GONZAGA UNIVERSITY et al. v. DOE

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273 OCTOBER TERM, 2001
Syllabus
GONZAGA UNIVERSITY et al. v. DOE
certiorari to the supreme court of washington
No. 01–679. Argued April 24, 2002—Decided June 20, 2002
As a student at petitioner Gonzaga University, a private educational insti-
tution in Washington State, respondent planned to become a public ele-
mentary schoolteacher in that State after graduation. Washington at
the time required all new teachers to obtain an affidavit of good moral
character from their graduating colleges. Petitioner League, Gonzaga’s
teacher certification specialist, overheard one student tell another that
respondent had engaged in sexual misconduct. League then launched
an investigation; contacted the state agency responsible for teacher cer-
tification, identifying respondent by name and discussing the allega-
tions; and, finally, told him that he would not receive his certification
affidavit. Respondent sued Gonzaga and League in state court under,
inter alia, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging a violation of the Family Educa-
tional Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), 20 U. S. C. § 1232g,
which prohibits the federal funding of schools that have a policy or prac-
tice of permitting the release of students’ education records without
their parents’ written consent. A jury awarded respondent compensa-
tory and punitive damages on the FERPA claim. The Washington
Court of Appeals reversed in relevant part, concluding that FERPA
does not create individual rights and thus cannot be enforced under
§ 1983. Reversing in turn, the State Supreme Court acknowledged that
FERPA does not give rise to a private cause of action, but reasoned
that the nondisclosure provision creates a federal right enforceable
under § 1983.
Held: Respondent’s action is foreclosed because the relevant FERPA pro-
visions create no personal rights to enforce under § 1983. Pp. 278–291.
(a) This Court has never held, and declines to do so here, that spend-
ing legislation drafted in terms resembling FERPA’s can confer enforce-
able rights. FERPA directs the Secretary of Education to enforce its
nondisclosure provisions and other spending conditions, § 1232g(f), by
establishing an office and review board to investigate, process, review,
and adjudicate FERPA violations, § 1232g(g), and to terminate funds
only upon determining that a recipient school is failing to comply sub-
stantially with any FERPA requirement and that such compliance can-
not be secured voluntarily, §§ 1234c(a), 1232g(f). In Pennhurst State
School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, the Court made clear
that unless Congress “speak[s] with a clear voice,” and manifests an

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“unambiguous” intent to create individually enforceable rights, federal
funding provisions provide no basis for private enforcement by § 1983,
id., at 17, 28, and n. 21. Since Pennhurst, the Court has found that
spending legislation gave rise to rights enforceable under § 1983 only in
Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U. S.
418, 426, 432, and Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 496 U. S. 498, 522–
523, where statutory provisions explicitly conferred specific monetary
entitlements upon the plaintiffs, and there was no sufficient administra-
tive means of enforcing the requirements against defendants that failed
to comply. The Court’s more recent decisions, however, have rejected
attempts to infer enforceable rights from Spending Clause statutes
whose language did not unambiguously confer such a right upon the
Act’s beneficiaries. See, e. g., Suter v. Artist M., 503 U. S. 347, 363;
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U. S. 329, 340, 343. Respondent’s attempt to
read this line of cases to establish a relatively loose standard for finding
rights enforceable by § 1983 is unavailing. Because § 1983 provides a
remedy only for the deprivation of “rights . . . secured by the [Federal]
Constitution and laws,” it is rights, not the broader or vaguer “benefits”
or “interests,” that may be enforced thereunder. Thus, the Court fur-
ther rejects the notion that its implied right of action cases are separate
and distinct from its § 1983 cases. To the contrary, the former cases
should guide the determination whether a statute confers rights en-
forceable under § 1983. Although the question whether a statutory vio-
lation may be enforced through § 1983 is a different inquiry from that
involved in determining whether a private right of action can be implied
from a particular statute, Wilder, supra, at 508, n. 9, the inquiries over-
lap in one meaningful respect—in either case it must first be determined
whether Congress intended to create a federal right, see Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 576. For a statute to create private
rights, its text must be phrased in terms of the persons benefited. E. g.,
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 692, n. 13. Once the
plaintiff demonstrates that the statute confers rights on a particular
class of persons, California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 294, the right
is presumptively enforceable by § 1983. Conversely, where a statute
provides no indication that Congress intends to create new individual
rights, there is no basis for a private suit under § 1983. Pp. 278–286.
(b) There is no question that FERPA’s confidentiality provisions cre-
ate no rights enforceable under § 1983. The provisions entirely lack
the sort of individually focused rights-creating language that is critical.
FERPA’s provisions speak only to the Secretary, directing that “[n]o
funds shall be made available” to any “educational . . . institution” which
has a prohibited “policy or practice,” § 1232g(b)(1). This focus is two
steps removed from the interests of individual students and parents

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and clearly does not confer the sort of individual entitlement that is
enforceable under § 1983. E. g., Cannon, supra, at 690–693. Further-
more, because FERPA’s confidentiality provisions speak only in terms
of institutional “policy or practice,” not individual instances of disclo-
sure, see §§ 1232g(b)(1)–(2), they have an “aggregate” focus, they are not
concerned with whether the needs of any particular person have been
satisfied, and they cannot give rise to individual rights, Blessing, supra,
at 344. The fact that recipient institutions can avoid termination of
funding so long as they “comply substantially” with FERPA’s require-
ments, § 1234c(a), also supports a finding that FERPA fails to support
a § 1983 suit. 520 U. S., at 335, 343. References in §§ 1232g(b)(1) and
(2) to individual parental consent cannot make out the requisite congres-
sional intent to confer individually enforceable rights because each of
those references is made in the context of describing the type of “policy
or practice” that triggers a funding prohibition. The conclusion that
FERPA fails to confer enforceable rights is buttressed by the mecha-
nism that Congress provided for enforcing FERPA violations. The
Secretary is expressly authorized to “deal with violations,” § 1232g(f),
and required to establish a review board to investigate and adjudicate
such violations, § 1232g(g). For these purposes, the Secretary created
the Family Policy Compliance Office, which has promulgated procedures
for resolving student complaints about suspected FERPA violations.
These procedures squarely distinguish this case from Wright and
Wilder, where an aggrieved individual lacked any federal review mecha-
nism. Finally, because FERPA prohibits most of the Secretary’s func-
tions from being carried out in regional offices, § 1232g(g), in order to
allay the concern that regionalizing enforcement might lead to multiple
interpretations of FERPA, it is implausible to presume that Congress
nonetheless intended private suits to be brought before thousands of
federal- and state-court judges. Pp. 287–290.
143 Wash. 2d 687, 24 P. 3d 390, reversed and remanded.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Breyer, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Souter, J., joined,
post, p. 291. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg,
J., joined, post, p. 293.
John G. Roberts, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the briefs were Martin Michaelson, Charles K.
Wiggins, and Kenneth W. Masters.

