Lawson, Julie v. CoStar Group, Inc.

FILED
Jan 15, 2025
07:49 AM(CT)
TENNESSEE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
APPEALS BOARD

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Julie Lawson ) Docket No. 2024-60-0333
)
v. ) State File No. 26221-2023
)
Costar Group, Inc., et al. )
)
)
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )
Compensation Claims )
Joshua D. Baker, Judge )

Reversed and Remanded

The employee reported suffering a work-related mental injury as a result of the actions of
certain supervisors in February 2023. Following a period of discovery, the employer
filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the employee was unable, as a matter
of law, to come forward with sufficient evidence that the supervisors’ alleged actions
constituted a sudden or unusual mental stimulus that could support a mental injury claim
under Tennessee’s Workers’ Compensation Law. The trial court agreed, concluding that
no reasonable person could interpret the supervisors’ actions to constitute a sudden or
unusual mental stimulus leading to a compensable mental injury. As a result, the court
granted summary judgment and dismissed the employee’s case, and the employee has
appealed. Because we conclude the trial court erred in its consideration of the case at the
summary judgment stage, we reverse and remand the case.

Presiding Judge Timothy W. Conner delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which
Judge Pele I. Godkin and Judge Meredith B. Weaver joined.

Julie Lawson, Nashville, Tennessee, employee-appellant, pro se

A. Allen Callison and Trent B. Norris, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the employer-appellee,
Costar Group, Inc.

Factual and Procedural Background

Julie Lawson (“Employee”) worked as a business analyst for Costar Group, Inc.
(“Employer”). At some point prior to February 2023, Employee apparently reported to

1
Employer instances of alleged sexual harassment by her direct supervisor. 1 According to
Employee’s various filings, a representative of Employer informed her that an
investigation was underway to address those allegations.

Employee acknowledged suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”)
that pre-dated the events in question. During a work-related meeting on February 28,
2023, which was conducted virtually, a colleague used the word “kidnapped” during a
conversation. Although Employee acknowledged that the word was used “in passing,”
she testified it was a triggering event for her, that she “gasped” at the use of the word,
took a walk after the meeting, and then took a drive during her lunch break to “re-set.” 2

Later that day, Employee was scheduled to attend her annual performance review.
Although the review was not conducted by her direct supervisor, it was allegedly
prepared by him despite the ongoing investigation concerning her allegations of sexual
harassment against him. Moreover, Employee believed that the male supervisors who
delivered the performance review were aware of both the nature of the allegations against
her direct supervisor and the existence of an ongoing investigation. According to
Employee, the male supervisors who conducted her performance review were dismissive
of her concerns, disregarded the impact of the ongoing investigation on her, and acted in
a “collective, tribal way” to cause her harm by conducting the performance review at that
time and in that manner. Employee concedes that she received a pay increase at some
point after her performance review.

Following the events of February 28, Employee sought treatment with her
psychiatrist, Dr. Susanna Quasem. Employee reported that Dr. Quasem changed her
diagnosis from PTSD to “complex PTSD.” Employee also asserted that Dr. Quasem
expressed the opinion that the work-related events of February 28 had exacerbated her
pre-existing mental condition and supported her claim of a work-related mental injury.
Specifically, Employee claimed that the work-related events on February 28 “produced
shock and excessive, unexpected anxiety.” She further alleged that the performance
review “was completely out of the ordinary in comparison to what another employee
conducting [sic] the same duty would experience.”

