Graves, Chad v. Southall Adventures, LLC

CourtListener 10660137Tennworkcompapp25 août 2025

Texte intégral

FILED
Aug 25, 2025
01:55 PM(CT)
TENNESSEE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
APPEALS BOARD

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Chad Graves Docket No. 2024-50-5540

v. State File No. 25190-2024

Southall Adventures, LLC, et al.

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ Heard August 1, 2025,
Compensation Claims in Nashville, Tennessee
Thomas L. Wyatt, Judge

Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Remanded

In this interlocutory appeal, both parties have filed notices of appeal. At an expedited
hearing, the employee sought additional medical treatment and temporary disability
benefits related to injuries he sustained when he slipped and fell at work. The court ordered
the employer to provide the requested benefits but declined to order the employer to
authorize treatment with the employee’s unauthorized physician for his alleged cervical
spine injury. In its notice of appeal, the employer contends the trial court erred when it
ordered additional medical and temporary disability benefits for the employee’s alleged
left knee injury. In his notice of appeal, the employee asserts the trial court erred in
declining to compel the employer to approve his unauthorized physician as his authorized
treating physician moving forward. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the
trial court’s order in part, reverse it in part, and remand the case.

Judge Pele I. Godkin delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding Judge
Timothy W. Conner and Judge Meredith B. Weaver joined.

Nicholas J. Peterson and Brady Allen, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the employer-
appellant/appellee, Southall Adventures, LLC

Adam Brock-Dagnan, Nashville, Tennessee, for the employee-appellee/appellant, Chad
Graves

Factual and Procedural Background

Chad Graves (“Employee”) worked as a pool cleaner for Southall Adventures, LLC
(“Employer”), when, while cleaning a whirlpool, he slipped and fell, landing on a hard

1
surface on his head, right arm, and the right side of his body. Employee attempted to
continue working but had to stop when his nose began to bleed. He reported the injury to
Employer and was seen at the Williamson County Medical Center emergency room that
same day. While there, Employee complained of nausea, fatigue, headaches, and left knee
and foot pain, but he did not report a loss of consciousness after his fall. Diagnostic studies
were interpreted as normal, and Employee was discharged home with instructions to follow
up with an orthopedic doctor.

Employer provided a panel of physicians from which Employee selected Dr. Jeffrey
Lawrence, whom he first saw on April 15, 2024. During that visit, Employee complained
of pain and an inability to move his right arm. Dr. Lawrence noted Employee’s history of
preexisting tendinitis and a previous right shoulder injury from approximately ten years
before the work incident. Imaging studies revealed “some cystic change at the attachment
site of the rotator cuff,” but no fractures or dislocations were noted. Based on Employee’s
clinical presentation, Dr. Lawrence believed Employee had “pseudo paralysis [and] full-
thickness tear of his rotator cuff” and ordered an MRI of the right shoulder. In his report,
Dr. Lawrence opined that Employee’s “present shoulder injury is work-related and in the
course of his normal work activities.”

Employee returned to Dr. Lawrence on April 24 with continued complaints of right
shoulder pain, neck pain, headaches, burning pain in his trapezial muscle and posterior
scapula, pain down his right arm, right wrist and elbow pain, and left knee pain, which he
said was “aggravated” during his fall. X-rays of Employee’s neck were normal, and the
MRI of his right shoulder revealed tendinitis but no full thickness tear of the rotator cuff.
Dr. Lawrence diagnosed Employee with a “[c]ervical whiplash type injury” to his neck,
right radiculopathy, right shoulder pain, and a concussion. He noted that Employee would
need to be evaluated for his concussion and was not to return to work until after he had
been cleared.

Employee selected Dr. James Mosly from the original panel for evaluation of his
concussion-type symptoms. He first saw Dr. Mosly on May 1 and reported headaches,
nausea, and dizziness, as well as neck, shoulder, and left knee pain. Due to Employee’s
high blood pressure, he was referred to an emergency room so that his blood pressure could
be stabilized. Thereafter, Employee was seen at a Vanderbilt walk-in clinic to be evaluated
for his concussion and complained of left knee pain, dizziness, headaches, and anxiety,
including nightmares and depression. X-rays of his knee revealed osteoarthritic changes
in the medial and patellofemoral joints. The provider recommended cognitive behavioral
therapy for post-traumatic stress and an orthopedic evaluation of his knee. Due to
Employee’s co-morbid conditions, the medical providers were unable to evaluate his
concussion symptoms.

