PGA TOUR, INC. v. MARTIN

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PGA TOUR, INC. v. MARTIN
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 00–24. Argued January 17, 2001—Decided May 29, 2001
Petitioner sponsors professional golf tournaments conducted on three an-
nual tours. A player may gain entry into the tours in various ways,
most commonly through successfully competing in a three-stage qualify-
ing tournament known as the “Q-School.” Any member of the public
may enter the Q-School by submitting two letters of recommendation
and paying a $3,000 entry fee to cover greens fees and the cost of golf
carts, which are permitted during the first two stages, but have been
prohibited during the third stage since 1997. The rules governing com-
petition in tour events include the “Rules of Golf,” which apply at all
levels of amateur and professional golf and do not prohibit the use of
golf carts, and the “hard card,” which applies specifically to petitioner’s
professional tours and requires players to walk the golf course during
tournaments, except in “open” qualifying events for each tournament
and on petitioner’s senior tour. Respondent Martin is a talented golfer
afflicted with a degenerative circulatory disorder that prevents him
from walking golf courses. His disorder constitutes a disability under
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U. S. C. § 12101
et seq. When Martin turned pro and entered the Q-School, he made a
request, supported by detailed medical records, for permission to use a
golf cart during the third stage. Petitioner refused, and Martin filed
this action under Title III of the ADA, which, among other things, re-
quires an entity operating “public accommodations” to make “reasonable
modifications” in its policies “when . . . necessary to afford such . . .
accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can
demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally
alter the nature of such . . . accommodations,” § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (em-
phasis added). In denying petitioner summary judgment, the Magis-
trate Judge rejected its contention, among others, that the play areas
of its tour competitions are not places of “public accommodation” within
Title III’s scope. After trial, the District Court entered a permanent
injunction requiring petitioner to permit Martin to use a cart. Among
its rulings, that court found that the walking rule’s purpose was to in-
ject fatigue into the skill of shotmaking, but that the fatigue injected
by walking a golf course cannot be deemed significant under normal

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circumstances; determined that even with the use of a cart, the fatigue
Martin suffers from coping with his disability is greater than the fatigue
his able-bodied competitors endure from walking the course; and con-
cluded that it would not fundamentally alter the nature of petitioner’s
game to accommodate Martin. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding,
inter alia, that golf courses, including play areas, are places of public
accommodation during professional tournaments and that permitting
Martin to use a cart would not “fundamentally alter” the nature of
those tournaments.
Held:
1. Title III of the ADA, by its plain terms, prohibits petitioner from
denying Martin equal access to its tours on the basis of his disability.
Cf. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206, 209.
That Title provides, as a general rule, that “[n]o individual shall be dis-
criminated against on the basis of a disability in the full and equal enjoy-
ment of the . . . privileges . . . of any place of public accommodation.”
§ 12182(a). The phrase “public accommodation” is defined in terms of 12
extensive categories, § 12181(7), which the legislative history indicates
should be construed liberally to afford people with disabilities equal ac-
cess to the wide variety of establishments available to the nondisabled.
Given the general rule and the comprehensive definition of “public ac-
commodation,” it is apparent that petitioner’s golf tours and their quali-
fying rounds fit comfortably within Title III’s coverage, and Martin
within its protection. The events occur on “golf course[s],” a type of
place specifically identified as a public accommodation. § 12181(7)(L).
And, at all relevant times, petitioner “leases” and “operates” golf
courses to conduct its Q-School and tours. § 12182(a). As a lessor and
operator, petitioner must not discriminate against any “individual” in
the “full and equal enjoyment of the . . . privileges” of those courses.
Ibid. Among those “privileges” are competing in the Q-School and
playing in the tours; indeed, the former is a privilege for which thou-
sands of individuals from the general public pay, and the latter is one for
which they vie. Martin is one of those individuals. The Court rejects
petitioner’s argument that competing golfers are not members of the
class protected by Title III—i. e., “clients or customers of the covered
public accommodation,” § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv)—but are providers of the
entertainment petitioner sells, so that their “job-related” discrimination
claims may only be brought under Title I. Even if Title III’s protected
class were so limited, it would be entirely appropriate to classify the
golfers who pay petitioner $3,000 for the chance to compete in the
Q-School and, if successful, in the subsequent tour events, as petitioner’s

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clients or customers. This conclusion is consistent with case law in the
analogous context of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See, e. g.,
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U. S. 298, 306. Pp. 674–681.
2. Allowing Martin to use a golf cart, despite petitioner’s walking
requirement, is not a modification that would “fundamentally alter the
nature” of petitioner’s tours or the third stage of the Q-School. In the-
ory, a modification of the tournaments might constitute a fundamental
alteration in these ways: (1) It might alter such an essential aspect of
golf, e. g., the diameter of the hole, that it would be unacceptable even
if it affected all competitors equally; or (2) a less significant change that
has only a peripheral impact on the game itself might nevertheless give
a disabled player, in addition to access to the competition as required
by Title III, an advantage over others and therefore fundamentally alter
the character of the competition. The Court is not persuaded that a
waiver of the walking rule for Martin would work a fundamental al-
teration in either sense. The use of carts is not inconsistent with the
fundamental character of golf, the essence of which has always been
shotmaking. The walking rule contained in petitioner’s hard cards
is neither an essential attribute of the game itself nor an indispensable
feature of tournament golf. The Court rejects petitioner’s attempt to
distinguish golf as it is generally played from the game at the highest
level, where, petitioner claims, the waiver of an “outcome-affecting” rule
such as the walking rule would violate the governing principle that com-
petitors must be subject to identical substantive rules, thereby funda-
mentally altering the nature of tournament events. That argument’s
force is mitigated by the fact that it is impossible to guarantee that all
golfers will play under exactly the same conditions or that an individu-
al’s ability will be the sole determinant of the outcome. Further, the
factual basis of petitioner’s argument—that the walking rule is “out-
come affecting” because fatigue may adversely affect performance—is
undermined by the District Court’s finding that the fatigue from walk-
ing during a tournament cannot be deemed significant. Even if peti-
tioner’s factual predicate is accepted, its legal position is fatally flawed
because its refusal to consider Martin’s personal circumstances in decid-
ing whether to accommodate his disability runs counter to the ADA’s
requirement that an individualized inquiry be conducted. Cf. Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U. S. 471, 483. There is no doubt that allow-
ing Martin to use a cart would not fundamentally alter the nature of
petitioner’s tournaments, given the District Court’s uncontested finding
that Martin endures greater fatigue with a cart than his able-bodied
competitors do by walking. The waiver of a peripheral tournament

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rule that does not impair its purpose cannot be said to fundamentally
alter the nature of the athletic event. Pp. 681–691.
204 F. 3d 994, affirmed.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined,
post, p. 691.
H. Bartow Farr III argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Richard G. Taranto, William J.
Maledon, and Andrew D. Hurtiwz.
Roy L. Reardon argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief was Joseph M. McLaughlin.
Deputy Solicitor General Underwood argued the cause
for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
With her on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, As-
sistant Attorney General Lee, Patricia A. Millett, Jessica
Dunsay Silver, and Thomas E. Chandler.*
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case raises two questions concerning the application
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 328,
42 U. S. C. § 12101 et seq., to a gifted athlete: first, whether
the Act protects access to professional golf tournaments by
a qualified entrant with a disability; and second, whether a
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Equal Em-
ployment Advisory Council by Ann Elizabeth Reesman; for ATP Tour,
Inc., et al. by Bradley I. Ruskin; for the United States Golf Association
by Roy T. Englert, Jr., Lee N. Abrams, James C. Schroeder, Robert M.
Dow, Jr., and John W. Vardaman; and for Kenneth R. Green II by Gregory
D. Smith.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American
Association of Adapted Sports Programs et al. by Anita M. Moorman and
Lisa Pike Masteralexis; for the K–T Support Group by Brian D. Shannon;
for the National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems et al. by
Sharon Masling, Samuel R. Bagenstos, and Neil V. McKittrick; and for
Robert J. Dole et al. by Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., and George G. Olsen.

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disabled contestant may be denied the use of a golf cart be-
cause it would “fundamentally alter the nature” of the tour-
naments, § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), to allow him to ride when all
other contestants must walk.
I
Petitioner PGA TOUR, Inc., a nonprofit entity formed in
1968, sponsors and cosponsors professional golf tournaments
conducted on three annual tours. About 200 golfers partici-
pate in the PGA TOUR; about 170 in the NIKE TOUR; 1 and
about 100 in the SENIOR PGA TOUR. PGA TOUR and
NIKE TOUR tournaments typically are 4-day events, played
on courses leased and operated by petitioner. The entire
field usually competes in two 18-hole rounds played on
Thursday and Friday; those who survive the “cut” play on
Saturday and Sunday and receive prize money in amounts
determined by their aggregate scores for all four rounds.
The revenues generated by television, admissions, conces-
sions, and contributions from cosponsors amount to about
$300 million a year, much of which is distributed in prize
money.
There are various ways of gaining entry into particular
tours. For example, a player who wins three NIKE TOUR
events in the same year, or is among the top-15 money win-
ners on that tour, earns the right to play in the PGA TOUR.
Additionally, a golfer may obtain a spot in an official tourna-
ment through successfully competing in “open” qualifying
rounds, which are conducted the week before each tourna-
ment. Most participants, however, earn playing privileges
in the PGA TOUR or NIKE TOUR by way of a three-stage
qualifying tournament known as the “Q-School.”
Any member of the public may enter the Q-School by pay-
ing a $3,000 entry fee and submitting two letters of reference
1 After the trial of the case, the name of the NIKE TOUR was changed
to the Buy.com TOUR.

