UNITED STATES v. RUIZ

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UNITED STATES v. RUIZ
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 01–595. Argued April 24, 2002—Decided June 24, 2002
After immigration agents found marijuana in respondent Ruiz’s luggage,
federal prosecutors offered her a “fast track” plea bargain, whereby she
would waive indictment, trial, and an appeal in exchange for a reduced
sentence recommendation. Among other things, the prosecutors’
standard “fast track” plea agreement acknowledges the Government’s
continuing duty to turn over information establishing the defendant’s
factual innocence, but requires that she waive the right to receive im-
peachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses,
as well as information supporting any affirmative defense she raises
if the case goes to trial. Because Ruiz would not agree to the latter
waiver, the prosecutors withdrew their bargaining offer, and she was
indicted for unlawful drug possession. Despite the absence of a plea
agreement, Ruiz ultimately pleaded guilty. At sentencing, she asked
the judge to grant her the same reduced sentence that the Government
would have recommended had she accepted the plea bargain. The Gov-
ernment opposed her request, and the District Court denied it. In va-
cating the sentence, the Ninth Circuit took jurisdiction under 18 U. S. C.
§ 3742; noted that the Constitution requires prosecutors to make certain
impeachment information available to a defendant before trial; decided
that this obligation entitles defendants to the information before they
enter into a plea agreement; ruled that the Constitution prohibits de-
fendants from waiving their right to the information; and held that the
“fast track” agreement was unlawful because it insisted upon such a
waiver.
Held:
1. Appellate jurisdiction was proper under § 3742(a)(1), which permits
appellate review of a sentence “imposed in violation of law.” Respond-
ent’s sentence would have been so imposed if her constitutional claim
were sound. Thus, if she had prevailed on the merits, her victory
would also have confirmed the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction. Although
this Court ultimately concludes that respondent’s sentence was not “im-
posed in violation of law” and therefore that § 3742(a)(1) does not author-
ize an appeal in a case of this kind, it is familiar law that a federal court
always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. See United
States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 291. In order to make that deter-

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mination, it was necessary for the Ninth Circuit to address the merits.
Pp. 626–628.
2. The Constitution does not require the Government to disclose mate-
rial impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a
criminal defendant. Although the Fifth and Sixth Amendments pro-
vide, as part of the Constitution’s “fair trial” guarantee, that defendants
have the right to receive exculpatory impeachment material from prose-
cutors, see, e. g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, 87, a defendant who
pleads guilty forgoes a fair trial as well as various other accompanying
constitutional guarantees, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 243. As
a result, the Constitution insists that the defendant enter a guilty plea
that is “voluntary” and make related waivers “knowing[ly], intelli-
gent[ly], [and] with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances
and likely consequences.” See, e. g., id., at 242. The Ninth Circuit in
effect held that a guilty plea is not “voluntary” (and that the defendant
could not, by pleading guilty, waive his right to a fair trial) unless the
prosecutors first made the same disclosure of material impeachment in-
formation that they would have had to make had the defendant insisted
upon a trial. Several considerations, taken together, demonstrate that
holding’s error. First, impeachment information is special in relation
to a trial’s fairness, not in respect to whether a plea is voluntary. It
is particularly difficult to characterize such information as critical, given
the random way in which it may, or may not, help a particular defendant.
The degree of help will depend upon the defendant’s own independent
knowledge of the prosecution’s potential case—a matter that the Consti-
tution does not require prosecutors to disclose. Second, there is no
legal authority that provides significant support for the Ninth Circuit’s
decision. To the contrary, this Court has found that the Constitution,
in respect to a defendant’s awareness of relevant circumstances, does
not require complete knowledge, but permits a court to accept a guilty
plea, with its accompanying waiver of various constitutional rights, de-
spite various forms of misapprehension under which a defendant might
labor. See, e. g., Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 757. Third, the
very due process considerations that have led the Court to find trial-
related rights to exculpatory and impeachment information—e. g., the
nature of the private interest at stake, the value of the additional safe-
guard, and the requirement’s adverse impact on the Government’s inter-
ests, Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68, 77—argue against the existence of
the “right” the Ninth Circuit found. Here, that right’s added value to
the defendant is often limited, given that the Government will provide
information establishing factual innocence under the proposed plea
agreement, and that the defendant has other guilty-plea safeguards, see
Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s rule could se-