2
On May 15, Employee returned to Dr. Lawrence with continued complaints of
headaches, anxiety, and “a lot of hypertension.” 1 He told Dr. Lawrence that he had been
to an urgent care clinic for his concussion and was treated at an emergency room for
hypertension. Employee brought Dr. Lawrence a note from the walk-in clinic that
described posttraumatic stress, left knee injury, pain, and hypertension. The note referred
Employee to an orthopedic specialist for evaluation of his knee complaints, and Dr.
Lawrence then “recommend[ed] that he be allowed to be seen for his knee from Workers’
Comp.” Dr. Lawrence noted that Employee had been to therapy for his shoulder, which
was improving; however, he still had pain in the right side of his neck, shoulder, and
posterior scapula. The MRI of Employee’s cervical spine revealed a C6-7 central disc
protrusion and some foraminal stenosis at C4-5 and C5-6. Dr. Lawrence diagnosed
Employee with right rotator cuff tendinosis and cervical degenerative disc disease with a
herniated cervical disc. Dr. Lawrence reiterated that Employee needed to be seen by a
neurologist to rule out a concussion. He also recommended an authorized evaluation of
Employee’s left knee complaints, continued physical therapy, and authorization for
Employee to see Dr. Robert Lowe, III, another physician in his practice, for Employee’s
neck complaints.

In the interim, Employer obtained Employee’s past medical records, which
documented a 2010 surgical repair to the quadriceps tendon in Employee’s left knee. These
records also revealed prior treatment for depression and anxiety stemming from a 2020
workers’ compensation case. Employer then retained Dr. Junaid Makda to perform a
records review in May 2024. Dr. Makda’s review included records pertaining to
Employee’s previous left knee injury along with negative x-rays from the date of injury
and May 2024. Ultimately, Dr. Makda opined that the April 10, 2024 incident was not the
primary cause of Employee’s left knee condition or need for medical treatment of that knee.

Pursuant to Dr. Lawrence’s referral, Dr. Lowe initially saw Employee on May 24
and diagnosed him with a cervical disc herniation at C6-7. Dr. Lowe wrote that it was
“certainly reasonable to assume that this is an acute injury.” He recommended continuing
physical therapy but did not believe Employee needed surgery. Dr. Lowe noted that
Employee should see a neurologist for concussion symptoms and recommended an EMG.

Thereafter, Employer scheduled an employer’s examination with Dr. Jeffrey
Hazlewood in July 2024. Following that examination, Dr. Hazlewood opined that
Employee’s neck and right arm issues were caused by a disc herniation at C6-7 and cervical
whiplash that were caused by the work accident. He also opined that Employee’s
headaches likely were the result of a concussion caused by his fall. However, Dr.
Hazlewood stated that Employee’s mental condition was related to a “stress reaction” and
not post-traumatic stress disorder. He opined that the April 2024 work accident was not
the primary cause of the left knee complaints because, upon examination, he found no

1
In his office note, Dr. Lawrence stated he had been provided with and reviewed video of the work incident.
3
objective evidence of an acute injury to the left knee, stating he saw “nothing to suggest
any acute injury on examination, nor apparently did the previous physicians that saw
[Employee].”

Following his evaluation with Dr. Hazlewood, Employee returned to Dr. Lowe, who
reiterated his causation opinion and noted that the disc protrusion at C6-7 “is related to the
work injury.” Medical records from that visit mistakenly indicated Employee had
completed physical therapy and had undergone a neurological evaluation. 2 Dr. Lowe
indicated that he would reorder physical therapy and continue Employee’s work
restrictions.

Thereafter, Employee testified he began to question whether Dr. Lowe was
considering Employee’s best interests in his evaluations and treatment recommendations.
As a result, he decided to “test” Dr. Lowe’s loyalty by requesting that Dr. Lowe remove
all work restrictions and release him to return to work. Employee apparently believed that
if Dr. Lowe complied with his request, it would prove that Dr. Lowe was not considering
his best interests. After Dr. Lowe complied with Employee’s request, Employee became
convinced that Dr. Lowe was not prioritizing his medical care over the interests of
Employer. Consequently, Employee called Dr. Lowe’s office to complain. Thereafter, a
representative of the medical practice reported to the adjuster that Employee had threatened
to “fly off the handle” and come to the doctor’s office to “get things done.” 3 Upon learning
that Dr. Lowe had released Employee to full duty, Employer ceased paying temporary
disability benefits on September 10, 2024. As a result of Employee’s actions and the
medical office personnel’s perception of direct threats, Dr. Lowe’s practice discharged
Employee as a patient of all of its providers. As a result, neither Dr. Lowe nor Dr.
Lawrence would agree to see Employee again. In addition, Dr. Lowe issued an opinion
indicating that Employee would need no further treatment and qualified for a 0%
impairment rating.

