, 685 (CCPA
1977)). “The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who normally
‘retains a general rather than a specific impression of marks.’” Sage Therapeutics,
2024 WL 1638376, at *5 (quoting In re i.am.symbolic, llc, No. 85916778, 2018 WL
3993582, at *4 (TTAB 2018) (citations omitted)).
Where, as here, the goods “are identical, the degree of similarity between the
marks necessary to support a determination that confusion is likely declines.” In re
Jimenez, No. 97551823 2025 WL 3126703, at *4 (TTAB 2025) (citing Bridgestone
Ams. Tire Operations, LLC v. Fed. Corp., 673 F.3d 1330, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).

Serial No. 98383219
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The involved marks are FREESTYLE and SPRO FREESTYLE, both in standard
characters. Applicant argues that “[c]onsumers will not mistakenly assume that
SPRO’s SPRO FREESTYLE-branded products come from or are associated with the
Registrant because, considered in its entirety, SPRO’s mark has a different
appearance, pronunciation, and meaning from the registered FREESTYLE mark.” 6
TTABVUE 4-5. Applicant further argues that “‘SPRO’ is the dominant portion of
SPRO’s SPRO FREESTYLE mark because it is fanciful and because it is placed in
the front of the mark,” and that “[g]iven the dominance of ‘SPRO,’ the ‘Freestyle’
wording plays a different role and has a different meaning in SPRO’s mark, and
notably, no portion of the mark in the Registration resembles ‘SPRO’ in appearance,
pronunciation, or meaning.” Id. at 6.
Applicant further argues that “[t]he presence of ‘Freestyle’ in both marks is not
enough to give rise to a risk to confusion because . . . ‘Freestyle’ is a weak trademark
term due to its frequent association with fishing gear, and also due to its highly
suggestive meaning for fishing equipment.” Id. at 15.49 Citing an Eighth Circuit case,
which again does not bind us, as well as Hartz Hotel, supra, and Knight Textile Corp.
v. Jones Inv. Co., No. 91153852, 2005 WL 1691588 (TTAB 2005), Applicant argues
that “because ‘Freestyle’ is highly suggestive of fishing equipment, the addition of the
distinctive and dominant ‘SPRO’ word to SPRO FREESTYLE will distinguish SPRO
49 Applicant notes that Registrant’s website offers FREESTYLER stickbait and MAGDRAFT
FREESTYLE swimbait, 6 TTABVUE 15, and argues that “[t]he fact that the owner of the
registration knowingly sells third-party products that use ‘Freestyle’ in their marks suggests
that the owner of the registration recognizes that its FREESTYLE mark gets only narrow
protection and that consumers are able to distinguish among the many ‘Freestyle’ marks.”
Id.

Serial No. 98383219
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FREESTYLE from the cited mark.” 6 TTABVUE 17. Applicant relies primarily on
Knight Textile, in which the Board dismissed an opposition to registration of the mark
NORTON MCNAUGHTON ESSENTIALS for clothing brought by the owner of a
registration of the mark ESSENTIALS for clothing. Applicant claims that Knight
Textile shows that “[w]hen encountering SPRO’s mark, consumers are likely to
attribute to ‘Freestyle’ its highly suggestive meaning, relating to a fishing style, and
not assume that SPRO’s products come from the Registrant.” Id. at 19.
The Examining Attorney responds that “[t]he applied-for mark differs from the
registered mark only in the addition of Applicant’s house mark SPRO” and
“Applicant’s mark therefore incorporates the registered FREESTYLE mark in its
entirety.” 8 TTABVUE 3. The Examining Attorney distinguishes Knight Textile on
two grounds: (1) the applicant in that case presented 23 third-party registrations of
ESSENTIALS-formative marks for clothing, owned by 21 different registrants, but
here Applicant has presented many fewer third-party uses and no probative third-
party registrations, and (2) the NORTON MCNAUGHTON house mark in Knight
Textile was much more prominent than the SPRO house mark here. Id. at 4.
The Examining Attorney further argues that “[h]ere, the average purchaser with
only a general impression of either mark is likely to remember FREESTYLE as a
source indication for fishing tackle” because “with respect to the proposed mark,
Applicant’s SPRO house mark is unlikely to stand out as dominant to an average
purchaser” and “may be viewed by consumers as a shortened form of the proposed
mark because of ‘the penchant of consumers to shorten marks.’” Id. at 5 (quotation

