The Ghost Agency, Inc.

THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Mailed: June 18, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re The Ghost Agency, Inc.
_____
Serial No. 98709623
_____
Michael Zarrabian of Command IP LLP,
for The Ghost Agency, Inc.
Amber Barreda, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 103,
Stacy Wahlberg, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Pologeorgis, Allard, and Bradley,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Allard, Administrative Trademark Judge:
The Ghost Agency, Inc. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register
of the mark (“AGENCY” disclaimed) for the following services:
Advertising services to create brand identity for others;
Post-production editing services for video and audio
commercials; Advertising agency services; Advertising and
publicity services, namely, promoting the goods, services,
brand identity and commercial information and news of
third parties through print, audio, video, digital and on-
line medium; Advertising and marketing services provided
by means of indirect methods of marketing
communications, namely, social media, search engine

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marketing, inquiry marketing, internet marketing, mobile
marketing, blogging and other forms of passive, sharable
or viral communications channels; Digital marketing
services; On-line customer-based social media brand
marketing services; Social media strategy and marketing
consultancy focusing on helping clients create and extend
their product and brand strategies by building virally
engaging marketing solutions; Providing advertising
services using 3D and animation designs
in International Class 35.1
The Examining Attorney refused registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant’s mark, when used on the
services identified above, so resembles the mark registered on the
Principal Register for, among other things, “Advertising and marketing services” in
International Class 35,2 that it is likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to
deceive.
After the refusal was made final, Applicant requested reconsideration and
concurrently filed a notice of appeal.3 The Board suspended the appeal and remanded
1 Application Serial No. 98709623 was filed on August 21, 2024, under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), based on Applicant’s claim of first use anywhere since
August 1, 2006 and first use in commerce since August 6, 2006.
The mark is described as “consist[ing] of the stylized text ‘GHOST’ in grey with the letter ‘G’
formed by a capital letter ‘C’ with a red horizontal line representing the counterpart of the
letter. Below, is the stylized text ‘AGENCY’ in grey with a grey horizontal line extending to
the left of the word ‘AGENCY’.” The colors grey and red are claimed as a feature of the mark.
2 Registration No. 6211578 was issued on December 1, 2020. The mark is described as
“consist[ing] of the word ‘GHOST’ in a stylized form.” Color is not claimed as a feature of the
mark.
3 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration after Final; 1 TTABVUE.

Serial No. 98709623
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the application to the Examining Attorney to consider the request for
reconsideration.4 After the Examining Attorney denied the request, the appeal was
resumed.5 The appeal is fully briefed.6 We reverse the refusal.
I. Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits the registration of a mark that
“[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent
and Trademark Office … as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods
[or services] of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ….”
15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of
all of the probative evidence of record bearing on the likelihood of confusion factors.
In re E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”);
see also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We consider
each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument. See, e.g., In re Guild
References to the briefs on appeal refer to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system.
The number preceding “TTABVUE” corresponds to the docket entry number; the number(s)
following “TTABVUE” refer to the page number(s) of that particular docket entry.
4 2 TTABVUE.
5 4, 5 TTABVUE.
6 Applicant’s brief appears at 6 TTABVUE, the Examining Attorney’s brief appears at 8
TTABVUE, and Applicant’s reply brief appears at 9 TTABVUE.
Applicant’s brief contains numerous hyperlinks. See, e.g., 6 TTABVUE 9, 16-18, 20. To the
extent that Applicant seeks to introduce new evidence with its brief, such submission is
untimely and will be given no consideration. See In re James S. Fallon, No. 86882668, 2020
TTAB LEXIS 464, at *7-8 (TTAB 2020). Moreover, it is well-settled that hyperlinks in a brief
do not properly make the evidence available at the link of record. See In re Olin Corp., No.
86651083, 2017 TTAB LEXIS 337, at *15 n.15 (TTAB 2017) (“Because the information
displayed at a link’s Internet address can be changed or deleted, merely providing a link to a
website is insufficient to make information from that site of record.”). We consider the
evidence specified in Applicant’s brief only to the extent that it was properly made of record
during examination.

