NORFOLK SHIPBUILDING & DRYDOCK CORP. v. GARRIS, administratrix of the ESTATE OF GARRIS, DECEASED

532US3 Unit: $U65 [09-06-02 19:22:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN
811 OCTOBER TERM, 2000
Syllabus
NORFOLK SHIPBUILDING & DRYDOCK CORP. v.
GARRIS, administratrix of the ESTATE OF
GARRIS, DECEASED
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit
No. 00–346. Argued April 18, 2001—Decided June 4, 2001
In her complaint filed in the District Court, respondent alleged that her
son died as a result of injuries sustained while performing sandblasting
aboard a vessel berthed in the navigable waters of the United States.
She further asserted that the injuries were caused by the negligence
of petitioner and another, and prayed for damages under general mari-
time law. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a federal claim, stating that no cause of action exists, under gen-
eral maritime law, for death resulting from negligence. The Fourth
Circuit reversed, explaining that although this Court had not yet rec-
ognized a maritime cause of action for wrongful death resulting from
negligence, the principles contained in Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc., 398 U. S. 375, made such an action appropriate.
Held: The general maritime cause of action recognized in Moragne—for
death caused by violation of maritime duties, id., at 409—is avail-
able for the negligent breach of a maritime duty of care. Although
Moragne’s opinion did not limit its rule to any particular maritime
duty, Moragne’s facts were limited to the duty of seaworthiness, and
so the issue of wrongful death for negligence has remained techni-
cally open. There is no rational basis, however, for distinguishing
negligence from unseaworthiness. Negligence is no less a maritime
duty than seaworthiness, and the choice-of-law and remedial anomalies
provoked by withholding a wrongful-death remedy are no less severe.
Nor is a negligence action precluded by any of the three relevant fed-
eral statutes that provide remedies for injuries and death suffered in
admiralty: the Jones Act, the Death on the High Seas Act, and the Long-
shore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Because of Congress’s
extensive involvement in legislating causes of action for maritime per-
sonal injuries, it will be the better course, in many cases that assert
new claims beyond what those statutes have seen fit to allow, to leave
further development to Congress. See, e. g., American Dredging Co.
v. Miller, 510 U. S. 443, 455. The cause of action recognized today,
however, is new only in the most technical sense. The general mari-
time law has recognized the tort of negligence for more than a cen-

532US3 Unit: $U65 [09-06-02 19:22:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN
812 NORFOLK SHIPBUILDING & DRYDOCK CORP.
v. GARRIS
Opinion of the Court
tury, and it has been clear since Moragne that breaches of a maritime
duty are actionable when they cause death, as when they cause injury.
Pp. 813–820.
210 F. 3d 209, affirmed.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, Parts I, II–A, and II–B–1
of which were unanimous, and Part II–B–2 of which was joined by Rehn-
quist, C. J., and Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ. Gins-
burg, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Souter and
Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 820.
James T. Ferrini argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Kimbley A. Kearney, Melinda S.
Kollross, Robert M. Tata, and Carl D. Gray.
Patrick H. O’Donnell argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief was John R. Crumpler, Jr.
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether the negli-
gent breach of a general maritime duty of care is actionable
when it causes death, as it is when it causes injury.
I
According to the complaint that respondent filed in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, her son, Christopher Garris, sustained injuries on
April 8, 1997, that caused his death one day later. App. to
Pet. for Cert. 53. The injuries were suffered while Garris
was performing sandblasting work aboard the USNS Maj.
Stephen W. Pless in the employ of Tidewater Temps, Inc., a
subcontractor for Mid-Atlantic Coatings, Inc., which was in
turn a subcontractor for petitioner Norfolk Shipbuilding &
Drydock Corporation. And the injuries were caused, the
complaint continued, by the negligence of petitioner and one
of its other subcontractors, since dismissed from this case.
Because the vessel was berthed in the navigable waters of
the United States when Garris was injured, respondent in-
voked federal admiralty jurisdiction, U. S. Const., Art. III,

