ILLINOIS v. McARTHUR

531US2 Unit: $U20 [04-12-02 19:07:55] PAGES PGT: OPIN
326 OCTOBER TERM, 2000
Syllabus
ILLINOIS v. McARTHUR
certiorari to the appellate court of illinois,
fourth district
No. 99–1132. Argued November 1, 2000—Decided February 20, 2001
Police officers, with probable cause to believe that respondent McArthur
had hidden marijuana in his home, prevented him from entering the
home unaccompanied by an officer for about two hours while they
obtained a search warrant. Once they did so, the officers found drug
paraphernalia and marijuana, and arrested McArthur. He was sub-
sequently charged with misdemeanor possession of those items. He
moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that it was the “fruit”
of an unlawful police seizure, namely, the refusal to let him reenter his
home unaccompanied. The Illinois trial court granted the motion, and
the State Appellate Court affirmed.
Held: Given the nature of the intrusion and the law enforcement interest
at stake, the brief seizure of the premises was permissible under the
Fourth Amendment. Pp. 330–337.
(a) The Amendment’s central requirement is one of reasonableness.
Although, in the ordinary case, personal property seizures are unreason-
able unless accomplished pursuant to a warrant, United States v. Place,
462 U. S. 696, 701, there are exceptions to this rule involving special
law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal
intrusions, and the like, see, e. g., Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U. S.
938, 940–941. The circumstances here involve a plausible claim of spe-
cially pressing or urgent law enforcement need. Cf., e. g., United States
v. Place, supra, at 701. Moreover, the restraint at issue was tailored
to that need, being limited in time and scope, cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S. 1, 29–30, and avoiding significant intrusion into the home itself,
cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 585. Consequently, rather than
employing a per se rule of unreasonableness, the Court must balance
the privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to determine
if the intrusion here was reasonable. Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S.
648, 654. In light of the following circumstances, considered in combi-
nation, the Court concludes that the restriction was reasonable, and
hence lawful. First, the police had probable cause to believe that Mc-
Arthur’s home contained evidence of a crime and unlawful drugs. Sec-
ond, they had good reason to fear that, unless restrained, he would de-
stroy the drugs before they could return with a warrant. Third, they

531US2 Unit: $U20 [04-12-02 19:07:55] PAGES PGT: OPIN
327 Cite as: 531 U. S. 326 (2001)
Syllabus
made reasonable efforts to reconcile their law enforcement needs with
the demands of personal privacy by avoiding a warrantless entry or
arrest and preventing McArthur only from entering his home unaccom-
panied. Fourth, they imposed the restraint for a limited period, which
was no longer than reasonably necessary for them, acting with diligence,
to obtain the warrant. Pp. 330–333.
(b) The conclusion that the restriction was lawful finds significant
support in this Court’s case law. See, e. g., Segura v. United States,
468 U. S. 796; United States v. Place, supra, at 706. And in no case
has this Court held unlawful a temporary seizure that was supported
by probable cause and was designed to prevent the loss of evidence
while the police diligently obtained a warrant in a reasonable period.
But cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U. S. 740, 754. Pp. 333–334.
(c) The Court is not persuaded by the countervailing considerations
raised by the parties or lower courts: that the police proceeded without
probable cause; that, because McArthur was on his porch, the police
order that he stay outside his home amounted to an impermissible
“constructive eviction”; that an officer, with McArthur’s consent,
stepped inside the home’s doorway to observe McArthur when Mc-
Arthur reentered the home on two or three occasions; and that Welsh
v. Wisconsin, supra, at 742, 754, offers direct support for McArthur’s
position. Pp. 334–336.
304 Ill. App. 3d 395, 713 N. E. 2d 93, reversed and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Gins-
burg, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 337.
Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 338.
Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General of Illinois, argued the
cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were James E.
Ryan, Attorney General, and William L. Browers and Col-
leen M. Griffin, Assistant Attorneys General.
Matthew D. Roberts argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the
brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney
General Robinson, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and
Deborah Watson.