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riously interfere with the Government’s interest in securing guilty pleas
by disrupting ongoing investigations and exposing prospective wit-
nesses to serious intimidation and harm, thereby forcing the Govern-
ment to modify its current practice, devote substantially more resources
to preplea trial preparation, or abandon its heavy reliance on plea bar-
gaining. Due process cannot demand so radical a change in order to
achieve so comparatively small a constitutional benefit. Pp. 628–633.
3. Although the “fast track” plea agreement requires a defendant to
waive her right to affirmative defense information, the Court does not
believe, for most of the foregoing reasons, that the Constitution requires
provision of this information to the defendant prior to plea bargaining.
P. 633.
241 F. 3d 1157, reversed.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and
Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment, post, p. 633.
Solicitor General Olson argued the cause for the United
States. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney
General Chertoff, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, Irving
L. Gornstein, and Jonathan L. Marcus.
Steven F. Hubachek, by appointment of the Court, 534
U. S. 1126, argued the cause for respondent. With him on
the brief was Benjamin L. Coleman.*
*A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the State of
Ohio et al. by Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio, David
M. Gormley, State Solicitor, Stephen P. Carney, Associate Solicitor, Diane
M. Welsh, and Dan Schweitzer, and by the Attorneys General for their
respective jurisdictions as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, Bruce M. Bo-
telho of Alaska, Ken Salazar of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware,
Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Mike
Moore of Mississippi, Mike McGrath of Montana, Don Stenberg of Ne-
braska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Eliot Spitzer of New York,
W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, D. Michael
Fisher of Pennsylvania, Anabelle Rodriquez of Puerto Rico, Paul G. Sum-
mers of Tennessee, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Ver-
mont, and Hoke MacMillan of Wyoming.
John T. Philipsborn and David M. Porter filed a brief for the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as amici curiae.

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Opinion of the Court
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we primarily consider whether the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments require federal prosecutors, before en-
tering into a binding plea agreement with a criminal de-
fendant, to disclose “impeachment information relating to
any informants or other witnesses.” App. to Pet. for Cert.
46a. We hold that the Constitution does not require that
disclosure.
I
After immigration agents found 30 kilograms of marijuana
in Angela Ruiz’s luggage, federal prosecutors offered her
what is known in the Southern District of California as a
“fast track” plea bargain. That bargain—standard in that
district—asks a defendant to waive indictment, trial, and an
appeal. In return, the Government agrees to recommend to
the sentencing judge a two-level departure downward from
the otherwise applicable United States Sentencing Guide-
lines sentence. In Ruiz’s case, a two-level departure down-
ward would have shortened the ordinary Guidelines-specified
18-to-24-month sentencing range by 6 months, to 12-to-18
months. 241 F. 3d 1157, 1161 (2001).
The prosecutors’ proposed plea agreement contains a set of
detailed terms. Among other things, it specifies that “any
[known] information establishing the factual innocence of the
defendant” “has been turned over to the defendant,” and it
acknowledges the Government’s “continuing duty to provide
such information.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 45a–46a. At the
same time it requires that the defendant “waiv[e] the right”
to receive “impeachment information relating to any inform-
ants or other witnesses” as well as the right to receive infor-
mation supporting any affirmative defense the defendant
raises if the case goes to trial. Id., at 46a. Because Ruiz
would not agree to this last-mentioned waiver, the prosecu-
tors withdrew their bargaining offer. The Government then
indicted Ruiz for unlawful drug possession. And despite

