OHIO v. REINER

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Syllabus
OHIO v. REINER
on petition for writ of certiorari to the
supreme court of ohio
No. 00–1028. Decided March 19, 2001
Respondent was tried for involuntary manslaughter in the death of his
infant son Alex, who died from “shaken baby syndrome.” His defense
theory was that Alex was injured while in the care of the family’s baby-
sitter, Susan Batt. Batt informed the Ohio trial court before testify-
ing that she intended to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege, and
the court granted her transactional immunity. She then testified to the
jury that she had refused to testify without a grant of immunity on
the advice of counsel, although she had done nothing wrong. The jury
convicted respondent, and he appealed. The appeals court reversed,
and the State Supreme Court affirmed the reversal on the ground that
Batt had no valid Fifth Amendment privilege because she asserted inno-
cence and that the trial court’s grant of immunity was therefore unlaw-
ful. The court found that the wrongful grant of immunity prejudiced
respondent, because it effectively told the jury that Batt did not cause
Alex’s injuries.
Held: Batt had a valid Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. This Court has jurisdiction over the Ohio Supreme
Court’s judgment, which rests, as a threshold matter, on a determination
of federal law. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson,
478 U. S. 804, 816. The Fifth Amendment privilege’s protection ex-
tends only to witnesses who have a reasonable cause to apprehend dan-
ger from a direct answer. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 486.
That inquiry is for the court; the witness’ assertion does not by itself
establish the risk of incrimination. This Court has never held, how-
ever, that the privilege is unavailable to those who claim innocence. To
the contrary, the Court has emphasized that one of the Fifth Amend-
ment’s basic functions is to protect innocent persons who might other-
wise be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances. Grunewald v. United
States, 353 U. S. 391, 421. Batt had “reasonable cause” to apprehend
danger from her answers if questioned at respondent’s trial. Thus, it
was reasonable for her to fear that answers to possible questions might
tend to incriminate her.
Certiorari granted; 89 Ohio St. 3d 342, 731 N. E. 2d 662, reversed and
remanded.

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18 OHIO v. REINER
Per Curiam
Per Curiam.
The Supreme Court of Ohio here held that a witness who
denies all culpability does not have a valid Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Because our prece-
dents dictate that the privilege protects the innocent as well
as the guilty, and that the facts here are sufficient to sustain
a claim of privilege, we grant the petition for certiorari and
reverse.
Respondent was charged with involuntary manslaughter
in connection with the death of his 2-month-old son Alex.
The coroner testified at trial that Alex died from “shaken
baby syndrome,” the result of child abuse. He estimated
that Alex’s injury most likely occurred minutes before the
child stopped breathing. Alex died two days later when he
was removed from life support. Evidence produced at trial
revealed that Alex had a broken rib and a broken leg at the
time of his death. His twin brother Derek, who was also
examined, had several broken ribs. Respondent had been
alone with Alex for half an hour immediately before Alex
stopped breathing. Respondent’s experts testified that
Alex could have been injured several hours before his res-
piratory arrest. Alex was in the care of the family’s baby-
sitter, Susan Batt, at that time. Batt had cared for the
children during the day for about two weeks prior to Alex’s
death. The defense theory was that Batt, not respondent,
was the culpable party.
Batt informed the court in advance of testifying that she
intended to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege. At the
State’s request, the trial court granted her transactional im-
munity from prosecution pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2945.44 (1999). She then testified to the jury that she had
refused to testify without a grant of immunity on the advice
of counsel, although she had done nothing wrong. Batt de-
nied any involvement in Alex’s death. She testified that she
had never shaken Alex or his brother at any time, specifically
on the day Alex suffered respiratory arrest. She said she

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19 Cite as: 532 U. S. 17 (2001)
Per Curiam
was unaware of and had nothing to do with the other injuries
to both children. The jury found respondent guilty of invol-
untary manslaughter, and he appealed.
The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Sixth District, reversed re-
spondent’s conviction on grounds not relevant to our decision
here. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the reversal, on
the alternative ground that Batt had no valid Fifth Amend-
ment privilege and that the trial court’s grant of immunity
under § 2945.44 was therefore unlawful.* 89 Ohio St. 3d 342,
358, 731 N. E. 2d 662, 677 (2000). The court found that the
wrongful grant of immunity prejudiced respondent, because
it effectively told the jury that Batt did not cause Alex’s
injuries.
The court recognized that the privilege against self-
incrimination applies where a witness’ answers “could rea-
sonably ‘furnish a link in the chain of evidence’ ” against him,
id., at 352, 731 N. E. 2d, at 673 (quoting Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U. S. 479, 486 (1951)). Hoffman, it noted, re-
quires the trial court to determine whether the witness has
correctly asserted the privilege, and to order the witness to
answer questions if the witness is mistaken about the danger
of incrimination. Ibid. The court faulted the trial judge
for failing to question sufficiently Batt’s assertion of the priv-
ilege. It noted that the Court of Appeals, in finding a valid
privilege, failed to consider the prosecutor’s suggestion that
Batt’s testimony would not incriminate her, and Batt’s denial
of involvement in Alex’s abuse when questioned by the Chil-
dren’s Services Board. The court held that “Susan Batt’s
*Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.44 (1999) states in pertinent part: “In any
criminal proceeding . . . if a witness refuses to answer or produce informa-
tion on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, the court of
common pleas . . . unless it finds that to do so would not further the admin-
istration of justice, shall compel the witness to answer or produce the
information, if . . . [the prosecuting attorney so requests and] . . . [t]he
court . . . informs the witness that by answering, or producing the informa-
tion he will receive [transactional] immunity . . . .” (Emphasis added.)