Serial No. 98709623
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Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Varying weights may be assigned to
each DuPont factor depending on the evidence presented. See Citigroup Inc. v. Cap.
City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Shell Oil Co., 992
F.2d 1204, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[T]he various evidentiary factors may play more or
less weighty roles in any particular determination.”).
In every Section 2(d) case, two key factors are the similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks and the relatedness of the goods or services. Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books,
Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65 (Fed. Cir. 2002). These two factors, together with others,
specifically the third factor (channels of trade and classes of consumers) and the sixth
factor (number and nature of similar marks (i.e., strength of the cited mark)), are
addressed in this decision.
A. The Strength or Weakness of the Cited Mark
We turn first to the strength of the cited mark and consider Applicant’s argument
that the cited mark is “relatively weak because it is highly suggestive of a
characteristic of the underlying services[,]” and because it coexists with sixty-three
registered GHOST-formative marks.7
When evaluating the strength or weakness of a mark, we look at the mark’s
conceptual strength based on the nature of the term itself and, if evidence is present,
its commercial strength. See Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 71 F.4th 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2023) (“There are two prongs of analysis for a mark’s strength under the sixth factor:
conceptual strength and commercial strength.”); In re Chippendales USA, Inc., 622
7 6 TTABVUE 5-8.

Serial No. 98709623
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F.3d 1346, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (measuring both conceptual and marketplace
strength).
Conceptual strength is a measure of a mark’s distinctiveness and may be placed
“in categories of generally increasing distinctiveness: . . . (1) generic; (2) descriptive;
(3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful.” Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763, 768 (1992). “Marks that are descriptive or highly suggestive are entitled to
a narrower scope of protection, i.e., are less likely to generate confusion over source
identification, than their more fanciful counterparts.” Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS
Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Because the cited mark is registered on the Principal Register without a claim of
acquired distinctiveness, we must presume that it is inherently distinctive, i.e. that
it is at least as distinctive as a suggestive term for its identified services. Section 7(b)
of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b). See also Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of
Tea, Inc., No. 91118587, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 330, at *62 (TTAB 2006) (“A mark that
is registered on the Principal Register is entitled to all Section 7(b) presumptions
including the presumption that the mark is distinctive and moreover, in the absence
of a Section 2(f) claim in the registration, that the mark is inherently distinctive for
the goods.”).
Nonetheless, presumptively distinctive marks can, under some circumstances, be
weak as an indicator of source. In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, No. 86490930, 2016
TTAB LEXIS 150, at *23 (TTAB 2016). Indeed, the Federal Circuit has held that if
there is evidence that a mark, or an element of a mark, is commonly adopted by many

Serial No. 98709623
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different registrants, that may indicate that the mark or common element has some
conceptual weakness as an indicator of a single source. See Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung
Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363,
1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[E]vidence of third-party registrations is relevant to ‘show the
sense in which a mark is used in ordinary parlance,’ . . . that is, some segment that
is common to both parties’ marks may have ‘a normally understood and well-
recognized descriptive or suggestive meaning, leading to the conclusion that segment
is relatively weak[.]’”) (quoting Juice Generation, 794 F.3d at 1339).
Applicant argues that the cited mark is “relatively weak because it is highly
suggestive of a characteristic of the underlying services[,]”8 explaining that:
It is very common for companies that provide white label
services for others to use the word “ghost” to refer to the
anonymous nature of their services. Clients hire “ghost”
agencies like Applicant to work behind the scenes to build
and promote their brands. These agencies work
anonymously, creating content in the voice of their clients,
such that end consumers do not know about their
involvement in a company’s content creation efforts.
Examples of such use include “ghostwriting,” “ghost
editing,” “ghost singing,” and “ghost kitchen.” When viewed
in connection with the marketing, advertising, and
entertainment services being offered under the cited
marks, then, the registered marks inform consumers that
the services offered are meant to be white label services for
others. The word “GHOST” is therefore highly suggestive
of a characteristic of the services offered under the Cited
Mark, and therefore the registration[ is] entitled to a
narrower scope of protection, such that Applicant’s mark
can coexist on the trademark register.9
8 6 TTABVUE 5.
9 6 TTABVUE 5-6.