In the interim, Employee attempted to return to work but was unsuccessful.
Employer offered him a buyout to resign from his job in October, and Employee accepted.
Employee testified that he was able to use some of this money to purchase health insurance,
which enabled him to obtain treatment for his alleged work injuries.

After being discharged from Dr. Lowe’s practice in September 2024, Employee
requested replacement panels for continued medical care. Employee ultimately received
additional panels in January 2025, and he selected Dr. Jason Jones to treat his shoulder.
Following Dr. Jones’s initial evaluation, he wrote that it was “not unreasonable to think
that the fall could have caused an acute pain on the right side.” Employee also selected
2
Employee testified at the hearing that he had not completed physical therapy or had a neurological
evaluation because Employer never authorized that treatment.
3
Employee testified that he never threatened to harm anyone, although he acknowledged he made the call.
4
two providers from Employer-provided panels for his neck, but both selected physicians
declined to treat him. Employer then provided another panel for Employee’s neck, but, as
of the date of the expedited hearing, Employee had not selected a physician for his neck
complaints from Employer’s new panel.

Meanwhile, after being discharged from Dr. Lowe’s practice in September and
while awaiting receipt of new panels, Employee returned to the walk-in clinic where he
had been seen previously. There, he saw providers for his neck, right shoulder, and left
knee complaints. In December 2024, Dr. Raymond Gardocki evaluated and treated
Employee for his neck and recommended a cervical fusion. Employee also saw Dr. Eric
Bowman that same month for his left knee complaints. He told Dr. Bowman that he had
felt a “pop” in his left knee at the time of the work incident, which was the first indication
in the record that Employee reported such a symptom. He also told Dr. Bowman that, after
the accident, he experienced left knee pain and “catching” with certain activities. On
January 14, 2025, Dr. Bowman surgically repaired medical meniscus and anterior collateral
ligament tears in Employee’s left knee. Dr. Gardocki ultimately performed a cervical
fusion on February 17, 2025. That treatment and surgery were not authorized by Employer.

Employee’s counsel sent questionnaires to Dr. Gardocki and Dr. Bowman seeking
causation opinions. With respect to the left knee, Dr. Bowman was asked:

Is it your opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty – considering
[Employee’s] self-reported history, as well as the video documentation – that
[Employee’s] current left knee problems [are] causally-related to the April
10, 2024 work injury?

(Emphasis added.) In response, Dr. Bowman checked “yes.” In light of the prior MRI
finding of a “non-acute” ACL tear in the left knee, Dr. Bowman was also asked whether
Employee’s “on-the-job accident primarily caused” that injury, to which Dr. Bowman
responded “no” and wrote, “unclear, but unlikely.”

In a questionnaire sent to Dr. Gardocki regarding Employee’s neck condition,
Employee asked if the “on-the-job accident worsened and/or exacerbated [Employee’s]
C6-C7 herniation and, in turn, primarily caused his need for surgery.” In response, Dr.
Gardocki wrote, “Yes, his neck appears to have become symptomatic after a fall at work
on 4/10/24.”

Relying on Dr. Gardocki’s responses to the questionnaire, Employee asked the trial
court to compel Employer to authorize Dr. Gardocki for ongoing neck treatment, asserting
that seeking unauthorized treatment was reasonable due to the delay in receiving a
replacement panel, the decision of two panel-selected physicians not to treat him, and his
urgent need for treatment of a disabling injury. He also asked the court to: (1) compel
Employer to authorize Dr. Bowman for continuing left knee care; (2) compel Employer to

5
provide a neurological panel for his concussion symptoms and headaches pursuant to the
referral from Dr. Lawrence; and (3) compel Employer to provide a psychiatric panel for
his mental symptoms as originally recommended by Dr. Lawrence. Employee also sought
temporary total disability benefits dating back to September 10, 2024, the date he was
discharged by Dr. Lowe, based on Dr. Bowman’s January 27, 2025 report indicating that
Employee “should have been off from work since the date of the injury.” For its part,
Employer asserted it did not authorize these referrals because it never received written
referrals from the authorized treating providers.