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276 GONZAGA UNIV. v. DOE
Opinion of the Court
Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief
were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General
McCallum, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Mark B.
Stern, Alisa B. Klein, and Anne Murphy.
Beth S. Brinkmann argued the cause for respondent.
With her on the brief were Drew S. Days III and Lois K.
Perrin.*
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The question presented is whether a student may sue a
private university for damages under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42
U. S. C. § 1983 (1994 ed., Supp. V), to enforce provisions of
the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974
(FERPA or Act), 88 Stat. 571, 20 U. S. C. § 1232g, which pro-
hibit the federal funding of educational institutions that have
a policy or practice of releasing education records to unau-
thorized persons. We hold such an action foreclosed because
the relevant provisions of FERPA create no personal rights
to enforce under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1994 ed., Supp. V).
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Illi-
nois et al. by James E. Ryan, Attorney General of Illinois, Joel D. Bertoc-
chi, Solicitor General, Michael P. Doyle, Assistant Attorney General, and
Dan Schweitzer, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States
as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A.
Butterworth of Florida, Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of
Maryland, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie
Sue Del Papa of Nevada, David Samson of New Jersey, Betty D. Mont-
gomery of Ohio, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah,
Christine O. Gregoire of Washington, and Hoke MacMillan of Wyoming;
for the American Association of Community Colleges et al. by Philip Burl-
ing, John M. Stevens, and Sheldon E. Steinbach; and for the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. by Gregg P. Leslie, Lucy A.
Dalglish, Bruce W. Sanford, and S. Mark Goodman.
Aaron H. Caplan, Jordan Gross, and Steven R. Shapiro filed a brief
for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging
affirmance.

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Opinion of the Court
Respondent John Doe is a former undergraduate in the
School of Education at Gonzaga University, a private univer-
sity in Spokane, Washington. He planned to graduate and
teach at a Washington public elementary school. Washing-
ton at the time required all of its new teachers to obtain an
affidavit of good moral character from a dean of their grad-
uating college or university. In October 1993, Roberta
League, Gonzaga’s “teacher certification specialist,” over-
heard one student tell another that respondent engaged in
acts of sexual misconduct against Jane Doe, a female under-
graduate. League launched an investigation and contacted
the state agency responsible for teacher certification, identi-
fying respondent by name and discussing the allegations
against him. Respondent did not learn of the investigation,
or that information about him had been disclosed, until
March 1994, when he was told by League and others that he
would not receive the affidavit required for certification as a
Washington schoolteacher.
Respondent then sued Gonzaga and League (petitioners)
in state court. He alleged violations of Washington tort and
contract law, as well as a pendent violation of § 1983 for the
release of personal information to an “unauthorized person”
in violation of FERPA.1 A jury found for respondent on all
counts, awarding him $1,155,000, including $150,000 in com-
pensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages on the
FERPA claim.
1 The Washington Court of Appeals and the Washington Supreme Court
found petitioners to have acted “under color of state law” for purposes of
§ 1983 when they disclosed respondent’s personal information to state offi-
cials in connection with state-law teacher certification requirements. 143
Wash. 2d 687, 710–711, 24 P. 3d 390, 401–402 (2001). Although the petition
for certiorari challenged this holding, we agreed to review only the ques-
tion posed in the first paragraph of this opinion, a question reserved in
Owasso Independent School Dist. No. I–011 v. Falvo, 534 U. S. 426, 430–
431 (2002). We therefore assume without deciding that the relevant dis-
closures occurred under color of state law.

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The Washington Court of Appeals reversed in relevant
part, concluding that FERPA does not create individual
rights and thus cannot be enforced under § 1983. 99 Wash.
App. 338, 992 P. 2d 545 (2000). The Washington Supreme
Court reversed that decision, and ordered the FERPA dam-
ages reinstated. 143 Wash. 2d 687, 24 P. 3d 390 (2001). The
court acknowledged that “FERPA itself does not give rise
to a private cause of action,” but reasoned that FERPA’s
nondisclosure provision “gives rise to a federal right enforce-
able under section 1983.” Id., at 707–708, 24 P. 3d, at 400.
Like the Washington Supreme Court and the State Court
of Appeals below, other state and federal courts have divided
on the question of FERPA’s enforceability under § 1983.2
The fact that all of these courts have relied on the same set
of opinions from this Court suggests that our opinions in this
area may not be models of clarity. We therefore granted
certiorari, 534 U. S. 1103 (2002), to resolve the conflict among
the lower courts and in the process resolve any ambiguity in
our own opinions.
Congress enacted FERPA under its spending power to
condition the receipt of federal funds on certain require-
ments relating to the access and disclosure of student educa-
tional records. The Act directs the Secretary of Education
to withhold federal funds from any public or private “educa-
tional agency or institution” that fails to comply with these
conditions. As relevant here, the Act provides:
2 Compare Gundlach v. Reinstein, 924 F. Supp. 684, 692 (ED Pa. 1996)
(FERPA confers no enforceable rights because it contains “no unambigu-
ous intention on the part of the Congress to permit the invocation of § 1983
to redress an individual release of records”), aff ’d, 114 F. 3d 1172 (CA3
1997); and Meury v. Eagle-Union Community School Corp., 714 N. E. 2d
233, 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (same), with Falvo v. Owasso Independent
School Dist. No. I–011, 233 F. 3d 1203, 1210 (CA10 2000) (concluding that
release of records in “violation of FERPA is actionable under . . . § 1983”),
rev’d on other grounds, 534 U. S. 426 (2002); and Brown v. Oneonta, 106
F. 3d 1125, 1131–1132 (CA2 1997) (same).

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“No funds shall be made available under any applicable
program to any educational agency or institution which
has a policy or practice of permitting the release of edu-
cation records (or personally identifiable information
contained therein . . .) of students without the written
consent of their parents to any individual, agency, or or-
ganization.” 20 U. S. C. § 1232g(b)(1).
The Act directs the Secretary of Education to enforce this
and other of the Act’s spending conditions. § 1232g(f). The
Secretary is required to establish an office and review board
within the Department of Education for “investigating, proc-
essing, reviewing, and adjudicating violations of [the Act].”
§ 1232g(g). Funds may be terminated only if the Secretary
determines that a recipient institution “is failing to comply
substantially with any requirement of [the Act]” and that
such compliance “cannot be secured by voluntary means.”
§§ 1234c(a), 1232g(f).
Respondent contends that this statutory regime confers
upon any student enrolled at a covered school or institution
a federal right, enforceable in suits for damages under § 1983,
not to have “education records” disclosed to unauthorized
persons without the student’s express written consent. But
we have never before held, and decline to do so here, that
spending legislation drafted in terms resembling those of
FERPA can confer enforceable rights.
In Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980), six years after
Congress enacted FERPA, we recognized for the first time
that § 1983 actions may be brought against state actors to
enforce rights created by federal statutes as well as by the
Constitution. There we held that plaintiffs could recover
payments wrongfully withheld by a state agency in violation
of the Social Security Act. Id., at 4. A year later, in Penn-
hurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1
(1981), we rejected a claim that the Developmentally Dis-
abled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975 conferred
enforceable rights, saying:

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“In legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power,
the typical remedy for state noncompliance with feder-
ally imposed conditions is not a private cause of action
for noncompliance but rather action by the Federal Gov-
ernment to terminate funds to the State.” Id., at 28.
We made clear that unless Congress “speak[s] with a clear
voice,” and manifests an “unambiguous” intent to confer indi-
vidual rights, federal funding provisions provide no basis for
private enforcement by § 1983. Id., at 17, 28, and n. 21.
Since Pennhurst, only twice have we found spending legis-
lation to give rise to enforceable rights. In Wright v. Roa-
noke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U. S. 418
(1987), we allowed a § 1983 suit by tenants to recover past
overcharges under a rent-ceiling provision of the Public
Housing Act, on the ground that the provision unambigu-
ously conferred “a mandatory [benefit] focusing on the indi-
vidual family and its income.” Id., at 430. The key to our
inquiry was that Congress spoke in terms that “could not be
clearer,” ibid., and conferred entitlements “sufficiently spe-
cific and definite to qualify as enforceable rights under Penn-
hurst.” Id., at 432. Also significant was that the federal
agency charged with administering the Public Housing Act
“ha[d] never provided a procedure by which tenants could
complain to it about the alleged failures [of state welfare
agencies] to abide by [the Act’s rent-ceiling provision].”
Id., at 426.
Three years later, in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn.,
496 U. S. 498 (1990), we allowed a § 1983 suit brought by
health care providers to enforce a reimbursement provision
of the Medicaid Act, on the ground that the provision, much
like the rent-ceiling provision in Wright, explicitly conferred
specific monetary entitlements upon the plaintiffs. Con-
gress left no doubt of its intent for private enforcement, we
said, because the provision required States to pay an “objec-
tive” monetary entitlement to individual health care provid-
ers, with no sufficient administrative means of enforcing the

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requirement against States that failed to comply. 496 U. S.,
at 522–523.
Our more recent decisions, however, have rejected at-
tempts to infer enforceable rights from Spending Clause
statutes. In Suter v. Artist M., 503 U. S. 347 (1992), the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 required
States receiving funds for adoption assistance to have a
“plan” to make “reasonable efforts” to keep children out of
foster homes. A class of parents and children sought to
enforce this requirement against state officials under § 1983,
claiming that no such efforts had been made. We read the
Act “in the light shed by Pennhurst,” id., at 358, and found
no basis for the suit, saying:
“Careful examination of the language . . . does not unam-
biguously confer an enforceable right upon the Act’s
beneficiaries. The term ‘reasonable efforts’ in this con-
text is at least as plausibly read to impose only a rather
generalized duty on the State, to be enforced not by pri-
vate individuals, but by the Secretary in the manner [of
reducing or eliminating payments].” Id., at 363.
Since the Act conferred no specific, individually enforceable
rights, there was no basis for private enforcement, even
by a class of the statute’s principal beneficiaries. Id., at 357.
Similarly, in Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U. S. 329 (1997),
Title IV–D of the Social Security Act required States receiv-
ing federal child-welfare funds to “substantially comply”
with requirements designed to ensure timely payment of
child support. Five Arizona mothers invoked § 1983 against
state officials on grounds that state child-welfare agencies
consistently failed to meet these requirements. We found
no basis for the suit, saying:
“Far from creating an individual entitlement to serv-
ices, the standard is simply a yardstick for the Secretary
to measure the systemwide performance of a State’s
Title IV–D program. Thus, the Secretary must look to

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the aggregate services provided by the State, not to
whether the needs of any particular person have been
satisfied.” Id., at 343 (emphases in original).
Because the provision focused on “the aggregate services
provided by the State,” rather than “the needs of any partic-
ular person,” it conferred no individual rights and thus could
not be enforced by § 1983. We emphasized: “[T]o seek re-
dress through § 1983, . . . a plaintiff must assert the violation
of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.”
Id., at 340 (emphases in original).
Respondent reads this line of cases to establish a relatively
loose standard for finding rights enforceable by § 1983. He
claims that a federal statute confers such rights so long as
Congress intended that the statute “benefit” putative plain-
tiffs. Brief for Respondent 40–46. He further contends
that a more “rigorous” inquiry would conflate the standard
for inferring a private right of action under § 1983 with the
standard for inferring a private right of action directly from
the statute itself, which he admits would not exist under
FERPA. Id., at 41–43. As authority, respondent points to
Blessing and Wilder, which, he says, used the term “benefit”
to define the sort of statutory interest enforceable by § 1983.
See Blessing, supra, at 340–341 (“Congress must have in-
tended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff ”);
Wilder, supra, at 509 (same).
Some language in our opinions might be read to suggest
that something less than an unambiguously conferred right is
enforceable by § 1983. Blessing, for example, set forth three
“factors” to guide judicial inquiry into whether or not a stat-
ute confers a right: “Congress must have intended that the
provision in question benefit the plaintiff,” “the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the
statute is not so ‘vague and amorphous’ that its enforcement
would strain judicial competence,” and “the provision giving
rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory,
rather than precatory, terms.” 520 U. S., at 340–341. In

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the same paragraph, however, Blessing emphasizes that it is
only violations of rights, not laws, which give rise to § 1983
actions. Id., at 340. This confusion has led some courts to
interpret Blessing as allowing plaintiffs to enforce a statute
under § 1983 so long as the plaintiff falls within the general
zone of interest that the statute is intended to protect; some-
thing less than what is required for a statute to create rights
enforceable directly from the statute itself under an implied
private right of action. Fueling this uncertainty is the no-
tion that our implied private right of action cases have no
bearing on the standards for discerning whether a statute
creates rights enforceable by § 1983. Wilder appears to sup-
port this notion, 496 U. S., at 508–509, n. 9, while Suter, 503
U. S., at 363–364, and Pennhurst, 451 U. S., at 28, n. 21, ap-
pear to disavow it.
We now reject the notion that our cases permit anything
short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause
of action brought under § 1983. Section 1983 provides a
remedy only for the deprivation of “rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United
States. Accordingly, it is rights, not the broader or vaguer
“benefits” or “interests,” that may be enforced under the
authority of that section. This being so, we further reject
the notion that our implied right of action cases are separate
and distinct from our § 1983 cases. To the contrary, our
implied right of action cases should guide the determination
of whether a statute confers rights enforceable under § 1983.
We have recognized that whether a statutory violation
may be enforced through § 1983 “is a different inquiry than
that involved in determining whether a private right of
action can be implied from a particular statute.” Wilder,
supra, at 508, n. 9. But the inquiries overlap in one mean-
ingful respect—in either case we must first determine
whether Congress intended to create a federal right. Thus
we have held that “[t]he question whether Congress . . . in-
tended to create a private right of action [is] definitively an-

