J. E. M. AG SUPPLY, INC., dba FARM ADVANTAGE, INC., et al. v. PIONEER HI-BRED INTERNATIONAL, INC.

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
124 OCTOBER TERM, 2001
Syllabus
J. E. M. AG SUPPLY, INC., dba FARM ADVANTAGE,
INC., et al. v. PIONEER HI-BRED
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the federal circuit
No. 99–1996. Argued October 3, 2001—Decided December 10, 2001
Respondent Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. (Pioneer), holds 17 utility
patents issued under 35 U. S. C. § 101 that cover the manufacture, use,
sale, and offer for sale of its inbred and hybrid corn seed products. Pio-
neer sells its patented hybrid seeds under a limited label license that
allows only the production of grain and/or forage, and prohibits using
such seed for propagation or seed multiplication or for the produc-
tion or development of a hybrid or different seed variety. Petitioner
J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc., doing business as Farm Advantage, Inc., bought
patented seeds from Pioneer in bags bearing the license agreement
and then resold the bags. Pioneer filed this patent infringement suit
against Farm Advantage and distributors and customers of Farm Ad-
vantage (collectively Farm Advantage or petitioners). Farm Advan-
tage filed a patent invalidity counterclaim, arguing that sexually repro-
ducing plants, such as Pioneer’s corn plants, are not patentable subject
matter within § 101. Farm Advantage maintained that the Plant Pat-
ent Act of 1930 (PPA) and the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) set
forth the exclusive statutory means for protecting plant life because
these statutes are more specific than § 101, and thus each carves out
subject matter from § 101 for special treatment. The District Court
granted Pioneer summary judgment. Relying on this Court’s broad
construction of § 101 in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, the Dis-
trict Court held that § 101 clearly covers plant life. It also held that
in enacting the PPA and the PVPA, Congress neither expressly nor
implicitly removed plants from § 101’s subject matter. In particular,
the District Court noted that Congress did not implicitly repeal § 101
by passing the more specific PVPA because there was no irreconcilable
conflict between the two statutes. The Federal Circuit affirmed.
Held: Newly developed plant breeds fall within the subject matter of
§ 101, and neither the PPA nor the PVPA limits the scope of § 101’s cov-
erage. Pp. 130–146.
(a) In approaching the question presented here, this Court is mindful
that it has already recognized that § 101’s language is extremely broad
and has concluded that living things are patentable under that provision,

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
125 Cite as: 534 U. S. 124 (2001)
Syllabus
Chakrabarty, supra, at 308, 313, 315. Since 1985, the Patent and Trade-
mark Office (PTO) has had an unbroken practice of conferring utility
patents for plants. Nonetheless, petitioners argue that the PPA and
the PVPA are the exclusive means of protecting new varieties of plants,
and so awarding utility patents for plants upsets the scheme contem-
plated by Congress. Pp. 130–132.
(b) Neither the PPA’s original nor its recodified text indicates that its
protection for asexually reproduced plants was intended to be exclusive.
The 1930 PPA amended the general patent provision to protect only the
asexual reproduction of a plant. And Congress’ 1952 revision, which
placed plant patents into a separate chapter 15, was only a housekeeping
measure that did not change the substantive rights or the relaxed re-
quirements for such patents. Plant patents under the PPA thus con-
tinue to have very limited coverage and less stringent requirements
than § 101 utility patents. Importantly, chapter 15 nowhere states that
plant patents are the exclusive means of granting intellectual property
protection to plants. The arguments that petitioners advance for why
the PPA should preclude assigning utility patents for plants are unper-
suasive because petitioners fail to take account of the forward-looking
perspective of the utility patent statute and the reality of plant breeding
in 1930. Pp. 132–138.
(c) That the PVPA specifically authorizes limited patent-like protec-
tion for certain sexually reproduced plants does not evidence Congress’
intent to deny broader § 101 utility patent protection for such plants.
While the PVPA creates a comprehensive statutory scheme with re-
spect to its particular protections and subject matter, giving limited
protection to plant varieties that are new, distinct, uniform, and stable,
nowhere does it restrict the scope of patentable subject matter under
§ 101. The PVPA contains no statement of exclusivity. Furthermore,
at the time the PVPA was enacted, the PTO had already issued numer-
ous utility patents for hybrid plant processes, which reaffirms that
such material was within § 101’s scope. Petitioners also err in arguing
that the PVPA altered § 101’s subject-matter coverage by implication.
Repeal by implication requires that the earlier and later statutes be
irreconcilable, Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 550. The differences
in the requirements for, and coverage of, utility patents and PVPA plant
variety certificates, however, do not present irreconcilable conflicts be-
cause the requirements for a § 101 utility patent are more stringent than
those for a PVP certificate, and the protections afforded by a utility
patent are greater than those afforded by a PVP certificate. Petition-
ers’ suggestion that dual protection cannot exist when statutes over-
lap and purport to protect the same commercially valuable attribute
or thing is rejected as well. This Court has given effect to two over-

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
126 J. E. M. AG SUPPLY, INC. v. PIONEER HI-BRED
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Syllabus
lapping statutes, so long as each reaches some distinct cases, see Con-
necticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253, and it has allowed
dual protection in other intellectual property cases, see, e. g., Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U. S. 470, 484. In this case, many plant
varieties that are unable to satisfy § 101’s stringent requirements might
still qualify for the PVPA’s lesser protections. Pp. 138–144.
(d) The PTO has assigned utility patents for plants for at least 16
years, and there has been no indication from either Congress or agencies
with expertise that such coverage is inconsistent with the PVPA or the
PPA. Congress has not only failed to pass legislation indicating that it
disagrees with the PTO’s interpretation of § 101; it has even recognized
the availability of utility patents for plants. Pp. 144–145.
200 F. 3d 1374, affirmed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia,
J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 146. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 147. O’Connor, J., took no
part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Bruce E. Johnson argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs was S. P. DeVolder.
Edmund J. Sease argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were Herbert H. Jervis, Daniel J. Cosgrove,
and Richard G. Taranto.
Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for
the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Acting
Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Austin C. Schlick,
Barbara Biddle, Alfred Mollin, John M. Whealan, Bruce J.
Chasan, Stephen Walsh, and James Michael Kelly.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American
Corn Growers Association et al. by Joseph Mendelson III; and for Malla
Pollack, pro se, et al.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American
Bar Association by Martha W. Barnett and Reid G. Adler; for the Ameri-
can Crop Protection Association by David L. Kelleher; for the American
Intellectual Property Law Association by Robert L. Baechtold and War-
ren D. Woessner; for the American Seed Trade Association by Gary Jay
Kushner; for the Biotechnology Industry Organization by Jeffrey P. Ku-