At the expedited hearing, Employer argued that Employee was not entitled to
treatment for his neck injury with Dr. Gardocki because it was Employee’s own
unreasonable actions that resulted in his discharge from Dr. Lowe’s practice, which, in
turn, led to the unauthorized medical care. Employer also contended that Employee
unreasonably sought care outside the workers’ compensation system while it tried to
identify eligible specialists for a replacement panel. Moreover, Employer argued that
Employee did not prove the other conditions for which he seeks treatment arose primarily
from the work accident. Finally, Employer asserted it does not owe temporary disability
benefits because: (1) Employee failed to prove he had a work-related knee disability; and
(2) Employee had been placed at maximum medical improvement by Dr. Lowe.

At the conclusion of the hearing, Employer moved for a directed verdict, arguing
that Employee’s claim for neck treatment was moot given the unauthorized treatment by
Dr. Gardocki, and it asserted Employee had failed to prove that his other medical
conditions arose primarily from the work accident. 4 The court took Employer’s motion
under advisement and, in its April 8 expedited hearing order, denied the motion. The court
determined that the issue of Employee’s neck treatment was not moot because the question
of whether Employer is obligated to pay for unauthorized medical treatment depends on
the reasonableness of the parties’ actions in view of the totality of the circumstances. It
further determined that Employer’s motion for dismissal of Employee’s claim for lack of
proof of causation failed because “the fact that the causation standard considered by
[Employee’s] physicians did not exactly track the statutory language does not invalidate
those physicians’ opinions.” Next, the court found that Employee had acted unreasonably
in his interactions with Dr. Lowe and his medical staff and, therefore, was “limited to
ongoing treatment for his neck injury from a physician selected from a replacement panel”
and was not entitled to ongoing care by Dr. Gardocki.

Regarding the left knee, the court weighed the competing opinions of Dr. Bowman
and Dr. Hazlewood and concluded that Dr. Bowman’s opinion offered the most probable
4
In a non-jury setting, such a motion is correctly called a motion for involuntary dismissal under Tennessee
Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(2), which states: “After the plaintiff in an action tried by the court without a
jury has completed the presentation of plaintiff’s evidence, the defendant, without waiving the right to offer
evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts
and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(2).
6
explanation of the causal relationship between Employee’s fall and his torn meniscus and
ligament injury in the left knee. The court noted that although Dr. Bowman’s opinion “was
not stated in response to a rigid recitation of statutory language [it] does not limit the
Court’s confidence in it.” The court also noted that Employee reported left knee pain to
the emergency physician he saw on the date of the injury and that an x-ray of the left knee
was obtained. As a result, the court found that Employee had established he would likely
prevail at trial in showing his left knee condition and the need for treatment arose primarily
from the work accident.

As to ongoing care, the court found that Employer had failed to authorize further
treatment as recommended by Dr. Lawrence and, instead, sought alternative causation
opinions before ultimately denying the compensability of the knee claim. The court
concluded that, under those circumstances, Employee had established he would likely
prevail at trial in proving an entitlement to ongoing left knee treatment with Dr. Bowman.

The court also determined Employee had come forward with sufficient evidence
supporting an order for a panel of neurologists to evaluate his concussion-type symptoms
based on Dr. Lawrence’s original referral. Further, because Employer failed to authorize
a referral for cognitive behavioral therapy as recommended by the authorized physician,
the court stated that Employee could return to the clinic that originally recommended that
therapy for any further reasonable and necessary treatment of any work-related mental
symptoms and ordered Employer to authorize such treatment.

Finally, the court found Dr. Bowman had opined that Employee had been disabled
as a result of the left knee injury since the date of the accident. Because Employer stopped
paying temporary disability benefits on September 10, 2024, the court awarded Employee
temporary disability benefits from September 11, 2024 through January 27, 2025, at
Employee’s stipulated compensation rate of $629.24. The court also found that, although
Dr. Lowe had placed Employee at maximum medical improvement for his neck injury, this
did not affect his entitlement to temporary disability benefits related to the knee injury.
Both parties have appealed.