Serial No. 98709623
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The record shows that in the context of digital marketing, “white label branding”
means:
A marketing agency is hired to provide marketing solutions
to its client(s),
Then the agency outsources those services to a white label
external team,
The agency then rebrands the end product to make it
appear as if they created those solutions,
Then the agency resells those solutions to their client(s).10
Thus, according to one third-party website, white-label solutions allow entities to
provide products or services under their brand, which are developed and delivered by
a third-party provider.11 “For example, a digital marketing agency might use a white-
label digital marketing agency to run website campaigns for their clients, but the
clients think the agency did all the work.”12
To further support its argument that the cited mark is conceptually weak,
Applicant made of record sixty-three third-party registrations for marks that
10 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 226, 233.
Page references herein to the application record refer to the online database of the USPTO’s
Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) system. All citations to documents
contained in the TSDR database are to the downloadable .pdf versions of the documents in
the USPTO TSDR Case Viewer.
11 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 245.
12 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 234.
While this type of third-party website evidence might be considered hearsay in an inter
partes proceeding, in an ex parte appeal, the Board takes a more permissive approach, so we
consider it. In re Embiid, No. 88202890, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 168, at *6 n.19 (TTAB 2021)
(“[W]e are more permissive regarding the use of hearsay in ex parte appeals ….”). See also
TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD (TBMP) § 1208 (2025) and cases cited therein.

Serial No. 98709623
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incorporate the term GHOST.13 While we agree with the Examining Attorney that
the third-party registrations are not evidence that the registered marks are in use or
that the public is familiar with them,14 nonetheless they may bear on conceptual
weakness if a term is commonly registered for similar goods or services. See
Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915, 917 (CCPA 1976) (Third-party
registrations “may be given some weight to show the meaning of a mark in the same
way that dictionaries are used.”).
Applicant contends that these 63 registered marks, together with the cited mark,
demonstrate that “consumers encounter many different ‘GHOST’ marks and can
distinguish them based on their additional wording, design, and the particular
services identified.”15 Contrary to Applicant’s argument, the sixth DuPont factor
considers third-party marks and, in this context, the cited mark itself is not
considered a third-party mark. In re Max Cap. Grp. Ltd., No. 77186166, 2010 TTAB
LEXIS 1, at *8-9 (2010 TTAB) (“Although characterized as third-party use, applicant
has also included uses by itself and the [cited] registrant…. Such evidence does not
address the du Pont factor of third-party use.”). Therefore, we do not consider it in
this context.
13 6 TTABVUE 6-7; August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 69-183, 279-341 (Exhibits
A-BK)).
Although Applicant indicates in its brief that each registration has been assigned a
corresponding exhibit designation, the printouts attached to the Request for Reconsideration
do not include any such designation. Nonetheless, we repeat the exhibit designations herein
so as to coordinate the registration to the text of Applicant’s argument in its brief and in its
Request.
14 8 TTABVUE 6.
15 6 TTABVUE 6-7.

Serial No. 98709623
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We also immediately disregard five third-party registrations because they are not
based on use in commerce but rather issued under Sections 44(e) or 66(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1126(e), 1141f(a), and have been registered for less than
five years. Made in Nature, LLC v. Pharmavite LLC, No. 91223352, 2022 TTAB
LEXIS 251, at *30-31 (TTAB 2022). As such, the following registered marks have no
probative value: Reg. Nos. 5859476;16 7699677;17 7117201;18 7246040;19 and
7562692.20
We can also disregard two registrations that have since been cancelled: Reg. Nos.
5709069;21 and 5782910.22 TBMP § 1208.02 (“The Board may choose not to consider
expired or cancelled third-party registrations.”) and cases cited therein.
To the extent that Applicant argues that the third-party registrations are relevant
solely because they identify services in International Class 35, this argument is
unavailing. Classification is merely an administrative act that has no bearing on the
determination of likelihood of confusion. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297,
1307 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Rather, we must consider the goods or services as identified in
the third-party registrations.
16 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 40, 113-15 (Exhibit AO).
17 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 25, 295-97 (Exhibit I).
18 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 29, 314-16 (Exhibit P).
19 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 41-42, 122-24 (Exhibit AR).
20 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 49, 176-78 (Exhibit BI).
21 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 33-34, 340-41 (Exhibit Z).
22 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 24-25, 292-94 (Exhibit H).