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from, among others, PGA TOUR or NIKE TOUR members.
The $3,000 entry fee covers the players’ greens fees and the
cost of golf carts, which are permitted during the first two
stages, but which have been prohibited during the third
stage since 1997. Each year, over a thousand contestants
compete in the first stage, which consists of four 18-hole
rounds at different locations. Approximately half of them
make it to the second stage, which also includes 72 holes.
Around 168 players survive the second stage and advance to
the final one, where they compete over 108 holes. Of those
finalists, about a fourth qualify for membership in the PGA
TOUR, and the rest gain membership in the NIKE TOUR.
The significance of making it into either tour is illuminated
by the fact that there are about 25 million golfers in the
country.2
Three sets of rules govern competition in tour events.
First, the “Rules of Golf,” jointly written by the United
States Golf Association (USGA) and the Royal and Ancient
Golf Club of Scotland, apply to the game as it is played, not
only by millions of amateurs on public courses and in private
country clubs throughout the United States and worldwide,
but also by the professionals in the tournaments conducted
by petitioner, the USGA, the Ladies’ Professional Golf Asso-
ciation, and the Senior Women’s Golf Association. Those
rules do not prohibit the use of golf carts at any time.3
Second, the “Conditions of Competition and Local Rules,”
often described as the “hard card,” apply specifically to peti-
tioner’s professional tours. The hard cards for the PGA
2 Generally, to maintain membership in a tour for the succeeding year,
rather than go through the Q-School again, a player must perform at a
certain level.
3 Instead, Appendix I to the Rules of Golf lists a number of “optional”
conditions, among them one related to transportation: “If it is desired
to require players to walk in a competition, the following condition is
suggested:
“Players shall walk at all times during a stipulated round.” App. 125.

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TOUR and NIKE TOUR require players to walk the golf
course during tournaments, but not during open qualifying
rounds.4 On the SENIOR PGA TOUR, which is limited to
golfers age 50 and older, the contestants may use golf carts.
Most seniors, however, prefer to walk.5
Third, “Notices to Competitors” are issued for particular
tournaments and cover conditions for that specific event.
Such a notice may, for example, explain how the Rules of Golf
should be applied to a particular water hazard or manmade
obstruction. It might also authorize the use of carts to
speed up play when there is an unusual distance between
one green and the next tee.6
The basic Rules of Golf, the hard cards, and the weekly
notices apply equally to all players in tour competitions. As
one of petitioner’s witnesses explained with reference to “the
Masters Tournament, which is golf at its very highest
level, . . . the key is to have everyone tee off on the first hole
under exactly the same conditions and all of them be tested
over that 72-hole event under the conditions that exist dur-
ing those four days of the event.” App. 192.
II
Casey Martin is a talented golfer. As an amateur, he won
17 Oregon Golf Association junior events before he was 15,
4 The PGA TOUR hard card provides: “Players shall walk at all times
during a stipulated round unless permitted to ride by the PGA TOUR
Rules Committee.” Id., at 127. The NIKE TOUR hard card similarly
requires walking unless otherwise permitted. Id., at 129. Additionally,
as noted, golf carts have not been permitted during the third stage of the
Q-School since 1997. Petitioner added this recent prohibition in order to
“approximat[e] a PGA TOUR event as closely as possible.” Id., at 152.
5 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1251 (Ore. 1998).
6 See, e. g., App. 156–160 (Notices to Competitors for 1997 Bob Hope
Chrysler Classic, 1997 AT&T Pebble Beach National Pro-Am, and 1997
Quad City Classic).

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and won the state championship as a high school senior. He
played on the Stanford University golf team that won the
1994 National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) cham-
pionship. As a professional, Martin qualified for the NIKE
TOUR in 1998 and 1999, and based on his 1999 performance,
qualified for the PGA TOUR in 2000. In the 1999 season,
he entered 24 events, made the cut 13 times, and had 6 top-10
finishes, coming in second twice and third once.
Martin is also an individual with a disability as defined in
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act).7
Since birth he has been afflicted with Klippel-Trenaunay-
Weber Syndrome, a degenerative circulatory disorder that
obstructs the flow of blood from his right leg back to his
heart. The disease is progressive; it causes severe pain and
has atrophied his right leg. During the latter part of his
college career, because of the progress of the disease, Martin
could no longer walk an 18-hole golf course.8 Walking not
only caused him pain, fatigue, and anxiety, but also created
a significant risk of hemorrhaging, developing blood clots,
and fracturing his tibia so badly that an amputation might
be required. For these reasons, Stanford made written re-
quests to the Pacific 10 Conference and the NCAA to waive
for Martin their rules requiring players to walk and carry
their own clubs. The requests were granted.9
7 Title 42 U. S. C. § 12102 provides, in part:
“The term ‘disability’ means, with respect to an individual—
“(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual . . . .”
8 Before then, even when Martin was in extreme pain, and was offered
a cart, he declined. Tr. 564–565.
9 When asked about the other teams’ reaction to Martin’s use of a cart,
the Stanford coach testified:
“Q. Was there any complaint ever made to you by the coaches when he
was allowed a cart that that gave a competitive advantage over the—
“A. Any complaints? No sir, there were exactly—exactly the opposite.
Everybody recognized Casey for the person he was, and what he was

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When Martin turned pro and entered petitioner ’s
Q-School, the hard card permitted him to use a cart during
his successful progress through the first two stages. He
made a request, supported by detailed medical records, for
permission to use a golf cart during the third stage. Peti-
tioner refused to review those records or to waive its walk-
ing rule for the third stage. Martin therefore filed this
action. A preliminary injunction entered by the District
Court made it possible for him to use a cart in the final stage
of the Q-School and as a competitor in the NIKE TOUR and
PGA TOUR. Although not bound by the injunction, and de-
spite its support for petitioner’s position in this litigation,
the USGA voluntarily granted Martin a similar waiver in
events that it sponsors, including the U. S. Open.
III
In the District Court, petitioner moved for summary judg-
ment on the ground that it is exempt from coverage under
Title III of the ADA as a “private clu[b] or establish-
men[t],” 10 or alternatively, that the play areas of its tour
competitions do not constitute places of “public accommoda-
tion” within the scope of that Title.11 The Magistrate Judge
concluded that petitioner should be viewed as a commercial
enterprise operating in the entertainment industry for the
economic benefit of its members rather than as a private
doing with his life, and every coach, to my knowledge, and every player
wanted Casey in the tournament and they welcomed him there.
“Q. Did anyone contend that that constituted an alteration of the com-
petition to the extent that it didn’t constitute the game to your level, the
college level?
“A. Not at all, sir.” App. 208.
10 Title 42 U. S. C. § 12187 provides: “The provisions of this subchapter
shall not apply to private clubs or establishments exempted from coverage
under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U. S. C. § 2000–a(e)) or to
religious organizations or entities controlled by religious organizations,
including places of worship.”
11 See § 12181(7).

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club. Furthermore, after noting that the statutory defini-
tion of public accommodation included a “golf course,” 12 he
rejected petitioner’s argument that its competitions are only
places of public accommodation in the areas open to specta-
tors. The operator of a public accommodation could not, in
his view, “create private enclaves within the facility . . . and
thus relegate the ADA to hop-scotch areas.” 984 F. Supp.
1320, 1326–1327 (Ore. 1998). Accordingly, he denied peti-
tioner’s motion for summary judgment.
At trial, petitioner did not contest the conclusion that Mar-
tin has a disability covered by the ADA, or the fact “that his
disability prevents him from walking the course during a
round of golf.” 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (Ore. 1998). Rather,
petitioner asserted that the condition of walking is a sub-
stantive rule of competition, and that waiving it as to
any individual for any reason would fundamentally alter the
nature of the competition. Petitioner’s evidence included
the testimony of a number of experts, among them some
of the greatest golfers in history. Arnold Palmer,13 Jack
Nicklaus,14 and Ken Venturi 15 explained that fatigue can be
12 § 12181(7)(L).
13 “Q. And fatigue is one of the factors that can cause a golfer at the
PGA Tour level to lose one stroke or more?
“A. Oh, it is. And it has happened.
“Q. And can one stroke be the difference between winning and not win-
ning a tournament at the PGA Tour level?
“A. As I said, I’ve lost a few national opens by one stroke.” App. 177.
14 “Q. Mr. Nicklaus, what is your understanding of the reason why in
these competitive events . . . that competitors are required to walk the
course?
“A. Well, in my opinion, physical fitness and fatigue are part of the game
of golf.” Id., at 190.
15 “Q. So are you telling the court that this fatigue factor tends to accu-
mulate over the course of the four days of the tournament?
“A. Oh definitely. There’s no doubt.
. . . . .
“Q. Does this fatigue factor that you’ve talked about, Mr. Venturi, affect
the manner in which you—you perform as a professional out on the golf
course?

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a critical factor in a tournament, particularly on the last day
when psychological pressure is at a maximum. Their testi-
mony makes it clear that, in their view, permission to use a
cart might well give some players a competitive advantage
over other players who must walk. They did not, however,
express any opinion on whether a cart would give Martin
such an advantage.16
Rejecting petitioner’s argument that an individualized in-
quiry into the necessity of the walking rule in Martin’s case
would be inappropriate, the District Court stated that it had
“the independent duty to inquire into the purpose of the rule
at issue, and to ascertain whether there can be a reasonable
modification made to accommodate plaintiff without frustrat-
ing the purpose of the rule” and thereby fundamentally al-
tering the nature of petitioner’s tournaments. Id., at 1246.
The judge found that the purpose of the rule was to inject
fatigue into the skill of shotmaking, but that the fatigue in-
jected “by walking the course cannot be deemed significant
under normal circumstances.” Id., at 1250. Furthermore,
Martin presented evidence, and the judge found, that even
with the use of a cart, Martin must walk over a mile during
“A. Oh, there’s no doubt, again, but that, that fatigue does play a big
part. It will influence your game. It will influence your shot-making.
It will influence your decisions.” Id., at 236–237.
16 “Q. Based on your experience, do you believe that it would fundamen-
tally alter the nature of the competition on the PGA Tour and the Nike
Tour if competitors in those events were permitted to use golf carts?
“A. Yes, absolutely.
“Q. Why do you say so, sir?
“A. It would—it would take away the fatigue factor in many ways. It
would—it would change the game.
. . . . .
“Q. Now, when you say that the use of carts takes away the fatigue
factor, it would be an aid, et cetera, again, as I understand it, you are not
testifying now about the plaintiff. You are just talking in general terms?
. . . . .
“A. Yes, sir.” Id., at 238. See also id., at 177–178 (Palmer); id., at
191 (Nicklaus).

