DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT v. RUCKER et al.

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125 OCTOBER TERM, 2001
Syllabus
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT v. RUCKER et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 00–1770. Argued February 19, 2002—Decided March 26, 2002*
Title 42 U. S. C. § 1437d(l)(6) provides that each “public housing agency
shall utilize leases . . . provid[ing] that . . . any drug-related criminal
activity on or off [federally assisted low-income housing] premises, en-
gaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant’s house-
hold, or any guest or other person under the tenant’s control, shall be
cause for termination of tenancy.” Respondents are four such tenants
of the Oakland Housing Authority (OHA). Paragraph 9(m) of their
leases obligates them to “assure that the tenant, any member of the
household, a guest, or another person under the tenant’s control, shall
not engage in . . . any drug-related criminal activity on or near the
premises.” Pursuant to United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) regulations authorizing local public housing
authorities to evict for drug-related activity even if the tenant did not
know, could not foresee, or could not control behavior by other occu-
pants, OHA instituted state-court eviction proceedings against respond-
ents, alleging violations of lease paragraph 9(m) by a member of each
tenant’s household or a guest. Respondents filed federal actions
against HUD, OHA, and OHA’s director, arguing that § 1437d(l)(6) does
not require lease terms authorizing the eviction of so-called “innocent”
tenants, and, in the alternative, that if it does, the statute is unconsti-
tutional. The District Court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction
against OHA was affirmed by the en banc Ninth Circuit, which held
that HUD’s interpretation permitting the eviction of so-called “inno-
cent” tenants is inconsistent with congressional intent and must be re-
jected under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842–843.
Held: Section 1437d(l)(6)’s plain language unambiguously requires lease
terms that give local public housing authorities the discretion to termi-
nate the lease of a tenant when a member of the household or a guest
engages in drug-related activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew,
or should have known, of the drug-related activity. Congress’ decision
*Together with No. 00–1781, Oakland Housing Authority et al. v.
Rucker et al., also on certiorari to the same court.

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126 DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT v. RUCKER
Syllabus
not to impose any qualification in the statute, combined with its use of
the term “any” to modify “drug-related criminal activity,” precludes any
knowledge requirement. See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U. S. 600,
609. Because “any” has an expansive meaning—i. e., “one or some in-
discriminately of whatever kind,” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S.
1, 5—any drug-related activity engaged in by the specified persons is
grounds for termination, not just drug-related activity that the tenant
knew, or should have known, about. The Ninth Circuit’s ruling that
“under the tenant’s control” modifies not just “other person,” but also
“member of the tenant’s household” and “guest,” runs counter to basic
grammar rules and would result in a nonsensical reading. Rather,
HUD offers a convincing explanation for the grammatical imperative
that “under the tenant’s control” modifies only “other person”: By “con-
trol,” the statute means control in the sense that the tenant has permit-
ted access to the premises. Implicit in the terms “household member”
or “guest” is that access to the premises has been granted by the tenant.
Section 1437d(l)(6)’s unambiguous text is reinforced by comparing it to
21 U. S. C. § 881(a)(7), which subjects all leasehold interests to civil for-
feiture when used to commit drug-related criminal activities, but ex-
pressly exempts tenants who had no knowledge of the activity, thereby
demonstrating that Congress knows exactly how to provide an “inno-
cent owner” defense. It did not provide one in § 1437d(l)(6). Given
that Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue, Chev-
ron, supra, at 842, other considerations with which the Ninth Circuit
attempted to bolster its holding are unavailing, including the legislative
history, the erroneous conclusion that the plain reading of the statute
leads to absurd results, the canon of constitutional avoidance, and reli-
ance on inapposite decisions of this Court to cast doubt on § 1437d(l)(6)’s
constitutionality under the Due Process Clause. Pp. 130–136.
237 F. 3d 1113, reversed and remanded.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other
Members joined, except Breyer, J., who took no part in the consideration
or decision of the cases.
James A. Feldman argued the cause for the federal
petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor Gen-
eral Olson, Assistant Attorney General McCallum, Dep-
uty Solicitor General Kneedler, Barbara C. Biddle, Howard
S. Scher, Richard A. Hauser, Carole W. Wilson, Howard
M. Schmeltzer, and Harold J. Rennett. Gary T. Lafayette