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the absence of any agreement, Ruiz ultimately pleaded
guilty.
At sentencing, Ruiz asked the judge to grant her the same
two-level downward departure that the Government would
have recommended had she accepted the “fast track” agree-
ment. The Government opposed her request, and the Dis-
trict Court denied it, imposing a standard Guideline sentence
instead. 241 F. 3d, at 1161.
Relying on 18 U. S. C. § 3742, see infra, at 627, 628–629,
Ruiz appealed her sentence to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit vacated
the District Court’s sentencing determination. The Ninth
Circuit pointed out that the Constitution requires prosecu-
tors to make certain impeachment information available to a
defendant before trial. 241 F. 3d, at 1166. It decided that
this obligation entitles defendants to receive that same infor-
mation before they enter into a plea agreement. Id., at
1164. The Ninth Circuit also decided that the Constitution
prohibits defendants from waiving their right to that infor-
mation. Id., at 1165–1166. And it held that the prosecu-
tors’ standard “fast track” plea agreement was unlawful be-
cause it insisted upon that waiver. Id., at 1167. The Ninth
Circuit remanded the case so that the District Court could
decide any related factual disputes and determine an appro-
priate remedy. Id., at 1169.
The Government sought certiorari. It stressed what it
considered serious adverse practical implications of the
Ninth Circuit’s constitutional holding. And it added that
the holding is unique among courts of appeals. Pet. for
Cert. 8. We granted the Government’s petition. 534 U. S.
1074 (2002).
II
At the outset, we note that a question of statutory juris-
diction potentially blocks our consideration of the Ninth
Circuit’s constitutional holding. The relevant statute says
that a

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“defendant may file a notice of appeal . . . for review . . .
if the sentence
“(1) was imposed in violation of law;
“(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect applica-
tion of the sentencing guidelines; or
“(3) is greater than [the Guideline] specified [sen-
tence] . . . ; or
“(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no
sentencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable.” 18
U. S. C. § 3742(a).
Every Circuit has held that this statute does not authorize a
defendant to appeal a sentence where the ground for appeal
consists of a claim that the district court abused its discretion
in refusing to depart. See, e. g., United States v. Conway,
81 F. 3d 15, 16 (CA1 1996); United States v. Lawal, 17 F. 3d
560, 562 (CA2 1994); United States v. Powell, 269 F. 3d 175,
179 (CA3 2001); United States v. Ivester, 75 F. 3d 182, 183
(CA4 1996); United States v. Cooper, 274 F. 3d 230, 248 (CA5
2001); United States v. Scott, 74 F. 3d 107, 112 (CA6 1996);
United States v. Byrd, 263 F. 3d 705, 707 (CA7 2001); United
States v. Mora-Higuera, 269 F. 3d 905, 913 (CA8 2001);
United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 927 F. 2d 489, 490 (CA9
1991); United States v. Coddington, 118 F. 3d 1439, 1441
(CA10 1997); United States v. Calderon, 127 F. 3d 1314, 1342
(CA11 1997); In re Sealed Case No. 98–3116, 199 F. 3d 488,
491–492 (CADC 1999).
The statute does, however, authorize an appeal from a sen-
tence that “was imposed in violation of law.” Two quite dif-
ferent theories might support appellate jurisdiction pursuant
to that provision. First, as the Court of Appeals recognized,
if the District Court’s sentencing decision rested on a mis-
taken belief that it lacked the legal power to grant a depar-
ture, the quoted provision would apply. 241 F. 3d, at 1162,
n. 2. Our reading of the record, however, convinces us that
the District Judge correctly understood that he had such dis-
cretion but decided not to exercise it. We therefore reject

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that basis for finding appellate jurisdiction. Second, if re-
spondent’s constitutional claim, discussed in Part III, infra,
were sound, her sentence would have been “imposed in viola-
tion of law.” Thus, if she had prevailed on the merits, her
victory would also have confirmed the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals.
Although we ultimately conclude that respondent’s sen-
tence was not “imposed in violation of law” and therefore
that § 3742(a)(1) does not authorize an appeal in a case of
this kind, it is familiar law that a federal court always has
jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. See United
States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 291 (1947). In order
to make that determination, it was necessary for the Ninth
Circuit to address the merits. We therefore hold that appel-
late jurisdiction was proper.
III
The constitutional question concerns a federal criminal de-
fendant’s waiver of the right to receive from prosecutors ex-
culpatory impeachment material—a right that the Constitu-
tion provides as part of its basic “fair trial” guarantee. See
U. S. Const., Amdts. 5, 6. See also Brady v. Maryland, 373
U. S. 83, 87 (1963) (Due process requires prosecutors to
“avoi[d] . . . an unfair trial” by making available “upon re-
quest” evidence “favorable to an accused . . . where the evi-
dence is material either to guilt or to punishment”); United
States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 112–113 (1976) (defense request
unnecessary); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 435 (1995) (ex-
culpatory evidence is evidence the suppression of which
would “undermine confidence in the verdict”); Giglio v.
United States, 405 U. S. 150, 154 (1972) (exculpatory evidence
includes “evidence affecting” witness “credibility,” where
the witness’ “reliability” is likely “determinative of guilt or
innocence”).
When a defendant pleads guilty he or she, of course, for-
goes not only a fair trial, but also other accompanying consti-