532US3 Unit: $U65 [09-06-02 19:22:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN
813 Cite as: 532 U. S. 811 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
§ 2, cl. 1; 28 U. S. C. § 1333, and prayed for damages under
general maritime law. She also asserted claims under the
Virginia wrongful-death statute, Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01–50 to
8.01–56 (2000).
The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure
to state a federal claim, for the categorical reason that
“no cause of action exists, under general maritime law, for
death of a nonseaman in state territorial waters resulting
from negligence.” 1999 A. M. C. 769 (1998). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and
remanded for further proceedings, explaining that although
this Court had not yet recognized a maritime cause of ac-
tion for wrongful death resulting from negligence, the prin-
ciples contained in our decision in Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc., 398 U. S. 375 (1970), made such an action appro-
priate. 210 F. 3d 209, 211 (2000). Judge Hall concurred in
the judgment because, in her view, Moragne had itself rec-
ognized the action. 210 F. 3d, at 222–227. The Court of
Appeals denied petitioner’s suggestion for rehearing en
banc, with two judges dissenting. 215 F. 3d 420 (2000). We
granted certiorari. 531 U. S. 1050 (2000).
II
Three of four issues of general maritime law are settled,
and the fourth is before us. It is settled that the general
maritime law imposes duties to avoid unseaworthiness and
negligence, see, e. g., Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362
U. S. 539, 549–550 (1960) (unseaworthiness); Leathers v.
Blessing, 105 U. S. 626, 630 (1882) (negligence), that non-
fatal injuries caused by the breach of either duty are com-
pensable, see, e. g., Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co., 321 U. S.
96, 102–103 (1944) (unseaworthiness); Robins Dry Dock &
Repair Co. v. Dahl, 266 U. S. 449, 457 (1925) (negligence), and
that death caused by breach of the duty of seaworthiness
is also compensable, Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,
supra, at 409. Before us is the question whether death

532US3 Unit: $U65 [09-06-02 19:22:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN
814 NORFOLK SHIPBUILDING & DRYDOCK CORP.
v. GARRIS
Opinion of the Court
caused by negligence should, or must under direction of a
federal statute, be treated differently.
A
For more than 80 years, from 1886 until 1970, all four
issues were considered resolved, though the third not in the
manner we have just described. The governing rule then
was the rule of The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199, 213 (1886):
Although the general maritime law provides relief for in-
juries caused by the breach of maritime duties, it does
not provide relief for wrongful death. The Harrisburg said
that rule was compelled by the existence of the same rule at
common law, id., at 213–214—although it acknowledged,
id., at 205–212, that admiralty courts had held that damages
for wrongful death were recoverable under maritime law,
see also Moragne, supra, at 387–388 (listing cases).
In 1969, however, we granted certiorari in Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, Inc., supra, for the express purpose
of considering “whether The Harrisburg . . . should any
longer be regarded as acceptable law.” 398 U. S., at 375–
376. We inquired whether the rule of The Harrisburg was
defensible under either the general maritime law or the
policy displayed in the maritime statutes Congress had since
enacted, 398 U. S., at 379–393, whether those statutes pre-
empted judicial action overruling The Harrisburg, 398 U. S.,
at 393–403, whether stare decisis required adherence to
The Harrisburg, 398 U. S., at 403–405, and whether insuper-
able practical difficulties would accompany The Harrisburg’s
overruling, 398 U. S., at 405–408. Answering every ques-
tion no, we overruled the case and declared a new rule of
maritime law: “We . . . hold that an action does lie under
general maritime law for death caused by violation of mari-
time duties.” Id., at 409.
As we have noted in an earlier opinion, the wrongful-death
rule of Moragne was not limited to any particular mari-
time duty, Yamaha Motor Corp., U. S. A. v. Calhoun, 516