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an 18-hole round,17 and that the fatigue he suffers from cop-
ing with his disability is “undeniably greater” than the fa-
tigue his able-bodied competitors endure from walking the
course. Id., at 1251. As the judge observed:
“[P]laintiff is in significant pain when he walks, and
even when he is getting in and out of the cart. With
each step, he is at risk of fracturing his tibia and hemor-
rhaging. The other golfers have to endure the psycho-
logical stress of competition as part of their fatigue;
Martin has the same stress plus the added stress of pain
and risk of serious injury. As he put it, he would gladly
trade the cart for a good leg. To perceive that the cart
puts him—with his condition—at a competitive advan-
tage is a gross distortion of reality.” Id., at 1251–1252.
As a result, the judge concluded that it would “not funda-
mentally alter the nature of the PGA Tour’s game to accom-
modate him with a cart.” Id., at 1252. The judge accord-
ingly entered a permanent injunction requiring petitioner
to permit Martin to use a cart in tour and qualifying events.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, petitioner did not chal-
lenge the District Court’s rejection of its claim that it was
exempt as a “private club,” but it renewed the contention
that during a tournament the portion of the golf course “ ‘be-
hind the ropes’ is not a public accommodation because the
public has no right to enter it.” 204 F. 3d 994, 997 (2000).
The Court of Appeals viewed that contention as resting on
the incorrect assumption that the competition among partici-
pants was not itself public. The court first pointed out that,
as with a private university, “the fact that users of a facility
are highly selected does not mean that the facility cannot be
17 “In the first place, he does walk while on the course—even with a cart,
he must move from cart to shot and back to the cart. In essence, he still
must walk approximately 25% of the course. On a course roughly five
miles in length, Martin will walk 1 1⁄ 4 miles.” 994 F. Supp., at 1251.

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a public accommodation.” Id., at 998.18 In its opinion, the
competition to enter the select circle of PGA TOUR and
NIKE TOUR golfers was comparable because “[a]ny mem-
ber of the public who pays a $3000 entry fee and supplies
two letters of recommendation may try out in the qualifying
school.” Id., at 999. The court saw “no justification in rea-
son or in the statute to draw a line beyond which the per-
formance of athletes becomes so excellent that a competition
restricted to their level deprives its situs of the character of
a public accommodation.” Ibid. Nor did it find a basis for
distinguishing between “use of a place of public accommoda-
tion for pleasure and use in the pursuit of a living.” Ibid.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals concluded that golf
courses remain places of public accommodation during PGA
tournaments. Ibid.
On the merits, because there was no serious dispute about
the fact that permitting Martin to use a golf cart was both a
reasonable and a necessary solution to the problem of provid-
ing him access to the tournaments, the Court of Appeals re-
garded the central dispute as whether such permission would
“fundamentally alter” the nature of the PGA TOUR or
NIKE TOUR. Like the District Court, the Court of Ap-
peals viewed the issue not as “whether use of carts generally
would fundamentally alter the competition, but whether the
use of a cart by Martin would do so.” Id., at 1001. That
issue turned on “an intensively fact-based inquiry,” and, the
court concluded, had been correctly resolved by the trial
judge. In its words, “[a]ll that the cart does is permit Mar-
tin access to a type of competition in which he otherwise
could not engage because of his disability.” Id., at 1000.
18 It explained: “For example, Title III includes in its definition ‘sec-
ondary, undergraduate, or post-graduate private school[s].’ 42 U. S. C.
§ 12181(7)(J). The competition to enter the most elite private universities
is intense, and a relatively select few are admitted. That fact clearly does
not remove the universities from the statute’s definition as places of public
accommodation.” 204 F. 3d, at 998.

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The day after the Ninth Circuit ruled in Martin’s favor,
the Seventh Circuit came to a contrary conclusion in a case
brought against the USGA by a disabled golfer who failed to
qualify for “America’s greatest—and most democratic—golf
tournament, the United States Open.” Olinger v. United
States Golf Assn., 205 F. 3d 1001 (2000).19 The Seventh Cir-
cuit endorsed the conclusion of the District Court in that
case that “the nature of the competition would be fundamen-
tally altered if the walking rule were eliminated because it
would remove stamina (at least a particular type of stamina)
from the set of qualities designed to be tested in this compe-
tition.” Id., at 1006 (internal quotation marks omitted). In
the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, the physical ordeals endured
by Ken Venturi and Ben Hogan when they walked to their
Open victories in 1964 and 1950 amply demonstrated the im-
portance of stamina in such a tournament.20 As an alterna-
tive basis for its holding, the court also concluded that the
ADA does not require the USGA to bear “the administrative
burdens of evaluating requests to waive the walking rule and
permit the use of a golf cart.” Id., at 1007.
Although the Seventh Circuit merely assumed that the
ADA applies to professional golf tournaments, and therefore
did not disagree with the Ninth on the threshold coverage
issue, our grant of certiorari, 530 U. S. 1306 (2000), encom-
passes that question as well as the conflict between those
courts.
IV
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 to remedy widespread
discrimination against disabled individuals. In studying the
need for such legislation, Congress found that “historically,
society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with
19 The golfer in the Seventh Circuit case, Ford Olinger, suffers from
bilateral avascular necrosis, a degenerative condition that significantly
hinders his ability to walk.
20 For a description of the conditions under which they played, see
Olinger v. United States Golf Assn., 205 F. 3d, at 1006–1007.

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disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue
to be a serious and pervasive social problem.” 42 U. S. C.
§ 12101(a)(2); see § 12101(a)(3) (“[D]iscrimination against in-
dividuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as
employment, housing, public accommodations, education,
transportation, communication, recreation, institutionaliza-
tion, health services, voting, and access to public services”).
Congress noted that the many forms such discrimination
takes include “outright intentional exclusion” as well as the
“failure to make modifications to existing facilities and prac-
tices.” § 12101(a)(5). After thoroughly investigating the
problem, Congress concluded that there was a “compelling
need” for a “clear and comprehensive national mandate” to
eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals, and to
integrate them “into the economic and social mainstream of
American life.” S. Rep. No. 101–116, p. 20 (1989); H. R. Rep.
No. 101–485, pt. 2, p. 50 (1990).
In the ADA, Congress provided that broad mandate. See
42 U. S. C. § 12101(b). In fact, one of the Act’s “most impres-
sive strengths” has been identified as its “comprehensive
character,” Hearings on S. 933 before the Senate Committee
on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcommittee on
the Handicapped, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 197 (1989) (state-
ment of Attorney General Thornburgh), and accordingly the
Act has been described as “a milestone on the path to a more
decent, tolerant, progressive society,” Board of Trustees of
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356, 375 (2001) (Kennedy,
J., concurring). To effectuate its sweeping purpose, the
ADA forbids discrimination against disabled individuals in
major areas of public life, among them employment (Title I
of the Act),21 public services (Title II),22 and public accommo-
dations (Title III).23 At issue now, as a threshold matter, is
21 42 U. S. C. §§ 12111–12117.
22 §§ 12131–12165.
23 §§ 12181–12189.

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the applicability of Title III to petitioner’s golf tours and
qualifying rounds, in particular to petitioner’s treatment of a
qualified disabled golfer wishing to compete in those events.
Title III of the ADA prescribes, as a “[g]eneral rule”:
“No individual shall be discriminated against on the
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or ac-
commodations of any place of public accommodation by
any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates
a place of public accommodation.” 42 U. S. C. § 12182(a).
The phrase “public accommodation” is defined in terms of 12
extensive categories,24 which the legislative history indicates
“should be construed liberally” to afford people with disabili-
24 “(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an estab-
lishment located within a building that contains not more than five rooms
for rent or hire and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of such
establishment as the residence of such proprietor;
“(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
“(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other
place of exhibition or entertainment;
“(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of
public gathering;
“(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping
center, or other sales or rental establishment;
“(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel
service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an ac-
countant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a
health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment;
“(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public
transportation;
“(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of display or collection;
“(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
“(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate
private school, or other place of education;
“(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food
bank, adoption agency, or other social service center establishment; and
“(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place
of exercise or recreation.” § 12181(7) (emphasis added).

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ties “equal access” to the wide variety of establishments
available to the nondisabled.25
It seems apparent, from both the general rule and the com-
prehensive definition of “public accommodation,” that peti-
tioner’s golf tours and their qualifying rounds fit comfortably
within the coverage of Title III, and Martin within its pro-
tection. The events occur on “golf course[s],” a type of place
specifically identified by the Act as a public accommodation.
§ 12181(7)(L). In addition, at all relevant times, petitioner
“leases” and “operates” golf courses to conduct its Q-School
and tours. § 12182(a). As a lessor and operator of golf
courses, then, petitioner must not discriminate against any
“individual” in the “full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommoda-
tions” of those courses. Ibid. Certainly, among the “privi-
leges” offered by petitioner on the courses are those of com-
peting in the Q-School and playing in the tours; indeed, the
former is a privilege for which thousands of individuals from
the general public pay, and the latter is one for which they
vie. Martin, of course, is one of those individuals. It would
therefore appear that Title III of the ADA, by its plain
terms, prohibits petitioner from denying Martin equal access
to its tours on the basis of his disability. Cf. Pennsylvania
Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206, 209 (1998)
(holding that text of Title II’s prohibition of discrimina-
tion by “public entities” against disabled individuals “unmis-
takably includes State prisons and prisoners within its
coverage”).
Petitioner argues otherwise. To be clear about its posi-
tion, it does not assert (as it did in the District Court) that
it is a private club altogether exempt from Title III’s cov-
erage. In fact, petitioner admits that its tournaments are
conducted at places of public accommodation.26 Nor does
petitioner contend (as it did in both the District Court and
25 S. Rep. No. 101–116, p. 59 (1989); H. R. Rep. No. 101–485, pt. 2, p. 100
(1990).
26 Reply Brief for Petitioner 1–2.