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
127 Cite as: 534 U. S. 124 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether utility patents
may be issued for plants under 35 U. S. C. § 101 (1994 ed.), or
whether the Plant Variety Protection Act, 84 Stat. 1542, as
amended, 7 U. S. C. § 2321 et seq., and the Plant Patent Act
of 1930, 35 U. S. C. §§ 161–164 (1994 ed. and Supp. V), are
the exclusive means of obtaining a federal statutory right to
exclude others from reproducing, selling, or using plants or
plant varieties. We hold that utility patents may be issued
for plants.
I
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has
issued some 1,800 utility patents for plants, plant parts, and
seeds pursuant to 35 U. S. C. § 101. Seventeen of these pat-
ents are held by respondent Pioneer Hi-Bred International,
Inc. (Pioneer). Pioneer’s patents cover the manufacture,
use, sale, and offer for sale of the company’s inbred and hy-
brid corn seed products. A patent for an inbred corn line
protects both the seeds and plants of the inbred line and the
hybrids produced by crossing the protected inbred line with
another corn line. See, e. g., U. S. Patent No. 5,506,367,
col. 3, App. 42. A hybrid plant patent protects the plant,
its seeds, variants, mutants, and trivial modifications of the
hybrid. See U. S. Patent No. 5,491,295, cols. 2–3, id., at
29–30.
Pedigree inbred corn plants are developed by crossing
corn plants with desirable characteristics and then inbreed-
ing the resulting plants for several generations until the re-
sulting plant line is homogenous. Inbreds are often weak
shan, Marinn F. Carlson, and Stephan E. Lawton; for Cargill, Inc., by
Frank P. Porcelli, Michael E. Florey, Richard J. Anderson, Jonathan E.
Singer, John A. Dragseth, Timothy S. Bishop, and Thomas B. Nachbar;
for the Delta and Pine Land Co. by Shawn N. Sullivan; for the Monsanto
Co. by Richard L. Stanley; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al.
by Daniel J. Popeo and R. Shawn Gunnarson.
Thomas E. Friebel filed a brief for BASF Corp. as amicus curiae.

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
128 J. E. M. AG SUPPLY, INC. v. PIONEER HI-BRED
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Opinion of the Court
and have a low yield; their value lies primarily in their use
for making hybrids. See, e. g., U. S. Patent No. 5,506,367,
col. 6, id., at 43 (describing the traits and applications of the
inbred corn line PHP38 by reference to the qualities exhib-
ited in hybrid plants created with PHP38).
Hybrid seeds are produced by crossing two inbred corn
plants and are especially valuable because they produce
strong and vibrant hybrid plants with selected highly desir-
able characteristics. For instance, Pioneer’s hybrid corn
plant 3394 is “characterized by superior yield for maturity,
excellent seedling vigor, very good roots and stalks, and ex-
ceptional stay green.” U. S. Patent No. 5,491,295, cols. 2–3,
id., at 29–30. Hybrid plants, however, generally do not re-
produce true-to-type, i. e., seeds produced by a hybrid plant
do not reliably yield plants with the same hybrid characteris-
tics. Thus, a farmer who wishes to continue growing hybrid
plants generally needs to buy more hybrid seed.
Pioneer sells its patented hybrid seeds under a limited
label license that provides: “License is granted solely to
produce grain and/or forage.” Id., at 51. The license “does
not extend to the use of seed from such crop or the progeny
thereof for propagation or seed multiplication.” Ibid. It
strictly prohibits “the use of such seed or the progeny
thereof for propagation or seed multiplication or for pro-
duction or development of a hybrid or different variety of
seed.” Ibid.
Petitioner J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc., doing business as Farm
Advantage, Inc., purchased patented hybrid seeds from Pio-
neer in bags bearing this license agreement. Although not
a licensed sales representative of Pioneer, Farm Advantage
resold these bags. Pioneer subsequently brought a com-
plaint for patent infringement against Farm Advantage and
several other corporations and residents of the State of Iowa
who are distributors and customers for Farm Advantage
(referred to collectively as Farm Advantage or petitioners).
Pioneer alleged that Farm Advantage has “for a long-time

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
129 Cite as: 534 U. S. 124 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
past been and still [is] infringing one or more [Pioneer pat-
ents] by making, using, selling, or offering for sale corn seed
of the . . . hybrids in infringement of these patents-in-suit.”
Id., at 10.
Farm Advantage answered with a general denial of patent
infringement and entered a counterclaim of patent invalidity,
arguing that patents that purport to confer protection for
corn plants are invalid because sexually reproducing plants
are not patentable subject matter within the scope of 35
U. S. C. § 101 (1994 ed.). App. 12–13, 17. Farm Advantage
maintained that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA) and the
Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) set forth the exclusive
statutory means for the protection of plant life because these
statutes are more specific than § 101, and thus each carves
out subject matter from § 101 for special treatment.1
The District Court granted summary judgment to Pioneer.
Relying on this Court’s broad construction of § 101 in Dia-
mond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303 (1980), the District Court
held that the subject matter covered by § 101 clearly includes
plant life. 49 USPQ 2d 1813, 1817 (ND Iowa 1998). It fur-
ther concluded that in enacting the PPA and the PVPA Con-
gress neither expressly nor implicitly removed plants from
§ 101’s subject matter. Id., at 1819. In particular, the Dis-
trict Court noted that Congress did not implicitly repeal
§ 101 by passing the more specific PVPA because there was
no irreconcilable conflict between the PVPA and § 101. Id.,
at 1821.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit affirmed the judgment and reasoning of the District
1 Petitioners favor a holding that the PVPA is the only means of protect-
ing these corn plants primarily because the PVPA’s coverage is generally
less extensive and the hybrid seeds at issue do not have PVPA protection.
App. 14. Most notably, the PVPA provides exemptions for research and
for farmers to save seed from their crops for replanting. See infra,
at 140. Utility patents issued for plants do not contain such exemptions.

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
130 J. E. M. AG SUPPLY, INC. v. PIONEER HI-BRED
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Opinion of the Court
Court. 200 F. 3d 1374 (2000). We granted certiorari, 531
U. S. 1143 (2001), and now affirm.
II
The question before us is whether utility patents may be
issued for plants pursuant to 35 U. S. C. § 101 (1994 ed.).
The text of § 101 provides:
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of mat-
ter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.”
As this Court recognized over 20 years ago in Chakrabarty,
447 U. S., at 308, the language of § 101 is extremely broad.
“In choosing such expansive terms as ‘manufacture’ and
‘composition of matter,’ modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’
Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would
be given wide scope.” Ibid. This Court thus concluded in
Chakrabarty that living things were patentable under § 101,
and held that a manmade micro-organism fell within the
scope of the statute. As Congress recognized, “the relevant
distinction was not between living and inanimate things,
but between products of nature, whether living or not, and
human-made inventions.” Id., at 313.
In Chakrabarty, the Court also rejected the argument
that Congress must expressly authorize protection for new
patentable subject matter:
“It is, of course, correct that Congress, not the courts,
must define the limits of patentability; but it is equally
true that once Congress has spoken it is ‘the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is.’ Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).
Congress has performed its constitutional role in de-
fining patentable subject matter in § 101; we perform
ours in construing the language Congress has em-

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
131 Cite as: 534 U. S. 124 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
ployed. . . . The subject-matter provisions of the patent
law have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitu-
tional and statutory goal of promoting ‘the Progress of
Science and the useful Arts’ with all that means for the
social and economic benefits envisioned by Jefferson.”
Id., at 315.
Thus, in approaching the question presented by this case,
we are mindful that this Court has already spoken clearly
concerning the broad scope and applicability of § 101.2
Several years after Chakrabarty, the PTO Board of Pat-
ent Appeals and Interferences held that plants were within
the understood meaning of “manufacture” or “composition
of matter” and therefore were within the subject matter of
§ 101. In re Hibberd, 227 USPQ 443, 444 (1985). It has
been the unbroken practice of the PTO since that time to
confer utility patents for plants. To obtain utility patent
protection, a plant breeder must show that the plant he
has developed is new, useful, and nonobvious. 35 U. S. C.
§§ 101–103 (1994 ed. and Supp. V). In addition, the plant
must meet the specifications of § 112, which require a written
description of the plant and a deposit of seed that is publicly
accessible. See 37 CFR §§ 1.801–1.809 (2001).
Petitioners do not allege that Pioneer’s patents are invalid
for failure to meet the requirements for a utility patent.
Nor do they dispute that plants otherwise fall within the
terms of § 101’s broad language that includes “manufacture”
2 Justice Breyer argues that Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S.
303, 315 (1980), cannot determine the outcome of this case because it did
not answer the precise question presented. See post, at 147–149 (dissent-
ing opinion). But this simply misses the mark. Chakrabarty broadly
interpreted the reach of § 101. This interpretation is surely germane to
the question whether sexually reproduced plants fall within the subject
matter of § 101. In addition, Chakrabarty’s discussion of the PPA and
the PVPA is relevant to petitioners’ primary arguments against utility
patent protection for sexually reproduced plants. See 447 U. S., at 310–
314; see also infra, at 134–135.