531US2 Unit: $U20 [04-12-02 19:07:56] PAGES PGT: OPIN
328 ILLINOIS v. McARTHUR
Opinion of the Court
Deanne Fortna Jones argued the cause for respondent.
With her on the brief was Jeff Justice.*
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
Police officers, with probable cause to believe that a man
had hidden marijuana in his home, prevented that man from
entering the home for about two hours while they obtained
a search warrant. We must decide whether those officers
violated the Fourth Amendment. We conclude that the of-
ficers acted reasonably. They did not violate the Amend-
ment’s requirements. And we reverse an Illinois court’s
holding to the contrary.
I
A
On April 2, 1997, Tera McArthur asked two police officers
to accompany her to the trailer where she lived with her
husband, Charles, so that they could keep the peace while
she removed her belongings. The two officers, Assistant
Chief John Love and Officer Richard Skidis, arrived with
*A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the State of
Ohio et al. by Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio, Edward
B. Foley, State Solicitor, and Robert C. Maier and Matthew D. Miko, As-
sistant Solicitors, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States
as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Janet Napolitano of Arizona, M.
Jane Brady of Delaware, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Thomas J. Miller of
Iowa, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Mike
Hatch of Minnesota, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Philip McLaughlin
of New Hampshire, John J. Farmer, Jr., of New Jersey, Don Stenberg of
Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, W. A. Drew Edmondson of
Oklahoma, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, Mark Barnett of South
Dakota, Jan Graham of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, Christine
O. Gregoire of Washington, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, D. Michael
Fisher of Pennsylvania, and Mark L. Earley of Virginia.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Lisa B. Kemler; and for the
Rutherford Institute by John W. Whitehead and Steven H. Aden.

531US2 Unit: $U20 [04-12-02 19:07:56] PAGES PGT: OPIN
329 Cite as: 531 U. S. 326 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
Tera at the trailer at about 3:15 p.m. Tera went inside,
where Charles was present. The officers remained outside.
When Tera emerged after collecting her possessions, she
spoke to Chief Love, who was then on the porch. She sug-
gested he check the trailer because “Chuck had dope in
there.” App. 15. She added (in Love’s words) that she had
seen Chuck “slid[e] some dope underneath the couch.” Id.,
at 19.
Love knocked on the trailer door, told Charles what Tera
had said, and asked for permission to search the trailer,
which Charles denied. Love then sent Officer Skidis with
Tera to get a search warrant.
Love told Charles, who by this time was also on the porch,
that he could not reenter the trailer unless a police officer
accompanied him. Charles subsequently reentered the
trailer two or three times (to get cigarettes and to make
phone calls), and each time Love stood just inside the door
to observe what Charles did.
Officer Skidis obtained the warrant by about 5 p.m.
He returned to the trailer and, along with other officers,
searched it. The officers found under the sofa a marijuana
pipe, a box for marijuana (called a “one-hitter” box), and a
small amount of marijuana. They then arrested Charles.
B
Illinois subsequently charged Charles McArthur with un-
lawfully possessing drug paraphernalia and marijuana (less
than 2.5 grams), both misdemeanors. See Ill. Comp. Stat.,
ch. 720, §§ 550/4(a), 600/3.5(a) (1998). McArthur moved to
suppress the pipe, box, and marijuana on the ground that
they were the “fruit” of an unlawful police seizure, namely,
the refusal to let him reenter the trailer unaccompanied,
which would have permitted him, he said, to “have destroyed
the marijuana.” App. 27.
The trial court granted McArthur’s suppression motion.
The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, 304 Ill. App. 3d