532US3 Unit: $U65 [09-06-02 19:22:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN
815 Cite as: 532 U. S. 811 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
U. S. 199, 214, n. 11 (1996) (dictum), but Moragne’s facts
were limited to the duty of seaworthiness, and so the issue
of wrongful death for negligence has remained techni-
cally open. We are able to find no rational basis, however,
for distinguishing negligence from seaworthiness. It is no
less a distinctively maritime duty than seaworthiness: The
common-law duties of care have not been adopted and re-
tained unmodified by admiralty, but have been adjusted
to fit their maritime context, see, e. g., Kermarec v. Com-
pagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U. S. 625, 630–632
(1959), and a century ago the maritime law exchanged the
common law’s rule of contributory negligence for one of
comparative negligence, see, e. g., The Max Morris, 137 U. S.
1, 14–15 (1890); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U. S. 406,
408–409 (1953). Consequently the “tensions and discrep-
ancies” in our precedent arising “from the necessity to ac-
commodate state remedial statutes to exclusively maritime
substantive concepts”—which ultimately drove this Court
in Moragne to abandon The Harrisburg, see 398 U. S., at
401—were no less pronounced with maritime negligence
than with unseaworthiness. In fact, both cases cited by
Moragne to exemplify those discrepancies involved maritime
negligence, see ibid. (citing Hess v. United States, 361 U. S.
314 (1960); Goett v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 U. S. 340 (1960)
(per curiam)); see also Nelson v. United States, 639 F. 2d
469, 473 (CA9 1980) (opinion by then-Judge Kennedy) (con-
cluding that uniformity concerns required Moragne’s applica-
tion to negligence). It is true, as petitioner observes, that
we have held admiralty accommodation of state remedial
statutes to be constitutionally permissible, see, e. g., Western
Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233, 242 (1921); The Tungus v.
Skovgaard, 358 U. S. 588, 594 (1959),1 but that does not re-
1 The issue addressed in Yamaha Motor Corp., U. S. A. v. Calhoun, 516
U. S. 199 (1996), whether state remedies may in some instances supple-
ment a federal maritime remedy, is not presented by this case, where
respondent is no longer pursuing state remedies. After the District

532US3 Unit: $U65 [09-06-02 19:22:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN
816 NORFOLK SHIPBUILDING & DRYDOCK CORP.
v. GARRIS
Opinion of the Court
solve the issue here: whether requiring such an accommoda-
tion by refusing to recognize a federal remedy is preferable
as a matter of maritime policy. We think it is not.
The choice-of-law anomaly occasioned by providing a fed-
eral remedy for injury but not death is no less strange when
the duty breached is negligence than when it is seaworthi-
ness. Of two victims injured at the same instant in the
same location by the same negligence, only one would be
covered by federal law, provided only that the other died of
his injuries. See, e. g., Byrd v. Napoleon Avenue Ferry Co.,
125 F. Supp. 573, 578 (ED La. 1954) (in case involving single
car accident on ferry, applying state negligence law to claim
for deceased husband’s wrongful death but federal maritime
negligence law to claim for surviving wife’s injuries), aff ’d,
227 F. 2d 958 (CA5 1955) (per curiam). And cutting off the
law’s remedy at the death of the injured person is no less “a
striking departure from the result dictated by elementary
principles in the law of remedies,” Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc., 398 U. S., at 381, when the duty breached is negli-
gence than when it is seaworthiness. “Where existing law
imposes a primary duty, violations of which are compensable
if they cause injury, nothing in ordinary notions of justice
suggests that a violation should be nonactionable simply be-
cause it was serious enough to cause death.” Ibid. Finally,
the maritime policy favoring recovery for wrongful death
that Moragne found implicit in federal statutory law cannot
be limited to unseaworthiness, for both of the federal Acts
on which Moragne relied permit recovery for negligence, see
Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 688(a); Death on the High Seas
Act (DOHSA), 46 U. S. C. App. § 761 et seq.; see also Engel
v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33, 36–37 (1926) (Jones Act). In sum,
a negligent breach of a maritime duty of care being assumed
Court dismissed her state-law claim on jurisdictional grounds, respondent
re-filed it in state court, where it was resolved against her. See Brief for
Respondent 2, n. 1.

