Luxury Brands International LLC

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: January 26, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Luxury Brands International LLC
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Serial No. 98476728
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Sumedh Rishi of Markavocom,
for Luxury Brands International LLC.
Shahrzad Poormosleh, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 110,
Loksye Lee Riso, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Lykos, Larkin, and Casagrande,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Lykos, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Luxury Brands International LLC (“Applicant”) seeks to register on the Principal
Register the stylized mark displayed below,
with LUXURY BRANDS INTERNATIONAL disclaimed, for goods identified as

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Bed sheet sets; Bed sheets; Bed sheets for children;
Blanket throws; Pillow cases; Bed sheets, fitted bed sheet
covers, bed flat sheets, and pillow cases used in the
bedding, health care, home-health care and nursing home
industries made of biodegradable film created from
renewable bio-polymer resources; Children’s bed sheets;
Children’s pillow cases; Children’s bed sheets, pillow cases,
and blankets; Fitted bed sheets; Flat bed sheets; Silk
blankets; Silk bed blankets; Valanced bed sheets” in
International Class 24.1
Registration was refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant’s mark so resembles the registered standard
character mark LUXBRAND on the Principal Register for various goods in
International Class 24, including “bed blankets” and “bed sheets,” that it is likely to
cause confusion or mistake or to deceive.2
When the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed and requested
reconsideration. The Board suspended the appeal and remanded the application to
the Trademark Examining Attorney. After the Trademark Examining Attorney
denied the request for reconsideration, the appeal resumed. Applicant and the
1 Application Serial No. 98476728, filed March 31, 2024 under Section 1(b) of the Trademark
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), alleging a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce. The
description of the mark is as follows: “The mark consists of the stylized wording ‘LBI
LUXURY BRANDS INTERNATIONAL.’” Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark.
Citations to the prosecution file refer to the USPTO’s Trademark Status & Document
Retrieval (“TSDR”) system in Portable Document Format (“PDF”). Citations to the record
also include references to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system.
2 Registration No. 7169093, registered September 19, 2023 on the Principal Register. The full
identification reads as follows: “Comforters; Coverlets; Bath towels; Bed blankets; Bed
sheets; Bed skirts; Blankets for outdoor use; Canvas for tapestry or embroidery; Curtains
and towels; Fabric bed valances; Fabrics with patterns, designs, inspirational words printed
thereon; Flags of textile or plastic; Furnishing and upholstery fabrics; Gift wrap of textile;
Kitchen towels; Picnic blankets; Pillow covers; Shower curtains; Table pads; Table runners
of plastic; Table runners of textile; Textile wall hangings; Wall hangings of textile featuring
mural art.”

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Trademark Examining Attorney have filed briefs.3 For the reasons explained below,
we reverse the refusal to register.
I. Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits the registration of a mark that:
[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a
mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a
mark or trade name previously used in the United States
by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used
on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.
15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of
all of the probative evidence of record bearing on the likelihood of confusion. In re E.
I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”), cited in
B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 144 (2015); see, e.g., In re
Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023); In re Majestic Distilling
Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In making our determination, we have
considered each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument. See In re
Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
3 Both Applicant and the Examining Attorney submitted materials with their briefs. Any
materials not properly of record are untimely and have been given no consideration. See
Trademark Rules 2.142(d) and (d)(1), 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.142(d) and (d)(1). To the extent any of
the submissions duplicate evidence from the record, they are superfluous. The Board strongly
disapproves of this practice because it requires additional time to compare the materials
against the record to determine admissibility. See In re Info. Builders Inc., No. 87753964,
2020 TTAB LEXIS 20, at n.4 (attaching previously submitted evidence to an appeal brief is
unnecessary and impedes efficient disposition of the appeal by the Board), appeal voluntarily
dismissed, No. 20-1979 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 20, 2020); accord In re Jimenez, No. 97551823, 2025
TTAB LEXIS 441, at *14.