Following an extended period of discovery and the filing of numerous motions,
Employer filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the alleged stressful
events on February 28 were not “extraordinary in comparison to the stress ordinarily

1
The record on appeal contains no specific information regarding the nature or severity of any such
alleged harassment or the results of any internal investigation. Consequently, we will not identify the
alleged harasser by name in this opinion.
2
The record contains limited information as to why the use of that word triggered Employee’s pre-
existing PTSD.
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experienced by an employee in the same type of duty.” 3 In essence, Employer based its
motion for summary judgment on the theory that Employee’s evidence of an
extraordinary, stressful work-related event was insufficient as a matter of law. Employee
filed responses to Employer’s motion and statement of undisputed material facts.
Specifically, Employee asserted that the manner in which two male supervisors
conducted her performance review, in light of her pending allegations of sexual
harassment against the male supervisor who wrote the performance review, constituted an
extraordinary, unexpected stressor that exacerbated or aggravated her pre-existing mental
condition.

Following a hearing, the trial court granted Employer’s motion for summary
judgment and dismissed Employee’s case. The court reasoned that the feelings
Employee experienced during and after the performance review “are not uncommon or
unexpected in a workplace where supervisors must wield and exert authority even if the
results seem unfair.” The court further noted that Employee’s “physical safety was not
harmed or threatened” and that “the threat of harm and loss was to her employment and
employment opportunities,” which Tennessee’s Workers’ Compensation Law excludes as
a basis for a mental injury claim. Consequently, the trial court concluded that Employee
had produced insufficient evidence of “a sudden or unusual mental stimulus for an
ordinary employee” and dismissed Employee’s claim with prejudice. Employee has
appealed.

Standard of Review

The interpretation and application of statutes and regulations are questions of law
that we review de novo with no presumption that the trial court’s conclusions are correct.
See Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn.
2013). The grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment likewise is a question of
law that we review de novo with no presumption that the trial court’s conclusions are
correct. See Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 250
(Tenn. 2015). As such, we “make a fresh determination of whether the requirements of
Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure have been satisfied.” Id. We are also
mindful of our obligation to construe the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly,
impartially, and in accordance with basic principles of statutory construction” and in a
way that does not favor either the employee or the employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
116 (2024).

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Of note, Employer did not include the date and time of a hearing on the face of its dispositive motion, as
is required by Tenn. Comp. R. and Regs. 0800-02-21-.18(1)(c) (2023). Instead, Employer filed a separate
“Notice of Hearing.” Because we reverse on other grounds, we need not address this rule violation
further. See Harris v. Mavis Tire Supply, No. 2021-08-0024, 2024 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 18,
at *9-10 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Apr. 12, 2024).
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Analysis

On appeal, Employee asserts the trial court erred in granting summary judgment,
in part, because “Employer did not demonstrate that Employee’s evidence was
insufficient to establish an essential element of her claim.” She further asserts that there
are disputed issues of material fact that render summary judgment inappropriate. Finally,
Employee argues that the trial court erred in applying an “objective standard” to conclude
the threat of harm she purportedly experienced during the performance review was the
potential loss of employment and employment opportunities.

Insufficiency of Non-Moving Party’s Evidence

The Tennessee Supreme Court has established a two-pronged approach to the
evaluation of a motion for summary judgment. Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 264. First, the
moving party can succeed by “affirmatively negating an essential element of the
nonmoving party’s claim.” Id. Second, the moving party can succeed by “demonstrating
that the nonmoving party’s evidence at the summary judgment stage is insufficient to
establish the nonmoving party’s claim.” Id. (emphasis in original). With respect to the
second prong, the Supreme Court further explained:

[A] moving party seeking summary judgment by attacking the nonmoving
party’s evidence must do more than make a conclusory assertion that
summary judgment is appropriate on this basis. Rather, Tennessee Rule
56.03 requires the moving party to support its motion with “a separate
concise statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends
there is no genuine issue for trial.”

Id. (emphasis added). If the moving party properly supports its motion as required by
Rule 56.03, the burden of production then shifts to the nonmoving party to show, by any
means provided in Rule 56, “that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 265.