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
132 J. E. M. AG SUPPLY, INC. v. PIONEER HI-BRED
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Opinion of the Court
or “composition of matter.” Rather, petitioners argue that
the PPA and the PVPA provide the exclusive means of pro-
tecting new varieties of plants, and so awarding utility pat-
ents for plants upsets the scheme contemplated by Congress.
Brief for Petitioners 11. We disagree. Considering the
two plant specific statutes in turn, we find that neither fore-
closes utility patent coverage for plants.
A
The 1930 PPA conferred patent protection to asexually
reproduced plants. Significantly, nothing within either the
original 1930 text of the statute or its recodified version in
1952 indicates that the PPA’s protection for asexually repro-
duced plants was intended to be exclusive.
Plants were first explicitly brought within the scope of
patent protection in 1930 when the PPA included “plants”
among the useful things subject to patents. Thus the 1930
PPA amended the general utility patent provision, Rev. Stat.
§ 4886, to provide:
“Any person who has invented or discovered any new
and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvements thereof,
or who has invented or discovered and asexually re-
produced any distinct and new variety of plant, other
than a tuber-propagated plant, not known or used by
others in this country, before his invention or discovery
thereof, . . . may . . . obtain a patent therefor.” Act of
May 23, 1930, § 1, 46 Stat. 376.
This provision limited protection to the asexual reproduc-
tion of the plant. Asexual reproduction occurs by grafting,
budding, or the like, and produces an offspring with a ge-
netic combination identical to that of the single parent—es-
sentially a clone.3 The PPA also amended Revised Statutes
3 By contrast, sexual reproduction occurs by seed and sometimes in-
volves two different plants.

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
133 Cite as: 534 U. S. 124 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
§ 4888 by adding: “No plant patent shall be declared invalid
on the ground of noncompliance with this section if the
description is made as complete as is reasonably possible.”
Id., § 2, 46 Stat. 376.
In 1952, Congress revised the patent statute and placed
the plant patents into a separate chapter 15 of Title 35 en-
titled, “Patents for plants.” 35 U. S. C. §§ 161–164.4 This
was merely a housekeeping measure that did nothing to
change the substantive rights or requirements for a plant
patent. A “plant patent” 5 continued to provide only the
exclusive right to asexually reproduce a protected plant,
§ 163, and the description requirement remained relaxed,
§ 162. 6 Plant patents under the PPA thus have very limited
coverage and less stringent requirements than § 101 utility
patents.
Importantly, chapter 15 nowhere states that plant patents
are the exclusive means of granting intellectual property
protection to plants. Although unable to point to any lan-
guage that requires, or even suggests, that Congress in-
tended the PPA’s protections to be exclusive, petitioners ad-
vance three reasons why the PPA should preclude assigning
utility patents for plants. We find none of these arguments
to be persuasive.
4 The PPA, as amended, provides: “Whoever invents or discovers and
asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant, including culti-
vated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than a
tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.” 35 U. S. C. § 161 (1994 ed.).
5 Patents issued under § 161 are referred to as “plant patents,” which
are distinguished from § 101 utility patents and § 171 design patents.
6 To obtain a plant patent under § 161 a breeder must meet all of the
requirements for § 101, except for the description requirement. See § 162
(“No plant patent shall be declared invalid for noncompliance with section
112 [providing for written description] of this title if the description is as
complete as is reasonably possible”).

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
134 J. E. M. AG SUPPLY, INC. v. PIONEER HI-BRED
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Opinion of the Court
First, petitioners argue that plants were not covered by
the general utility patent statute prior to 1930. Brief for
Petitioners 19 (“If the patent laws before 1930 allowed pat-
ents on ‘plants’ then there would have been no reason for
Congress to have passed the 1930 PPA . . .”). In advancing
this argument, petitioners overlook the state of patent law
and plant breeding at the time of the PPA’s enactment. The
Court in Chakrabarty explained the realities of patent law
and plant breeding at the time the PPA was enacted: “Prior
to 1930, two factors were thought to remove plants from
patent protection. The first was the belief that plants, even
those artificially bred, were products of nature for purposes
of the patent law. . . . The second obstacle to patent pro-
tection for plants was the fact that plants were thought
not amenable to the ‘written description’ requirement of
the patent law.” 447 U. S., at 311–312. Congress addressed
these concerns with the 1930 PPA, which recognized that
the work of a plant breeder was a patentable invention and
relaxed the written description requirement. See §§ 1–2, 46
Stat. 376. The PPA thus gave patent protection to breed-
ers who were previously unable to overcome the obstacles
described in Chakrabarty.
This does not mean, however, that prior to 1930 plants
could not have fallen within the subject matter of § 101.
Rather, it illustrates only that in 1930 Congress believed
that plants were not patentable under § 101, both because
they were living things and because in practice they could
not meet the stringent description requirement. Yet these
premises were disproved over time. As this Court held in
Chakrabarty, “the relevant distinction” for purposes of
§ 101 is not “between living and inanimate things, but be-
tween products of nature, whether living or not, and human-
made inventions.” 447 U. S., at 313. In addition, advances
in biological knowledge and breeding expertise have al-
lowed plant breeders to satisfy § 101’s demanding descrip-
tion requirement.

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
135 Cite as: 534 U. S. 124 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
Whatever Congress may have believed about the state
of patent law and the science of plant breeding in 1930, plants
have always had the potential to fall within the general sub-
ject matter of § 101, which is a dynamic provision designed
to encompass new and unforeseen inventions. “A rule that
unanticipated inventions are without protection would con-
flict with the core concept of the patent law that anticipation
undermines patentability.” Id., at 316.
Petitioners essentially ask us to deny utility patent pro-
tection for sexually reproduced plants because it was un-
foreseen in 1930 that such plants could receive protection
under § 101. Denying patent protection under § 101 simply
because such coverage was thought technologically infeasible
in 1930, however, would be inconsistent with the forward-
looking perspective of the utility patent statute. As we
noted in Chakrabarty, “Congress employed broad general
language in drafting § 101 precisely because [new types of]
inventions are often unforeseeable.” Ibid.
Second, petitioners maintain that the PPA’s limitation to
asexually reproduced plants would make no sense if Con-
gress intended § 101 to authorize patents on plant varieties
that were sexually reproduced. But this limitation once
again merely reflects the reality of plant breeding in 1930.
At that time, the primary means of reproducing bred plants
true-to-type was through asexual reproduction. Congress
thought that sexual reproduction through seeds was not
a stable way to maintain desirable bred characteristics.7
7 The Senate Report accompanying the bill notes: “All such plants must
be asexually reproduced in order to have their identity preserved. This
is necessary since seedlings either of chance or self-pollenization from any
of these would not preserve the character of the individual.” S. Rep.
No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1930).
This Report, like the text, indicates Congress’ intent to limit plant
patent coverage to asexual reproduction, but explains that this limita-
tion “recognizes a practical situation”—i. e., that propagation by seeds
does not preserve the character of the original. See id., at 4 (“[T]he
patent right granted is a right to propagate the new variety by asexual