531US2 Unit: $U20 [04-12-02 19:07:56] PAGES PGT: OPIN
330 ILLINOIS v. McARTHUR
Opinion of the Court
395, 713 N. E. 2d 93 (1999), and the Illinois Supreme Court
denied the State’s petition for leave to appeal, 185 Ill. 2d
651, 720 N. E. 2d 1101 (1999). We granted certiorari to de-
termine whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits the kind
of temporary seizure at issue here.
II
A
The Fourth Amendment says that the “right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 4. Its “central requirement” is
one of reasonableness. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730,
739 (1983). In order to enforce that requirement, this Court
has interpreted the Amendment as establishing rules and
presumptions designed to control conduct of law enforcement
officers that may significantly intrude upon privacy interests.
Sometimes those rules require warrants. We have said, for
example, that in “the ordinary case,” seizures of personal
property are “unreasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment,” without more, “unless . . . accom-
plished pursuant to a judicial warrant,” issued by a neutral
magistrate after finding probable cause. United States v.
Place, 462 U. S. 696, 701 (1983).
We nonetheless have made it clear that there are excep-
tions to the warrant requirement. When faced with special
law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy,
minimal intrusions, or the like, the Court has found that
certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a
warrantless search or seizure reasonable. See, e. g., Penn-
sylvania v. Labron, 518 U. S. 938, 940–941 (1996) (per cu-
riam) (search of automobile supported by probable cause);
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U. S. 444, 455
(1990) (suspicionless stops at drunk driver checkpoint);
United States v. Place, supra, at 706 (temporary seizure
of luggage based on reasonable suspicion); Michigan v.

531US2 Unit: $U20 [04-12-02 19:07:56] PAGES PGT: OPIN
331 Cite as: 531 U. S. 326 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 702–705 (1981) (temporary detention
of suspect without arrest warrant to prevent flight and pro-
tect officers while executing search warrant); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U. S. 1, 27 (1968) (temporary stop and limited search for
weapons based on reasonable suspicion).
In the circumstances of the case before us, we cannot say
that the warrantless seizure was per se unreasonable. It in-
volves a plausible claim of specially pressing or urgent law
enforcement need, i. e., “exigent circumstances.” Cf., e. g.,
United States v. Place, supra, at 701 (“[T]he exigencies of
the circumstances” may permit temporary seizure without
warrant); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U. S.
294, 298–299 (1967) (warrantless search for suspect and
weapons reasonable where delay posed grave danger);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 770–771 (1966)
(warrantless blood test for alcohol reasonable where delay
would have led to loss of evidence). Moreover, the restraint
at issue was tailored to that need, being limited in time and
scope, cf. Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 29–30, and avoiding sig-
nificant intrusion into the home itself, cf. Payton v. New
York, 445 U. S. 573, 585 (1980) (“ ‘[T]he chief evil against
which the . . . Fourth Amendment is directed’ ” is warrantless
entry and search of home) (quoting United States v. United
States Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of Mich., 407 U. S. 297,
313 (1972)). Consequently, rather than employing a per se
rule of unreasonableness, we balance the privacy-related
and law enforcement-related concerns to determine if the
intrusion was reasonable. Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S.
648, 654 (1979) (determining lawfulness by balancing privacy
and law enforcement interests); United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 (1975) (same).
We conclude that the restriction at issue was reasonable,
and hence lawful, in light of the following circumstances,
which we consider in combination. First, the police had
probable cause to believe that McArthur’s trailer home con-
tained evidence of a crime and contraband, namely, unlawful