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swered in the negative” where a “statute by its terms grants
no private rights to any identifiable class.” Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 576 (1979). For a statute to
create such private rights, its text must be “phrased in terms
of the persons benefited.” Cannon v. University of Chi-
cago, 441 U. S. 677, 692, n. 13 (1979). We have recognized,
for example, that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 create
individual rights because those statutes are phrased “with
an unmistakable focus on the benefited class.” Id., at 691
(emphasis added).3 But even where a statute is phrased in
such explicit rights-creating terms, a plaintiff suing under an
implied right of action still must show that the statute mani-
fests an intent “to create not just a private right but also a
private remedy.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 286
(2001) (emphases added).
Plaintiffs suing under § 1983 do not have the burden of
showing an intent to create a private remedy because § 1983
generally supplies a remedy for the vindication of rights se-
cured by federal statutes. See supra, at 279–281. Once a
plaintiff demonstrates that a statute confers an individual
right, the right is presumptively enforceable by § 1983.4 But
3 Title VI provides: “No person in the United States shall . . . be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance” on the basis of race, color, or national origin. 78 Stat.
252, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d (1994 ed.) (emphasis added). Title IX provides:
“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, . . . be subjected
to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance.” 86 Stat. 373, 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a) (emphasis
added). Where a statute does not include this sort of explicit “right- or
duty-creating language,” we rarely impute to Congress an intent to create
a private right of action. See Cannon, 441 U. S., at 690, n. 13 (listing
provisions); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 288 (2001) (existence or
absence of rights-creating language is critical to the Court’s inquiry).
4 The State may rebut this presumption by showing that Congress “spe-
cifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983.” Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S.
992, 1004–1005, n. 9 (1984). The State’s burden is to demonstrate that
Congress shut the door to private enforcement either expressly, through

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the initial inquiry—determining whether a statute confers
any right at all—is no different from the initial inquiry in an
implied right of action case, the express purpose of which is
to determine whether or not a statute “confer[s] rights on a
particular class of persons.” California v. Sierra Club, 451
U. S. 287, 294 (1981). This makes obvious sense, since § 1983
merely provides a mechanism for enforcing individual rights
“secured” elsewhere, i. e., rights independently “secured by
the Constitution and laws” of the United States. “[O]ne
cannot go into court and claim a ‘violation of § 1983’—for
§ 1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything.”
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441
U. S. 600, 617 (1979).
A court’s role in discerning whether personal rights exist
in the § 1983 context should therefore not differ from its role
in discerning whether personal rights exist in the implied
right of action context. Compare Golden State Transit
Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U. S. 103, 107–108, n. 4 (1989) (“[A]
claim based on a statutory violation is enforceable under
§ 1983 only when the statute creates ‘rights, privileges, or
immunities’ in the particular plaintiff ”), with Cannon, supra,
at 690, n. 13 (statute is enforceable under implied right only
where Congress “explicitly conferred a right directly on a
class of persons that included the plaintiff in the case”).
Both inquiries simply require a determination as to whether
or not Congress intended to confer individual rights upon
a class of beneficiaries. Compare Wright, 479 U. S., at 423
(statute must be “intended to rise to the level of an enforce-
“specific evidence from the statute itself,” Wright v. Roanoke Redevelop-
ment and Housing Authority, 479 U. S. 418, 423 (1987), or “impliedly, by
creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with
individual enforcement under § 1983,” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U. S. 329,
341 (1997). See also Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National
Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 20 (1981). These questions do not arise
in this case due to our conclusion that FERPA confers no individual rights
and thus cannot give rise to a presumption of enforceability under § 1983.

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able right”), with Alexander v. Sandoval, supra, at 289 (stat-
ute must evince “congressional intent to create new rights”);
and California v. Sierra Club, supra, at 294 (“The question
is not simply who would benefit from the Act, but whether
Congress intended to confer federal rights upon those bene-
ficiaries” (citing Cannon, supra, at 690–693, n. 13)). Accord-
ingly, where the text and structure of a statute provide no
indication that Congress intends to create new individual
rights, there is no basis for a private suit, whether under
§ 1983 or under an implied right of action.
Justice Stevens disagrees with this conclusion princi-
pally because separation-of-powers concerns are, in his view,
more pronounced in the implied right of action context as
opposed to the § 1983 context. Post, at 300–301 (dissenting
opinion) (citing Wilder, 496 U. S., at 509, n. 9). But we fail
to see how relations between the branches are served by
having courts apply a multifactor balancing test to pick and
choose which federal requirements may be enforced by
§ 1983 and which may not. Nor are separation-of-powers
concerns within the Federal Government the only guideposts
in this sort of analysis. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State
Police, 491 U. S. 58, 65 (1989) (“[I]f Congress intends to alter
the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the
Federal Government,’ it must make its intention to do so
‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute’ ” (quoting
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 242
(1985); citing Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Hal-
derman, 465 U. S. 89, 99 (1984))). 5
5 This case illustrates the point well. Justice Stevens would conclude
that Congress intended FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions to confer indi-
vidual rights on millions of school students from kindergarten through
graduate school without having ever said so explicitly. This conclusion
entails a judicial assumption, with no basis in statutory text, that Congress
intended to set itself resolutely against a tradition of deference to state
and local school officials, e. g., Falvo, 534 U. S., at 435 (rejecting proposed

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Opinion of the Court
With this principle in mind, there is no question that
FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions fail to confer enforceable
rights. To begin with, the provisions entirely lack the sort
of “rights-creating” language critical to showing the requi-
site congressional intent to create new rights. Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U. S., at 288–289; Cannon, 441 U. S., at 690,
n. 13. Unlike the individually focused terminology of Titles
VI and IX (“No person . . . shall . . . be subjected to discrimi-
nation”), FERPA’s provisions speak only to the Secretary of
Education, directing that “[n]o funds shall be made available”
to any “educational agency or institution” which has a pro-
hibited “policy or practice.” 20 U. S. C. § 1232g(b)(1). This
focus is two steps removed from the interests of individual
students and parents and clearly does not confer the sort
of “individual entitlement” that is enforceable under § 1983.
Blessing, 520 U. S., at 343 (emphasis in original). As we said
in Cannon:
“There would be far less reason to infer a private rem-
edy in favor of individual persons if Congress, instead
of drafting Title IX with an unmistakable focus on the
benefited class, had written it simply as a ban on dis-
criminatory conduct by recipients of federal funds or as
a prohibition against the disbursement of public funds
to educational institutions engaged in discriminatory
practices.” 441 U. S., at 690–693.
See also Alexander v. Sandoval, supra, at 289 (“Statutes
that focus on the person regulated rather than the individu-
als protected create ‘no implication of an intent to confer
rights on a particular class of persons’ ” (quoting California
v. Sierra Club, supra, at 294)).
interpretation of FERPA because “[w]e doubt Congress meant to inter-
vene in this drastic fashion with traditional state functions”); Regents of
Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U. S. 214, 226 (1985) (noting tradition of
“reluctance to trench on the prerogatives of state and local educational
institutions”), by subjecting them to private suits for money damages
whenever they fail to comply with a federal funding condition.