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the Court of Appeals) that the competitors’ area “behind the
ropes” is not a public accommodation, notwithstanding the
status of the rest of the golf course. Rather, petitioner re-
frames the coverage issue by arguing that the competing
golfers are not members of the class protected by Title III
of the ADA.27
According to petitioner, Title III is concerned with dis-
crimination against “clients and customers” seeking to obtain
“goods and services” at places of public accommodation,
whereas it is Title I that protects persons who work at such
places.28 As the argument goes, petitioner operates not a
“golf course” during its tournaments but a “place of exhibi-
tion or entertainment,” 42 U. S. C. § 12181(7)(C), and a pro-
fessional golfer such as Martin, like an actor in a theater
production, is a provider rather than a consumer of the
entertainment that petitioner sells to the public. Martin
therefore cannot bring a claim under Title III because he is
not one of the “ ‘clients or customers of the covered public
accommodation.’ ” 29 Rather, Martin’s claim of discrimina-
tion is “job-related” 30 and could only be brought under Title
I—but that Title does not apply because he is an independent
contractor (as the District Court found) rather than an
employee.
The reference to “clients or customers” that petitioner
quotes appears in 42 U. S. C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv), which
27 Martin complains that petitioner’s failure to make this exact argument
below precludes its assertion here. However, the Title III coverage issue
was raised in the lower courts, petitioner advanced this particular argument
in support of its position on the issue in its petition for certiorari, and the
argument was fully briefed on the merits by both parties. Given the impor-
tance of the issue, we exercise our discretion to consider it. See Harris
Trust and Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530 U. S. 238, 245–246,
n. 2 (2000); Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 17, n. 2 (1980).
28 Brief for Petitioner 10, 11.
29 Id., at 19 (quoting 42 U. S. C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv)).
30 Brief for Petitioner 15; see also id., at 16 (Martin’s claim “is nothing more
than a straightforward discrimination-in-the-workplace complaint”).

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states: “For purposes of clauses (i) through (iii) of this sub-
paragraph, the term ‘individual or class of individuals’ refers
to the clients or customers of the covered public accommoda-
tion that enters into the contractual, licensing or other ar-
rangement.” Clauses (i) through (iii) of the subparagraph
prohibit public accommodations from discriminating against
a disabled “individual or class of individuals” in certain
ways 31 either directly or indirectly through contractual ar-
rangements with other entities. Those clauses make clear
on the one hand that their prohibitions cannot be avoided by
means of contract, while clause (iv) makes clear on the other
hand that contractual relationships will not expand a public
accommodation’s obligations under the subparagraph beyond
its own clients or customers.
As petitioner recognizes, clause (iv) is not literally appli-
cable to Title III’s general rule prohibiting discrimina-
tion against disabled individuals.32 Title III’s broad general
rule contains no express “clients or customers” limitation,
§ 12182(a), and § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv) provides that its limi-
tation is only “[f]or purposes of ” the clauses in that sepa-
rate subparagraph. Nevertheless, petitioner contends that
clause (iv)’s restriction of the subparagraph’s coverage to the
clients or customers of public accommodations fairly de-
scribes the scope of Title III’s protection as a whole.
We need not decide whether petitioner’s construction of
the statute is correct, because petitioner’s argument falters
even on its own terms. If Title III’s protected class were
limited to “clients or customers,” it would be entirely appro-
priate to classify the golfers who pay petitioner $3,000 for
the chance to compete in the Q-School and, if successful, in
the subsequent tour events, as petitioner’s clients or custom-
31 Clause (i) prohibits the denial of participation, clause (ii) participation in
unequal benefits, and clause (iii) the provision of separate benefits.
32 Brief for Petitioner 20 (clause (iv) “applies directly just to subsection
12182(b)”); Reply Brief for Petitioner 4, n. 1 (clause (iv) “does not apply di-
rectly to the general provision prohibiting discrimination”).

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ers. In our view, petitioner’s tournaments (whether situ-
ated at a “golf course” or at a “place of exhibition or enter-
tainment”) simultaneously offer at least two “privileges” to
the public—that of watching the golf competition and that of
competing in it. Although the latter is more difficult and
more expensive to obtain than the former, it is nonetheless
a privilege that petitioner makes available to members of the
general public. In consideration of the entry fee, any golfer
with the requisite letters of recommendation acquires the
opportunity to qualify for and compete in petitioner’s tours.
Additionally, any golfer who succeeds in the open qualifying
rounds for a tournament may play in the event. That peti-
tioner identifies one set of clients or customers that it serves
(spectators at tournaments) does not preclude it from having
another set (players in tournaments) against whom it may
not discriminate. It would be inconsistent with the literal
text of the statute as well as its expansive purpose to read
Title III’s coverage, even given petitioner’s suggested limita-
tion, any less broadly.33
33 Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, our view of the Q-School does not
make “everyone who seeks a job” at a public accommodation, through “an
open tryout” or otherwise, “a customer.” Post, at 697 (opinion of Scalia,
J.). Unlike those who successfully apply for a job at a place of public accom-
modation, or those who successfully bid for a contract, the golfers who qual-
ify for petitioner’s tours play at their own pleasure (perhaps, but not neces-
sarily, for prize money), and although they commit to playing in at least 15
tournaments, they are not bound by any obligations typically associated
with employment. See, e. g., App. 260 (trial testimony of PGA commis-
sioner Timothy Finchem) (petitioner lacks control over when and where tour
members compete, and over their manner of performance outside the rules
of competition). Furthermore, unlike athletes in “other professional
sports, such as baseball,” post, at 697, in which players are employed by their
clubs, the golfers on tour are not employed by petitioner or any related orga-
nizations. The record does not support the proposition that the purpose of
the Q-School “is to hire,” ibid., rather than to narrow the field of participants
in the sporting events that petitioner sponsors at places of public
accommodation.

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Our conclusion is consistent with case law in the analogous
context of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat.
243, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a et seq. Title II of that Act prohibits
public accommodations from discriminating on the basis of
race, color, religion, or national origin. § 2000a(a). In Dan-
iel v. Paul, 395 U. S. 298, 306 (1969), applying Title II to the
Lake Nixon Club in Little Rock, Arkansas, we held that the
definition of a “place of exhibition or entertainment,” as a
public accommodation, covered participants “in some sport
or activity” as well as “spectators or listeners.” We find
equally persuasive two lower court opinions applying Title
II specifically to golfers and golf tournaments. In Evans v.
Laurel Links, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 474, 477 (ED Va. 1966), a
class action brought to require a commercial golf establish-
ment to permit black golfers to play on its course, the Dis-
trict Court held that Title II “is not limited to spectators if
the place of exhibition or entertainment provides facilities
for the public to participate in the entertainment.” 34 And
in Wesley v. Savannah, 294 F. Supp. 698 (SD Ga. 1969), the
District Court found that a private association violated Title
II when it limited entry in a golf tournament on a municipal
course to its own members but permitted all (and only) white
golfers who paid the membership and entry fees to com-
pete. 35 These cases support our conclusion that, as a public
accommodation during its tours and qualifying rounds, peti-
tioner may not discriminate against either spectators or com-
petitors on the basis of disability.
V
As we have noted, 42 U. S. C. § 12182(a) sets forth Title
III’s general rule prohibiting public accommodations from
34 Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 includes in its definition of “public
accommodation” a “place of exhibition or entertainment” but does not spe-
cifically list a “golf course” as an example. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000a(b).
35 Under petitioner’s theory, Title II would not preclude it from discrimi-
nating against golfers on racial grounds. App. 197; Tr. of Oral Arg. 11–12.

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discriminating against individuals because of their disabili-
ties. The question whether petitioner has violated that rule
depends on a proper construction of the term “discrimina-
tion,” which is defined by Title III to include
“a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures, when such modifications are
necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, priv-
ileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals
with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that
making such modifications would fundamentally alter
the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations.” § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)
(emphasis added).
Petitioner does not contest that a golf cart is a reasonable
modification that is necessary if Martin is to play in its tour-
naments. Martin’s claim thus differs from one that might
be asserted by players with less serious afflictions that make
walking the course uncomfortable or difficult, but not beyond
their capacity. In such cases, an accommodation might be
reasonable but not necessary. In this case, however, the
narrow dispute is whether allowing Martin to use a golf
cart, despite the walking requirement that applies to the
PGA TOUR, the NIKE TOUR, and the third stage of the
Q-School, is a modification that would “fundamentally alter
the nature” of those events.
In theory, a modification of petitioner’s golf tournaments
might constitute a fundamental alteration in two different
ways. It might alter such an essential aspect of the game
of golf that it would be unacceptable even if it affected all
competitors equally; changing the diameter of the hole from
three to six inches might be such a modification.36 Alterna-
tively, a less significant change that has only a peripheral
36 Cf. post, at 701 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I suppose there is some point at
which the rules of a well-known game are changed to such a degree that no
reasonable person would call it the same game”).