531US2 Unit: $U20 [04-12-02 19:07:56] PAGES PGT: OPIN
332 ILLINOIS v. McARTHUR
Opinion of the Court
drugs. The police had had an opportunity to speak with
Tera McArthur and make at least a very rough assessment
of her reliability. They knew she had had a firsthand op-
portunity to observe her husband’s behavior, in particular
with respect to the drugs at issue. And they thought, with
good reason, that her report to them reflected that opportu-
nity. Cf. Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U. S. 727, 732–734
(1984) (per curiam) (upholding search warrant issued in sim-
ilar circumstances).
Second, the police had good reason to fear that, unless re-
strained, McArthur would destroy the drugs before they
could return with a warrant. They reasonably might have
thought that McArthur realized that his wife knew about his
marijuana stash; observed that she was angry or frightened
enough to ask the police to accompany her; saw that after
leaving the trailer she had spoken with the police; and no-
ticed that she had walked off with one policeman while leav-
ing the other outside to observe the trailer. They rea-
sonably could have concluded that McArthur, consequently
suspecting an imminent search, would, if given the chance,
get rid of the drugs fast.
Third, the police made reasonable efforts to reconcile their
law enforcement needs with the demands of personal privacy.
They neither searched the trailer nor arrested McArthur be-
fore obtaining a warrant. Rather, they imposed a signifi-
cantly less restrictive restraint, preventing McArthur only
from entering the trailer unaccompanied. They left his
home and his belongings intact—until a neutral Magistrate,
finding probable cause, issued a warrant.
Fourth, the police imposed the restraint for a limited pe-
riod of time, namely, two hours. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, supra,
at 28 (manner in which police act is “vital . . . part of . . .
inquiry”). As far as the record reveals, this time period was
no longer than reasonably necessary for the police, acting
with diligence, to obtain the warrant. Compare United

531US2 Unit: $U20 [04-12-02 19:07:56] PAGES PGT: OPIN
333 Cite as: 531 U. S. 326 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
States v. Place, 462 U. S., at 709–710 (holding 90-minute de-
tention of luggage unreasonable based on nature of interfer-
ence with person’s travels and lack of diligence of police),
with United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249, 253 (1970)
(holding 29-hour detention of mailed package reasonable
given unavoidable delay in obtaining warrant and minimal
nature of intrusion). Given the nature of the intrusion and
the law enforcement interest at stake, this brief seizure of
the premises was permissible.
B
Our conclusion that the restriction was lawful finds sig-
nificant support in this Court’s case law. In Segura v.
United States, 468 U. S. 796 (1984), the Court considered
the admissibility of drugs which the police had found in a
lawful, warrant-based search of an apartment, but only
after unlawfully entering the apartment and occupying it
for 19 hours. The majority held that the drugs were ad-
missible because, had the police acted lawfully throughout,
they could have discovered and seized the drugs pursuant to
the validly issued warrant. See id., at 799, 814–815 (citing
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385
(1920)). The minority disagreed. However, when describ-
ing alternative lawful search and seizure methods, both
majority and minority assumed, at least for argument’s
sake, that the police, armed with reliable information that
the apartment contained drugs, might lawfully have sealed
the apartment from the outside, restricting entry into the
apartment while waiting for the warrant. Compare Segura
v. United States, 468 U. S., at 814 (“Had police never entered
the apartment, but instead conducted a perimeter stakeout
to prevent anyone from entering . . . and destroying evi-
dence, the contraband . . . would have been . . . seized pre-
cisely as it was here”), with id., at 824, n. 15 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“I assume impoundment would be permissible

531US2 Unit: $U20 [04-12-02 19:07:56] PAGES PGT: OPIN
334 ILLINOIS v. McARTHUR
Opinion of the Court
even absent exigent circumstances when it occurs ‘from the
outside’—when the authorities merely seal off premises
pending the issuance of a warrant but do not enter”); see
also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 394 (1978) (exigent
circumstances do not justify search where police guard at
door could prevent loss of evidence); United States v. Jeffers,
342 U. S. 48, 52 (1951) (same).
In various other circumstances, this Court has upheld
temporary restraints where needed to preserve evidence
until police could obtain a warrant. See, e. g., United States
v. Place, supra, at 706 (reasonable suspicion justifies brief
detention of luggage pending further investigation); United
States v. Van Leeuwen, supra, at 253 (reasonable suspicion
justifies detaining package delivered for mailing). Cf. Rich-
ards v. Wisconsin, 520 U. S. 385, 395 (1997) (no need to
“knock and announce” when executing a search warrant
where officers reasonably suspect that evidence might be
destroyed); Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 153
(1925) (warrantless search of automobile constitutionally
permissible).
We have found no case in which this Court has held un-
lawful a temporary seizure that was supported by probable
cause and was designed to prevent the loss of evidence while
the police diligently obtained a warrant in a reasonable
period of time. But cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U. S. 740,
754 (1984) (holding warrantless entry into and arrest in home
unreasonable despite possibility that evidence of noncriminal
offense would be lost while warrant was being obtained).
C
Nor are we persuaded by the countervailing considerations
that the parties or lower courts have raised. McArthur
argues that the police proceeded without probable cause.
But McArthur has waived this argument. See 304 Ill.
App. 3d, at 397, 713 N. E. 2d, at 95 (stating that McArthur