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127 Cite as: 535 U. S. 125 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
argued the cause for the private petitioners in No. 00–1781.
With him on the briefs was Susan T. Kumagai.
Paul Renne argued the cause for respondents in both
cases. With him on the brief were James Donato, Whitty
Somvichian, and John Murcko.†
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
With drug dealers “increasingly imposing a reign of terror
on public and other federally assisted low-income housing
tenants,” Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.
§ 5122, 102 Stat. 4301, 42 U. S. C. § 11901(3) (1994 ed.). The
Act, as later amended, provides that each “public housing
agency shall utilize leases which . . . provide that any crimi-
nal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any
drug-related criminal activity on or off such premises, en-
gaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the ten-
ant’s household, or any guest or other person under the ten-
ant’s control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy.” 42
U. S. C. § 1437d(l)(6) (1994 ed., Supp. V). Petitioners say
that this statute requires lease terms that allow a local public
†Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Council of
Large Public Housing Authorities et al. by William F. Maher and Robert
A. Graham; for the International City-County Management Association
et al. by Richard Ruda and James I. Crowley; and for the Washington
Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for AARP et al. by
Catherine M. Bishop and Julie E. Levin; for the American Civil Liberties
Union et al. by Mark J. Lopez, Steven R. Shapiro, and Alan L. Schlosser;
for the National Network to End Domestic Violence et al. by Bruce D.
Sokler and Fernando R. Laguarda; for the Pennsylvania Association of
Resident Councils et al. by Eileen D. Yacknin and Richard S. Matesic;
and for Lawrence Lessig et al. by David T. Goldberg and Daniel N.
Abrahamson.
Kirsten D. Levingston, Michael S. Feldberg, and Martha F. Davis filed
a brief for the Coalition to Protect Public Housing et al. as amici curiae.

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128 DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
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Opinion of the Court
housing authority to evict a tenant when a member of the
tenant’s household or a guest engages in drug-related crimi-
nal activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew, or had
reason to know, of that activity. Respondents say it does
not. We agree with petitioners.
Respondents are four public housing tenants of the Oak-
land Housing Authority (OHA). Paragraph 9(m) of respond-
ents’ leases, tracking the language of § 1437d(l)(6), obligates
the tenants to “assure that the tenant, any member of the
household, a guest, or another person under the tenant’s con-
trol, shall not engage in . . . [a]ny drug-related criminal activ-
ity on or near the premise[s].” App. 59. Respondents also
signed an agreement stating that the tenant “understand[s]
that if I or any member of my household or guests should
violate this lease provision, my tenancy may be terminated
and I may be evicted.” Id., at 69.
In late 1997 and early 1998, OHA instituted eviction pro-
ceedings in state court against respondents, alleging viola-
tions of this lease provision. The complaint alleged: (1) that
the respective grandsons of respondents William Lee and
Barbara Hill, both of whom were listed as residents on the
leases, were caught in the apartment complex parking lot
smoking marijuana; (2) that the daughter of respondent
Pearlie Rucker, who resides with her and is listed on the
lease as a resident, was found with cocaine and a crack co-
caine pipe three blocks from Rucker’s apartment;1 and
(3) that on three instances within a 2-month period, respond-
ent Herman Walker’s caregiver and two others were found
with cocaine in Walker’s apartment. OHA had issued
Walker notices of a lease violation on the first two occasions,
before initiating the eviction action after the third violation.
United States Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) regulations administering § 1437d(l)(6) require
1 In February 1998, OHA dismissed the unlawful detainer action against
Rucker, after her daughter was incarcerated, and thus no longer posed a
threat to other tenants.

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lease terms authorizing evictions in these circumstances.
The HUD regulations closely track the statutory language,2
and provide that “[i]n deciding to evict for criminal activity,
the [public housing authority] shall have discretion to con-
sider all of the circumstances of the case . . . .” 24 CFR
§ 966.4(l)(5)(i) (2001). The agency made clear that local pub-
lic housing authorities’ discretion to evict for drug-related
activity includes those situations in which “[the] tenant did
not know, could not foresee, or could not control behavior by
other occupants of the unit.” 56 Fed. Reg. 51560, 51567
(1991).
After OHA initiated the eviction proceedings in state
court, respondents commenced actions against HUD, OHA,
and OHA’s director in United States District Court. They
challenged HUD’s interpretation of the statute under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A), arguing
that 42 U. S. C. § 1437d(l)(6) does not require lease terms au-
thorizing the eviction of so-called “innocent” tenants, and, in
the alternative, that if it does, then the statute is unconstitu-
tional.3 The District Court issued a preliminary injunction,
enjoining OHA from “terminating the leases of tenants pur-
suant to paragraph 9(m) of the ‘Tenant Lease’ for drug-
related criminal activity that does not occur within the ten-
2 The regulations require public housing authorities (PHAs) to impose a
lease obligation on tenants:
“To assure that the tenant, any member of the household, a guest, or
another person under the tenant’s control, shall not engage in:
“(A) Any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to
peaceful enjoyment of the PHA’s public housing premises by other resi-
dents or employees of the PHA, or
“(B) Any drug-related criminal activity on or near such premises.
“Any criminal activity in violation of the preceding sentence shall be cause
for termination of tenancy, and for eviction from the unit.” 24 CFR
§ 966.4(f)(12)(i) (2001).
3 Respondents Rucker and Walker also raised Americans with Disabili-
ties Act claims that are not before this Court. And all of the respondents
raised state-law claims against OHA that are not before this Court.