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
136 J. E. M. AG SUPPLY, INC. v. PIONEER HI-BRED
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Opinion of the Court
Thus, it is hardly surprising that plant patents would pro-
tect only asexual reproduction, since this was the most
reliable type of reproduction for preserving the desirable
characteristics of breeding. See generally E. Sinnott, Bot-
any Principles and Problems 266–267 (1935); J. Priestley &
L. Scott, Introduction to Botany 530 (1938).
Furthermore, like other laws protecting intellectual prop-
erty, the plant patent provision must be understood in its
proper context. Until 1924, farmers received seed from the
Government’s extensive free seed program that distributed
millions of packages of seed annually. See Fowler, The
Plant Patent Act of 1930: A Sociological History of its Cre-
ation, 82 J. Pat. & Tm. Off. Soc. 621, 623, 632 (2000).8 In
1930, seed companies were not primarily concerned with va-
rietal protection, but were still trying to successfully com-
modify seeds. There was no need to protect seed breeding
because there were few markets for seeds. See Kloppen-
burg 71 (“Seed companies’ first priority was simply to estab-
lish a market, and they continued to view the congressional
distribution as a principal constraint”).
By contrast, nurseries at the time had successfully com-
mercialized asexually reproduced fruit trees and flowers.
These plants were regularly copied, draining profits from
those who discovered or bred new varieties. Nurseries
reproduction. It does not include the right to propagate by seeds. This
limitation in the right granted recognizes a practical situation and greatly
narrows the scope of the bill”). The limitation to asexual reproduction
was a recognition of the “practical situation” that seedlings did not re-
produce true-to-type. An exclusive right to asexual reproduction was
the only type of coverage needed and thought possible given the state of
plant breeding at the time.
8 At its high point in 1897, over 20 million packages of seed were dis-
tributed to farmers. See N. Klose, America’s Crop Heritage 98 (1950).
Even at the time the program was eliminated in 1924, it was the third
largest line item in the Department of Agriculture’s budget. See J. Klop-
penburg, First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology
1492–2000, p. 71 (1988) (hereinafter Kloppenburg).

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
137 Cite as: 534 U. S. 124 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
were the primary subjects of agricultural marketing and
so it is not surprising that they were the specific focus of
the PPA. See Fowler, supra, at 634–635; Kneen, Patent
Plants Enrich Our World, National Geographic 357, 363
(1948).
Moreover, seed companies at the time could not point
to genuinely new varieties and lacked the scientific knowl-
edge to engage in formal breeding that would increase agri-
cultural productivity. See Kloppenburg 77; Fowler, supra,
at 633 (“Absent significant numbers of distinct new varie-
ties being produced by seed companies, variety protection
through something like a patent law would hardly have been
considered a business necessity”). In short, there is simply
no evidence, let alone the overwhelming evidence needed
to establish repeal by implication, see Matsushita Elec. In-
dustrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U. S. 367, 381 (1996), that Con-
gress, by specifically protecting asexually reproduced plants
through the PPA, intended to preclude utility patent protec-
tion for sexually reproduced plants.9
Third, petitioners argue that in 1952 Congress would not
have moved plants out of the utility patent provision and
into § 161 if it had intended § 101 to allow for protection of
plants. Brief for Petitioners 20. Petitioners again rely on
9 The dissent relies on United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U. S. 517
(1998), for the proposition that “a later, more specific statute trumps an
earlier, more general one.” See post, at 156. Yet in Estate of Romani
this purported rule was applied because the meaning of the earlier statute
was “unresolved.” 523 U. S., at 530. The Court noted that “despite the
age of the statute, and despite the fact that it has been the subject of a
great deal of litigation,” its meaning had not been definitively established.
Id., at 529. By contrast, the statutory terms “manufacture or composition
of matter” were not similarly unresolved at the time the PPA was passed.
In addition, these subject-matter terms have been interpreted broadly
to evolve with developments in science and technology. See Chakrabarty,
447 U. S., at 315. Moreover, even in Estate of Romani, the Court consid-
ered that there was no “plain inconsistency” between the earlier and later
statutes. 523 U. S., at 533.

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
138 J. E. M. AG SUPPLY, INC. v. PIONEER HI-BRED
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Opinion of the Court
negative inference because they cannot point to any express
indication that Congress intended § 161 to be the exclusive
means of patenting plants. But this negative inference sim-
ply does not support carving out subject matter that other-
wise fits comfortably within the expansive language of § 101,
especially when § 101 can protect different attributes and has
more stringent requirements than does § 161.
This is especially true given that Congress in 1952 did
nothing to change the substantive rights or requirements for
obtaining a plant patent. Absent a clear intent to the con-
trary, we are loath to interpret what was essentially a house-
keeping measure as an affirmative decision by Congress to
deny sexually reproduced plants patent protection under
§ 101.
B
By passing the PVPA in 1970, Congress specifically au-
thorized limited patent-like protection for certain sexually
reproduced plants. Petitioners therefore argue that this
legislation evidences Congress’ intent to deny broader § 101
utility patent protection for such plants. Petitioners’ ar-
gument, however, is unavailing for two reasons. First, no-
where does the PVPA purport to provide the exclusive
statutory means of protecting sexually reproduced plants.
Second, the PVPA and § 101 can easily be reconciled. Be-
cause it is harder to qualify for a utility patent than for a
Plant Variety Protection (PVP) certificate, it only makes
sense that utility patents would confer a greater scope of
protection.
1
The PVPA provides plant variety protection for:
“The breeder of any sexually reproduced or tuber
propagated plant variety (other than fungi or bacteria)
who has so reproduced the variety . . . .” 7 U. S. C.
§ 2402(a).

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
139 Cite as: 534 U. S. 124 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
Infringement of plant variety protection occurs, inter alia,
if someone sells or markets the protected variety, sexually
multiplies the variety as a step in marketing, uses the vari-
ety in producing a hybrid, or dispenses the variety without
notice that the variety is protected.10
Since the 1994 amendments, the PVPA also protects “any
variety that is essentially derived from a protected variety,”
§ 2541(c)(1), and “any variety whose production requires the
10 Title 7 U. S. C. § 2541(a) provides in full:
“(a) Acts constituting infringement
“Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, it shall be an infringe-
ment of the rights of the owner of a protected variety to perform without
authority, any of the following acts in the United States, or in commerce
which can be regulated by Congress or affecting such commerce, prior to
expiration of the right to plant variety protection but after either the issue
of the certificate or the distribution of a protected plant variety with the
notice under section 2567 of this title:
“(1) sell or market the protected variety, or offer it or expose it for
sale, deliver it, ship it, consign it, exchange it, or solicit an offer to buy it,
or any other transfer of title or possession of it;
“(2) import the variety into, or export it from, the United States;
“(3) sexually multiply, or propagate by a tuber or part of a tuber, the
variety as a step in marketing (for growing purposes) the variety;
“(4) use the variety in producing (as distinguished from developing) a
hybrid or different variety therefrom;
“(5) use seed which had been marked ‘Unauthorized Propagation Pro-
hibited’ or ‘Unauthorized Seed Multiplication Prohibited’ or progeny
thereof to propagate the variety;
“(6) dispense the variety to another, in a form which can be propagated,
without notice as to being a protected variety under which it was received;
“(7) condition the variety for the purpose of propagation, except to the
extent that the conditioning is related to the activities permitted under
section 2543 of this title;
“(8) stock the variety for any of the purposes referred to in para-
graphs (1) through (7);
“(9) perform any of the foregoing acts even in instances in which the
variety is multiplied other than sexually, except in pursuance of a valid
United States plant patent; or
“(10) instigate or actively induce performance of any of the foregoing
acts.”