531US2 Unit: $U20 [04-12-02 19:07:56] PAGES PGT: OPIN
335 Cite as: 531 U. S. 326 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
does not contest existence of probable cause); Brief in Oppo-
sition 7 (acknowledging probable cause). And, in any event,
it is without merit. See supra, at 331–332.
The Appellate Court of Illinois concluded that the police
could not order McArthur to stay outside his home because
McArthur’s porch, where he stood at the time, was part
of his home; hence the order “amounted to a constructive
eviction” of McArthur from his residence. 304 Ill. App. 3d,
at 402, 713 N. E. 2d, at 98. This Court has held, however,
that a person standing in the doorway of a house is “in a
‘public’ place,” and hence subject to arrest without a warrant
permitting entry of the home. United States v. Santana,
427 U. S. 38, 42 (1976). Regardless, we do not believe the
difference to which the Appellate Court points—porch ver-
sus, e. g., front walk—could make a significant difference
here as to the reasonableness of the police restraint; and
that, from the Fourth Amendment’s perspective, is what
matters.
The Appellate Court also found negatively significant the
fact that Chief Love, with McArthur’s consent, stepped in-
side the trailer’s doorway to observe McArthur when Mc-
Arthur reentered the trailer on two or three occasions. 304
Ill. App. 3d, at 402–403, 713 N. E. 2d, at 98. McArthur, how-
ever, reentered simply for his own convenience, to make
phone calls and to obtain cigarettes. Under these circum-
stances, the reasonableness of the greater restriction (pre-
venting reentry) implies the reasonableness of the lesser
(permitting reentry conditioned on observation).
Finally, McArthur points to a case (and we believe it is
the only case) that he believes offers direct support, namely,
Welsh v. Wisconsin, supra. In Welsh, this Court held that
police could not enter a home without a warrant in order to
prevent the loss of evidence (namely, the defendant’s blood
alcohol level) of the “nonjailable traffic offense” of driving
while intoxicated. 466 U. S., at 742, 754. McArthur notes

531US2 Unit: $U20 [04-12-02 19:07:56] PAGES PGT: OPIN
336 ILLINOIS v. McARTHUR
Opinion of the Court
that his two convictions are for misdemeanors, which, he
says, are as minor, and he adds that the restraint, keeping
him out of his home, was nearly as serious.
We nonetheless find significant distinctions. The evidence
at issue here was of crimes that were “jailable,” not “non-
jailable.” See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, § 550/4(a) (1998);
ch. 730, § 5/5–8–3(3) (possession of less than 2.5 grams of
marijuana punishable by up to 30 days in jail); ch. 720, § 600/
3.5; ch. 730, § 5/5–8–3(1) (possession of drug paraphernalia
punishable by up to one year in jail). In Welsh, we noted
that, “[g]iven that the classification of state crimes differs
widely among the States, the penalty that may attach to any
particular offense seems to provide the clearest and most
consistent indication of the State’s interest in arresting in-
dividuals suspected of committing that offense.” 466 U. S.,
at 754, n. 14. The same reasoning applies here, where
class C misdemeanors include such widely diverse offenses
as drag racing, drinking alcohol in a railroad car or on a rail-
road platform, bribery by a candidate for public office, and
assault. See, e. g., Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 65, § 5/4–8–2 (1998);
ch. 610, § 90/1; ch. 625, § 5/11–504; ch. 720, § 5/12–1.
And the restriction at issue here is less serious. Tempo-
rarily keeping a person from entering his home, a conse-
quence whenever police stop a person on the street, is con-
siderably less intrusive than police entry into the home
itself in order to make a warrantless arrest or conduct a
search. Cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 585 (the
Fourth Amendment’s central concern is the warrantless
entry and search of the home).
We have explained above why we believe that the need
to preserve evidence of a “jailable” offense was sufficiently
urgent or pressing to justify the restriction upon entry that
the police imposed. We need not decide whether the cir-
cumstances before us would have justified a greater re-
striction for this type of offense or the same restriction were
only a “nonjailable” offense at issue.