532US3 Unit: $U65 [09-06-02 19:22:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN
817 Cite as: 532 U. S. 811 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
by the posture of this case,2 no rational basis within the
maritime law exists for denying respondent the recovery
recognized by Moragne for the death of her son.
B
Weightier arguments against recognizing a wrongful-
death action for negligence may be found not within gen-
eral maritime law but without, in the federal statutes that
provide remedies for injuries and death suffered in ad-
miralty. As we explained in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,
498 U. S. 19, 27 (1990), “[w]e no longer live in an era when
seamen and their loved ones must look primarily to the
courts as a source of substantive legal protection from injury
and death; Congress . . . [has] legislated extensively in these
areas.” And, even in admiralty, “we have no authority to
substitute our views for those expressed by Congress in a
duly enacted statute.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,
436 U. S. 618, 626 (1978). Hence, when a statute resolves
a particular issue, we have held that the general maritime
law must comply with that resolution. See, e. g., Dooley
v. Korean Air Lines Co., 524 U. S. 116, 123–124 (1998). We
must therefore make careful study of the three statutes
relevant here.
1
The Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 688(a), establishes a cause
of action for negligence for injuries or death suffered in the
course of employment, but only for seamen. See generally
Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U. S. 347 (1995) (describing test
for seaman status). Respondent’s son, who was not a sea-
man, was not covered by the Jones Act, and we have held
that the Jones Act bears no implication for actions brought
2 The District Court dismissed the case for the threshold reason that,
regardless of a negligent breach, there could be no recovery. See supra,
at 813. Petitioner therefore will be free to present its arguments regard-
ing duty and breach on remand to the extent they have been preserved.

532US3 Unit: $U65 [09-06-02 19:22:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN
818 NORFOLK SHIPBUILDING & DRYDOCK CORP.
v. GARRIS
Opinion of the Court
by nonseamen. See, e. g., American Export Lines, Inc. v.
Alvez, 446 U. S. 274, 282–283 (1980). Moreover, even as to
seamen, we have held that general maritime law may pro-
vide wrongful-death actions predicated on duties beyond
those that the Jones Act imposes. See, e. g., Miles v. Apex
Marine Corp., supra, at 28–30 (seaworthiness). The Jones
Act does not preclude respondent’s negligence action.
DOHSA creates wrongful-death actions for negligence
and unseaworthiness, see Moragne, supra, at 395, but only
by the personal representatives of people killed “beyond a
marine league from the shore of any State,” 46 U. S. C. App.
§ 761. Respondent’s son was killed in state territorial wa-
ters, where DOHSA expressly provides that its provisions
“shall . . . [not] apply,” § 767. In Moragne, after discussing
the anomalies that would result if DOHSA were interpreted
to preclude federal maritime causes of action even where
its terms do not apply, 398 U. S., at 395–396, we held that
DOHSA “was not intended to preclude the availability of a
remedy for wrongful death under general maritime law in
situations not covered by the Act,” id., at 402. Or, “[t]o put
it another way, . . . no intention appears that the Act have
the effect of foreclosing any nonstatutory federal remedies
that might be found appropriate to effectuate the policies of
general maritime law.” Id., at 400. DOHSA therefore does
not pre-empt respondent’s negligence action.
Finally, the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensa-
tion Act (LHWCA), 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C.
§ 901 et seq., provides nonseaman maritime workers such as
respondent’s son, see § 902(3) (defining covered employees),
with no-fault workers’ compensation claims (against their
employer, § 904(b)) and negligence claims (against the vessel,
§ 905(b)) for injury and death. As to those two defendants,
the LHWCA expressly pre-empts all other claims, §§ 905(a),
(b); but cf. Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U. S. 715,
723–726 (1980) (holding some state workers’ compensation
claims against employer not pre-empted), but it expressly