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impact on the game itself might nevertheless give a disabled
player, in addition to access to the competition as required
by Title III, an advantage over others and, for that reason,
fundamentally alter the character of the competition.37 We
are not persuaded that a waiver of the walking rule for Mar-
tin would work a fundamental alteration in either sense.38
As an initial matter, we observe that the use of carts is
not itself inconsistent with the fundamental character of the
game of golf. From early on, the essence of the game has
been shotmaking—using clubs to cause a ball to progress
from the teeing ground to a hole some distance away with as
few strokes as possible.39 That essential aspect of the game
37 Accord, post, at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The statute seeks to as-
sure that a disabled person’s disability will not deny him equal access to
(among other things) competitive sporting events—not that his disability
will not deny him an equal chance to win competitive sporting events”).
38 As we have noted, the statute contemplates three inquiries: whether
the requested modification is “reasonable,” whether it is “necessary” for
the disabled individual, and whether it would “fundamentally alter the
nature of ” the competition. 42 U. S. C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). Whether one
question should be decided before the others likely will vary from case to
case, for in logic there seems to be no necessary priority among the three.
In routine cases, the fundamental alteration inquiry may end with the
question whether a rule is essential. Alternatively, the specifics of the
claimed disability might be examined within the context of what is a rea-
sonable or necessary modification. Given the concession by petitioner
that the modification sought is reasonable and necessary, and given peti-
tioner’s reliance on the fundamental alteration provision, we have no occa-
sion to consider the alternatives in this case.
39 Golf is an ancient game, tracing its ancestry to Scotland, and played
by such notables as Mary Queen of Scots and her son James. That shot-
making has been the essence of golf since early in its history is reflected
in the first recorded rules of golf, published in 1744 for a tournament on
the Leith Links in Edinburgh:
“Articles & Laws in Playing at Golf
“1. You must Tee your Ball, within a Club’s length of the [previous] Hole.
“2. Your Tee must be upon the Ground.
“3. You are not to change the Ball which you Strike off the Tee.
[Footnote 39 is continued on p. 684]

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is still reflected in the very first of the Rules of Golf, which
declares: “The Game of Golf consists in playing a ball from
the teeing ground into the hole by a stroke or successive
strokes in accordance with the rules.” Rule 1–1, Rules of
Golf, App. 104 (emphasis in original). Over the years, there
have been many changes in the players’ equipment, in golf
course design, in the Rules of Golf, and in the method of
transporting clubs from hole to hole.40 Originally, so few
clubs were used that each player could carry them without
“4. You are not to remove, Stones, Bones or any Break Club for the sake
of playing your Ball, Except upon the fair Green/& that only/ within a
Club’s length of your Ball.
“5. If your Ball comes among Water, or any Watery Filth, you are at lib-
erty to take out your Ball & bringing it behind the hazard and Teeing it,
you may play it with any Club and allow your Adversary a Stroke for so
getting out your Ball.
“6. If your Balls be found anywhere touching one another, You are to lift
the first Ball, till you play the last.
“7. At Holling, you are to play your Ball honestly for the Hole, and, not to
play upon your Adversary’s Ball, not lying in your way to the Hole.
“8. If you should lose your Ball, by its being taken up, or any other way,
you are to go back to the Spot, where you struck last & drop another Ball,
And allow your Adversary a Stroke for the misfortune.
“9. No man at Holling his Ball, is to be allowed, to mark his way to the
Hole with his Club or, any thing else.
“10. If a Ball be stopp’d by any person, Horse, Dog, or any thing else, The
Ball so stop’d must be play’d where it lyes.
“11. If you draw your Club, in order to Strike & proceed so far in the
Stroke, as to be bringing down your Club; If then, your Club shall break,
in, any way, it is to be Accounted a Stroke.
“12. He, whose Ball lyes farthest from the Hole is obliged to play first.
“13. Neither Trench, Ditch, or Dyke, made for the preservation of the
Links, nor the Scholar’s Holes or the Soldier’s Lines, Shall be accounted a
Hazard; But the Ball is to be taken out/Teed/and play’d with any Iron
Club.” K. Chapman, Rules of the Green 14–15 (1997).
40 See generally M. Campbell, The Random House International Encyclo-
pedia of Golf 9–57 (1991); Golf Magazine’s Encyclopedia of Golf 1–17 (2d
ed. 1993).

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a bag. Then came golf bags, caddies, carts that were pulled
by hand, and eventually motorized carts that carried players
as well as clubs. “Golf carts started appearing with increas-
ing regularity on American golf courses in the 1950’s.
Today they are everywhere. And they are encouraged.
For one thing, they often speed up play, and for another, they
are great revenue producers.” 41 There is nothing in the
Rules of Golf that either forbids the use of carts or penalizes
a player for using a cart. That set of rules, as we have ob-
served, is widely accepted in both the amateur and profes-
sional golf world as the rules of the game.42 The walking
rule that is contained in petitioner’s hard cards, based on an
optional condition buried in an appendix to the Rules of
Golf,43 is not an essential attribute of the game itself.
Indeed, the walking rule is not an indispensable feature
of tournament golf either. As already mentioned, petitioner
permits golf carts to be used in the SENIOR PGA TOUR,
the open qualifying events for petitioner’s tournaments, the
first two stages of the Q-School, and, until 1997, the third
stage of the Q-School as well. See supra, at 665–667.
Moreover, petitioner allows the use of carts during certain
tournament rounds in both the PGA TOUR and the NIKE
41 Olinger v. United States Golf Assn., 205 F. 3d 1001, 1003 (CA7 2000).
42 On this point, the testimony of the immediate past president of the
USGA (and one of petitioner’s witnesses at trial) is illuminating:
“Tell the court, if you would, Ms. Bell, who it is that plays under these
Rules of Golf . . . ?
“A. Well, these are the rules of the game, so all golfers. These are for
all people who play the game.
“Q. So the two amateurs that go out on the weekend to play golf
together would—would play by the Rules of Golf?
“A. We certainly hope so.
“Q. Or a tournament that is conducted at a private country club for its
members, is it your understanding that that would typically be conducted
under the Rules of Golf?
“A. Well, that’s—that’s right. If you want to play golf, you need to play
by these rules.” App. 239.
43 See n. 3, supra.

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TOUR. See supra, at 667, and n. 6. In addition, although
the USGA enforces a walking rule in most of the tourna-
ments that it sponsors, it permits carts in the Senior Ama-
teur and the Senior Women’s Amateur championships.44
Petitioner, however, distinguishes the game of golf as it is
generally played from the game that it sponsors in the PGA
TOUR, NIKE TOUR, and (at least recently) the last stage
of the Q-School—golf at the “highest level.” According to
petitioner, “[t]he goal of the highest-level competitive athlet-
ics is to assess and compare the performance of different
competitors, a task that is meaningful only if the competitors
are subject to identical substantive rules.” 45 The waiver of
any possibly “outcome-affecting” rule for a contestant would
violate this principle and therefore, in petitioner’s view, fun-
damentally alter the nature of the highest level athletic
event.46 The walking rule is one such rule, petitioner sub-
mits, because its purpose is “to inject the element of fatigue
into the skill of shot-making,” 47 and thus its effect may be
the critical loss of a stroke. As a consequence, the reason-
able modification Martin seeks would fundamentally alter
the nature of petitioner’s highest level tournaments even if
he were the only person in the world who has both the talent
to compete in those elite events and a disability sufficiently
serious that he cannot do so without using a cart.
The force of petitioner’s argument is, first of all, mitigated
by the fact that golf is a game in which it is impossible to
guarantee that all competitors will play under exactly the
44 Furthermore, the USGA’s handicap system, used by over 4 million
amateur golfers playing on courses rated by the USGA, does not consider
whether a player walks or rides in a cart, or whether she uses a caddy or
carries her own clubs. Rather, a player’s handicap is determined by a
formula that takes into account the average score in the 10 best of her 20
most recent rounds, the difficulty of the different courses played, and
whether or not a round was a “tournament” event.
45 Brief for Petitioner 13.
46 Id., at 37.
47 994 F. Supp., at 1250.

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same conditions or that an individual’s ability will be the sole
determinant of the outcome. For example, changes in the
weather may produce harder greens and more head winds
for the tournament leader than for his closest pursuers. A
lucky bounce may save a shot or two.48 Whether such hap-
penstance events are more or less probable than the likeli-
hood that a golfer afflicted with Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber
Syndrome would one day qualify for the NIKE TOUR and
PGA TOUR, they at least demonstrate that pure chance may
have a greater impact on the outcome of elite golf tourna-
ments than the fatigue resulting from the enforcement of the
walking rule.
Further, the factual basis of petitioner’s argument is un-
dermined by the District Court’s finding that the fatigue
from walking during one of petitioner’s 4-day tournaments
cannot be deemed significant. The District Court credited
the testimony of a professor in physiology and expert on fa-
tigue, who calculated the calories expended in walking a golf
course (about five miles) to be approximately 500 calories—
“ ‘nutritionally . . . less than a Big Mac.’ ” 994 F. Supp., at
1250. What is more, that energy is expended over a 5-hour
period, during which golfers have numerous intervals for
rest and refreshment. In fact, the expert concluded, be-
cause golf is a low intensity activity, fatigue from the game
is primarily a psychological phenomenon in which stress and
motivation are the key ingredients. And even under condi-
tions of severe heat and humidity, the critical factor in fa-
tigue is fluid loss rather than exercise from walking.
Moreover, when given the option of using a cart, the ma-
jority of golfers in petitioner’s tournaments have chosen to
48 A drive by Andrew Magee earlier this year produced a result that he
neither intended nor expected. While the foursome ahead of him was
still on the green, he teed off on a 322-yard par four. To his surprise, the
ball not only reached the green, but also bounced off Tom Byrum’s putter
and into the hole. Davis, Magee Gets Ace on Par-4, Ariz. Republic, Jan.
26, 2001, p. C16, 2001 WL 8510792.

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Opinion of the Court
walk, often to relieve stress or for other strategic reasons.49
As NIKE TOUR member Eric Johnson testified, walking
allows him to keep in rhythm, stay warmer when it is chilly,
and develop a better sense of the elements and the course
than riding a cart.50
Even if we accept the factual predicate for petitioner’s
argument—that the walking rule is “outcome affecting”
because fatigue may adversely affect performance—its legal
position is fatally flawed. Petitioner’s refusal to consider
Martin’s personal circumstances in deciding whether to ac-
commodate his disability runs counter to the clear language
and purpose of the ADA. As previously stated, the ADA
was enacted to eliminate discrimination against “individuals”
with disabilities, 42 U. S. C. § 12101(b)(1), and to that end
Title III of the Act requires without exception that any “poli-
cies, practices, or procedures” of a public accommodation be
reasonably modified for disabled “individuals” as necessary
to afford access unless doing so would fundamentally alter
what is offered, § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). To comply with this
command, an individualized inquiry must be made to deter-
mine whether a specific modification for a particular person’s
disability would be reasonable under the circumstances as
well as necessary for that person, and yet at the same time
not work a fundamental alteration. See S. Rep. No. 101–116,
at 61; H. R. Rep. No. 101–485, pt. 2, at 102 (public accommo-
dations “are required to make decisions based on facts appli-
cable to individuals”). Cf. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U. S. 471, 483 (1999) (“[W]hether a person has a disability
under the ADA is an individualized inquiry”).
49 That has been so not only in the SENIOR PGA TOUR and the first
two stages of the Q-School, but also, as Martin himself noticed, in the third
stage of the Q-School after petitioner permitted everyone to ride rather
than just waiving the walking rule for Martin as required by the District
Court’s injunction.
50 App. 201. See also id., at 179–180 (deposition testimony of Gerry Nor-
quist); id., at 225–226 (trial testimony of Harry Toscano).