531US2 Unit: $U20 [04-12-02 19:07:56] PAGES PGT: OPIN
337 Cite as: 531 U. S. 326 (2001)
Souter, J., concurring
III
In sum, the police officers in this case had probable cause
to believe that a home contained contraband, which was
evidence of a crime. They reasonably believed that the
home’s resident, if left free of any restraint, would destroy
that evidence. And they imposed a restraint that was both
limited and tailored reasonably to secure law enforcement
needs while protecting privacy interests. In our view, the
restraint met the Fourth Amendment’s demands.
The judgment of the Illinois Appellate Court is reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings not in-
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Souter, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion subject to this afterword on
two points: the constitutionality of a greater intrusion than
the one here and the permissibility of choosing impoundment
over immediate search. Respondent McArthur’s location
made the difference between the exigency that justified
temporarily barring him from his own dwelling and cir-
cumstances that would have supported a greater inter-
ference with his privacy and property. As long as he was
inside his trailer, the police had probable cause to believe
that he had illegal drugs stashed as his wife had reported
and that with any sense he would flush them down the drain
before the police could get a warrant to enter and search.
This probability of destruction in anticipation of a warrant
exemplifies the kind of present risk that undergirds the
accepted exigent circumstances exception to the general
warrant requirement. Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S.
757, 770–771 (1966). That risk would have justified the
police in entering McArthur’s trailer promptly to make a
lawful, warrantless search. United States v. Santana, 427
U. S. 38, 42–43 (1976); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden,
387 U. S. 294, 298–299 (1967). When McArthur stepped

531US2 Unit: $U20 [04-12-02 19:07:56] PAGES PGT: OPIN
338 ILLINOIS v. McARTHUR
Stevens, J., dissenting
outside and left the trailer uninhabited, the risk abated and
so did the reasonableness of entry by the police for as long
as he was outside. This is so because the only justification
claimed for warrantless action here is the immediate risk,
and the limit of reasonable response by the police is set by
the scope of the risk. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 25–26
(1968).
Since, however, McArthur wished to go back in, why was
it reasonable to keep him out when the police could perfectly
well have let him do as he chose, and then enjoyed the en-
suing opportunity to follow him and make a warrantless
search justified by the renewed danger of destruction? The
answer is not that the law officiously insists on safeguarding
a suspect’s privacy from search, in preference to respecting
the suspect’s liberty to enter his own dwelling. Instead, the
legitimacy of the decision to impound the dwelling follows
from the law’s strong preference for warrants, which under-
lies the rule that a search with a warrant has a stronger
claim to justification on later, judicial review than a search
without one. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102,
106 (1965); see also 5 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§ 11.2(b), p. 38 (3d ed. 1996) (“[M]ost states follow the rule
which is utilized in the federal courts: if the search or seizure
was pursuant to a warrant, the defendant has the burden of
proof; but if the police acted without a warrant the burden
of proof is on the prosecution”). The law can hardly raise
incentives to obtain a warrant without giving the police a
fair chance to take their probable cause to a magistrate and
get one.
Justice Stevens, dissenting.
The Illinois General Assembly has decided that the pos-
session of less than 2.5 grams of marijuana is a class C mis-
demeanor. See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, § 550/4(a) (1998).
In so classifying the offense, the legislature made a concerted
policy judgment that the possession of small amounts of