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Varying weights may be assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the evidence
presented. See Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 353 (Fed.
Cir. 2011). “Each case must be decided on its own facts and the differences are often
subtle ones.” Indus. Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d 1197, 1199 (CCPA 1973).
In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two key considerations are the similarity
or dissimilarity of the marks and the goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, LLC, 866 F.3d
1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156,
1164-65 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also In re Embiid, No. 88202890, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 168,
at *10 (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of
differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”)
(quoting Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103 (CCPA
1976)). These factors, as well as others raised by the Examining Attorney and
Applicant, are discussed below. In our final balancing analysis, we will accord a
specific weight to each factor to determine if confusion is likely. See, e.g., Charger
Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1381; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
A. Strength or Weakness of the Cited Mark
First we address the “number and nature of similar marks in use on similar
goods.” See DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. This DuPont factor “is a measure of the extent
to which other marks weaken the assessed mark.” See Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 71
F.4th 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (inter partes context). “The weaker [the cited] mark,
the closer an applicant’s mark can come without causing a likelihood of confusion and

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thereby invading what amounts to its comparatively narrower range of protection.”
Id. at 1338 (internal citations omitted).
In determining the strength or weakness of the cited mark, we consider both its
inherent strength, based on the nature of the mark itself, and, if there is evidence in
the record of marketplace recognition of the mark, its commercial or marketplace
strength. Spireon, 71 F.4th at 1362; see also In re Chippendales USA, Inc., 622 F.3d
1346, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“A mark’s strength is measured both by its conceptual
strength … and its marketplace strength ….”); see also Tea Bd. of India v. Republic
of Tea Inc., No. 91118587, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 330, at *62.
Conceptual or inherent strength is a measure of a mark’s distinctiveness.
Chippendales, 622 F.3d at 1353-54. Distinctiveness is “often classified in categories
of generally increasing distinctiveness[:] ... (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive;
(4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful.” Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768
(1992). “Commercial strength, on the other hand, is the marketplace recognition
value of the mark.” Spireon, 71 F.4th at 1362 (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). “Evidence of third-party use of similar marks on similar goods is relevant
to show that a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of
protection.” Palm Bay Imps. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772,
396 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen
GmbH v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363, 1373- 74 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
The cited mark LUXBRAND is registered on the Principal Register without a
claim of acquired distinctiveness, and thus carries a presumption under Trademark

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Act Section 7(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b), that it is inherently distinctive. See, e.g., New
Era Cap Co. v. Pro Era, LLC, No. 91216455, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 199, at *29. That
said, we observe that LUXBRAND is a portmanteau of two merely descriptive words,
“luxury” and “brand.” The record shows that “lux” is a recognized abbreviation for
“luxury,”4 which may be defined as “something that is not essential but provides
pleasure and comfort,” and “brand” may denote “a product or service so identified.”5
Just as each individual word is conceptually weak, so is their fusion because, in the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, the combination strongly suggests to
consumers that the identified goods are part of a luxury brand line. “Marks that are
… highly suggestive are entitled to a narrower scope of protection, i.e., are less likely
to generate confusion over source identification, than their more fanciful
counterparts.” Spireon, 71 F.4th at 1362 (quoting Juice Generation, 794 F.3d at 1339).
Next we address the third-party registration evidence Applicant made of record.
Applicant contends that such evidence demonstrates both commercial and conceptual
weakness. Applicant is mistaken to the extent that such evidence is indicative of
commercial weakness. Third-party marketplace uses, not registrations, may show
commercial weakness. However, Applicant is correct that third-party registered
marks may “prove that some segment of the [marks] has a normally understood and
well-recognized descriptive or suggestive meaning, leading to the conclusion that that
4 Entry for “lux” from Acronym Finder searchable database (www.acronymfinder.com)
submitted with November 25, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 8-12.
5 Entries for “luxury” and “brand” from THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
(www.ahddictionary.com) submitted with October 11, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 5 and 7.

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segment is relatively weak” in connection with the goods.” Juice Generation, 794 F.3d
at 1339. Even if “there is no evidence of actual use” of third-party registrations, such
registrations “may be given some weight to show the meaning of a mark in the same
way that dictionaries are used.” Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915, 917
(CCPA 1976). “The controlling inquiry is the extent of third-party marks … on
‘similar’ goods or services.” Omaha Steaks Int’l, Inc. v. Greater Omaha Packing Co.,
Inc., 908 F.3d 1315, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v.
Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
We deem most relevant the following eight (8) third-party registrations for marks,
each registered in standard characters on the Principal Register, comprised of “LUX”
or its phonetic equivalent “LUXE,” for the same or “similar” goods, see DuPont, 476
F.2d at 1361 and Omaha Steaks, 908 F.3d at 1324, as Registrant’s “bed blankets” and
“bed sheets:”6
Registration No. 6872595 for the mark LUX SNUGGLE for
“… Bed throws; Children’s blankets; …”;
Registration No. 5826687 for the mark LUXCLUB for
“Sheet sets; Children’s bed sheets, pillow cases, and
blankets; Contour sheets; Fitted bed sheets; Flat bed
sheets”;
Registration No. 5455306 for the mark ELUXURY for
“Sheet sets; mattress pads; comforters …;
Registration No. 7041655 for the mark LUXBAY for “Bed
sheets; … Pillow cases …”;
6 December 11, 2024 Response to Office Action at TSDR 21-37. We have not considered
cancelled registrations. See In re Hartz Hotel Servs., No. 76692673, 2012 TTAB LEXIS 75, at
*6 n.5 (Board did not consider four cancelled third-party registrations submitted by
applicant).