Standard of Review

The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision presumes that the court’s
factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2024). When the trial judge has had the opportunity
to observe a witness’s demeanor and to hear in-court testimony, we give considerable
deference to factual findings made by the trial court. Madden v. Holland Grp. of Tenn.,
Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tenn. 2009). However, “[n]o similar deference need be
afforded the trial court’s findings based upon documentary evidence.” Goodman v.
Schwarz Paper Co., No. W2016-02594-SC-R3-WC, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 8, at *6 (Tenn.
Workers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 18, 2018). Similarly, the interpretation and application of

7
statutes and regulations are questions of law that are reviewed de novo with no presumption
of correctness afforded the trial court’s conclusions. See Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone
N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn. 2013). We are also mindful of our
obligation to construe the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly, impartially, and in
accordance with basic principles of statutory construction” and in a way that does not favor
either the employee or the employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2024).

Analysis

On appeal, Employer contends Employee failed to establish that his left knee injury
arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment and that the trial court
erred in accepting Dr. Bowman’s causation opinion when it did not address the proper
statutory causation standard. It argues Employee is not entitled to additional temporary
disability benefits or additional medical benefits for the left knee condition. For his part,
Employee contends the trial court erred by declining to compel Employer to authorize Dr.
Gardocki as Employee’s authorized treating physician for his cervical spine injury instead
of ordering a new panel of physicians. 5

Employer’s Appeal

At an expedited hearing, an employee need not establish every essential element of
his or her claim by a preponderance of the evidence but must come forward with sufficient
evidence from which the trial court can determine that the employee likely will prevail at
a hearing on the merits. McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing, No. 2014-06-0063,
2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 27,
2015). As we have previously noted, the legislature

deliberately established a lesser standard of proof to be applied at expedited
hearings that authorizes trial courts to order the initiation of certain benefits
on an interlocutory basis prior to the final trial of a case. In evaluating a
request for benefits at an expedited hearing, the trial court must determine,
based on the totality of the evidence presented at that time, whether the
employee “would likely prevail” at trial.

Miller v. Old Folks Mission Ctr., Inc., No. 2018-07-0022, 2019 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd.
LEXIS 1, at *18 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Jan. 9, 2019). In reviewing an
interlocutory order, our inquiry focuses on whether the employee established a likelihood
of prevailing at trial. Here, we must determine whether the evidence preponderates against
the trial court’s finding that Employee will likely prevail at trial in proving his left knee
condition and the need for treatment arose primarily out of the work injury.

5
Neither party appealed the portions of the trial court’s order addressing treatment for the concussion-type
symptoms or the mental symptoms.
8
In determining Employee would likely prevail at trial, the court concluded that Dr.
Bowman’s causation opinion indicating that the knee condition is “causally related” to the
work accident was entitled to greater weight than Dr. Hazlewood’s opinion that the
condition preexisted the work accident and there was no evidence of a compensable
aggravation of that condition. The court reasoned that Employee reported left knee pain to
the emergency room physician on the date of the accident and consistently “reported left-
knee pain to most providers, if not every provider, he saw at the outset of his treatment.”
The court also emphasized that Dr. Bowman’s causation opinion was consistent with Dr.
Lawrence’s opinion that Employee’s left knee treatment was “necessary under workers’
compensation.” In support of this proposition, the court quoted from on our opinion in
Panzarella v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2015-01-0383, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd.
LEXIS 30, at *14 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. May 15, 2017), and stated we held
that “a physician may render a [causation] opinion that meets the [statutory legal standard]
without couching the opinion in a rigid recitation of the statutory definition.” (Alterations
in trial court order.) The court then concluded, “[T]he fact that the causation standard
considered by [Employee’s] physician did not exactly track the statutory language does not
invalidate those physicians’ opinions.”

In Panzarella, an employee alleged he suffered a work-related injury to his left knee,
and the trial court found he had not proven compensability of his claim by a preponderance
of the evidence because the causation opinion he provided failed to satisfy the requirements
of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(14). Id. at *1-2. The employee appealed,
and we affirmed the trial court’s decision, which was affirmed by the Tennessee Supreme
Court’s Special Workers’ Compensation Panel. Id.; see Panzarella v. Amazon.com. Inc.,
No. E2017-01135-SC-R3-WC, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 244 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel May
16, 2018).