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FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions further speak only in
terms of institutional policy and practice, not individual in-
stances of disclosure. See §§ 1232g(b)(1)–(2) (prohibiting the
funding of “any educational agency or institution which has
a policy or practice of permitting the release of education
records” (emphasis added)). Therefore, as in Blessing, they
have an “aggregate” focus, 520 U. S., at 343, they are not
concerned with “whether the needs of any particular person
have been satisfied,” ibid., and they cannot “give rise to indi-
vidual rights,” id., at 344. Recipient institutions can further
avoid termination of funding so long as they “comply sub-
stantially” with the Act’s requirements. § 1234c(a). This,
too, is not unlike Blessing, which found that Title IV–D failed
to support a § 1983 suit in part because it only required “sub-
stantial compliance” with federal regulations. 520 U. S., at
335, 343. Respondent directs our attention to subsection
(b)(2), but the text and structure of subsections (b)(1) and
(b)(2) are essentially the same.6 In each provision the ref-
erence to individual consent is in the context of describing
the type of “policy or practice” that triggers a funding prohi-
6 Subsection (b)(2) provides in relevant part:
“No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any
educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of releas-
ing, or providing access to, any personally identifiable information in edu-
cation records other than directory information . . . unless—
“(A) there is written consent from the student’s parents specifying rec-
ords to be released, the reasons for such release, and to whom, and with a
copy of the records to be released to the student’s parents and the student
if desired by the parents.” 20 U. S. C. § 1232g(b)(2)(A).
Respondent invokes this provision to assert the very awkward “individu-
alized right to withhold consent and prevent the unauthorized release of
personally identifiable information in education records by an educational
institution that has a policy or practice of releasing, or providing access
to, such information.” Brief for Respondent 14. That is a far cry from
the sort of individualized, concrete monetary entitlement found enforce-
able in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980), Wright, and Wilder v. Vir-
ginia Hospital Assn., 496 U. S. 498 (1990). See supra, at 279–281.

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Opinion of the Court
bition. For reasons expressed repeatedly in our prior cases,
however, such provisions cannot make out the requisite con-
gressional intent to confer individual rights enforceable by
§ 1983.7
Our conclusion that FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions fail
to confer enforceable rights is buttressed by the mechanism
that Congress chose to provide for enforcing those provi-
sions. Congress expressly authorized the Secretary of Edu-
cation to “deal with violations” of the Act, § 1232g(f) (em-
phasis added), and required the Secretary to “establish or
designate [a] review board” for investigating and adjudicat-
ing such violations, § 1232g(g). Pursuant to these provi-
sions, the Secretary created the Family Policy Compliance
Office (FPCO) “to act as the Review Board required under
the Act [and] to enforce the Act with respect to all applicable
programs.” 34 CFR §§ 99.60(a) and (b) (2001). The FPCO
permits students and parents who suspect a violation of the
Act to file individual written complaints. § 99.63. If a com-
plaint is timely and contains required information, the FPCO
will initiate an investigation, §§ 99.64(a)–(b), notify the educa-
tional institution of the charge, § 99.65(a), and request a writ-
ten response, § 99.65. If a violation is found, the FPCO dis-
tributes a notice of factual findings and a “statement of the
specific steps that the agency or institution must take to
comply” with FERPA. §§ 99.66(b) and (c)(1). These admin-
7 Justice Stevens would have us look to other provisions in FERPA
that use the term “rights” to define the obligations of educational institu-
tions that receive federal funds. See post, at 293–294, 296. He then sug-
gests that any reference to “rights,” even as a shorthand means of describ-
ing standards and procedures imposed on funding recipients, should give
rise to a statute’s enforceability under § 1983. Ibid. This argument was
rejected in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S.
1, 18–20 (1981) (no presumption of enforceability merely because a statute
“speaks in terms of ‘rights’ ”), and it is particularly misplaced here since
Congress enacted FERPA years before Thiboutot declared that statutes
can ever give rise to rights enforceable by § 1983.

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Opinion of the Court
istrative procedures squarely distinguish this case from
Wright and Wilder, where an aggrieved individual lacked
any federal review mechanism, see supra, at 280–281, and
further counsel against our finding a congressional intent to
create individually enforceable private rights.8
Congress finally provided that “[e]xcept for the conduct of
hearings, none of the functions of the Secretary under this
section shall be carried out in any of the regional offices” of
the Department of Education. 20 U. S. C. § 1232g(g). This
centralized review provision was added just four months
after FERPA’s enactment due to “concern that regionalizing
the enforcement of [FERPA] may lead to multiple interpre-
tations of it, and possibly work a hardship on parents, stu-
dents, and institutions.” 120 Cong. Rec. 39863 (1974) ( joint
statement). Cf. Wright, 479 U. S., at 426 (“Congress’ aim
was to provide a decentralized . . . administrative process”
(emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)). It is
implausible to presume that the same Congress nonetheless
intended private suits to be brought before thousands of
federal- and state-court judges, which could only result in
the sort of “multiple interpretations” the Act explicitly
sought to avoid.
In sum, if Congress wishes to create new rights enforce-
able under § 1983, it must do so in clear and unambiguous
terms—no less and no more than what is required for
Congress to create new rights enforceable under an implied
private right of action. FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions
contain no rights-creating language, they have an aggregate,
not individual, focus, and they serve primarily to direct the
Secretary of Education’s distribution of public funds to
educational institutions. They therefore create no rights
enforceable under § 1983. Accordingly, the judgment of the
8 We need not determine whether FERPA’s procedures are “sufficiently
comprehensive” to offer an independent basis for precluding private en-
forcement, Middlesex County Sewerage Authority, 453 U. S., at 20, due to
our finding that FERPA creates no private right to enforce.

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Breyer, J., concurring in judgment
Supreme Court of Washington is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Souter joins,
concurring in the judgment.
The ultimate question, in respect to whether private indi-
viduals may bring a lawsuit to enforce a federal statute,
through 42 U. S. C. § 1983 or otherwise, is a question of con-
gressional intent. In my view, the factors set forth in this
Court’s § 1983 cases are helpful indications of that intent.
See, e. g., Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U. S. 329, 340–341 (1997);
Suter v. Artist M., 503 U. S. 347, 357 (1992); Wilder v. Vir-
ginia Hospital Assn., 496 U. S. 498, 509–511 (1990); Wright
v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479
U. S. 418, 423–427 (1987). But the statute books are too
many, the laws too diverse, and their purposes too complex,
for any single legal formula to offer more than general guid-
ance. I would not, in effect, predetermine an outcome
through the use of a presumption—such as the majority’s
presumption that a right is conferred only if set forth “unam-
biguously” in the statute’s “text and structure.” See ante,
at 280, 288.
At the same time, I do not believe that Congress intended
private judicial enforcement of this statute’s “school record
privacy” provisions. The Court mentions most of the con-
siderations I find persuasive: The phrasing of the relevant
prohibition (stating that “[n]o funds shall be made available”
to institutions with a “policy or practice” of permitting the
release of “education records”), see ante, at 288, n. 6, 288–
289; the total absence (in the relevant statutory provision)
of any reference to individual “rights” or the like, see ante,
at 287; the related provisions that make clear, by creating
administrative enforcement processes, that the Spending
Clause was not simply a device to obtain federal jurisdiction,