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
140 J. E. M. AG SUPPLY, INC. v. PIONEER HI-BRED
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Opinion of the Court
repeated use of a protected variety,” § 2541(c)(3). See Plant
Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1994, § 9, 108 Stat.
3142. Practically, this means that hybrids created from pro-
tected plant varieties are also protected; however, it is not
infringement to use a protected variety for the development
of a hybrid. See 7 U. S. C. § 2541(a)(4).11
The PVPA also contains exemptions for saving seed and
for research. A farmer who legally purchases and plants a
protected variety can save the seed from these plants for
replanting on his own farm. See § 2543 (“[I]t shall not in-
fringe any right hereunder for a person to save seed pro-
duced by the person from seed obtained, or descended from
seed obtained, by authority of the owner of the variety for
seeding purposes and use such saved seed in the production
of a crop for use on the farm of the person . . .”); see also
Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U. S. 179 (1995). In ad-
dition, a protected variety may be used for research. See 7
U. S. C. § 2544 (“The use and reproduction of a protected va-
riety for plant breeding or other bona fide research shall not
constitute an infringement of the protection provided under
this chapter”). The utility patent statute does not contain
similar exemptions.12
Thus, while the PVPA creates a statutory scheme that is
comprehensive with respect to its particular protections and
subject matter, giving limited protection to plant varieties
that are new, distinct, uniform, and stable, § 2402(a), nowhere
does it restrict the scope of patentable subject matter under
§ 101. With nothing in the statute to bolster their view that
11 It is, however, infringement of a utility patent to use a protected plant
in the development of another variety. See infra, at 143.
12 The dissent argues that our “reading would destroy” the PVPA’s ex-
emptions. Post, at 155. Yet such bold predictions are belied by the facts.
According to the Government, over 5,000 PVP certificates have been is-
sued, as compared to about 1,800 utility patents for plants. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 41. Since 1985 the PTO has interpreted § 101 to include utility pat-
ents for plants, and there is no evidence that the availability of such pat-
ents has rendered the PVPA and its specific exemptions obsolete.

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
141 Cite as: 534 U. S. 124 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
the PVPA provides the exclusive means for protecting sex-
ually reproducing plants, petitioners rely on the legislative
history of the PVPA. They argue that this history shows
the PVPA was enacted because sexually reproducing plant
varieties and their seeds were not and had never been
intended by Congress to be included within the classes of
things patentable under Title 35.13
The PVPA itself, however, contains no statement that
PVP certificates were to be the exclusive means of protect-
ing sexually reproducing plants. The relevant statements
in the legislative history reveal nothing more than the lim-
ited view of plant breeding taken by some Members of Con-
gress who believed that patent protection was unavailable
for sexually reproduced plants. This view stems from a lack
of awareness concerning scientific possibilities.
Furthermore, at the time the PVPA was enacted, the
PTO had already issued numerous utility patents for hybrid
plant processes. Many of these patents, especially since
the 1950’s, included claims on the products of the patented
process, i. e., the hybrid plant itself. See Kloppenburg 264.
Such plants were protected as part of a hybrid process and
not on their own. Nonetheless, these hybrids still enjoyed
protection under § 101, which reaffirms that such material
was within the scope of § 101.
2
Petitioners next argue that the PVPA altered the subject-
matter coverage of § 101 by implication. Brief for Petition-
ers 33–36. Yet “the only permissible justification for a re-
peal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes
13 Petitioners point to a House Report that concluded:
“Under patent law, protection is presently limited to those varieties
of plants which reproduce asexually, that is, by such methods as grafting
or budding. No protection is available to those varieties of plants which
reproduce sexually, that is, generally by seeds.” H. R. Rep. No. 91–1605,
p. 1 (1970); Brief for Petitioners 40.

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
142 J. E. M. AG SUPPLY, INC. v. PIONEER HI-BRED
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Opinion of the Court
are irreconcilable.” Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 550
(1974). “The rarity with which [the Court has] discovered
implied repeals is due to the relatively stringent standard for
such findings, namely, that there be an irreconcilable conflict
between the two federal statutes at issue.” Matsushita,
516 U. S., at 381 (internal quotation marks omitted).
To be sure, there are differences in the requirements for,
and coverage of, utility patents and PVP certificates issued
pursuant to the PVPA. These differences, however, do not
present irreconcilable conflicts because the requirements for
obtaining a utility patent under § 101 are more stringent
than those for obtaining a PVP certificate, and the protec-
tions afforded by a utility patent are greater than those af-
forded by a PVP certificate. Thus, there is a parallel rela-
tionship between the obligations and the level of protection
under each statute.
It is much more difficult to obtain a utility patent for
a plant than to obtain a PVP certificate because a utility
patentable plant must be new, useful, and nonobvious, 35
U. S. C. §§ 101–103. In addition, to obtain a utility patent, a
breeder must describe the plant with sufficient specificity to
enable others to “make and use” the invention after the pat-
ent term expires. § 112. The disclosure required by the
Patent Act is “the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.”
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U. S. 470, 484 (1974).
The description requirement for plants includes a deposit
of biological material, for example, seeds, and mandates
that such material be accessible to the public. See 37 CFR
§§ 1.801–1.809 (2001); see also App. 39 (seed deposits for U. S.
Patent No. 5,491,295).
By contrast, a plant variety may receive a PVP certificate
without a showing of usefulness or nonobviousness. See 7
U. S. C. § 2402(a) (requiring that the variety be only new,
distinct, uniform, and stable). Nor does the PVPA require
a description and disclosure as extensive as those required
under § 101. The PVPA requires a “description of the vari-

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
143 Cite as: 534 U. S. 124 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
ety setting forth its distinctiveness, uniformity and stability
and a description of the genealogy and breeding procedure,
when known.” 7 U. S. C. § 2422(2). It also requires a de-
posit of seed in a public depository, § 2422(4), but neither
the statute nor the applicable regulation mandates that such
material be accessible to the general public during the term
of the PVP certificate. See 7 CFR § 97.6 (2001).
Because of the more stringent requirements, utility patent
holders receive greater rights of exclusion than holders of a
PVP certificate. Most notably, there are no exemptions for
research or saving seed under a utility patent. Additionally,
although Congress increased the level of protection under
the PVPA in 1994, a PVP certificate still does not grant the
full range of protections afforded by a utility patent. For
instance, a utility patent on an inbred plant line protects that
line as well as all hybrids produced by crossing that inbred
with another plant line. Similarly, the PVPA now protects
“any variety whose production requires the repeated use of
a protected variety.” 7 U. S. C. § 2541(c)(3). Thus, one can-
not use a protected plant variety to produce a hybrid for
commercial sale. PVPA protection still falls short of a util-
ity patent, however, because a breeder can use a plant that
is protected by a PVP certificate to “develop” a new inbred
line while he cannot use a plant patented under § 101 for such
a purpose. See 7 U. S. C. § 2541(a)(4) (infringement includes
“use [of] the variety in producing (as distinguished from
developing) a hybrid or different variety therefrom”). See
also H. R. Rep. No. 91–1605, p. 11 (1970); 1 D. Chisum, Pat-
ents § 1.05[2][d][i], p. 549 (2001).
For all of these reasons, it is clear that there is no “posi-
tive repugnancy” between the issuance of utility patents for
plants and PVP coverage for plants. Radzanower v. Touche
Ross & Co., 426 U. S. 148, 155 (1976). Nor can it be said that
the two statutes “cannot mutually coexist.” Ibid. Indeed,
“when two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty
of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional inten-