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Opinion of the Court
ant’s apartment unit when the tenant did not know of and
had no reason to know of, the drug-related criminal activity.”
App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 00–1770, pp. 165a–166a.
A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
§ 1437d(l)(6) unambiguously permits the eviction of tenants
who violate the lease provision, regardless of whether the
tenant was personally aware of the drug activity, and that
the statute is constitutional. See Rucker v. Davis, 203 F. 3d
627 (CA9 2000). An en banc panel of the Court of Appeals
reversed and affirmed the District Court’s grant of the pre-
liminary injunction. See Rucker v. Davis, 237 F. 3d 1113
(2001). That court held that HUD’s interpretation permit-
ting the eviction of so-called “innocent” tenants “is inconsist-
ent with Congressional intent and must be rejected” under
the first step of Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842–843 (1984). 237
F. 3d, at 1126.
We granted certiorari, 533 U. S. 976 (2001), 534 U. S. 813
(2001), and now reverse, holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1437d(l)(6)
unambiguously requires lease terms that vest local public
housing authorities with the discretion to evict tenants for
the drug-related activity of household members and guests
whether or not the tenant knew, or should have known, about
the activity.
That this is so seems evident from the plain language of
the statute. It provides that “[e]ach public housing agency
shall utilize leases which . . . provide that . . . any drug-
related criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged
in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant’s
household, or any guest or other person under the tenant’s
control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy.” 42
U. S. C. § 1437d(l)(6) (1994 ed., Supp. V). The en banc Court
of Appeals thought the statute did not address “the level of
personal knowledge or fault that is required for eviction.”
237 F. 3d, at 1120. Yet Congress’ decision not to impose any

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qualification in the statute, combined with its use of the term
“any” to modify “drug-related criminal activity,” precludes
any knowledge requirement. See United States v. Mon-
santo, 491 U. S. 600, 609 (1989). As we have explained, “the
word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some
indiscriminately of whatever kind.’ ” United States v. Gon-
zales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997). Thus, any drug-related activity
engaged in by the specified persons is grounds for termina-
tion, not just drug-related activity that the tenant knew, or
should have known, about.
The en banc Court of Appeals also thought it possible that
“under the tenant’s control” modifies not just “other person,”
but also “member of the tenant’s household” and “guest.”
237 F. 3d, at 1120. The court ultimately adopted this read-
ing, concluding that the statute prohibits eviction where the
tenant, “for a lack of knowledge or other reason, could not
realistically exercise control over the conduct of a household
member or guest.” Id., at 1126. But this interpretation
runs counter to basic rules of grammar. The disjunctive
“or” means that the qualification applies only to “other per-
son.” Indeed, the view that “under the tenant’s control”
modifies everything coming before it in the sentence would
result in the nonsensical reading that the statute applies to
“a public housing tenant . . . under the tenant’s control.”
HUD offers a convincing explanation for the grammatical
imperative that “under the tenant’s control” modifies only
“other person”: “by ‘control,’ the statute means control in the
sense that the tenant has permitted access to the premises.”
66 Fed. Reg. 28781 (2001). Implicit in the terms “household
member” or “guest” is that access to the premises has been
granted by the tenant. Thus, the plain language of
§ 1437d(l)(6) requires leases that grant public housing au-
thorities the discretion to terminate tenancy without regard
to the tenant’s knowledge of the drug-related criminal
activity.