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Registration No. 6627932 for the mark LAIRLUX for
“…Duvets; … Bed linen; Bed skirts; Blanket throws; …
Woollen blankets”;
Registration No. 6989846 for the mark LUXE EXTREME
(with a disclaimer of LUXE) for “… Bed blankets”;
Registration No. 5768606 for the mark LUXOME for “Bed
spreads; Bed throws; … Bed blankets …”;
Registration No. 5451872 for PUR LUX for “Flat bed
sheets; Pillow covers; Bed blankets; Bed sheets;
Comforters; Pillow cases; Sheet sets; Mattress pads”; and
Registration No. 7145429 for the mark CHILL LUXE for
“Flat bed sheets; Pillow covers; Bed blankets; Bed sheets;
Comforters; Pillow cases; Sheet sets; Mattress pads.”
This evidence suggests that the shared segment “LUX” (or the slight variant “LUXE”)
has been adopted by other entities because it has a commonly understood meaning in
connection with bedding. Consumers will perceive the abbreviation “lux,” the
recognized shortened form of the word “luxury,” as describing lavish bedding sheets,
bedding blankets and other similar products. See In re Sien Equip. Co., 1975 TTAB
LEXIS 218, at *7 (the suggestive meaning of the word “Brute” in the context of the
goods at issue explains the numerous third-party registrations incorporating that
word).
Based on this evidence, we find that the cited mark LUXBRAND is highly
suggestive and falls on the lower end of the conceptual strength spectrum, making its
scope of protection relatively limited. Hartz Hotel Servs., 2012 TTAB LEXIS 75, at
*13 (“the mark GRAND HOTEL is highly suggestive, and therefore the scope of
protection to which the cited registration is entitled is quite limited.”). The sixth

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DuPont factor therefore weighs against a likelihood of confusion.
B. The Marks
Having gauged the conceptual weakness of the cited mark, we turn now to the
first DuPont factor, the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as
to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. See Palm Bay Imps.,
396 F.3d at 1371 (citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). “Similarity in any one of these
elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St.
John’s, LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 170, at *13 (quoting In re Davia, No.
85497617, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 214, at *21-24), aff’d mem., 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed. Cir.
2019); accord Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA
1968) (“It is sufficient if the similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely
to cause confusion.”) (citation omitted).
“[S]imilarity is not a binary factor but is a matter of degree.” In re St. Helena
Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 751 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d
1340 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). The proper test regarding similarity “is not a side-by-
side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar
in terms of their commercial impression such that persons who encounter the marks
would be likely to assume a connection between the [Registrant and Applicant].” Cai
v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs.
Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012)) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).

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Our analysis cannot be predicated on dissecting the marks into their various
components; that is, the decision must be based on the entire marks, not just part of
the marks. In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Franklin
Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 1007 (CCPA 1981) (“It is axiomatic that
a mark should not be dissected and considered piecemeal; rather, it must be
considered as a whole in determining likelihood of confusion.”). “No element of a mark
is ignored simply because it is less dominant, or would not have trademark
significance if used alone.” In re Electrolyte Labs. Inc., 929 F.2d 645, 647 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (citing Spice Islands, Inc. v. Frank Tea & Spice Co., 505 F.2d 1293 (CCPA
1974)).
We now compare Applicant’s mark reprinted below
with the cited mark LUXBRAND in standard characters. The Examining Attorney
argues that the marks are similar in connotation and commercial impression because
LUXBRAND is a truncated form of “Luxury Brands.” This argument hinges on the
Examining Attorney’s assertion that LUXURY BRANDS, rather than LBI, is “the
most prominent feature of the applicant’s mark.”7
7 8 TTABVUE 6; see also id. at 4.