Definition of Mental Injury

In Nickerson v. Knox County, No. E2020-01286-SC-R3-WC, 2021 Tenn. LEXIS
124 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel June 8, 2021), the Supreme Court’s Special Workers’
Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed and adopted as its own our opinion addressing the
statutory definition of “mental injury” in the context of a workers’ compensation case.
As the Appeals Panel noted, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(15) defines the
term “mental injury” as

a loss of mental faculties or a mental or behavioral disorder, arising
primarily out of a compensable physical injury or an identifiable work[-]
related event resulting in a sudden or unusual stimulus, and shall not

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include a psychological or psychiatric response due to the loss of
employment or employment opportunities.

(Emphasis added.) As noted in Nickerson, “since at least 2002, the legislature has
recognized two types of mental injuries: those arising primarily out of a compensable
physical injury and those arising primarily out of an identifiable work-related event
resulting in a sudden or unusual stimulus.” Id. at *11. The Nickerson Court then
concluded that, in evaluating a mental injury claim in circumstances where there is no
underlying physical injury, “we must look to the date of the identifiable work-related
event [or events] resulting in a sudden or unusual stimulus.” Id. at *26 (quotation marks
omitted).

Consideration of a “Reasonable Person” Standard

In Saylor v. Lakeway Trucking, Inc., 181 S.W.3d 314 (Tenn. 2005), the employee
alleged he had come into contact with a hazardous substance in the course of his
employment and, as a result, had sustained a mental injury. In evaluating the employee’s
claim, the Supreme Court first distinguished between the two types of mental injury
claims as noted above. Id. at 319. With respect to the category of mental injury claims
with no underlying physical injury, the Court explained as follows:

The performance of any contract of employment . . . produces some degree
of emotional stress. Compensation, therefore, is available for neither
emotional stress, anxiety, or worry of a general nature nor mental injuries
resulting from the accumulation of normal employment-related activities.
Rather, the stress must be extraordinary and unusual in comparison to the
stress ordinarily experienced by an employee in the same type [of] duty.

Id. at 320 (citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). In applying this
standard, therefore, the factfinder must determine whether a reasonable person under the
type of stress being described by the employee would experience a “sudden or unusual”
mental stimulus. The Court in Saylor concluded that “[a] reasonable person who had
been splashed with such material under these circumstances would have believed himself
to be in danger.” Id.

In Goodloe v. State, 36 S.W.3d 62 (Tenn. 2001), the Supreme Court considered
whether a trial court had improperly granted summary judgment in a mental injury case.
The employee alleged her mental injury was caused by a conversation with her
supervisor during which she was advised she might lose her job. Id. at 63. The Court
first noted that, when considering a motion for summary judgment, a court “must view
the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and must draw all
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Id. at 65 (citations omitted). Moreover,

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summary judgment should be granted “only when the facts and inferences permit a
reasonable person to reach only one conclusion.” Id.

The Court then concluded that summary judgment is appropriate in a mental injury
claim when the alleged injury “results from the accumulation of normal job-related
stress.” Id. at 66 (emphasis added). The Court explained:

The workers’ compensation system simply does not embrace every stress or
strain of daily living or every undesirable experience encountered in
carrying out the duties of a contract of employment. Rather, the stressful
stimulus must be something beyond the normal ups and downs of the
employment because emotional stress, to some degree, accompanies the
performance of any contract of employment.

Id. at 67 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

We conclude a critical element in mental injury cases involves application of a
“reasonable person” standard, which is generally a question of fact. See, e.g., Coleman v.
St. Thomas Hosp., 334 S.W.3d 199, 202 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010) (“If reasonable minds
could justifiably reach different conclusions based on the evidence at hand, then a
genuine question of fact exists.”). It is only when “the evidence and the inferences to be
reasonably drawn from the evidence would permit a reasonable person to reach only one
conclusion” that a motion for summary judgment should be granted. Wilson v. Rubin,
104 S.W.3d 39, 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). Moreover, as the Supreme Court has
explained, “by definition, . . . summary judgment does not involve fact-finding or the
weighing of evidence.” Berry v. Consolidated Sys., Inc., 804 S.W.2d 445, 446 (Tenn.
1991). “Obviously, a trial court should not grant summary judgment where resolution of
the case depends upon an interpretation or weighing of the facts.” Id.