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
144 J. E. M. AG SUPPLY, INC. v. PIONEER HI-BRED
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Opinion of the Court
tion to the contrary, to regard each as effective.” Morton,
supra, at 551. Here we can plainly regard each statute as
effective because of its different requirements and pro-
tections. The plain meaning of § 101, as interpreted by this
Court in Chakrabarty, clearly includes plants within its sub-
ject matter. The PPA and the PVPA are not to the contrary
and can be read alongside § 101 in protecting plants.
3
Petitioners also suggest that even when statutes overlap
and purport to protect the same commercially valuable at-
tribute of a thing, such “dual protection” cannot exist. Brief
for Petitioners 44–45. Yet this Court has not hesitated to
give effect to two statutes that overlap, so long as each
reaches some distinct cases. See Connecticut Nat. Bank v.
Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253 (1992) (statutes that overlap
“do not pose an either-or proposition” where each confers
jurisdiction over cases that the other does not reach). Here,
while utility patents and PVP certificates do contain some
similar protections, as discussed above, the overlap is only
partial.
Moreover, this Court has allowed dual protection in other
intellectual property cases. “Certainly the patent policy of
encouraging invention is not disturbed by the existence
of another form of incentive to invention. In this respect
the two systems [trade secret protection and patents] are
not and never would be in conflict.” Kewanee Oil, supra, at
484; see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 217 (1954) (the
patentability of an object does not preclude the copyright of
that object as a work of art). In this case, many plant varie-
ties that are unable to satisfy the stringent requirements of
§ 101 might still qualify for the lesser protections afforded
by the PVPA.
III
We also note that the PTO has assigned utility patents
for plants for at least 16 years and there has been no indica-

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
145 Cite as: 534 U. S. 124 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
tion from either Congress or agencies with expertise that
such coverage is inconsistent with the PVPA or the PPA.
The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, which has
specific expertise in issues of patent law, relied heavily on
this Court’s decision in Chakrabarty when it interpreted the
subject matter of § 101 to include plants. In re Hibberd, 227
USPQ 443 (1985). This highly visible decision has led to the
issuance of some 1,800 utility patents for plants. Moreover,
the PTO, which administers § 101 as well as the PPA, recog-
nizes and regularly issues utility patents for plants. In ad-
dition, the Department of Agriculture’s Plant Variety Pro-
tection Office acknowledges the existence of utility patents
for plants.
In the face of these developments, Congress has not only
failed to pass legislation indicating that it disagrees with the
PTO’s interpretation of § 101; it has even recognized the
availability of utility patents for plants. In a 1999 amend-
ment to 35 U. S. C. § 119, which concerns the right of priority
for patent rights, Congress provided: “Applications for plant
breeder’s rights filed in a WTO [World Trade Organization]
member country . . . shall have the same effect for the pur-
pose of the right of priority . . . as applications for patents,
subject to the same conditions and requirements of this sec-
tion as apply to applications for patents.” 35 U. S. C. § 119(f)
(1994 ed., Supp. V). Crucially, § 119(f) is part of the general
provisions of Title 35, not the specific chapter of the PPA,
which suggests a recognition on the part of Congress that
plants are patentable under § 101.
IV
For these reasons, we hold that newly developed plant
breeds fall within the terms of § 101, and that neither the
PPA nor the PVPA limits the scope of § 101’s coverage. As
in Chakrabarty, we decline to narrow the reach of § 101
where Congress has given us no indication that it intends

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
146 J. E. M. AG SUPPLY, INC. v. PIONEER HI-BRED
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Scalia, J., concurring
this result. 447 U. S., at 315–316. Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Justice Scalia, concurring.
This case presents an interesting and difficult point of stat-
utory construction, seemingly pitting against each other two
perfectly valid canons of interpretation: (1) that statutes
must be construed in their entirety, so that the meaning
of one provision sheds light upon the meaning of another;
and (2) that repeals by implication are not favored. I think
these sensible canons are reconcilable only if the first of
them is limited by the second. That is to say, the power
of a provision of law to give meaning to a previously enacted
ambiguity comes to an end once the ambiguity has been au-
thoritatively resolved. At that point, use of the later enact-
ment produces not clarification (governed by the first canon)
but amendment (governed by the second).
In the present case, the only ambiguity that could have
been clarified by the words added to the utility patent stat-
ute by the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA) is whether the
term “composition of matter” included living things. The
newly enacted provision for plants invited the conclusion
that this term which preceded it did not include living
things. (The term “matter,” after all, is sometimes used
in a sense that excludes living things. See Webster’s New
International Dictionary 1515 (2d ed. 1950): “Physical sub-
stance as made up of chemical elements and distinguished
from incorporeal substance, action, qualities, etc. . . . ‘Matter
is inert, senseless, and lifeless.’ Johnson.”) It is important
to note that this is the only way in which the new PPA lan-
guage could have clarified the ambiguity: There was no way
in which “composition of matter” could be regarded as a

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
147 Cite as: 534 U. S. 124 (2001)
Breyer, J., dissenting
category separate from plants, but not separate from other
living things.
Stare decisis, however, prevents us from any longer re-
garding as an open question—as ambiguous—whether “com-
position of matter” includes living things. Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 312–313 (1980), holds that it does.
As the case comes before us, therefore, the language of the
PPA—if it is to have any effect on the outcome—must do so
by way of amending what we have held to be a statute
that covers living things (and hence covers plants). At this
point the canon against repeal by implication comes into play,
and I agree with the Court that it determines the outcome.
I therefore join the opinion of the Court.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens joins,
dissenting.
The question before us is whether the words “manufac-
ture” or “composition of matter” contained in the utility
patent statute, 35 U. S. C. § 101 (1994 ed.) (Utility Patent
Statute), cover plants that also fall within the scope of two
more specific statutes, the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA),
35 U. S. C. § 161 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V), and the Plant
Variety Protection Act (PVPA), 7 U. S. C. § 2321 et seq.
I believe that the words “manufacture” or “composition of
matter” do not cover these plants. That is because Con-
gress intended the two more specific statutes to exclude
patent protection under the Utility Patent Statute for the
plants to which the more specific Acts directly refer. And,
as the Court implicitly recognizes, this Court neither consid-
ered nor decided this question in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U. S. 303 (1980). Consequently, I dissent.
I
Respondent and the Government claim that Chakrabarty
controls the outcome in this case. This is incorrect, for
Chakrabarty said nothing about the specific issue before us.

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
148 J. E. M. AG SUPPLY, INC. v. PIONEER HI-BRED
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Breyer, J., dissenting
Chakrabarty, in considering the scope of the Utility Patent
Statute’s language “manufacture, or composition of matter,”
35 U. S. C. § 101 (1994 ed.), asked whether those words in-
cluded such living things as bacteria—a substance to which
neither of the two specific plant Acts refers. 447 U. S.,
at 313–314. The Court held that the Utility Patent Stat-
ute language included a “new” bacterium because it was
“a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of
matter” that was “not nature’s handiwork.” Id., at 309–310.
It quoted language from a congressional Committee Re-
port indicating that “Congress intended statutory subject
matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is made by
man.’ ” Id., at 309 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess., 5 (1952); H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.,
6 (1952)). But it nowhere said or implied that this Utility
Patent Statute language also includes the very subject mat-
ter with which the two specific statutes deal, namely, plants.
Whether a bacterium technically speaking is, or is not, a
plant, the Court considered it a “life form,” and not the kind
of “plant” that the two specific statutes had in mind. 447
U. S., at 314 (noting that the PVPA specifically excluded bac-
teria, and that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had
held that bacteria were not plants for purposes of the PPA).
The Court did consider a complicated argument that
sought indirectly to relate the two specific plant statutes to
the issue before it. That argument went roughly as follows:
(1) Congress enacted two special statutes related to plants.
(2) Even though those two statutes do not cover bacteria,
the fact that Congress enacted them shows that Congress
thought the Utility Patent Statute’s language (“manufacture,
or composition of matter”) did not cover any living thing,
including bacteria. (3) Congress consequently must have in-
tended the two special Acts to provide exclusive protection
for all forms of “life” whether they do, or do not, count as
the kinds of “plants” to which the specific statutes refer.