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We disagree with the Examining Attorney that the disclaimed and merely
descriptive wording “Luxury Brands” is the dominant element of Applicant’s mark.
More or less weight may be given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the
ultimate conclusion rests on a consideration of the marks in their entireties. Nat’l
Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1058; see also Sabhnani v. Mirage Brands, LLC, No.
92068086, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 464, at *31. When we compare the marks as a whole,
overall we find them to be dissimilar in sound, appearance, connotation, and
commercial impression. The Examining Attorney failed to give proper consideration
to the stylized initialism LBI appearing in prominent serif styled lettering above the
merely descriptive wording “Luxury Brands” which is part of the corporate
designation “Luxury Brands International.” See, e.g., In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d
1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (disclaimed and generic word less dominant). The relatively
large size and staggered presentation of the three letters is eye-catching. By contrast,
“Luxury Brands” appears underneath in a much smaller sized and lighter shade font,
making it less perceptible. We focus on the “general recollection” of consumers. See
Gegenuber Dem Julichs-Platz v. Chesebrough-Pond, Inc., 470 F.2d 1385, 1386 (CCPA
1972) (“The focus must be on the ‘general recollection’ reasonably produced by
appellant’s mark and a comparison of appellee’s mark therewith.”) (citation omitted).
Marks must also “be considered . . . in light of the fallibility of memory” of consumers.
St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d at 751 (quoting San Fernando Elec. Mfg. Co. v. JFD Elecs.
Components Corp., 565 F.2d 683, 685 (CCPA 1977)). In light of the visual
presentation of Applicant’s mark and the meaning of the disclaimed words, we find

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that consumers are likely to overlook “Luxury Brands” as well as the entirety of that
entity designation and instead focus on LBI.
The marks also sound different. Consumers have a penchant to shorten marks.
See, e.g., Bay State Brewing, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 46, at *9. The cited mark is likely to
be shortened to LBI when spoken by consumers, which sounds nothing like
LUXBRAND. And even if this were not the case, “LBI Luxury Brands International”
sounds significantly different than LUXBRAND.
Finally, as to connotation and commercial impression, as noted above,
LUXBRAND is a portmanteau of the two words “luxury” and “brand.” LBI has no
recognized meaning in relation to the identified goods. However, when considered
within the context of the mark as a whole, it appears to be an initialism of Applicant’s
company name Luxury Brands International, LLC. Under either scenario, the marks
engender different connotations and commercial impressions, with the cited mark
evoking a concept and Applicant’s mark evoking a specific supplier.
We find critical the obvious distinctions between the marks in appearance, sound,
connotation and commercial impression. This DuPont factor weighs against finding
a likelihood of confusion.
C. The Goods and the Established, Likely-to-Continue Channels of Trade
Next we compare the goods as identified in the application and cited registration,
the second DuPont factor. See, e.g., In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307
(Fed. Cir. 2018). “‘[T]he question of registrability of an applicant’s mark must be
decided on the basis of the identification of goods set forth in the application …

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regardless of what the record may reveal as to the particular nature of an applicant’s
goods, the particular channels of trade or the class of purchasers to which sales of the
goods are directed.’” Stone Lion Cap. Partners, LP v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317,
1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous. Comput. Servs. Inc., 918
F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). It is sufficient for a finding of likelihood of confusion
as to a particular class if relatedness is established for any item of identified goods
within that class. See Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335,
1336 (CCPA 1981).
Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods are identical in part. Both the application and
cited registration identify “bed sheets” without any limitations, meaning that these
goods are literally identical. The cited registration also includes several specific types
of bed sheets: “Bed sheets for children” and “Children’s bed sheets;” “Bed sheets, …
[and] bed flat sheets used in the bedding, health care, home-health care and nursing
home industries made of biodegradable film created from renewable bio-polymer
resources;” and “Fitted bed sheets.” Each of these items is encompassed by
Applicant’s broad identification of “bed sheets,” making them legally identical. See In
re Hughes Furniture Indus., Inc., No. 85627379, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 65, at *10
(applicant’s broadly worded identification of “furniture” necessarily encompasses
Registrant’s narrowly identified “residential and commercial furniture.”); Sw. Mgmt.,
Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., No. 92080469, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 176, at *60-61 (given broad
identification of services, “we must presume that the services encompass all services
of the type identified”), aff’d mem., 652 F. App’x 971 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Likewise,