Here, we conclude the trial court did not view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party or draw all reasonable inferences in Employee’s favor.
Moreover, we conclude the trial court improperly granted summary judgment based on a
factual finding that no reasonable person could have experienced a sudden or unusual
mental stimulus beyond normal workplace stress in circumstances where a performance
evaluation was prepared by a male supervisor the female employee had accused of sexual
harassment and delivered by other male supervisors who were aware of those pending
allegations. Further, Employee did not allege that her mental injury arose from the
results of her performance evaluation, as suggested by the trial court, but by the timing of
the evaluation and the manner in which it was conducted.

In its decision, the trial court relied on Ireton v. Horizon Mental Health Mgmt.,
LLC, No. E2015-00296-SC-R3-WC, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 3 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel
Jan. 19, 2016). In Ireton, the employee heard statements at a training seminar regarding

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sexual abuse that he alleged triggered memories of his own sexual abuse and, thus,
caused a mental injury due to the sudden and unusual nature of the events. Id. at *5-8.
The Supreme Court’s Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel determined that an
“objective standard is required even [when] medical experts have opined that the
Employee suffered PTSD stemming out of a particular event or stress.” Id. at *29. The
Panel added, however, that “[t]he determination of whether a particular event or stress is
abnormal, extraordinary, or unusual in comparison to the stress ordinarily experienced by
an employee in the same type of duty is a question of fact.” Id. at *32. As noted above,
questions of fact generally are not appropriate for resolution by summary judgment.

In sum, Employer argued that the stress Employee experienced as a result of the
timing of the annual performance review and the manner in which it was conducted could
not, as a matter of law, constitute a sudden or unusual mental stimulus beyond normal
workplace stress. In granting Employer’s dispositive motion, the trial court weighed
Employee’s evidence regarding the impact of the performance evaluation on a reasonable
employee in similar circumstances and resolved this issue of fact in Employer’s favor.
Although such a result may occur following a full trial on the merits, it is not an
appropriate basis on which to award summary judgment. “Even when it appears the
employee may have incredible difficulty convincing the trier of fact of a compensable
claim, summary judgment is inappropriate if granting the motion would involve fact-
finding or the weighing of evidence.” Burke v. Steve Towers Enters., LLC, No. 2022-06-
0311, 2023 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 53, at *12 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App.
Bd. Nov. 15, 2023) (citing Berry, 804 S.W.2d at 446) (quotation marks omitted). In
short, we conclude there are one or more genuine issues of material fact regarding the
circumstances of the performance evaluation, the conditions under which it was
conducted, the impact of such events on the mental condition of a reasonable employee in
similar circumstances, and whether such events could constitute a “sudden or unusual”
mental stimulus under these circumstances. Thus, summary judgment was improper.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order granting summary
judgment and remand the case. Costs on appeal are taxed to Employer.

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TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Julie Lawson ) Docket No. 2024-60-0333
)
v. ) State File No. 26221-2023
)
CoStar Group, Inc., et al. )
)
)
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )
Compensation Claims )
Joshua D. Baker, Judge )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the referenced
case was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 15th day
of January, 2024.

Name Certified First Class Via Via Sent to:
Mail Mail Fax Email
Julie Lawson X julie.lawson00207@gmail.com
Allen Callison X allen.callison@mgclaw.com
Trent Norris trent.norris@mgclaw.com
Joshua D. Baker, Judge X Via Electronic Mail
Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge X Via Electronic Mail
Penny Shrum, Clerk, Court of X penny.patterson-shrum@tn.gov
Workers’ Compensation Claims

Olivia Yearwood
Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board
220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B
Nashville, TN 37243
Telephone: 615-253-1606
Electronic Mail: WCAppeals.Clerk@tn.gov