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To be sure, the waiver of an essential rule of competition
for anyone would fundamentally alter the nature of petition-
er’s tournaments. As we have demonstrated, however, the
walking rule is at best peripheral to the nature of petition-
er’s athletic events, and thus it might be waived in individ-
ual cases without working a fundamental alteration. There-
fore, petitioner’s claim that all the substantive rules for its
“highest-level” competitions are sacrosanct and cannot be
modified under any circumstances is effectively a contention
that it is exempt from Title III’s reasonable modification re-
quirement. But that provision carves out no exemption for
elite athletics, and given Title III’s coverage not only of
places of “exhibition or entertainment” but also of “golf
course[s],” 42 U. S. C. §§ 12181(7)(C), (L), its application to
petitioner’s tournaments cannot be said to be unintended or
unexpected, see §§ 12101(a)(1), (5). Even if it were, “the fact
that a statute can be applied in situations not expressly
anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity.
It demonstrates breadth.” Pennsylvania Dept. of Correc-
tions v. Yeskey, 524 U. S., at 212 (internal quotation marks
omitted).51
51 Hence, petitioner’s questioning of the ability of courts to apply the
reasonable modification requirement to athletic competition is a complaint
more properly directed to Congress, which drafted the ADA’s coverage
broadly, than to us. Even more misguided is Justice Scalia’s suggestion
that Congress did not place that inquiry into the hands of the courts at
all. According to the dissent, the game of golf as sponsored by petitioner
is, like all sports games, the sum of its “arbitrary rules,” and no one,
including courts, “can pronounce one or another of them to be ‘nonessen-
tial’ if the rulemaker (here the PGA TOUR) deems it to be essential.”
Post, at 700. Whatever the merit of Justice Scalia’s postmodern view
of “What Is [Sport],” ibid., it is clear that Congress did not enshrine it in
Title III of the ADA. While Congress expressly exempted “private clubs
or establishments” and “religious organizations or entities” from Title III’s
coverage, 42 U. S. C. § 12187, Congress made no such exception for athletic
competitions, much less did it give sports organizations carte blanche au-
thority to exempt themselves from the fundamental alteration inquiry by
deeming any rule, no matter how peripheral to the competition, to be

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Opinion of the Court
Under the ADA’s basic requirement that the need of a dis-
abled person be evaluated on an individual basis, we have
no doubt that allowing Martin to use a golf cart would not
fundamentally alter the nature of petitioner’s tournaments.
As we have discussed, the purpose of the walking rule is to
subject players to fatigue, which in turn may influence the
outcome of tournaments. Even if the rule does serve that
purpose, it is an uncontested finding of the District Court
that Martin “easily endures greater fatigue even with a cart
than his able-bodied competitors do by walking.” 994 F.
Supp., at 1252. The purpose of the walking rule is therefore
not compromised in the slightest by allowing Martin to use
a cart. A modification that provides an exception to a pe-
ripheral tournament rule without impairing its purpose can-
not be said to “fundamentally alter” the tournament. What
it can be said to do, on the other hand, is to allow Martin
the chance to qualify for, and compete in, the athletic events
petitioner offers to those members of the public who have
the skill and desire to enter. That is exactly what the ADA
requires.52 As a result, Martin’s request for a waiver of the
walking rule should have been granted.
The ADA admittedly imposes some administrative bur-
dens on the operators of places of public accommodation that
could be avoided by strictly adhering to general rules and
policies that are entirely fair with respect to the able-bodied
but that may indiscriminately preclude access by qualified
persons with disabilities.53 But surely, in a case of this kind,
essential. In short, Justice Scalia’s reading of the statute renders the
word “fundamentally” largely superfluous, because it treats the alteration
of any rule governing an event at a public accommodation to be a funda-
mental alteration.
52 On this fundamental point, the dissent agrees. See post, at 699 (“The
PGA TOUR cannot deny respondent access to that game because of his
disability”).
53 However, we think petitioner’s contention that the task of assessing
requests for modifications will amount to a substantial burden is over-
stated. As Martin indicates, in the three years since he requested the

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Scalia, J., dissenting
Congress intended that an entity like the PGA not only give
individualized attention to the handful of requests that it
might receive from talented but disabled athletes for a modi-
fication or waiver of a rule to allow them access to the com-
petition, but also carefully weigh the purpose, as well as the
letter, of the rule before determining that no accommodation
would be tolerable.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins,
dissenting.
In my view today’s opinion exercises a benevolent compas-
sion that the law does not place it within our power to im-
pose. The judgment distorts the text of Title III, the struc-
ture of the ADA, and common sense. I respectfully dissent.
I
The Court holds that a professional sport is a place of pub-
lic accommodation and that respondent is a “custome[r]” of
“competition” when he practices his profession. Ante, at
679–680. It finds, ante, at 680, that this strange conclusion
is compelled by the “literal text” of Title III of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U. S. C. § 12101
et seq., by the “expansive purpose” of the ADA, and by the
fact that Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000a(a), has been applied to an amusement park and public
golf courses. I disagree.
The ADA has three separate titles: Title I covers em-
ployment discrimination, Title II covers discrimination by
use of a cart, no one else has sued the PGA, and only two other golfers
(one of whom is Olinger) have sued the USGA for a waiver of the walking
rule. In addition, we believe petitioner’s point is misplaced, as nowhere
in § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) does Congress limit the reasonable modification re-
quirement only to requests that are easy to evaluate.

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692 PGA TOUR, INC. v. MARTIN
Scalia, J., dissenting
government entities, and Title III covers discrimination by
places of public accommodation. Title II is irrelevant to this
case. Title I protects only “employees” of employers who
have 15 or more employees, §§ 12112(a), 12111(5)(A). It does
not protect independent contractors. See, e. g., Birchem v.
Knights of Columbus, 116 F. 3d 310, 312–313 (CA8 1997);
cf. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U. S. 318, 322–
323 (1992). Respondent claimed employment discrimination
under Title I, but the District Court found him to be an inde-
pendent contractor rather than an employee.
Respondent also claimed protection under § 12182 of Title
III. That section applies only to particular places and per-
sons. The place must be a “place of public accommodation,”
and the person must be an “individual” seeking “enjoyment
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
or accommodations” of the covered place. § 12182(a). Of
course a court indiscriminately invoking the “sweeping” and
“expansive” purposes of the ADA, ante, at 675, 680, could
argue that when a place of public accommodation denied any
“individual,” on the basis of his disability, anything that
might be called a “privileg[e],” the individual has a valid
Title III claim. Cf. ante, at 677. On such an interpretation,
the employees and independent contractors of every place of
public accommodation come within Title III: The employee
enjoys the “privilege” of employment, the contractor the
“privilege” of the contract.
For many reasons, Title III will not bear such an interpre-
tation. The provision of Title III at issue here (§ 12182, its
principal provision) is a public-accommodation law, and it is
the traditional understanding of public-accommodation laws
that they provide rights for customers. “At common law,
innkeepers, smiths, and others who made profession of a pub-
lic employment, were prohibited from refusing, without good
reason, to serve a customer.” Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S.
557, 571 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also

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693 Cite as: 532 U. S. 661 (2001)
Scalia, J., dissenting
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241
(1964). This understanding is clearly reflected in the text of
Title III itself. Section 12181(7) lists 12 specific types of
entities that qualify as “public accommodations,” with a
follow-on expansion that makes it clear what the “enjoyment
of the goods, services, etc.,” of those entities consists of—and
it plainly envisions that the person “enjoying” the “public
accommodation” will be a customer. For example, Title III
is said to cover an “auditorium” or “other place of public
gathering,” § 12181(7)(D). Thus, “gathering” is the distinc-
tive enjoyment derived from an auditorium; the persons
“gathering” at an auditorium are presumably covered by
Title III, but those contracting to clean the auditorium are
not. Title III is said to cover a “zoo” or “other place of rec-
reation,” § 12181(7)(I). The persons “recreat[ing]” at a “zoo”
are presumably covered, but the animal handlers bringing
in the latest panda are not. The one place where Title III
specifically addresses discrimination by places of public ac-
commodation through “contractual” arrangements, it makes
clear that discrimination against the other party to the con-
tract is not covered, but only discrimination against “clients
or customers of the covered public accommodation that en-
ters into the contractual, licensing or other arrangement.”
§ 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv). And finally, the regulations promul-
gated by the Department of Justice reinforce the conclusion
that Title III’s protections extend only to customers. “The
purpose of the ADA’s public accommodations requirements,”
they say, “is to ensure accessibility to the goods offered by
a public accommodation.” 28 CFR, ch. 1, pt. 36, App. B,
p. 650 (2000). Surely this has nothing to do with employees
and independent contractors.
If there were any doubt left that § 12182 covers only cli-
ents and customers of places of public accommodation, it is
eliminated by the fact that a contrary interpretation would
make a muddle of the ADA as a whole. The words of Title
III must be read “in their context and with a view to their