532US3 Unit: $U65 [09-06-02 19:22:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN
819 Cite as: 532 U. S. 811 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
preserves all claims against third parties, §§ 933(a), (i). And
petitioner is a third party: It neither employed respondent’s
son nor owned the vessel on which he was killed.
Petitioner argues, however, that § 933’s preservation-of-
other-claims provisions express Congress’s intent to reserve
all other wrongful-death actions to the States. That argu-
ment cannot withstand our precedent, since we have con-
sistently interpreted § 933 to preserve federal maritime
claims as well as state claims, see, e. g., Seas Shipping Co.
v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85, 100–102 (1946); Cooper Stevedor-
ing Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U. S. 106, 113 (1974), in-
cluding maritime negligence claims, see, e. g., Pope & Talbot,
Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U. S., at 411–413 (upholding recovery for
negligence under maritime law by longshoreman covered
by the LHWCA). Petitioner’s further contention—that
the policy implicit in the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA
bars a maritime action for wrongful death though the
text of those amendments (which left § 933 unchanged) per-
mits it—cannot succeed. We do not find, as petitioner
does, an anti-maritime-wrongful-death policy implicit in the
amendment to § 905(b), see 86 Stat. 1263, which eliminated
covered workers’ unseaworthiness claims against a vessel,
see, e. g., Bloomer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 445 U. S. 74, 83
(1980) (“Congress abolished the unseaworthiness remedy for
longshoremen, recognized in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
328 U. S. 85 (1946)”). That amendment was directed not
at wrongful death in particular, but at unseaworthiness
generally, see Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Trans-
atlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 262 (1979) (“Congress acted in
1972, among other things, to eliminate the shipowner’s lia-
bility to the longshoreman for unseaworthiness . . .—in other
words, to overrule Sieracki”). To the extent the amend-
ment to § 905(b) reflects any policy relevant here, it is in
expressly ratifying longshore and harbor workers’ claims
against the vessel for negligence, see id., at 259–260. The
LHWCA therefore does not preclude this negligence action
for wrongful death.

532US3 Unit: $U65 [09-06-02 19:22:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN
820 NORFOLK SHIPBUILDING & DRYDOCK CORP.
v. GARRIS
Ginsburg, J., concurring in part
2
Even beyond the express pre-emptive reach of federal
maritime statutes, however, we have acknowledged that
they contain a further prudential effect. “While there is
an established and continuing tradition of federal common
lawmaking in admiralty, that law is to be developed, insofar
as possible, to harmonize with the enactments of Congress
in the field.” American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U. S.
443, 455 (1994). Cf. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A.
v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U. S. 308, 332–333 (1999)
(equitable lawmaking power of bankruptcy courts limited
by statute). Because of Congress’s extensive involvement
in legislating causes of action for maritime personal injuries,
it will be the better course, in many cases that assert new
claims beyond what those statutes have seen fit to allow,
to leave further development to Congress. The cause of ac-
tion we recognize today, however, is new only in the most
technical sense. The general maritime law has recognized
the tort of negligence for more than a century, and it has
been clear since Moragne that breaches of a maritime duty
are actionable when they cause death, as when they cause
injury. Congress’s occupation of this field is not yet so ex-
tensive as to preclude us from recognizing what is already
logically compelled by our precedents.
* * *
The maritime cause of action that Moragne established
for unseaworthiness is equally available for negligence.
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Souter and
Justice Breyer join, concurring in part.
I join all but Part II–B–2 of the Court’s opinion.
Following the reasoning in Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc., 398 U. S. 375 (1970), the Court today holds that

532US3 Unit: $U65 [09-06-02 19:22:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN
821 Cite as: 532 U. S. 811 (2001)
Ginsburg, J., concurring in part
the maritime cause of action Moragne established for un-
seaworthiness is equally available for negligence. I agree
with the Court’s clear opinion with one reservation. In Part
II–B–2, the Court counsels: “Because of Congress’s exten-
sive involvement in legislating causes of action for mari-
time personal injuries, it will be the better course, in many
cases that assert new claims beyond what those statutes . . .
allow, to leave further development to Congress.” Ante,
at 820. Moragne itself, however, tugs in the opposite di-
rection. Inspecting the relevant legislation, the Court in
Moragne found no measures counseling against the judicial
elaboration of general maritime law there advanced. See
398 U. S., at 399–402, 409; see also id., at 393 (“Where death
is caused by the breach of a duty imposed by federal mari-
time law, Congress has established a policy favoring recov-
ery in the absence of a legislative direction to except a par-
ticular class of cases.”). In accord with Moragne, I see
development of the law in admiralty as a shared venture in
which “federal common lawmaking” does not stand still, but
“harmonize[s] with the enactments of Congress in the field.”
Ante, at 820 (quoting American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510
U. S. 443, 455 (1994)). I therefore do not join the Court’s
dictum.