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Breyer, J., concurring in judgment
see ante, at 289–290; and later statutory insistence upon cen-
tralized federal enforcement at the national, not the regional,
level, see ante, at 290.
I would add one further reason. Much of the statute’s key
language is broad and nonspecific. The statute, for example,
defines its key term, “education records,” as (with certain
enumerated exceptions) “those records, files, documents, and
other materials which (i) contain information directly related
to a student; and (ii) are maintained by an educational . . .
institution.” 20 U. S. C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A). This kind of lan-
guage leaves schools uncertain as to just when they can, or
cannot, reveal various kinds of information. It has led, or
could lead, to legal claims that would limit, or forbid, such
practices as peer grading, see Owasso Independent School
Dist. No. I–011 v. Falvo, 534 U. S. 426 (2002), teacher evalua-
tions, see Moore v. Hyche, 761 F. Supp. 112 (ND Ala. 1991),
school “honor society” recommendations, see Price v. Young,
580 F. Supp. 1 (ED Ark. 1983), or even roll call responses
and “bad conduct” marks written down in class, see Tr. of
Oral Arg. in Falvo, supra, O. T. 2001, No. 00–1073, pp. 37–38.
And it is open to interpretations that invariably favor con-
fidentiality almost irrespective of conflicting educational
needs or the importance, or common sense, of limited disclo-
sures in certain circumstances, say, where individuals are
being considered for work with young children or other posi-
tions of trust.
Under these circumstances, Congress may well have
wanted to make the agency remedy that it provided exclu-
sive—both to achieve the expertise, uniformity, widespread
consultation, and resulting administrative guidance that can
accompany agency decisionmaking and to avoid the compara-
tive risk of inconsistent interpretations and misincentives
that can arise out of an occasional inappropriate application
of the statute in a private action for damages. This factor,
together with the others to which the majority refers, con-
vinces me that Congress did not intend private judicial en-
forcement actions here.

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Stevens, J., dissenting
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
dissenting.
The Court’s ratio decidendi in this case has a “now you
see it, now you don’t” character. At times, the Court seems
to hold that the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
of 1974 (FERPA or Act), 20 U. S. C. § 1232g, simply does not
create any federal rights, thereby disposing of the case with
a negative answer to the question “whether Congress in-
tended to create a federal right,” ante, at 283. This inter-
pretation would explain the Court’s studious avoidance of the
rights-creating language in the title and the text of the Act.
Alternatively, its opinion may be read as accepting the prop-
osition that FERPA does indeed create both parental rights
of access to student records and student rights of privacy in
such records, but that those federal rights are of a lesser
value because Congress did not intend them to be enforce-
able by their owners. See, e. g., ante, at 290 (requiring of
respondent “no less and no more” than what is required of
plaintiffs attempting to prove that a statute creates an im-
plied right of action). I shall first explain why the statute
does, indeed, create federal rights, and then explain why the
Court’s novel attempt to craft a new category of second-class
statutory rights is misguided.
I
Title 20 U. S. C. § 1232g, which embodies FERPA in its
entirety, includes 10 subsections, which create rights for both
students and their parents, and describe the procedures for
enforcing and protecting those rights. Subsection (a)(1)(A)
accords parents “the right to inspect and review the educa-
tion records of their children.” 1 Subsection (a)(1)(D) pro-
1 The following portions of 20 U. S. C. §§ 1232g(a)(1)(A) and (B) identify
the parents’ right. After stating that no funds shall be made available to
an institution that has a policy of denying parents “the right to inspect
and review the education records of their children,” subsection (a)(1)(A)
clarifies that if an education record pertains to more than one student,
“the parents of one of such students shall have the right to inspect and

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Stevens, J., dissenting
vides that a “student or a person applying for admission”
may waive “his right of access” to certain confidential state-
ments. Two separate provisions protect students’ privacy
rights: subsection (a)(2) refers to “the privacy rights of stu-
dents,” and subsection (c) protects “the rights of privacy of
students and their families.” And subsection (d) provides
that after a student has attained the age of 18, “the rights
accorded to the parents of the student” shall thereafter be
extended to the student. Given such explicit rights-creating
language, the title of the statute, which describes “family
educational rights,” is appropriate: The entire statutory
scheme was designed to protect such rights.
Of course, as we have stated previously, a “blanket ap-
proach” to determining whether a statute creates rights en-
forceable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1994 ed., Supp. V) is inap-
propriate. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U. S. 329, 344 (1997).
The precise statutory provision at issue in this case is
§ 1232g(b). 2 Although the rights-creating language in this
subsection is not as explicit as it is in other parts of the
statute, it is clear that, in substance, § 1232g(b) formulates
an individual right: in respondent’s words, the “right of
parents to withhold consent and prevent the unauthorized
release of education record information by an educational
review only” the parts pertaining to that student. That subsection then
provides that the educational institution “shall establish appropriate pro-
cedures” for the granting of parental requests for access within 45 days.
Ibid. Subsection (a)(1)(B) also refers to the parents’ “right to inspect and
review the education records” of their children.
2 In relevant part, § 1232g(b)(2) states that “[n]o funds shall be made
available under any applicable program to any educational agency or insti-
tution which has a policy or practice of releasing, or providing access to,
any personally identifiable information in education records other than
directory information . . . unless” either “there is written consent from the
student’s parents specifying records to be released, the reasons for such
release, and to whom, and with a copy of the records to be released to the
student’s parents and the student if desired by the parents,” or a court
order dictating release of information.

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Stevens, J., dissenting
institution . . . that has a policy or practice of releasing such
information.” Brief for Respondent 11. This provision
plainly meets the standards we articulated in Blessing for
establishing a federal right: It is directed to the benefit of
individual students and parents; the provision is binding on
States, as it is “couched in mandatory, rather than precatory,
terms”; and the right is far from “ ‘vague and amorphous,’ ”
520 U. S., at 340–341. Indeed, the right at issue is more spe-
cific and clear than rights previously found enforceable under
§ 1983 in Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing
Authority, 479 U. S. 418 (1987), and Wilder v. Virginia Hos-
pital Assn., 496 U. S. 498 (1990), both of which involved
plaintiffs’ entitlement to “reasonable” amounts of money.3
As such, the federal right created by § 1232g(b) is “presump-
tively enforceable by § 1983,” ante, at 284.
The Court claims that § 1232g(b), because it references a
“policy or practice,” has an aggregate focus and thus cannot
qualify as an individual right. See ante, at 288 (emphasis
deleted). But § 1232g(b) does not simply ban an institution
from having a policy or practice—which would be a more
systemic requirement. Rather, it permits a policy or prac-
tice of releasing information, so long as “there is written
consent from the student’s parents specifying records to be
released, the reasons for such release, and to whom, and with
a copy of the records to be released to the student’s parents
and the student if desired by the parents.” 20 U. S. C.
§ 1232g(b)(2)(A). The provision speaks of the individual
“student,” not students generally. In light of FERPA’s
stated purpose to “protect such individuals’ rights to privacy
by limiting the transferability of their records without their
consent,” 120 Cong. Rec. 39862 (1974) (statement of Sen.
3 In Wright, the right claimed was “that a ‘reasonable’ amount for utili-
ties be included in rent that a [public housing authority] was allowed to
charge.” 479 U. S., at 430. In Wilder, health care providers asserted the
right to “reasonable and adequate rates” from “States participating in the
Medicaid program.” 496 U. S., at 512.