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694 PGA TOUR, INC. v. MARTIN
Scalia, J., dissenting
place in the overall statutory scheme.” Davis v. Michigan
Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 809 (1989). Congress ex-
pressly excluded employers of fewer than 15 employees from
Title I. The mom-and-pop grocery store or laundromat need
not worry about altering the nonpublic areas of its place of
business to accommodate handicapped employees—or about
the litigation that failure to do so will invite. Similarly,
since independent contractors are not covered by Title I, the
small business (or the large one, for that matter) need not
worry about making special accommodations for the paint-
ers, electricians, and other independent workers whose serv-
ices are contracted for from time to time. It is an entirely
unreasonable interpretation of the statute to say that these
exemptions so carefully crafted in Title I are entirely elimi-
nated by Title III (for the many businesses that are places of
public accommodation) because employees and independent
contractors “enjoy” the employment and contracting that
such places provide. The only distinctive feature of places
of public accommodation is that they accommodate the pub-
lic, and Congress could have no conceivable reason for ac-
cording the employees and independent contractors of such
businesses protections that employees and independent con-
tractors of other businesses do not enjoy.
The United States apparently agrees that employee claims
are not cognizable under Title III, see Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 18–19, n. 17, but despite the impli-
cations of its own regulations, see 28 CFR, ch. 1, pt. 36,
App. B, at 650, appears to believe (though it does not explic-
itly state) that claims of independent contractors are cogni-
zable. In a discussion littered with entirely vague state-
ments from the legislative history, cf. ante, at 674–675, the
United States argues that Congress presumably wanted in-
dependent contractors with private entities covered under
Title III because independent contractors with governmen-
tal entities are covered by Title II, see Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 18, and n. 17—a line of reasoning

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Scalia, J., dissenting
that does not commend itself to the untutored intellect. But
since the United States does not provide (and I cannot con-
ceive of) any possible construction of the terms of Title III
that will exclude employees while simultaneously covering
independent contractors, its concession regarding employees
effectively concedes independent contractors as well. Title
III applies only to customers.
The Court, for its part, assumes that conclusion for the
sake of argument, ante, at 679–680, but pronounces respond-
ent to be a “customer” of the PGA TOUR or of the golf
courses on which it is played. That seems to me quite in-
credible. The PGA TOUR is a professional sporting event,
staged for the entertainment of a live and TV audience, the
receipts from whom (the TV audience’s admission price is
paid by advertisers) pay the expenses of the tour, including
the cash prizes for the winning golfers. The professional
golfers on the tour are no more “enjoying” (the statutory
term) the entertainment that the tour provides, or the facili-
ties of the golf courses on which it is held, than professional
baseball players “enjoy” the baseball games in which they
play or the facilities of Yankee Stadium. To be sure, profes-
sional ballplayers participate in the games, and use the ball-
fields, but no one in his right mind would think that they are
customers of the American League or of Yankee Stadium.
They are themselves the entertainment that the customers
pay to watch. And professional golfers are no different. It
makes not a bit of difference, insofar as their “customer”
status is concerned, that the remuneration for their perform-
ance (unlike most of the remuneration for ballplayers) is not
fixed but contingent—viz., the purses for the winners in the
various events, and the compensation from product endorse-
ments that consistent winners are assured. The compensa-
tion of many independent contractors is contingent upon
their success—real estate brokers, for example, or insur-
ance salesmen.

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696 PGA TOUR, INC. v. MARTIN
Scalia, J., dissenting
As the Court points out, the ADA specifically identifies
golf courses as one of the covered places of public accom-
modation. See § 12181(7)(L) (“a gymnasium, health spa,
bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or recre-
ation”); and the distinctive “goo[d], servic[e], facilit[y], privi-
leg[e], advantag[e], or accommodatio[n]” identified by that
provision as distinctive to that category of place of pub-
lic accommodation is “exercise or recreation.” Respondent
did not seek to “exercise” or “recreate” at the PGA TOUR
events; he sought to make money (which is why he is called
a professional golfer). He was not a customer buying recre-
ation or entertainment; he was a professional athlete selling
it. That is the reason (among others) the Court’s reliance
upon Civil Rights Act cases like Daniel v. Paul, 395 U. S. 298
(1969), see ante, at 681, is misplaced. A professional golfer’s
practicing his profession is not comparable to John Q. Pub-
lic’s frequenting “a 232-acre amusement area with swim-
ming, boating, sun bathing, picnicking, miniature golf, danc-
ing facilities, and a snack bar.” Daniel, supra, at 301.
The Court relies heavily upon the Q-School. It says that
petitioner offers the golfing public the “privilege” of “com-
peting in the Q-School and playing in the tours; indeed, the
former is a privilege for which thousands of individuals from
the general public pay, and the latter is one for which they
vie.” Ante, at 677. But the Q-School is no more a “privi-
lege” offered for the general public’s “enjoyment” than is the
California Bar Exam.1 It is a competition for entry into the
PGA TOUR—an open tryout, no different in principle from
open casting for a movie or stage production, or walk-on try-
1 The California Bar Exam is covered by the ADA, by the way, because
a separate provision of Title III applies to “examinations . . . related to
applications, licensing, certification, or credentialing for secondary or
post-secondary education, professional, or trade purposes.” 42 U. S. C.
§ 12189. If open tryouts were “privileges” under § 12182, and participants
in the tryouts “customers,” § 12189 would have been unnecessary.

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Scalia, J., dissenting
outs for other professional sports, such as baseball. See,
e. g., Amateurs Join Pros for New Season of HBO’s “Sopra-
nos,” Detroit News, Dec. 22, 2000, p. 2 (20,000 attend open
casting for “The Sopranos”); Bill Zack, Atlanta Braves,
Sporting News, Feb. 6, 1995 (1,300 would-be players at-
tended an open tryout for the Atlanta Braves). It may well
be that some amateur golfers enjoy trying to make the
grade, just as some amateur actors may enjoy auditions, and
amateur baseball players may enjoy open tryouts (I hesitate
to say that amateur lawyers may enjoy taking the California
Bar Exam). But the purpose of holding those tryouts is not
to provide entertainment; it is to hire. At bottom, open try-
outs for performances to be held at a place of public accom-
modation are no different from open bidding on contracts to
cut the grass at a place of public accommodation, or open
applications for any job at a place of public accommodation.
Those bidding, those applying—and those trying out—are
not converted into customers. By the Court’s reasoning, a
business exists not only to sell goods and services to the
public, but to provide the “privilege” of employment to the
public; wherefore it follows, like night the day, that everyone
who seeks a job is a customer.2
2 The Court suggests that respondent is not an independent contractor
because he “play[s] at [his] own pleasure,” and is not subject to PGA
TOUR control “over [his] manner of performance,” ante, at 680, n. 33.
But many independent contractors—composers of movie music, portrait
artists, script writers, and even (some would say) plumbers—retain at
least as much control over when and how they work as does respondent,
who agrees to play in a minimum of 15 of the designated PGA TOUR
events, and to play by the rules that the PGA TOUR specifies. Cf. Com-
munity for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U. S. 730, 751–753 (1989)
(discussing independent contractor status of a sculptor). Moreover, al-
though, as the Court suggests in the same footnote, in rare cases a PGA
TOUR winner will choose to forgo the prize money (in order, for example,
to preserve amateur status necessary for continuing participation in col-
lege play) he is contractually entitled to the prize money if he demands it,
which is all that a contractual relationship requires.

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698 PGA TOUR, INC. v. MARTIN
Scalia, J., dissenting
II
Having erroneously held that Title III applies to the “cus-
tomers” of professional golf who consist of its practitioners,
the Court then erroneously answers—or to be accurate sim-
ply ignores—a second question. The ADA requires covered
businesses to make such reasonable modifications of “poli-
cies, practices, or procedures” as are necessary to “afford”
goods, services, and privileges to individuals with disabili-
ties; but it explicitly does not require “modifications [that]
would fundamentally alter the nature” of the goods, services,
and privileges. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). In other words, dis-
abled individuals must be given access to the same goods,
services, and privileges that others enjoy. The regulations
state that Title III “does not require a public accommodation
to alter its inventory to include accessible or special goods
with accessibility features that are designed for, or facili-
tate use by, individuals with disabilities.” 28 CFR § 36.307
(2000); see also 28 CFR, ch. 1, pt. 36, App. B, at 650. As one
Court of Appeals has explained:
“The common sense of the statute is that the content
of the goods or services offered by a place of public ac-
commodation is not regulated. A camera store may not
refuse to sell cameras to a disabled person, but it is not
required to stock cameras specially designed for such
persons. Had Congress purposed to impose so enor-
mous a burden on the retail sector of the economy and
so vast a supervisory responsibility on the federal
courts, we think it would have made its intention clearer
and would at least have imposed some standards. It
is hardly a feasible judicial function to decide whether
shoestores should sell single shoes to one-legged persons
and if so at what price, or how many Braille books the
Borders or Barnes and Noble bookstore chains should
stock in each of their stores.” Doe v. Mutual of Omaha
Ins. Co., 179 F. 3d 557, 560 (CA7 1999).