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
149 Cite as: 534 U. S. 124 (2001)
Breyer, J., dissenting
The Court, in reply, wrote that Congress, when enacting
the specific statutes, might have (wrongly) believed that the
Utility Patent Statute did not apply to plants, probably be-
cause Congress thought that plants were “natural products,”
not human products. Id., at 311. It added that Congress
also might have believed that it was too difficult for plant
inventors to meet patent law’s ordinary “written description”
requirement. Id., at 312. In addition, the Court pointed
out that the relevant distinction between unpatentable and
patentable subject matter was not between living and in-
animate things, but rather between products of nature and
human-made inventions. Id., at 312–313. As such, the
bacteria at issue were patentable because they were prod-
ucts of human invention. And the Court concluded that
“nothing” in Congress’ decision to exclude bacteria from the
PVPA supported “petitioner’s position,” namely, that Con-
gress intended no utility patent protection for any living
thing. Id., at 313–314.
Neither this refutation nor the argument itself decides
the question here. That question is not about general cov-
erage for matters that the special statutes do not mention
(namely, nonplant life forms such as bacteria). It is about
general coverage for matters to which the special plant stat-
utes do refer (namely, plants). Chakrabarty neither asked,
nor answered, this latter question, the question now be-
fore us. And nothing in the Court’s opinion indicates the
contrary.
II
The critical question, as I have said, is whether the two
specific plant statutes embody a legislative intent to deny
coverage under the Utility Patent Statute to those plants to
which the specific plant statutes refer. In my view, the first
of these statutes, the PPA, reveals precisely that intent.
And nothing in the later history of either the Utility Patent
Statute or the PVPA suggests the contrary.

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
150 J. E. M. AG SUPPLY, INC. v. PIONEER HI-BRED
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Breyer, J., dissenting
As initially enacted in 1930, the PPA began by amending
the Utility Patent Statute to read as follows:
“Any person who has invented or discovered any new
and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvements thereof,
or who has invented or discovered and asexually repro-
duced any distinct and new variety of plant, other than
a tuber-propagated plant . . . may . . . obtain a patent
therefor[e].” Rev. Stat. § 4886, as amended by Act of
May 23, 1930, § 1, 46 Stat. 376 (language added by the
PPA italicized).
This language refers to all plants. It says that an inven-
tor—in principle—can obtain a patent on any plant (the sub-
ject matter of the patent) that meets three requirements.
It must be distinct; it must be new; and on one or more occa-
sions it must have been “asexually reproduced,” e. g., repro-
duced by means of a graft.
This last-mentioned “graft” requirement does not sepa-
rate (1) those plants that can reproduce through grafting
from (2) those plants that can reproduce by seed. The two
categories are not mutually exclusive. P. Raven, R. Evert,
& S. Eichhorn, Biology of Plants 179–180, 255 (6th ed. 1999).
Many plants—perhaps virtually any plant—can be repro-
duced “asexually” as well as by seed. S. Rep. No. 315, 71st
Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1930). Rather, the “asexual reproduc-
tion” requirement sought to ensure that the inventor was
capable of reproducing the new variety “asexually” (through
a graft) because that fact would guarantee that the variety’s
new characteristics had genetic (rather than, say, environ-
mental) causes and would prove genetically stable over time.
See ibid. (“A plant patent covers only the exclusive right of
asexual reproduction, and obviously it would be futile to
grant a patent for a new and distinct variety unless the vari-
ety had been demonstrated to be susceptible to asexual re-
production”); cf. Dunn v. Ragin, 50 USPQ 472, 474 (1941)

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
151 Cite as: 534 U. S. 124 (2001)
Breyer, J., dissenting
(noting that asexual reproduction “determine[s] that the
progeny in fact possess the characteristic or characteristics
which distinguish it as a new variety”).
Although the section defining the PPA’s coverage does not
limit its scope to plants that reproduce primarily through
grafting, a later section does so limit the protection that it
offers. That section specifies that the patent holder will re-
ceive “the exclusive right to asexually reproduce the plant,”
e. g., the right to reproduce it through grafting, but he will
not receive an exclusive right to reproduce the plant sexu-
ally, i. e., the right to reproduce it through seeds. 46 Stat.
376. And this is true regardless of whether the patent
holder could reproduce true to type offspring through seeds.
See S. Rep. No. 315, at 4 (“On the other hand, [the PPA] does
not give any patent protection to the right of propagation of
the new variety by seed, irrespective of the degree to which
the seedlings come true to type”). This was a significant
limitation because, the Court’s contrary claim notwithstand-
ing, ante, at 135, and n. 7, it was readily apparent in 1930
that a plant’s desirable characteristics could be preserved
through reproduction by seed. See Fowler, The Plant Pat-
ent Act of 1930: A Sociological History of its Creation, 82
J. Pat. & Tm. Off. Soc. 621, 635, 644 (2000).
In sum, the PPA permits patenting of new and distinct
varieties of (1) plants that breeders primarily reproduce
through grafts (say, apple trees), (2) plants that breeders pri-
marily reproduce through seeds (say, corn), and (3) plants
that reproduce both ways (say, violets). See C. Chong, Plant
Propagation, reprinted in 1 CRC Handbook of Plant Science
in Agriculture 91–92, 94, 104 (B. Christie & A. Hanson eds.,
1987); Raven, Evert, & Eichhorn, supra, at 179. But, be-
cause that statute left plant buyers free to keep, to repro-
duce, and to sell seeds, the statute likely proved helpful
only to those in the first category. Both the PPA’s legisla-
tive history and the earliest patents granted under the Act
fully support this interpretation. See S. Rep. No. 315, at 3

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
152 J. E. M. AG SUPPLY, INC. v. PIONEER HI-BRED
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Breyer, J., dissenting
(explaining that varieties that “resul[t] from seedlings of
cross pollenization of two species” were patentable under
the Act); Plant Patent Nos. 1–2, 5–6, 8–11 (roses); Plant
Patent Nos. 7, 15 (peach trees).
Given these characteristics, the PPA is incompatible with
the claim that the Utility Patent Statute’s language (“manu-
facture, or composition of matter”) also covers plants. To
see why that is so, simply imagine a plant breeder who, in
1931, sought to patent a new, distinct variety of plant that
he invented but which he has never been able to reproduce
through grafting, i. e., asexually. Because he could not re-
produce it through grafting, he could not patent it under
the more specific terms of the PPA. Could he nonetheless
patent it under the more general Utility Patent Statute
language “manufacture, or composition of matter?”
Assume the court that tried to answer that question was
prescient, i. e., that it knew that this Court, in Chakrabarty,
447 U. S., at 311–312, would say that the Utility Patent Stat-
ute language (“manufacture,” or “composition of matter”) in
principle might cover “anything under the sun,” including
bacteria. Such a prescient court would have said that the
Utility Patent Statute did cover plants had the case reached
it in 1929, before Congress enacted the more specific 1930
law. But how could any court decide the case similarly in
1931 after enactment of the 1930 amendment? To do so
would virtually nullify the PPA’s primary condition—that
the breeder have reproduced the new characteristic through
a graft—reading it out of the Act. Moreover, since the
Utility Patent Statute would cover, and thereby forbid, re-
production by seed, such a holding would also have read out
of the statute the PPA’s more limited list of exclusive rights.
Consequently, even a prescient court would have had to say,
as of 1931, that the 1930 Plant Patent Act had, in amend-
ing the Utility Patent Statute, placed the subject matter
of the PPA—namely, plants—outside the scope of the words
“manufacture, or composition of matter.” See United States