531US2 Unit: $U20 [04-12-02 19:07:56] PAGES PGT: OPIN
339 Cite as: 531 U. S. 326 (2001)
Stevens, J., dissenting
marijuana for personal use does not constitute a particularly
significant public policy concern. While it is true that this
offense—like feeding livestock on a public highway or offer-
ing a movie for rent without clearly displaying its rating 1 —
may warrant a jail sentence of up to 30 days, the detection
and prosecution of possessors of small quantities of this
substance is by no means a law enforcement priority in the
State of Illinois.2
Because the governmental interest implicated by the par-
ticular criminal prohibition at issue in this case is so slight,
this is a poor vehicle for probing the boundaries of the gov-
ernment’s power to limit an individual’s possessory interest
in his or her home pending the arrival of a search warrant.
Cf. Segura v. United States, 468 U. S. 796 (1984) (seven Jus-
tices decline to address this issue because case does not re-
quire its resolution). Given my preference, I would, there-
fore, dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
Compelled by the vote of my colleagues to reach the mer-
its, I would affirm. As the majority explains, the essential
inquiry in this case involves a balancing of the “privacy-
1 See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 605, § 5/9–124.1 (1998) (making feeding live-
stock on a public highway a class C misdemeanor); ch. 720, §§ 395/3–395/4
(making it a class C misdemeanor to sell or rent a video that does not
display the official rating of the motion picture from which it is copied).
Other examples of offenses classified as class C misdemeanors in Illinois
include camping on the side of a public highway, ch. 605, § 5/9–124, interfer-
ing with the “lawful taking of wild animals,” ch. 720, § 125/2, and tattooing
the body of a person under 21 years of age, ch. 720, § 5/12–10.
2 Nor in many other States. Under the laws of many other States, the
maximum penalty McArthur would have faced for possession of 2.3 grams
of marijuana would have been less than what he faced in Illinois. See,
e. g., Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11357(b) (West 1991) ($100 fine);
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18–18–406(1) (1999) ($100 fine); Minn. Stat. § 152.027(4)
(2000) ($200 fine and drug education); Miss. Code Ann. § 41–29–139(c)(2)(A)
(Supp. 1999) ($100–$250 fine); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28–416(13) (1995) ($100 fine
and drug education); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 30–31–23(B) (1997) ($50–$100 fine
and 15 days in jail); N. Y. Penal Law § 221.05 (McKinney 2000) ($100 fine);
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 475.992(4)(f) (Supp. 1998) ($100 fine).

531US2 Unit: $U20 [04-12-02 19:07:56] PAGES PGT: OPIN
340 ILLINOIS v. McARTHUR
Stevens, J., dissenting
related and law enforcement-related concerns to determine
if the intrusion was reasonable.” Ante, at 331. Under the
specific facts of this case, I believe the majority gets the
balance wrong. Each of the Illinois jurists who participated
in the decision of this case placed a higher value on the
sanctity of the ordinary citizen’s home than on the prose-
cution of this petty offense. They correctly viewed that
interest—whether the home be a humble cottage, a second-
hand trailer, or a stately mansion—as one meriting the most
serious constitutional protection.3 Following their analysis
and the reasoning in our decision in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466
U. S. 740 (1984) (holding that some offenses may be so minor
as to make it unreasonable for police to undertake searches
that would be constitutionally permissible if graver offenses
were suspected), I would affirm.
3 Principled respect for the sanctity of the home has long animated
this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See, e. g., Wilson v.
Layne, 526 U. S. 603, 610 (1999) (“The Fourth Amendment embodies this
centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy of the home”); Payton v.
New York, 445 U. S. 573, 601 (1980) (emphasizing “the overriding respect
for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions
since the origins of the Republic”); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 393
(1978) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment reflects the view of those who wrote
the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person’s home and property may
not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement
of the criminal law”).