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tutional guarantees. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 243
(1969) (pleading guilty implicates the Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege against self-incrimination, the Sixth Amendment right
to confront one’s accusers, and the Sixth Amendment right
to trial by jury). Given the seriousness of the matter, the
Constitution insists, among other things, that the defendant
enter a guilty plea that is “voluntary” and that the defendant
must make related waivers “knowing[ly], intelligent[ly],
[and] with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances
and likely consequences.” Brady v. United States, 397 U. S.
742, 748 (1970); see also Boykin, supra, at 242.
In this case, the Ninth Circuit in effect held that a guilty
plea is not “voluntary” (and that the defendant could not, by
pleading guilty, waive her right to a fair trial) unless the
prosecutors first made the same disclosure of material im-
peachment information that the prosecutors would have had
to make had the defendant insisted upon a trial. We must
decide whether the Constitution requires that preguilty plea
disclosure of impeachment information. We conclude that
it does not.
First, impeachment information is special in relation to the
fairness of a trial, not in respect to whether a plea is vol-
untary (“knowing,” “intelligent,” and “sufficient[ly] aware”).
Of course, the more information the defendant has, the more
aware he is of the likely consequences of a plea, waiver, or
decision, and the wiser that decision will likely be. But the
Constitution does not require the prosecutor to share all use-
ful information with the defendant. Weatherford v. Bursey,
429 U. S. 545, 559 (1977) (“There is no general constitutional
right to discovery in a criminal case”). And the law ordi-
narily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and suffi-
ciently aware if the defendant fully understands the nature
of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the
circumstances—even though the defendant may not know
the specific detailed consequences of invoking it. A defend-
ant, for example, may waive his right to remain silent, his

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right to a jury trial, or his right to counsel even if the defend-
ant does not know the specific questions the authorities in-
tend to ask, who will likely serve on the jury, or the particu-
lar lawyer the State might otherwise provide. Cf. Colorado
v. Spring, 479 U. S. 564, 573–575 (1987) (Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination waived when defendant
received standard Miranda warnings regarding the nature
of the right but not told the specific interrogation questions
to be asked).
It is particularly difficult to characterize impeachment in-
formation as critical information of which the defendant
must always be aware prior to pleading guilty given the ran-
dom way in which such information may, or may not, help a
particular defendant. The degree of help that impeachment
information can provide will depend upon the defendant’s
own independent knowledge of the prosecution’s potential
case—a matter that the Constitution does not require prose-
cutors to disclose.
Second, we have found no legal authority embodied either
in this Court’s past cases or in cases from other circuits that
provides significant support for the Ninth Circuit’s decision.
To the contrary, this Court has found that the Constitution,
in respect to a defendant’s awareness of relevant circum-
stances, does not require complete knowledge of the relevant
circumstances, but permits a court to accept a guilty plea,
with its accompanying waiver of various constitutional
rights, despite various forms of misapprehension under
which a defendant might labor. See Brady v. United States,
397 U. S., at 757 (defendant “misapprehended the quality of
the State’s case”); ibid. (defendant misapprehended “the
likely penalties”); ibid. (defendant failed to “anticipate” a
change in the law regarding relevant “punishments”); Mc-
Mann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 770 (1970) (counsel “mis-
judged the admissibility” of a “confession”); United States v.
Broce, 488 U. S. 563, 573 (1989) (counsel failed to point out a
potential defense); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U. S. 258, 267