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Registrant’s goods broadly identified as “bed blankets” encompass Applicant’s more
narrowly tailored “Children’s bed …blankets;” and “Silk bed blankets.” This DuPont
factor therefore weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.
This brings us to the “established, likely-to-continue channels of trade.” DuPont,
476 F.2d at 1361. We must presume that the Applicant’s and Registrant literally
identical and legally identical goods travel in the same ordinary trade and
distribution channels and will be marketed to the same potential consumers. See In
re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (even though there was no
evidence regarding channels of trade and classes of consumers, the Board was
entitled to rely on this legal presumption in determining likelihood of confusion where
the goods at issue were identical and unrestricted); In re Yawata Iron & Steel Co.,
403 F.2d 752, 771 (CCPA 1968) (where there are legally identical goods, the channels
of trade and classes of purchasers are considered to be the same); see also In re Fat
Boys Water Sports LLC, No. 86490930, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 150, at *26 (applying
presumption set forth in Viterra regarding trade channels and classes of consumers);
Sock It to Me, Inc. v. Fan, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 201, at *22 (same). The trade channels
and classes of customers weigh in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.
D. Purchasing Conditions
Lastly, we evaluate “[t]he conditions under which … sales are made, i.e. ‘impulse’
vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. A heightened degree
of care when making a purchasing decision may tend to minimize likelihood of
confusion. See, e.g., In re N.A.D., Inc., 754 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (Fed. Cir. 1985)

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(because only sophisticated purchasers exercising great care would purchase the
relevant goods, there would be no likelihood of confusion merely because of the
similarity between the marks NARCO and NARKOMED). Conversely, impulse
purchases of inexpensive goods may tend to have the opposite effect. Palm Bay Imps.,
396 F.3d at 1376.
Under this factor, we focus our analysis on the goods that we found literally
identical or legally identical and how such goods are delineated in the application and
registration. The relevant items in the application and cited registration consisting
of “bed sheets,” “Bed sheets for children,” “Children’s bed sheets;” “Fitted bed sheets,”
“Bed blankets,” “Children’s bed …blankets,” and “Silk bed blankets” are not limited
to any particular type or consumer, meaning that they encompass both the general
public as well as commercial purchasers (e.g., hotels, health care providers, long term
care facilities). We must base our analysis “on the least sophisticated potential
purchasers.” Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1365 (internal citations omitted). This DuPont
factor is neutral against a likelihood of confusion.
E. Weighing the DuPont Factors
The final step in analyzing likelihood of confusion is to weigh the DuPont factors
for which there has been evidence and argument. Where not all of the relevant factors
point in the same direction, we must explain “the weight [we] assigned to the relevant
factors” as well as “the results of that weighing.” Charger Ventures LLC, 65 F.4th at
1379 (citation omitted). “No mechanical rule determines likelihood of confusion, and
each case requires weighing of the facts and circumstances of the particular mark.”

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In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “[T]he
weight afforded to each factor depends on the circumstances” and “[a]ny single factor
may control a particular case.” Stratus Networks, Inc. v. UBTA-UBET Commc’ns Inc.,
955 F.3d 994, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
We have carefully considered all of the evidence made of record, as well as all of
the arguments related thereto. The goods are partially identical, which weighs
heavily in favor of concluding that confusion is likely. See, e.g., In re La Peregrina
Ltd., No. 78676199, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 38, at *8. We can rely on the presumption
that such goods travel in the same ordinary trade and distribution channels and will
be marketed to the same potential consumers, which also favors a likelihood of
confusion.
On the other hand, the marks are different in their entireties, tipping this key
DuPont factor heavily against finding a likelihood of confusion. The cited mark
LUXBRAND is highly suggestive, meaning that it has some degree of conceptual
weakness. LUX has also been used as a segment of registered marks for the same or
similar products further weakening the cited mark. With a relatively limited scope of
protection, this DuPont factor weighs moderately against a likelihood of confusion.
Purchaser care is neutral.
We find that the dissimilarity of the marks in sound, appearance, meaning and
commercial impression is sufficiently great such that, coupled with the conceptual
weakness of the cited mark outweigh the identical nature of some of the goods and
their respective trade channels. See, e.g., Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp., Inc.,

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637 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming Board’s holding that contemporaneous use
of applicant’s CAPITAL CITY BANK marks for banking and financial services, and
opposer’s CITIBANK marks for banking and financial services, would not likely cause
confusion, based, in part, on findings that the phrase “City Bank” was frequently used
in the banking industry and that “CAPITAL” was the dominant element of applicant’s
marks, which gave the marks a geographic connotation as well as a look and sound
distinct from opposer’s marks). We reach this conclusion fully cognizant of the
principle that where the goods are partially identical, the degree of similarity
between the marks necessary to support a determination that confusion is likely
declines. See Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, LLC v. Fed. Corp., 673 F.3d 1330,
1337 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Still, we think the differences between the marks, viewed in
their entireties, are substantial enough to make confusion unlikely even where the
marks are used with identical goods. Accordingly, we conclude that confusion is
unlikely.
Decision: The Section 2(d) refusal is reversed.