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Per Curiam
[trial] testimony did not incriminate her, because she denied
any involvement in the abuse. Thus, she did not have a
valid Fifth Amendment privilege.” 89 Ohio St. 3d, at 355,
731 N. E. 2d, at 675 (emphasis in original). The court em-
phasized that the defense’s theory of Batt’s guilt was not
grounds for a grant of immunity, “when the witness contin-
ues to deny any self-incriminating conduct.” Ibid.
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision that Batt was
wrongly granted immunity under § 2945.44 (and conse-
quently, that reversal of respondent’s conviction was re-
quired) rested on the court’s determination that Batt did not
have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege. In discussing the
contours of that privilege, the court relied on our precedents.
We have observed that “this Court retains a role when a
state court’s interpretation of state law has been influenced
by an accompanying interpretation of federal law.” Three
Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold En-
gineering, P. C., 467 U. S. 138, 152 (1984). The decision at
issue “fairly appears . . . to be interwoven with the federal
law,” and no adequate and independent state ground is clear
from the face of the opinion. Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S.
1032, 1040–1041 (1983). We have jurisdiction over a state-
court judgment that rests, as a threshold matter, on a deter-
mination of federal law. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U. S. 804, 816 (1986) (“[T]his Court
retains power to review the decision of a federal issue in a
state cause of action”); St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Taylor,
210 U. S. 281, 293–294 (1908).
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 5. As the Supreme Court of
Ohio acknowledged, this privilege not only extends “to an-
swers that would in themselves support a conviction . . . but
likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the
chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant.” Hoff-
man, 341 U. S., at 486. “[I]t need only be evident from the

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Per Curiam
implications of the question, in the setting in which it is
asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an expla-
nation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous be-
cause injurious disclosure could result.” Id., at 486–487.
We have held that the privilege’s protection extends only
to witnesses who have “reasonable cause to apprehend dan-
ger from a direct answer.” Id., at 486. That inquiry is for
the court; the witness’ assertion does not by itself establish
the risk of incrimination. Ibid. A danger of “imaginary
and unsubstantial character” will not suffice. Mason v.
United States, 244 U. S. 362, 366 (1917). But we have never
held, as the Supreme Court of Ohio did, that the privilege is
unavailable to those who claim innocence. To the contrary,
we have emphasized that one of the Fifth Amendment’s
“basic functions . . . is to protect innocent men . . . ‘who
otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.’ ”
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S. 391, 421 (1957) (quot-
ing Slochower v. Board of Higher Ed. of New York City, 350
U. S. 551, 557–558 (1956)) (emphasis in original). In Grune-
wald, we recognized that truthful responses of an innocent
witness, as well as those of a wrongdoer, may provide the
government with incriminating evidence from the speaker’s
own mouth. 353 U. S., at 421–422.
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s determination that Batt
did not have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege because
she denied any involvement in the abuse of the children
clearly conflicts with Hoffman and Grunewald. Batt had
“reasonable cause” to apprehend danger from her answers
if questioned at respondent’s trial. Hoffman, supra, at
486. Batt spent extended periods of time alone with Alex
and his brother in the weeks immediately preceding discov-
ery of their injuries. She was with Alex within the poten-
tial timeframe of the fatal trauma. The defense’s theory of
the case was that Batt, not respondent, was responsible for
Alex’s death and his brother’s uncharged injuries. In this
setting, it was reasonable for Batt to fear that answers to

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22 OHIO v. REINER
Per Curiam
possible questions might tend to incriminate her. Batt
therefore had a valid Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.
We do not, of course, address the question whether immu-
nity from suit under § 2945.44 was appropriate. Because the
Supreme Court of Ohio mistakenly held that the witness’
assertion of innocence deprived her of her Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, the petition for a writ of
certiorari is granted, the court’s judgment is reversed, and
this case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsist-
ent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.