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Comparing § 1437d(l)(6) to a related statutory provision
reinforces the unambiguous text. The civil forfeiture stat-
ute that makes all leasehold interests subject to forfeit-
ure when used to commit drug-related criminal activities
expressly exempts tenants who had no knowledge of the
activity: “[N]o property shall be forfeited under this
paragraph . . . by reason of any act or omission established
by that owner to have been committed or omitted without
the knowledge or consent of that owner.” 21 U. S. C.
§ 881(a)(7) (1994 ed.). Because this forfeiture provision was
amended in the same Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 that cre-
ated 42 U. S. C. § 1437d(l)(6), the en banc Court of Appeals
thought Congress “meant them to be read consistently” so
that the knowledge requirement should be read into the evic-
tion provision. 237 F. 3d, at 1121–1122. But the two sec-
tions deal with distinctly different matters. The “innocent
owner” defense for drug forfeiture cases was already in ex-
istence prior to 1988 as part of 21 U. S. C. § 881(a)(7). All
that Congress did in the 1988 Act was to add leasehold inter-
ests to the property interests that might be forfeited under
the drug statute. And if such a forfeiture action were to be
brought against a leasehold interest, it would be subject to
the pre-existing “innocent owner” defense. But 42 U. S. C.
§ 1437(d)(l)(6), with which we deal here, is a quite different
measure. It is entirely reasonable to think that the Govern-
ment, when seeking to transfer private property to itself in
a forfeiture proceeding, should be subject to an “innocent
owner defense,” while it should not be when acting as a land-
lord in a public housing project. The forfeiture provision
shows that Congress knew exactly how to provide an “inno-
cent owner” defense. It did not provide one in § 1437d(l)(6).
The en banc Court of Appeals next resorted to legislative
history. The Court of Appeals correctly recognized that ref-
erence to legislative history is inappropriate when the text
of the statute is unambiguous. 237 F. 3d, at 1123. Given
that the en banc Court of Appeals’ finding of textual ambigu-

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ity is wrong, see supra, at 130–132, there is no need to con-
sult legislative history.4
Nor was the en banc Court of Appeals correct in conclud-
ing that this plain reading of the statute leads to absurd re-
sults.5 The statute does not require the eviction of any ten-
4 Even if it were appropriate to look at legislative history, it would not
help respondents. The en banc Court of Appeals relied on two passages
from a 1990 Senate Report on a proposed amendment to the eviction provi-
sion. 237 F. 3d, at 1123 (citing S. Rep. No. 101–316 (1990)). But this
Report was commenting on language from a Senate version of the 1990
amendment, which was never enacted. The language in the Senate ver-
sion, which would have imposed a different standard of cause for eviction
for drug-related crimes than the unqualified language of § 1437d(l)(6), see
136 Cong. Rec. 15991, 16012 (1990) (reproducing S. 566, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., §§ 521(f) and 714(a) (1990)), was rejected at Conference. See H. R.
Conf. Rep. No. 101–943, p. 418 (1990). And, as the dissent from the en
banc decision below explained, the passages may plausibly be read as a
mere suggestion about how local public housing authorities should exercise
the “wide discretion to evict tenants connected with drug-related criminal
behavior” that the lease provision affords them. 237 F. 3d, at 1134
(Sneed, J., dissenting).
Respondents also cite language from a House Report commenting on
the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, codified at 18 U. S. C. § 983.
Brief for Respondents 15–16. For the reasons discussed supra, at 132
and this page, legislative history concerning forfeiture provisions is not
probative on the interpretation of § 1437d(l)(6).
A 1996 amendment to § 1437d(l)(6), enacted five years after HUD issued
its interpretation of the statute, supports our holding. The 1996 amend-
ment expanded the reach of § 1437d(l)(6), changing the language of the
lease provision from applying to activity taking place “on or near” the
public housing premises, to activity occurring “on or off ” the public hous-
ing premises. See Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996,
§ 9(a)(2), 110 Stat. 836. But Congress, “presumed to be aware” of HUD’s
interpretation rejecting a knowledge requirement, made no other change
to the statute. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580 (1978).
5 For the reasons discussed above, no-fault eviction, which is specifically
authorized under § 1437d(l)(6), does not violate § 1437d(l)(2), which prohib-
its public housing authorities from including “unreasonable terms and con-
ditions [in their leases].” In addition, the general statutory provision in
the latter section cannot trump the clear language of the more specific
§ 1437d(l)(6). See Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U. S. 504,
524–526 (1989).