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(1973) (counsel failed to find a potential constitutional infir-
mity in grand jury proceedings). It is difficult to distin-
guish, in terms of importance, (1) a defendant’s ignorance of
grounds for impeachment of potential witnesses at a possible
future trial from (2) the varying forms of ignorance at issue
in these cases.
Third, due process considerations, the very considerations
that led this Court to find trial-related rights to exculpatory
and impeachment information in Brady and Giglio, argue
against the existence of the “right” that the Ninth Circuit
found here. This Court has said that due process considera-
tions include not only (1) the nature of the private interest
at stake, but also (2) the value of the additional safeguard,
and (3) the adverse impact of the requirement upon the
Government’s interests. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68, 77
(1985). Here, as we have just pointed out, the added value
of the Ninth Circuit’s “right” to a defendant is often limited,
for it depends upon the defendant’s independent awareness
of the details of the Government’s case. And in any case,
as the proposed plea agreement at issue here specifies, the
Government will provide “any information establishing the
factual innocence of the defendant” regardless. That fact,
along with other guilty-plea safeguards, see Fed. Rule Crim.
Proc. 11, diminishes the force of Ruiz’s concern that, in the
absence of impeachment information, innocent individuals,
accused of crimes, will plead guilty. Cf. McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U. S. 459, 465–467 (1969) (discussing Rule 11’s role
in protecting a defendant’s constitutional rights).
At the same time, a constitutional obligation to provide
impeachment information during plea bargaining, prior to
entry of a guilty plea, could seriously interfere with the Gov-
ernment’s interest in securing those guilty pleas that are fac-
tually justified, desired by defendants, and help to secure the
efficient administration of justice. The Ninth Circuit’s rule
risks premature disclosure of Government witness informa-
tion, which, the Government tells us, could “disrupt ongoing

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investigations” and expose prospective witnesses to serious
harm. Brief for United States 25. Cf. Amendments to
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 92 (1975) (statement
of John C. Keeney, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Crim-
inal Div., Dept. of Justice) (opposing mandated witness dis-
closure three days before trial because of documented in-
stances of witness intimidation). And the careful tailoring
that characterizes most legal Government witness disclosure
requirements suggests recognition by both Congress and the
Federal Rules Committees that such concerns are valid.
See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3432 (witness list disclosure required in
capital cases three days before trial with exceptions); § 3500
(Government witness statements ordinarily subject to dis-
covery only after testimony given); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc.
16(a)(2) (embodies limitations of 18 U. S. C. § 3500). Com-
pare 156 F. R. D. 460, 461–462 (1994) (congressional proposal
to significantly broaden § 3500) with 167 F. R. D. 221, 223,
n. ( judicial conference opposing congressional proposal).
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit’s requirement could force
the Government to abandon its “general practice” of not “dis-
clos[ing] to a defendant pleading guilty information that
would reveal the identities of cooperating informants, under-
cover investigators, or other prospective witnesses.” Brief
for United States 25. It could require the Government to
devote substantially more resources to trial preparation
prior to plea bargaining, thereby depriving the plea-
bargaining process of its main resource-saving advantages.
Or it could lead the Government instead to abandon its heavy
reliance upon plea bargaining in a vast number—90% or
more—of federal criminal cases. We cannot say that the
Constitution’s due process requirement demands so radical a
change in the criminal justice process in order to achieve so
comparatively small a constitutional benefit.

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Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
These considerations, taken together, lead us to conclude
that the Constitution does not require the Government to
disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a
plea agreement with a criminal defendant.
In addition, we note that the “fast track” plea agreement
requires a defendant to waive her right to receive informa-
tion the Government has regarding any “affirmative defense”
she raises at trial. App. to Pet. for Cert. 46a. We do not
believe the Constitution here requires provision of this infor-
mation to the defendant prior to plea bargaining—for most
(though not all) of the reasons previously stated. That is
to say, in the context of this agreement, the need for this
information is more closely related to the fairness of a trial
than to the voluntariness of the plea; the value in terms of
the defendant’s added awareness of relevant circumstances
is ordinarily limited; yet the added burden imposed upon the
Government by requiring its provision well in advance of
trial (often before trial preparation begins) can be serious,
thereby significantly interfering with the administration of
the plea-bargaining process.
For these reasons the judgment of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit is
Reversed.
Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the Constitution does not re-
quire the Government to disclose either affirmative defense
information or impeachment information relating to inform-
ants or other witnesses before entering into a binding plea
agreement with a criminal defendant. The Court, however,
suggests that the constitutional analysis turns in some part
on the “degree of help” such information would provide to
the defendant at the plea stage, see ante, at 630, 631, a dis-
tinction that is neither necessary nor accurate. To the ex-
tent that the Court is implicitly drawing a line based on a

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Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
flawed characterization about the usefulness of certain types
of information, I can only concur in the judgment. The prin-
ciple supporting Brady was “avoidance of an unfair trial to
the accused.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, 87 (1963).
That concern is not implicated at the plea stage regardless.