Serial No. 98383219
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omitted). The Examining Attorney concludes that “the differences between
Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks are far outweighed by their similarities such that
the average purchaser, with only a general impression of the marks, is likely to
remember the word FREESTYLE.” Id. at 6.
As noted by both Applicant and the Examining Attorney, Applicant’s mark SPRO
FREESTYLE contains the cited mark FREESTYLE in its entirety. There is no per se
rule that confusion is likely where an applicant’s mark contains the whole of the cited
mark, coupled with additional matter, but “[l]ikelihood of confusion often has been
found where the entirety of one mark is incorporated within another.” Double Coin
Holdings Ltd. v. Tru Dev., No. 92063808, 2019 WL 4877349, at *8 (TTAB 2019)
(quoting Hunter Indus., Inc. v. Toro Co., No. 91203612, 2014 WL 1649332, at *11
(TTAB 2014)); see also In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., No. 79046106, 2009 WL
1896059, at *3 (TTAB 2009) (finding that the applicant’s mark VANTAGE TITAN
was confusingly similar to the cited mark TITAN for different types of medical
diagnostic equipment); In re Riddle, No. 73377365, 1985 WL 72011, at *2 (TTAB
1985) (finding that the applicant’s mark RICHARD PETTY’S ACCUTUNE and
design for automotive service centers specializing in engine tune-ups and oil changes
was confusingly similar to the cited mark ACCU-TUNE for automotive testing
equipment).
Although the shared word FREESTYLE in the marks is suggestive of certain
types of fishing tackle, the record does not show that it is suggestive to the degree
that the ESSENTIALS mark was suggestive of clothing in Knight Textile. In that

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case, the Board found that a dictionary definition of “essentials” showed that the word
“connote[d] that the clothing items sold under the marks are basic and indispensable
components or ‘essentials’ of one’s wardrobe,” Knight Textile, 2005 WL 1691588, at
*3, and that the 23 third-party registrations of ESSENTIALS-formative marks for
clothing corroborated the dictionary definition and showed that “others in the field
have considered the word ESSENTIALS to have suggestive significance as applied to
clothing,” that “the clothing items identified in the registrations are to be viewed by
purchasers as wardrobe ‘essentials,’” and that the “Office has recognized that
ESSENTIALS has such suggestive significance as applied to items of apparel.” Id. at
*4. The Board found that “[b]ased on this evidence . . . purchasers are able to
distinguish among various ESSENTIALS marks by looking to other elements of the
marks” and that “[i]n this case, that other element is the presence of applicant’s house
mark NORTON MCNAUGHTON.” Id.
Here, as discussed above, the dictionary definition of “freestyle” does not show
that the word has a meaning in the context of fishing, and the two articles and the
handful of third-party uses do not show that the cited mark FREESTYLE “is so highly
suggestive that the inclusion of [Applicant’s SPRO] house mark would create
significant differences in the marks’ appearance, pronunciation, meaning, and
commercial impression.” In re Fiesta Palms, LLC, No. 76595049, 2007 WL 950952, at
*7 (TTAB 2007) (distinguishing Knight Textile).50 “Applicant’s house mark is a
50 As noted above, Applicant again cites Hartz Hotel, 6 TTABVUE 17, but in that case, the
applicant made of record a dictionary definition of “grand,” as well as 17 third-party uses,
and five third-party registrations, of GRAND-formative marks for hotel services. Hartz Hotel,
2012 WL 1193704, at *2-3. Citing the “highly suggestive nature of the term ‘Grand Hotel,’