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
153 Cite as: 534 U. S. 124 (2001)
Breyer, J., dissenting
v. Estate of Romani, 523 U. S. 517, 530–533 (1998) (holding
that a later, specific statute trumps an earlier, more gen-
eral statute).
Nothing that occurred after 1930 changes this conclusion.
In 1952, the Utility Patent Statute was recodified, and the
PPA language I have quoted was given its own separate
place in the Code. See 35 U. S. C. § 161 et seq. (1994 ed. and
Supp. V). As Pioneer itself concedes, that change was not
“substantive.” Brief for Respondent 7; see also ante, at 133.
Indeed, as recodified the PPA still allows a breeder to ob-
tain a patent when he “invents or discovers and asexually
reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant,” 35 U. S. C.
§ 161 (1994 ed.) (emphasis added), but it only allows the pat-
ent holder to “exclude others from asexually reproducing
the plant or selling or using the plant so reproduced,” § 163
(emphasis added).
Nor does the enactment of the Plant Variety Protection
Act of 1970 change the conclusion. The PVPA proved neces-
sary because plant breeders became capable of creating new
and distinct varieties of certain crops, corn, for example, that
were valuable only when reproduced through seeds—a form
of reproduction that the earlier Act freely permitted. See
S. Rep. No. 91–1246, pp. 2–3 (1970). Just prior to its enact-
ment a special Presidential Commission, noting the special
problems that plant protection raised and favoring the devel-
opment of a totally new plant protection scheme, had recom-
mended that “[a]ll provisions in the patent statute for plant
patents be deleted . . . .” President’s Commission on the
Patent System, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts,
S. Doc. No. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 20–21 (1967) (hereinafter
S. Doc.). Instead Congress kept the PPA while adding
the PVPA. The PVPA gave patent-like protection (for 20
years) to plants reproduced by seed, and it excluded the
PPA’s requirement that a breeder have “asexually re-
produced” the plant. 7 U. S. C. §§ 2402, 2483. It imposed
certain specific requirements. § 2402 (variety must be new,

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
154 J. E. M. AG SUPPLY, INC. v. PIONEER HI-BRED
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Breyer, J., dissenting
distinct, uniform, and stable). And it provided the breeder
with an exclusive right to sell, offer to sell, reproduce, im-
port, or export the variety, including the seeds. § 2483.
At the same time, the PVPA created two important ex-
ceptions. The first provided that a farmer who plants his
fields with a protected plant “shall not infringe any right
hereunder” by saving the seeds and planting them in future
years. § 2543. The second permitted “use and reproduc-
tion of a protected variety for plant breeding or other bona
fide research.” § 2544.
Nothing in the history, language, or purpose of the 1970
statute suggests an intent to reintroduce into the scope of
the general words “manufacture, or composition of matter”
the subject matter that the PPA had removed, namely,
plants. To the contrary, any such reintroduction would
make meaningless the two exceptions—for planting and for
research—that Congress wrote into that Act. It is not sur-
prising that no party argues that passage of the PVPA some-
how enlarged the scope of the Utility Patent Statute.
III
The Court replies as follows to the claim that its read-
ing of the Utility Patent Statute nullifies the PPA’s lim-
itation of protection to plants produced by graft and the
PVPA’s exemptions for seeds and research: (1) The Utility
Patent Statute applies only to plants that are useful,
novel, nonobvious, and for which the inventor provides an
enabling written description of the invention. 35 U. S. C.
§§ 101, 102, 103, 112 (1994 ed. and Supp. V). (2) The PVPA
applies to plants that are novel, distinct, uniform, and stable.
7 U. S. C. § 2402. (3) The second set of criteria seem slightly
easier to meet, as they do not include nonobviousness and a
written description (Pioneer does not argue that the “useful”
requirement is significant). (4) And Congress could reason-
ably have intended the planting and research exceptions to

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
155 Cite as: 534 U. S. 124 (2001)
Breyer, J., dissenting
apply only to the set of plants that can meet the easier,
but not the tougher, criteria.
I do not find this argument convincing. For one thing,
it is not clear that the general patent law requirements are
significantly tougher. Counsel for Pioneer stated at oral
argument that there are many more PVP certificates than
there are plant patents. But he added that the major dif-
ference in criteria is the difference between the utility
patent law’s “nonobviousness” requirement and the specific
Acts’ requirement of “newness”—a difference that may re-
flect the Patent Office’s more “rigorous” examination proc-
ess. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 26, 30. But see S. Doc., at 20–21
(suggesting little difference because patent office tends to
find “nonobviousness” as long as the plant is deemed “new”
by the Department of Agriculture).
In any case, there is no relationship between the criteria
differences and the exemptions. Why would anyone want
to limit the exemptions—related to seedplanting and re-
search—only to those new plant varieties that are slightly
less original? Indeed, the research exemption would seem
more useful in respect to more original, not less original,
innovation. The Court has advanced no sound reason why
Congress would want to destroy the exemptions in the
PVPA that Congress created. And the Court’s reading
would destroy those exemptions.
The Court and Justice Scalia’s concurrence also rely
upon the interpretive canon that disfavors repeal by im-
plication. The Court, citing Matsushita Elec. Industrial
Co. v. Epstein, 516 U. S. 367 (1996), says that “there is simply
no evidence” that the PPA was meant to preclude § 101 pro-
tection for sexually reproduced plants. Ante, at 137. But
reliance on the canon of “implied repeal” is misplaced. The
canon has traditionally been embraced when a party claims
that a later statute—that does not actually modify an ear-
lier statute—implicitly repeals the earlier legislation. E. g.,
516 U. S., at 380–381. That canon has no relevance to the

534US1 Unit: $$U8 [04-21-03 13:42:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN
156 J. E. M. AG SUPPLY, INC. v. PIONEER HI-BRED
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Breyer, J., dissenting
PPA—which explicitly amended the Utility Patent Statute
by limiting protection to plants produced by graft. Even
were that not so, the Court has noted that a later, more spe-
cific statute will ordinarily trump the earlier, more general
one. See United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U. S., at
530–533.
Regardless, canons are not mandatory rules. They are
guides to help courts determine likely legislative intent.
See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, ante, p. 84; see also
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 115 (2001);
id., at 137–140 (Souter, J., dissenting). And that intent is
critical. Those who write statutes seek to solve human
problems. Fidelity to their aims requires us to approach an
interpretive problem not as if it were a purely logical game,
like a Rubik’s Cube, but as an effort to divine the human
intent that underlies the statute. Here that effort calls not
for an appeal to canons, but for an analysis of language,
structure, history, and purpose. Those factors make clear
that the Utility Patent Statute does not apply to plants.
Nothing in Chakrabarty holds to the contrary.
For these reasons, I dissent.