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Buckley), the individual focus of § 1232g(b) is manifest.
Moreover, simply because a “pattern or practice” is a precon-
dition to individual relief does not mean that the right as-
serted is not an individually enforceable right. Cf. Monell
v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 690–
695 (1978) (authorizing municipal liability under § 1983 when
a municipality’s “policy or custom” has caused the violation
of an individual’s federal rights).
Although § 1232g(b) alone provides strong evidence that
an individual federal right has been created, this conclusion
is bolstered by viewing the provision in the overall context
of FERPA. Not once in its opinion does the Court acknowl-
edge the substantial number of references to “rights” in the
FERPA provisions surrounding § 1232g(b), even though our
past § 1983 cases have made clear that a given statutory pro-
vision’s meaning is to be discerned “in light of the entire
legislative enactment,” Suter v. Artist M., 503 U. S. 347, 357
(1992).4 Rather, ignoring these provisions, the Court as-
serts that FERPA—not just § 1232g(b)—“entirely lack[s]”
rights-creating language, ante, at 287. The Court also
claims that “we have never before held . . . that spending
legislation drafted in terms resembling those of FERPA can
confer enforceable rights.” Ante, at 279. In making this
claim, the Court contrasts FERPA’s “[n]o funds shall be
made available” language with “individually focused termi-
4 The Court correctly states that “rights” language alone does not neces-
sarily create rights enforceable under § 1983, ante, at 289, n. 7 (quoting
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981)),
but such language is certainly relevant to whether a statute creates rights,
see ante, at 287 (describing “ ‘rights-creating’ language” as “critical to
showing the requisite congressional intent to create new rights”). More-
over, in Pennhurst, the Court treated the “rights” language as the only
arguable evidence that the statute created rights; here, the “ ‘overall’ or
‘specific’ purposes of the Act,” 451 U. S., at 18, also show an intent to
create individual rights. See supra, at 295 and this page (discussing
FERPA’s “stated purpose”).

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Stevens, J., dissenting
nology” characteristic of federal antidiscrimination statutes,
such as “[n]o person . . . shall . . . be subjected to discrimina-
tion,” ante, at 287. But the sort of rights-creating language
idealized by the Court has never been present in our § 1983
cases; rather, such language ordinarily gives rise to an im-
plied cause of action. See Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U. S. 677, 690, n. 13 (1979). None of our four most recent
cases involving whether a Spending Clause statute created
rights enforceable under § 1983—Wright, Wilder, Suter, and
Blessing—involved the sort of “no person shall” rights-
creating language envisioned by the Court. And in two of
those cases—Wright and Wilder—we concluded that individ-
ual rights enforceable under § 1983 existed. See n. 3, supra.
Although a “presumptively enforceable” right, ante, at 284,
has been created by § 1232g(b), one final question remains.
As our cases recognize, Congress can rebut the presumption
of enforcement under § 1983 either “expressly, by forbidding
recourse to § 1983 in the statute itself, or impliedly, by creat-
ing a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompati-
ble with individual enforcement [actions].” Blessing, 520
U. S., at 341. FERPA has not explicitly foreclosed enforce-
ment under § 1983. The only question, then, is whether the
administrative enforcement mechanisms provided by the
statute are “comprehensive” and “incompatible” with § 1983
actions. As the Court explains, ante, at 289, FERPA au-
thorizes the establishment of an administrative enforcement
framework, and the Secretary of Education has created the
Family Policy Compliance Office (FPCO) to “deal with viola-
tions” of the Act, 20 U. S. C. § 1232g(f). FPCO accepts com-
plaints from the public concerning alleged FERPA violations
and, if it so chooses, may follow up on such a complaint by
informing institutions of the steps they must take to comply
with FERPA, see 34 CFR §§ 99.63–99.67 (2001), and, in
exceptional cases, by administrative adjudication against
noncomplying institutions, see 20 U. S. C. § 1234. These ad-

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ministrative avenues fall far short of what is necessary to
overcome the presumption of enforceability. We have only
found a comprehensive administrative scheme precluding en-
forceability under § 1983 in two of our past cases—Middlesex
County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers
Assn., 453 U. S. 1 (1981), and Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S.
992 (1984). In Sea Clammers, the relevant statute not only
had “unusually elaborate enforcement provisions,” but it also
permitted private citizens to bring enforcement actions in
court. 453 U. S., at 13–14. In Smith, the statute at issue
provided for “carefully tailored” administrative proceedings
followed by federal judicial review. 468 U. S., at 1009. In
contrast, FERPA provides no guaranteed access to a formal
administrative proceeding or to federal judicial review;
rather, it leaves to administrative discretion the decision
whether to follow up on individual complaints. As we said
in Blessing, 520 U. S., at 348, the enforcement scheme here
is “far more limited than those in Sea Clammers and Smith,”
and thus does not preclude enforcement under § 1983.5
5 The Court does not test FERPA’s administrative scheme against the
“comprehensive enforcement scheme,” Blessing, 520 U. S., at 341, standard
for rebutting the presumptive enforceability of a federal right, ante, at
290, n. 8, because it concludes that there is no federal right to trigger this
additional analysis. Yet, at the same time, the Court imports “enforce-
ment scheme” considerations into the initial question whether the statute
creates a presumptively enforceable right. See ante, at 289 (“Our conclu-
sion that FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions fail to confer enforceable
rights is buttressed by the mechanism that Congress chose to provide for
enforcing [FERPA violations]”). Folding such considerations into the
rights question renders the rebuttal inquiry superfluous. Moreover, the
Court’s approach is inconsistent with our past cases, which have kept sepa-
rate the inquiries whether there is a right and whether an enforcement
scheme rebuts presumptive enforceability. Thus, the Court’s discussion
of the schemes in Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Au-
thority, 479 U. S. 418 (1987), and Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 496
U. S. 498 (1990), is inapposite, see ante, at 289–290, because neither of
those cases considered the existence of an enforcement scheme relevant
to whether a federal right had been created in the first instance.