As applicable to the present case, although we agree with the trial court that a doctor
need not necessarily adhere to a rigid recitation of the statutory language addressing expert
medical causation, we have also stated, “[w]hat is necessary, however, is sufficient proof
from which the trial court can conclude that the statutory requirements of an injury as
defined in section 50-6-102[(12)] are satisfied.” Panzarella, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App.
Bd. LEXIS 30, at *14.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(12)(B) provides that

An injury “arises primarily out of and in the course and scope of
employment” only if it has been shown by a preponderance of the evidence
that the employment contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing
the injury, considering all causes.

Hence, to be entitled to medical benefits, an injured worker must establish, by a
reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the employment “contributed more than fifty

9
percent (50%) in causing the death, disablement or need for medical treatment, considering
all causes.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(12)(C). In addition, the phrase “shown to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty” means that, “in the opinion of the physician, it is
more likely that not considering all causes, as opposed to speculation or possibility.” Tenn.
Code Ann. § 50-6-102(12)(D). Here, we conclude Dr. Bowman’s causation statement did
not meet the statutory requirements and does not support a finding that Employee is likely
to prove medical causation at trial. In response to a medical questionnaire sent to him, Dr.
Bowman merely agreed Employee’s left knee condition was “causally related” to the work
incident. Nothing in that opinion suggests Employee is likely to prove at trial that the work
accident was the primary cause of the knee condition, “considering all causes,” especially
in view of evidence of a prior left knee injury, a “non-acute” tear, and pre-existing tendinitis
in the left knee. Thus, we conclude Dr. Bowman’s causation opinion is insufficient to
establish Employee will likely prevail at trial in meeting his burden of proof as to the
primary cause of his left knee condition and the need for treatment. As a result, we
conclude the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings regarding the left
knee at this interlocutory stage of the case, and this portion of the trial court’s order is
reversed. 6

Employee’s Appeal

On appeal, Employee argues the trial court erred by declining to compel Employer
to authorize Dr. Gardocki as Employee’s authorized treating physician for his cervical
spine injury. In support of his position, Employee asserts he was reasonable in seeking out
medical treatment because he was “left without an authorized neck physician for two (2)
months while waiting for a replacement panel.” Employee claims he needed treatment for
this injury and, therefore, his decision to obtain treatment from Dr. Gardocki was
reasonable under the circumstances. Employee also argues that Employer’s delay in
providing a panel was, in effect, a denial, given Employee’s ongoing entitlement to medical
care despite having been discharged from Dr. Lawrence’s practice group.

In ordering a panel for ongoing treatment of Employee’s neck injury, the trial court
noted that Employee had acted unreasonably both when he decided to “test” Dr. Lowe’s
loyalty and when he decided to contact the doctor’s staff. The court noted that although
Employee denied using threatening language during the phone call, his comments could
have been perceived as threatening. Thus, based on the totality of the circumstances, the
court determined that Employee “created the circumstances leading to his need for another
physician for neck treatment . . . [and] he has not shown an entitlement to ongoing care by
Dr. Gardocki.” We cannot conclude the trial court erred in this regard.

6
The trial court also awarded Employee temporary disability benefits for a period of disability due to his
left knee injury based on Dr. Bowman’s opinion. Because we have concluded Employee has not shown he
is likely to prevail at trial on the issue of medical causation, we also reverse the portion of the trial court’s
order requiring Employer to pay temporary disability benefits at this time.
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Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s order for
ongoing medical treatment of Employee’s left knee injury and associated temporary
disability benefits. We affirm the portion of the trial court’s order compelling Employer
to provide a panel of physicians for ongoing treatment of his neck injury. Costs on appeal
are taxed to Employee.

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TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Chad Graves Docket No. 2024-50-5540

v. State File No. 25190-2024

Southall Adventures, LLC, et al.

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ Heard August 1, 2025,
Compensation Claims in Nashville, Tennessee
Thomas L. Wyatt, Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the referenced case
was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 25th day of
August, 2025.

Name Certified First Class Via Via Sent to:
Mail Mail Fax Email
Nicholas J. Peterson X nick.peterson@petersonwhite.com
brady.allen@petersonwhite.com
Adam C. Brock-Dagnan X adam.brockdagnan@forthepeople.com
kelly.slagle@forthepeople.com
Thomas L. Wyatt, Judge X Via Electronic Mail
Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge X Via Electronic Mail
Penny Shrum, Clerk, Court of X penny.patterson-shrum@tn.gov
Workers’ Compensation Claims

Olivia Yearwood
Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board
220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B
Nashville, TN 37243
Telephone: 615-253-1606
Electronic Mail: WCAppeals.Clerk@tn.gov

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