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Scalia, J., dissenting
Since this is so, even if respondent here is a consumer of the
“privilege” of the PGA TOUR competition, see ante, at 677,
I see no basis for considering whether the rules of that com-
petition must be altered. It is as irrelevant to the PGA
TOUR’s compliance with the statute whether walking is es-
sential to the game of golf as it is to the shoe store’s compli-
ance whether “pairness” is essential to the nature of shoes.
If a shoe store wishes to sell shoes only in pairs it may; and
if a golf tour (or a golf course) wishes to provide only walk-
around golf, it may. The PGA TOUR cannot deny respond-
ent access to that game because of his disability, but it need
not provide him a game different (whether in its essentials
or in its details) from that offered to everyone else.
Since it has held (or assumed) professional golfers to be
customers “enjoying” the “privilege” that consists of PGA
TOUR golf; and since it inexplicably regards the rules of
PGA TOUR golf as merely “policies, practices, or proce-
dures” by which access to PGA TOUR golf is provided, the
Court must then confront the question whether respondent’s
requested modification of the supposed policy, practice, or
procedure of walking would “fundamentally alter the nature”
of the PGA TOUR game, § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). The Court
attacks this “fundamental alteration” analysis by asking
two questions: first, whether the “essence” or an “essential
aspect” of the sport of golf has been altered; and second,
whether the change, even if not essential to the game, would
give the disabled player an advantage over others and
thereby “fundamentally alter the character of the competi-
tion.” Ante, at 683. It answers no to both.
Before considering the Court’s answer to the first ques-
tion, it is worth pointing out that the assumption which un-
derlies that question is false. Nowhere is it writ that PGA
TOUR golf must be classic “essential” golf. Why cannot the
PGA TOUR, if it wishes, promote a new game, with distinc-
tive rules (much as the American League promotes a game
of baseball in which the pitcher’s turn at the plate can be

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700 PGA TOUR, INC. v. MARTIN
Scalia, J., dissenting
taken by a “designated hitter”)? If members of the public
do not like the new rules—if they feel that these rules do
not truly test the individual’s skill at “real golf ” (or the
team’s skill at “real baseball”) they can withdraw their pa-
tronage. But the rules are the rules. They are (as in all
games) entirely arbitrary, and there is no basis on which any-
one—not even the Supreme Court of the United States—can
pronounce one or another of them to be “nonessential” if the
rulemaker (here the PGA TOUR) deems it to be essential.
If one assumes, however, that the PGA TOUR has some
legal obligation to play classic, Platonic golf—and if one as-
sumes the correctness of all the other wrong turns the Court
has made to get to this point—then we Justices must con-
front what is indeed an awesome responsibility. It has been
rendered the solemn duty of the Supreme Court of the
United States, laid upon it by Congress in pursuance of the
Federal Government’s power “[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States,” U. S. Const.,
Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to decide What Is Golf. I am sure that the
Framers of the Constitution, aware of the 1457 edict of King
James II of Scotland prohibiting golf because it interfered
with the practice of archery, fully expected that sooner or
later the paths of golf and government, the law and the links,
would once again cross, and that the judges of this august
Court would some day have to wrestle with that age-old ju-
risprudential question, for which their years of study in the
law have so well prepared them: Is someone riding around a
golf course from shot to shot really a golfer? The answer,
we learn, is yes. The Court ultimately concludes, and it will
henceforth be the Law of the Land, that walking is not a
“fundamental” aspect of golf.
Either out of humility or out of self-respect (one or the
other) the Court should decline to answer this incredibly dif-
ficult and incredibly silly question. To say that something
is “essential” is ordinarily to say that it is necessary to the
achievement of a certain object. But since it is the very

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nature of a game to have no object except amusement (that
is what distinguishes games from productive activity), it is
quite impossible to say that any of a game’s arbitrary rules
is “essential.” Eighteen-hole golf courses, 10-foot-high bas-
ketball hoops, 90-foot baselines, 100-yard football fields—all
are arbitrary and none is essential. The only support for
any of them is tradition and (in more modern times) insist-
ence by what has come to be regarded as the ruling body of
the sport—both of which factors support the PGA TOUR’s
position in the present case. (Many, indeed, consider walk-
ing to be the central feature of the game of golf—hence Mark
Twain’s classic criticism of the sport: “a good walk spoiled.”)
I suppose there is some point at which the rules of a well-
known game are changed to such a degree that no reasonable
person would call it the same game. If the PGA TOUR
competitors were required to dribble a large, inflated ball
and put it through a round hoop, the game could no longer
reasonably be called golf. But this criterion—destroying
recognizability as the same generic game—is surely not the
test of “essentialness” or “fundamentalness” that the Court
applies, since it apparently thinks that merely changing the
diameter of the cup might “fundamentally alter” the game
of golf, ante, at 682.
Having concluded that dispensing with the walking rule
would not violate federal-Platonic “golf ” (and, implicitly, that
it is federal-Platonic golf, and no other, that the PGA TOUR
can insist upon), the Court moves on to the second part of
its test: the competitive effects of waiving this nonessential
rule. In this part of its analysis, the Court first finds that
the effects of the change are “mitigated” by the fact that
in the game of golf weather, a “lucky bounce,” and “pure
chance” provide different conditions for each competitor
and individual ability may not “be the sole determinant
of the outcome.” Ante, at 687. I guess that is why those
who follow professional golfing consider Jack Nicklaus the
luckiest golfer of all time, only to be challenged of late by

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Scalia, J., dissenting
the phenomenal luck of Tiger Woods. The Court’s empiri-
cism is unpersuasive. “Pure chance” is randomly distrib-
uted among the players, but allowing respondent to use a
cart gives him a “lucky” break every time he plays. Pure
chance also only matters at the margin—a stroke here or
there; the cart substantially improves this respondent’s com-
petitive prospects beyond a couple of strokes. But even
granting that there are significant nonhuman variables af-
fecting competition, that fact does not justify adding another
variable that always favors one player.
In an apparent effort to make its opinion as narrow as
possible, the Court relies upon the District Court’s finding
that even with a cart, respondent will be at least as fatigued
as everyone else. Ante, at 690. This, the Court says, proves
that competition will not be affected. Far from thinking
that reliance on this finding cabins the effect of today’s opin-
ion, I think it will prove to be its most expansive and de-
structive feature. Because step one of the Court’s two-part
inquiry into whether a requested change in a sport will “fun-
damentally alter [its] nature,” § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), consists of
an utterly unprincipled ontology of sports (pursuant to which
the Court is not even sure whether golf ’s “essence” requires
a 3-inch hole), there is every reason to think that in future
cases involving requests for special treatment by would-be
athletes the second step of the analysis will be determina-
tive. In resolving that second step—determining whether
waiver of the “nonessential” rule will have an impermissible
“competitive effect”—by measuring the athletic capacity of
the requesting individual, and asking whether the special
dispensation would do no more than place him on a par (so
to speak) with other competitors, the Court guarantees that
future cases of this sort will have to be decided on the basis
of individualized factual findings. Which means that future
cases of this sort will be numerous, and a rich source of lucra-
tive litigation. One can envision the parents of a Little

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League player with attention deficit disorder trying to con-
vince a judge that their son’s disability makes it at least 25%
more difficult to hit a pitched ball. (If they are successful,
the only thing that could prevent a court order giving the
kid four strikes would be a judicial determination that, in
baseball, three strikes are metaphysically necessary, which
is quite absurd.)
The statute, of course, provides no basis for this individu-
alized analysis that is the Court’s last step on a long and
misguided journey. The statute seeks to assure that a dis-
abled person’s disability will not deny him equal access to
(among other things) competitive sporting events—not that
his disability will not deny him an equal chance to win com-
petitive sporting events. The latter is quite impossible,
since the very nature of competitive sport is the measure-
ment, by uniform rules, of unevenly distributed excellence.
This unequal distribution is precisely what determines the
winners and losers—and artificially to “even out” that distri-
bution, by giving one or another player exemption from a
rule that emphasizes his particular weakness, is to destroy
the game. That is why the “handicaps” that are customary
in social games of golf—which, by adding strokes to the
scores of the good players and subtracting them from scores
of the bad ones, “even out” the varying abilities—are not
used in professional golf. In the Court’s world, there is one
set of rules that is “fair with respect to the able-bodied” but
“individualized” rules, mandated by the ADA, for “talented
but disabled athletes.” Ante, at 691. The ADA mandates
no such ridiculous thing. Agility, strength, speed, balance,
quickness of mind, steadiness of nerves, intensity of concen-
tration—these talents are not evenly distributed. No wild-
eyed dreamer has ever suggested that the managing bodies
of the competitive sports that test precisely these qualities
should try to take account of the uneven distribution of God-

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Scalia, J., dissenting
given gifts when writing and enforcing the rules of compe-
tition. And I have no doubt Congress did not authorize
misty-eyed judicial supervision of such a revolution.
* * *
My belief that today’s judgment is clearly in error should
not be mistaken for a belief that the PGA TOUR clearly
ought not allow respondent to use a golf cart. That is a
close question, on which even those who compete in the PGA
TOUR are apparently divided; but it is a different question
from the one before the Court. Just as it is a different ques-
tion whether the Little League ought to give disabled young-
sters a fourth strike, or some other waiver from the rules
that makes up for their disabilities. In both cases, whether
they ought to do so depends upon (1) how central to the game
that they have organized (and over whose rules they are the
master) they deem the waived provision to be, and (2) how
competitive—how strict a test of raw athletic ability in all
aspects of the competition—they want their game to be.
But whether Congress has said they must do so depends
upon the answers to the legal questions I have discussed
above—not upon what this Court sententiously decrees to be
“ ‘decent, tolerant, [and] progressive,’ ” ante, at 675 (quoting
Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356,
375 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
And it should not be assumed that today’s decent, tolerant,
and progressive judgment will, in the long run, accrue to the
benefit of sports competitors with disabilities. Now that it
is clear courts will review the rules of sports for “fundamen-
talness,” organizations that value their autonomy have every
incentive to defend vigorously the necessity of every regula-
tion. They may still be second-guessed in the end as to the
Platonic requirements of the sport, but they will assuredly
lose if they have at all wavered in their enforcement. The
lesson the PGA TOUR and other sports organizations should
take from this case is to make sure that the same written

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rules are set forth for all levels of play, and never voluntarily
to grant any modifications. The second lesson is to end open
tryouts. I doubt that, in the long run, even disabled athletes
will be well served by these incentives that the Court has
created.
Complaints about this case are not “properly directed to
Congress,” ante, at 689, n. 51. They are properly directed
to this Court’s Kafkaesque determination that professional
sports organizations, and the fields they rent for their exhibi-
tions, are “places of public accommodation” to the competing
athletes, and the athletes themselves “customers” of the or-
ganization that pays them; its Alice in Wonderland determi-
nation that there are such things as judicially determinable
“essential” and “nonessential” rules of a made-up game; and
its Animal Farm determination that fairness and the ADA
mean that everyone gets to play by individualized rules
which will assure that no one’s lack of ability (or at least no
one’s lack of ability so pronounced that it amounts to a dis-
ability) will be a handicap. The year was 2001, and “every-
body was finally equal.” K. Vonnegut, Harrison Bergeron,
in Animal Farm and Related Readings 129 (1997).