Serial No. 98709623
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Inasmuch as Applicant’s services are legally identical to the services of the cited
registration and Applicant did not make of record any evidence that the non-identical
goods or services of the third-party registrations are related or similar to those
identified in the cited registration,23 we focus our analysis to those services that are
identical to or encompassed by the services identified in the cited registration or
encompassed by them. With this in mind, we disregard many of the third-party
registrations, including the following exemplary registrations: Reg. Nos. 6057086
(“Online retail store services featuring dietary and nutritional supplements, sports
drinks, energy drinks, and drinking accessories”);24 7062944 (for, among other things,
“business management services”);25 6183787 (“Online retail store services featuring
apparel, artwork prints, photographs, paintings, skate decks, and stickers”);26 and
6927943 (for various services, including, “Business management and operation
assistance to yacht owners and operators”).27
23 We also note that none of the identifications listed in the third-party registrations
demonstrate, on their face, that the services are related.
24 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 21, 69-72 (Exhibit A).
25 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 22, 279-81 (Exhibit C).
26 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 23, 282-83 (Exhibit D).
27 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 23, 284-86 (Exhibit E).
For the same reason, i.e., that the identified goods/services have not been shown to be related
or similar, we disregard the following registrations: August 21, 2025 Request for
Reconsideration at 34, 73-75 (Exhibit AA, RN 7478568); 34-35, 76-77 (Exhibit AB, RN
6480505); 35, 78-80 (Exhibit AC, RN 6042849); 36, 85-86 (Exhibit AE, RN 3207520); 36-37,
87-88 (Exhibit AF, RN 7480262); 36, 89-91 (Exhibit AG, RN 6210274); 37, 94-95 (Exhibit AI,
RN 4616833); 38, 100-04 (Exhibit AK, RN 5887958); 39, 108-110 (Exhibit AM, RN 7130612);
39-40, 111-12 (Exhibit AN, RN 6497708); 44, 135-38 (Exhibit AV, RN 3815835); 45, 142-44
(Exhibit AX, RN 4026596); 45-46, 148-49 (Exhibit AZ, RN 5549674); 22, 150-52 (Exhibit B,
RN 7071342); 46, 153-55 (Exhibit BA, RN 4504739); 47, 159-61 (Exhibit BC, RN 7593293);
47, 162-64 (Exhibit BD, RN 5311900); 48, 168-70 (Exhibit BF, RN 5087082); 48, 171-72
(Exhibit BG, RN 5549673); 49, 173-75 (Exhibit BH, RN 3853133); 50, 181-83 (Exhibit BK,

Serial No. 98709623
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Other third-party registrations we disregard are those for the mark GEIST, both
with and without a design (Reg. Nos. 6918651 and 6931401).28 It is true that each
registration includes a statement that the English translation of GEIST is GHOST.29
However, because Applicant does not argue or explain why the doctrine of foreign
equivalents should be applied here, we decline to consider these registrations. In any
event, even if the doctrine were applied, these registrations would be irrelevant
because they each identify unrelated services, i.e., retail store services in the field of
hunting.
Similarly, we disregard the following registered marks because they engender
different overall commercial impressions, rendering them less similar to the cited
mark than Applicant’s mark: (Reg. No. 7606127);30 RGB OF THE
OZARKS (Reg. No. 7114758);31 (Reg. No. 5656663);32 (Reg. No.
RN 6464011); 23-24, 287-88 (Exhibit F, RN 7022768); 26, 301-02 (Exhibit K, RN 6941452);
27-28, 306-08 (Exhibit M, RN 6178559); 28, 309-11 (Exhibit N, RN 7530773); 28, 312-13
(Exhibit O, RN 6338851); 29-30, 317-18 (Exhibit Q, RN 6242708); 30-31, 321-22 (Exhibit S,
RN 7022767); 31, 324-26 (Exhibit T, RN 7139704); 31, 327-29 (Exhibit U, RN 7231365); 32,
330-31 (Exhibit V, RN 5057626); 32, 332-33 (Exhibit W, RN 7235577); and 32-33, 334-36
(Exhibit X, RN 6927944).
28 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 41, 42, 119-21, 125-27 (Exhibits AQ, AS).
29 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 119-21, 125-27.
30 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 47-48, 165-67 (Exhibit BE).
31 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 49-50, 179-80 (Exhibit BJ).
32 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 43, 131-34 (Exhibit AU).