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II
Since FERPA was enacted in 1974, all of the Federal
Courts of Appeals expressly deciding the question have con-
cluded that FERPA creates federal rights enforceable under
§ 1983.6 Nearly all other federal and state courts reaching
the issue agree with these Circuits.7 Congress has not over-
ruled these decisions by amending FERPA to expressly pre-
clude recourse to § 1983. And yet, the Court departs from
over a quarter century of settled law in concluding that
FERPA creates no enforceable rights. Perhaps more perni-
cious than its disturbing of the settled status of FERPA
rights, though, is the Court’s novel use of our implied right
of action cases in determining whether a federal right exists
for § 1983 purposes.
In my analysis of whether § 1232g(b) creates a right for
§ 1983 purposes, I have assumed the Court’s forthrightness
in stating that the question presented is “whether Congress
intended to create a federal right,” ante, at 283, and that
“[p]laintiffs suing under § 1983 do not have the burden of
showing an intent to create a private remedy,” ante, at 284.
Rather than proceeding with a straightforward analysis
6 See Falvo v. Owasso Independent School Dist. No. I–011, 233 F. 3d
1203, 1210 (CA10 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 534 U. S. 426 (2002); Tarka
v. Cunningham, 917 F. 2d 890, 891 (CA5 1990); Brown v. Oneonta, 106
F. 3d 1125, 1131 (CA2 1997) (citing Fay v. South Colonie Central School
Dist., 802 F. 2d 21, 33 (CA2 1986)). The Court does not cite—nor can it—
a circuit or state high court opinion to the contrary. See ante, at 278, n. 2.
7 To justify its statement that courts are “divided,” ante, at 278, concern-
ing FERPA’s enforceability under § 1983, the Court cites only two cases
disagreeing with the overwhelming majority position of courts reaching
the issue. See ante, at 278, n. 2 (citing Gundlach v. Reinstein, 924
F. Supp. 684 (ED Pa. 1996), aff ’d, 114 F. 3d 1172 (CA3 1997), and Meury v.
Eagle-Union Community School Corp., 714 N. E. 2d 233, 239 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1999)). And Gundlach did not even squarely hold that FERPA
rights are unenforceable; rather, the court merely rejected a claim under
§ 1232 in which the plaintiff “failed to allege that Defendants released the
alleged educational records pursuant to university policy,” 924 F. Supp.,
at 692.

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300 GONZAGA UNIV. v. DOE
Stevens, J., dissenting
under these principles, however, the Court has undermined
both of these assertions by needlessly borrowing from cases
involving implied rights of action—cases which place a more
exacting standard on plaintiffs. See ante, at 283–286. By
using these cases, the Court now appears to require a height-
ened showing from § 1983 plaintiffs: “[I]f Congress wishes to
create new rights enforceable under § 1983, it must do so in
clear and unambiguous terms—no less and no more than
what is required for Congress to create new rights enforce-
able under an implied private right of action.” Ante, at 290.
A requirement that Congress intend a “right to support a
cause of action,” ante, at 283, as opposed to simply the cre-
ation of an individual federal right, makes sense in the im-
plied right of action context. As we have explained, our im-
plied right of action cases “reflec[t] a concern, grounded in
separation of powers, that Congress rather than the courts
controls the availability of remedies for violations of stat-
utes.” Wilder, 496 U. S., at 509, n. 9. However, imposing
the implied right of action framework upon the § 1983 in-
quiry, see ante, at 283–286, is not necessary: The separation-
of-powers concerns present in the implied right of action con-
text “are not present in a § 1983 case,” because Congress
expressly authorized private suits in § 1983 itself. Wilder,
496 U. S., at 509, n. 9. Nor is it consistent with our prece-
dent, which has always treated the implied right of action
and § 1983 inquiries as separate. See, e. g., ibid.8
It has been long recognized that the pertinent question in
determining whether a statute provides a basis for a § 1983
suit is whether Congress intended to create individual rights
binding on States—as opposed to mere “precatory terms”
that do not “unambiguously” create state obligations, Penn-
8 Indeed, endorsing such a framework sub silentio overrules cases such
as Wright and Wilder. In those cases we concluded that the statutes at
issue created rights enforceable under § 1983, but the statutes did not
“clear[ly] and unambiguous[ly],” ante, at 290, intend enforceability
under § 1983.

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hurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1,
17, 18 (1981), or “generalized,” “systemwide” duties on
States, Blessing, 520 U. S., at 343; Suter, 503 U. S., at 363.
What has never before been required is congressional intent
specifically to make the right enforceable under § 1983. Yet
that is exactly what the Court, at points, appears to require
by relying on implied right of action cases: the Court now
asks whether “Congress nonetheless intended private suits
to be brought before thousands of federal- and state-court
judges,” ante, at 290.
If it were true, as the Court claims, that the implied right
of action and § 1983 inquiries neatly “overlap in one meaning-
ful respect—in either case we must first determine whether
Congress intended to create a federal right,” ante, at 283,
then I would have less trouble referencing implied right of
action precedent to determine whether a federal right exists.
Contrary to the Court’s suggestion, however, our implied
right of action cases do not necessarily cleanly separate out
the “right” question from the “cause of action” question.
For example, in the discussion of rights-creating language in
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979), which
the Court characterizes as pertaining only to whether there
is a right, ante, at 287, Cannon’s reasoning is explicitly based
on whether there is “reason to infer a private remedy,” 441
U. S., at 691, and the “propriety of implication of a cause of
action,” id., at 690, n. 13. Because Cannon and other im-
plied right of action cases do not clearly distinguish the ques-
tions of “right” and “cause of action,” it is inappropriate to
use these cases to determine whether a statute creates
rights enforceable under § 1983.
The Court, however, asserts that it has not imported the
entire implied right of action inquiry into the § 1983 context,
explaining that while § 1983 plaintiffs share with implied
right of action plaintiffs the burden of establishing a federal
right, § 1983 plaintiffs “do not have the burden of showing an
intent to create a private remedy because § 1983 generally

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Stevens, J., dissenting
supplies a remedy for the vindication of rights secured by
federal statutes.” Ante, at 284. If the Court has not
adopted such a requirement in the § 1983 context—which it
purports not to have done—then there should be no differ-
ence between the Court’s “new” approach to discerning a
federal right in the § 1983 context and the test we have “tra-
ditionally” used, as articulated in Blessing: whether Con-
gress intended to benefit individual plaintiffs, whether the
right asserted is not “ ‘vague and amorphous,’ ” and whether
Congress has placed a binding obligation on the State with
respect to the right asserted. 520 U. S., at 340–341. In-
deed, the Court’s analysis, in part, closely tracks Blessing’s
factors, as it examines the statute’s language, and the as-
serted right’s individual versus systematic thrust. See
ante, at 287–289.
The Court’s opinion in other places, however, appears to
require more of plaintiffs. By defining the § 1983 plaintiff ’s
burden concerning “whether a statute confers any right at
all,” ante, at 285, as whether “Congress nonetheless intended
private suits to be brought before thousands of federal- and
state-court judges,” ante, at 290, the Court has collapsed the
ostensible two parts of the implied right of action test (“is
there a right” and “is it enforceable”) into one. As a result,
and despite its statement to the contrary, ante, at 284, the
Court seems to place the unwarranted “burden of showing
an intent to create a private remedy,” ibid., on § 1983 plain-
tiffs. Moreover, by circularly defining a right actionable
under § 1983 as, in essence, “a right which Congress intended
to make enforceable,” the Court has eroded—if not eviscer-
ated—the long-established principle of presumptive enforce-
ability of rights under § 1983. Under this reading of the
Court’s opinion, a right under Blessing is second class com-
pared to a right whose enforcement Congress has clearly in-
tended. Creating such a hierarchy of rights is not only

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Stevens, J., dissenting
novel, but it blurs the long-recognized distinction between
rights and remedies. And it does nothing to clarify our
§ 1983 jurisprudence.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.