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ant who violated the lease provision. Instead, it entrusts
that decision to the local public housing authorities, who are
in the best position to take account of, among other things,
the degree to which the housing project suffers from “ram-
pant drug-related or violent crime,” 42 U. S. C. § 11901(2)
(1994 ed. and Supp. V), “the seriousness of the offending ac-
tion,” 66 Fed. Reg., at 28803, and “the extent to which the
leaseholder has . . . taken all reasonable steps to prevent or
mitigate the offending action,” ibid. It is not “absurd” that
a local housing authority may sometimes evict a tenant who
had no knowledge of the drug-related activity. Such “no-
fault” eviction is a common “incident of tenant responsibility
under normal landlord-tenant law and practice.” 56 Fed.
Reg., at 51567. Strict liability maximizes deterrence and
eases enforcement difficulties. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1, 14 (1991).
And, of course, there is an obvious reason why Congress
would have permitted local public housing authorities to con-
duct no-fault evictions: Regardless of knowledge, a tenant
who “cannot control drug crime, or other criminal activities
by a household member which threaten health or safety of
other residents, is a threat to other residents and the proj-
ect.” 56 Fed. Reg., at 51567. With drugs leading to “mur-
ders, muggings, and other forms of violence against tenants,”
and to the “deterioration of the physical environment that
requires substantial government expenditures,” 42 U. S. C.
§ 11901(4) (1994 ed., Supp. V), it was reasonable for Congress
to permit no-fault evictions in order to “provide public and
other federally assisted low-income housing that is decent,
safe, and free from illegal drugs,” § 11901(1) (1994 ed.).
In another effort to avoid the plain meaning of the statute,
the en banc Court of Appeals invoked the canon of constitu-
tional avoidance. But that canon “has no application in the
absence of statutory ambiguity.” United States v. Oakland
Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U. S. 483, 494 (2001).
“Any other conclusion, while purporting to be an exercise in

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judicial restraint, would trench upon the legislative powers
vested in Congress by Art. I, § 1, of the Constitution.”
United States v. Albertini, 472 U. S. 675, 680 (1985). There
are, moreover, no “serious constitutional doubts” about Con-
gress’ affording local public housing authorities the discre-
tion to conduct no-fault evictions for drug-related crime.
Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 314, n. 9 (1993) (emphasis
deleted).
The en banc Court of Appeals held that HUD’s interpreta-
tion “raise[s] serious questions under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment,” because it permits “tenants
to be deprived of their property interest without any rela-
tionship to individual wrongdoing.” 237 F. 3d, at 1124–1125
(citing Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 224–225 (1961);
Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Danaher, 238
U. S. 482 (1915)). But both of these cases deal with the acts
of government as sovereign. In Scales, the United States
criminally charged the defendant with knowing membership
in an organization that advocated the overthrow of the
United States Government. In Danaher, an Arkansas stat-
ute forbade discrimination among customers of a telephone
company. The situation in the present cases is entirely dif-
ferent. The government is not attempting to criminally
punish or civilly regulate respondents as members of the
general populace. It is instead acting as a landlord of prop-
erty that it owns, invoking a clause in a lease to which re-
spondents have agreed and which Congress has expressly
required. Scales and Danaher cast no constitutional doubt
on such actions.
The Court of Appeals sought to bolster its discussion of
constitutional doubt by pointing to the fact that respondents
have a property interest in their leasehold interest, citing
Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U. S. 444 (1982). This is undoubtedly
true, and Greene held that an effort to deprive a tenant of
such a right without proper notice violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But, in the present

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Opinion of the Court
cases, such deprivation will occur in the state court where
OHA brought the unlawful detainer action against respond-
ents. There is no indication that notice has not been given
by OHA in the past, or that it will not be given in the future.
Any individual factual disputes about whether the lease pro-
vision was actually violated can, of course, be resolved in
these proceedings.6
We hold that “Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S., at 842. Section
1437d(l)(6) requires lease terms that give local public hous-
ing authorities the discretion to terminate the lease of a ten-
ant when a member of the household or a guest engages in
drug-related activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew,
or should have known, of the drug-related activity.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is re-
versed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or deci-
sion of these cases.
6 The en banc Court of Appeals cited only the due process constitutional
concern. Respondents raise two others: the First Amendment and the
Excessive Fines Clause. We agree with Judge O’Scannlain, writing for
the panel that reversed the injunction, that the statute does not raise
substantial First Amendment or Excessive Fines Clause concerns. Lyng
v. Automobile Workers, 485 U. S. 360 (1988), forecloses respondents’ claim
that the eviction of unknowing tenants violates the First Amendment
guarantee of freedom of association. See 203 F. 3d 627, 647 (2000). And
termination of tenancy “is neither a cash nor an in-kind payment imposed
by and payable to the government” and therefore is “not subject to analy-
sis as an excessive fine.” Id., at 648.