Serial No. 98709623
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5549676);33 and (Reg. No. 3898321).34 See e.g., Made in Nature,
2022 TTAB LEXIS 251, at *29-30; In re I-Coat Co., LLC, No. 86802467, 2018 TTAB
LEXIS 171, at *16-17 (TTAB 2018) (“none of the[se] marks are as similar to the mark
in the cited registration as is Applicant’s mark.”).
That leaves us with the following twelve third-party registered marks in the name
of eleven different entities that identify services that are identical to or encompassed
by the services identified in the cited mark:
1) GHOST SHERPA for, among other things, “marketing analysis services” and
“market research” (Reg. No. 7517788);35
2) (CUBE disclaimed) for, among other things,
“Advertising and publicity services” (Reg. No. 7076755);36
3) and GHOST ROCK both for, among other things, “advertising and
marketing” (Reg. Nos. 6975141 and 6734360);37
4) GHOST GIRL for, inter alia, “Advertising, promotion and marketing services
in the nature of e-mail blast campaigns for others” (Reg. No. 6270118);38
33 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 44, 139-41 (Exhibit AW).
34 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 42-43, 128-30 (Exhibit AT).
35 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 24, 289-91 (Exhibit G).
36 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 26, 298-300 (Exhibit J).
37 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 27, 33, 303-05, 337-39 (Exhibits L, Y).
38 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 30, 319-20 (Exhibit R).

Serial No. 98709623
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5) GHOST GAMING (GAMING disclaimed) for, among other things, “advertising
and marketing services” (Reg. No. 6211376);39
6) THE TAX GHOST for, among other things, “Marketing services in the nature
of lead generation” (Reg. No. 7405053);40
7) (MULTIROTOR QUADCOPTER disclaimed) for, inter
alia, “advertising; marketing and promotional services” (Reg. No. 5286646);41
8) THE WRITING GHOST (WRITING disclaimed) for, among other things,
“marketing services” (Reg. No. 5384821);42
9) (“GHOST” and “MARKETING AGENCY” disclaimed) for,
among other things, “Marketing services” (Reg. No. 7384213);43
10) GHOSTLIGHT for, inter alia, “Advertising for motion picture films” (Reg. No.
6743149);44 and
11) GHOSTWATER for, among other things, “providing motion picture
advertising for others” (Reg. No. 2466034).45
While 12 third-party registrations is substantially less than the 63 registrations
proffered, nonetheless, considering all of the above-discussed evidence, we find that
the record shows that the term GHOST is highly suggestive because it brings to mind
a feature or purpose of the services for which the marks are registered–to render
39 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 35-36, 81-84 (Exhibit AD).
40 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 37, 92-93 (Exhibit AH).
41 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 37-38, 96-99 (Exhibit AJ).
42 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 38-39, 105-07 (Exhibit AL).
43 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 40-41, 116-18 (Exhibit AP).
44 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 45, 145-47 (Exhibit AY).
45 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 46-47, 156-58 (Exhibit BB).

Serial No. 98709623
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advertising and marketing services for and in the name of another. As a result, the
term GHOST is conceptually weak when used with advertising and marketing
services and entitled only to a narrow scope of protection. See Juice Generation, 794
F.3d at 1339 (“Marks that are . . . highly suggestive are entitled to a narrower scope
of protection, i.e., are less likely to generate confusion over source identification, than
their more fanciful counterparts.”); Made in Nature, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 251, at *42
(“Opposer’s MADE IN NATURE marks are highly suggestive, because they bring to
mind a quality of the goods for which the marks are registered―all natural without
added man-made ingredients.”).46 Thus, the sixth DuPont factor does not favor a
finding of likelihood of confusion.
B. Similarity or Dissimilarity and Nature of the Services, and Similarity
or Dissimilarity of Established and Likely-to-Continue Channels of
Trade and Classes of Purchasers
We turn next to the second DuPont factor, which involves a comparison of the
services as they are identified in the involved application and the cited registration.
See In re Detroit Athletic, 903 F.3d at 1306; Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press
Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
46 Both the Examining Attorney and Applicant focus on conceptual strength and neither
discuss commercial strength. 6 TTABVUE 5-8, 23; 8 TTABVUE 6-8. Evidence of third-party
registrations unaccompanied by evidence of use of the mark is not probative of the
commercial weakness of the cited mark. Here, because Applicant did not submit any evidence
of third-party use, and because third-party registrations do not equate to proof of third-party
use, we do not find the cited mark commercially weak. Tao Licensing, LLC v. Bender
Consulting Ltd., No. 92057132, 2017 TTAB LEXIS 437, at *47 (TTAB 2017) (“Use evidence
may reflect commercial weakness, while third-party registration evidence that does not
equate to proof of third-party use may bear on conceptual weakness if a term is commonly
registered for similar goods or services.”).