Serial No. 98383219
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difference between the marks, but we conclude that it does not result in marks that
are dissimilar for likelihood of confusion purposes.” Id. We find that the fishing
equipment sold under Applicant’s mark SPRO FREESTYLE is “more likely to be
considered [additional] product[s] from the previously anonymous source of”
FREESTYLE fishing tackle. Toshiba Med. Sys., 2009 WL 1896059, at *5.
“Similarity is not a binary factor but is a matter of degree.” Jimenez, 2025 WL
3126703, at *4 (quoting St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d at 751 (internal quotation
omitted)). Even assuming that SPRO is the dominant portion of Applicant’s mark
SPRO FREESTYLE because it is Applicant’s house mark and it appears at the
beginning of the mark, Applicant’s mark and the cited FREESTYLE mark are more
similar than dissimilar in appearance, sound, and connotation and commercial
impression because of the common presence of the word FREESTYLE, which appears
and sounds the same, and has the same meaning, in both marks. The first DuPont
factor supports a conclusion that confusion is likely.
the third-party registrations, and the evidence of third-party uses of marks incorporating the
term ‘Grand Hotel,’” id. at *4, the Board found that it was “clear from the third-party
registrations that the addition of a geographic location to the word [sic] GRAND HOTEL has
been sufficient for the Patent and Trademark Office to view these marks as being sufficiently
different from the cited registrant’s mark, and from each other, such as not to cause
confusion,” id., and that “consumers distinguish between these marks even though the only
distinguishing element is a geographically descriptive term.” Id. The Board concluded that
“viewing the marks GRAND HOTEL and GRAND HOTEL NYC in the context of the facts
and circumstance presented by the record in this case, we find that the addition of NYC to
applicant’s mark is sufficient to render applicant’s mark distinguishable from the mark in
the cited registration.” Id. at *7. The record here does not support a finding that the addition
of Applicant’s house mark SPRO to the FREESTYLE mark shown in the cited registration is
sufficient to differentiate the sources of the identical goods sold under the marks.

Serial No. 98383219
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D. Balancing the DuPont Factors
“The final step in analyzing likelihood of confusion is to weigh the DuPont factors
for which there has been evidence and argument; ‘explain the results of that
weighing;’ and discuss ‘the weight [we] assigned to the relevant factors.” Jimenez,
2025 WL 3126703, at *8 (quoting Charger Ventures, 65 F.4th at 1379).
“No mechanical rule determines likelihood of confusion, and each case requires
weighing of the facts and circumstances of the particular mark.” Id. (quoting In re
Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). “‘[T]he weight afforded to
each factor depends on the circumstances’ and ‘[a]ny single factor may control a
particular case.’” Id. (quoting Stratus Networks, Inc. v. UBTA-UBET Commc’ns Inc.,
955 F.3d 994, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2020)).
The key first and second DuPont factors both support a conclusion that confusion
is likely, while the sixth DuPont factor weighs slightly in the other direction because
the cited nark has some conceptual weakness. The goods, channels of trade, and
classes of consumers are identical, which reduces the degree of similarity between
Applicant’s SPRO FREESTYLE mark and the cited FREESTYLE mark that is
necessary for confusion to be likely, and Applicant’s mark, which incorporates the
cited mark in its entirety, is sufficiently similar to the cited mark when used for
identical goods to offset the conceptual weakness of the cited mark. See generally
Conde Nast Publ’ns, Inc. v. Miss Quality, Inc., 507 F.2d 1404, 1406 (CCPA 1975)
(“Although this court has often referred to the ‘scope of protection,’ ‘degree of
protection,’ and ‘latitude of protection’ to be accorded marks—‘limited’ in the case of

Serial No. 98383219
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‘weak’ marks and ‘broad’ or ‘wide’ in the case of ‘strong’ marks, it has, nevertheless,
made it clear that the decisive question is whether there is a likelihood of confusion,
mistake, or deception for purposes of 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). Therefore, if there is such
likelihood, that ends the matter whether appellant’s mark be termed ‘weak’ or
‘strong.’”); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Nat’l Steel Const. Co., 442 F.2d 1383, 1385
(CCPA 1971) (“Neither trademarks nor the public are adequately protected unless
decisions in cases of this kind are based on a realistic appraisal of the likelihood of
purchasers or prospective purchasers being confused as to source regardless of
theoretical ‘weakness’ of a mark.”).
We conclude that the similarity of the marks, and the identical nature of the goods,
channels of trade, and classes of consumers, outweigh the conceptual weakness of the
cited mark, and that consumers with a general rather than specific impression of the
cited FREESTYLE mark for fishing tackle who separately encounter Applicant’s
SPRO FREESTYLE for identical goods are likely to believe mistakenly that the goods
have a common source.
Decision: The refusal to register is affirmed.