Serial No. 98709623
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Recall that the cited registration identifies “advertising and marketing services,”
which encompasses all services of the type described, including Applicant’s more
narrowly identified services, which include:
• Advertising services to create brand identity for others;
• Advertising agency services;
• Advertising and publicity services, namely, promoting the goods, services,
brand identity and commercial information and news of third parties
through print, audio, video, digital and on-line medium;
• Advertising and marketing services provided by means of indirect methods
of marketing communications, namely, social media, search engine
marketing, inquiry marketing, internet marketing, mobile marketing,
blogging and other forms of passive, sharable or viral communications
channels; and
• Digital marketing services.
Accordingly, Applicant’s and Registrant’s services are legally identical in-part.47 See
New Era Cap Co. v. Pro Era, LLC, No. 91216455, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 199, at *39-40
(TTAB 2020) (finding “caps” as identified in the application broad enough to
47 The Examining Attorney also provided third-party website evidence showing that “it is
common for consumers to encounter the applicant’s services and cited services together and
offered by the same source in the marketplace.” 8 TTABVUE 17. This evidence indicates that
the identified services are of a type that may commonly emanate from a single source and
thus may be perceived as related and that they also travel through the same channels of
trade. While we appreciate the Examining Attorney’s thoroughness in providing this
evidence, we need not further consider it, given our finding that, based on the respective
identifications of services alone, Applicant’s services and Registrant’s services are legally
identical in-part and are presumed to travel through the same channels of trade to the same
classes of consumers. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
The Examining Attorney also made arguments ostensibly under the fourth DuPont factor,
but concludes that “[f]or the foregoing reasons, … applicant’s services and the cited services
are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.” 8 TTABVUE 8. Because these
arguments are addressed in our discussion of the second factor, we have not separately
addressed the fourth DuPont factor. Applicant, for its part, does not address the fourth factor.

Serial No. 98709623
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encompass all types of caps, including “athletic caps” identified in the opposer’s
registration, rendering the parties’ goods in-part legally identical); In re Hughes
Furniture Indus., Inc., No. 85627379, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 65, at *10 (TTAB 2015)
(“Applicant’s broadly worded identification of ‘furniture’ necessarily encompasses
Registrant’s narrowly identified ‘residential and commercial furniture.’”).
This brings us to the similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue
trade channels and classes of consumers, the third DuPont factor. DuPont, 476 F.2d
at 1361. Because the services are legally identical in-part and because the
identifications of the involved application and cited registration are unrestricted as
to trade channels, we must presume that the legally identical in-part services travel
in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers. See In re Viterra, 671
F.3d at 1362 (even though there was no evidence regarding channels of trade and
classes of consumers, the Board “was entitled to rely on this legal presumption in
determining likelihood of confusion”).
The legally identical nature of the services and the presumed identity in trade
channels and classes of purchasers cause the second and third DuPont factors to
weigh heavily in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.
C. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
Under the first DuPont factor, we consider the similarity or dissimilarity of
Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks in their entireties, considering their appearance,
sound, meaning and commercial impression. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. See also In re
Detroit Athletic, 903 F.3d at 1303. In comparing the marks, “[t]he proper test is not a

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side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead ‘whether the marks are sufficiently
similar in terms of their commercial impression’ such that persons who encounter the
marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Coach Servs.,
Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Leading
Jewelers Guild, Inc. v. LJOW Holdings, LLC, No. 91160856, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 35,
at *14 (TTAB 2007)). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser,
who normally retains a general rather than a specific impression of trademarks. See
In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 751 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Finally, where, as here,
the marks are used with legally identical services, “a lesser degree of similarity
between the marks may be sufficient to give rise to a likelihood of confusion.” Coach
Servs., 668 F.3d at 1368.
While marks must be compared in their entireties and the analysis cannot be
predicated on dissecting the marks into their various components, different features
may be analyzed to determine whether the marks are similar. See In re Nat’l Data
Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985); New Era Cap, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 199, at
*41-42. There is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less
weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate
conclusion rests on a consideration of the marks in their entireties. Nat’l Data, 753
F.2d at 1058.
Recall that Applicant seeks to register and the mark of the
cited registration is .

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Applicant argues that its highly stylized letter G, is formed by a grey capital C
shape and a red horizontal line, and constitutes “a design evocative of a ‘power on’
button symbol.”48 Applicant maintains that this design element not only
differentiates the appearance of Applicant’s mark from the word GHOST “but also
imbues it with a modern, tech-savvy impression distinct from the cited
registrant’s mark (which lacks such imagery).”49 To support its argument, Applicant
made of record evidence that the symbol is known as the power symbol.50
The Examining Attorney counters that the literal element GHOST is the
dominant element in Applicant’s mark and it is identical to the only literal element
in the cited mark.51 Because the term AGENCY has been disclaimed, the Examining
Attorney continues, this term does not have any trademark significance so it cannot
meaningfully differentiate the marks.52 As for Applicant’s design element, i.e., the
power button, the Examining Attorney contends that it does not create a distinct
commercial impression apart from the literal element and, as a result, it is
insufficient to differentiate the marks.53
48 6 TTABVUE 8.
49 6 TTABVUE 9-10 (emphasis in original).
50 August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration after Final at 197-98 (Wikipedia.org), 219
(dribble.com).
51 8 TTABVUE 7-8.
52 8 TTABVUE 9.
53 8 TTABVUE 11.

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As an initial matter, we disagree that the cited mark makes the commercial
impression of the word GHOST with a line through it. While we acknowledge that
this understanding is consistent with the description of the mark, the description of
the mark is not binding upon our determination since “[a] mark’s meaning is based
on the impression actually created by the mark in the minds of consumers, not on the
impression that the applicant states the mark is intended to convey.” TRADEMARK
MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE (TMEP) § 808.02 (May 2026) (giving the
examining attorney the discretion to decide when to defer to the applicant’s phrasing
of a description of the mark). The cited mark consists of letters all in lower case; the
initial letter appears to us as a lowercase “q”, not a lowercase “g”. Thus, the mark
makes the commercial impression of “Q HOST,” which suggests some sort of hosting,
possibly web hosting, for example, that is commonly associated with websites, which
are a common form of digital advertising and marketing.54
We are also not persuaded by Applicant’s arguments that its symbol is a
power button, nonetheless we do agree that this stylized G, with its clean, crisp lines
and contrasting colors, causes Applicant’s mark to make a different commercial
impression than that of the cited mark. This is true despite the shared component
“host”, which causes the marks to sound similar. Apart from this similarity in sound
of the end portion (HOST), the distinctive stylizations of the marks cause them to
look very different, particularly when the entirety of Applicant’s mark is considered,
54 See, e.g., August 21, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 225-28.

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which includes the term AGENCY. The differences in the connotations of the marks
(Q HOST versus GHOST (with a stylized G) AGENCY) are very different and, when
considering the marks in their entireties, the marks engender very different
commercial impressions.
Even were we to find that the cited mark engenders the commercial impression of
GHOST with a line through it, rather than Q HOST, we would still find confusion is
unlikely. This is because the record demonstrates that the term GHOST is
conceptually weak and this conceptual weakness, when combined with the
dissimilarity of the stylizations of the marks discussed above, would also be sufficient
to find that confusion is not likely.
The first DuPont factor weighs against likelihood of confusion.
D. Balancing the DuPont Factors
Having carefully considered all of the evidence made of record, as well as all of the
arguments related thereto, we now turn to the task of weighing the DuPont factors
for which there has been evidence and argument. In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64
F.4th 1375, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
The term GHOST has been shown to be conceptually weak under the sixth DuPont
factor which therefore disfavors a finding of likelihood of confusion. Regarding the
second and third factors, these each weigh heavily in favor of a likelihood of confusion
because the identified services are legally identical in-part and are presumed to travel
through the same channels of trade to the same classes of consumers. Under the first
factor, we consider the marks to be dissimilar. Dissimilarity of the marks alone is a

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sufficient basis to conclude that no confusion is likely. See, e.g., Odom’s Tenn. Pride
Sausage, Inc. v. FF Acquisition, LLC, 600 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding
the first DuPont factor alone may be dispositive in a likelihood of confusion analysis);
Champagne Louis Roederer, S.A. v. Delicato Vineyards, 148 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (same); Kellogg Co. v. Pack ’Em Enters., Inc., 951 F.2d 330, 333 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (“We know of no reason why, in a particular case, a single duPont factor may
not be dispositive” and holding that “substantial and undisputed differences” between
two competing marks justified a conclusion of no likelihood of confusion on summary
judgment).
Decision
The refusal to register Applicant’s mark under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act
is reversed.