PUBLIC LANDS COUNCIL et al. v. BABBITT, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al.

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Syllabus
PUBLIC LANDS COUNCIL et al. v. BABBITT,
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the tenth circuit
No. 98–1991. Argued March 1, 2000—Decided May 15, 2000
The Taylor Grazing Act, inter alia, grants the Secretary of the Interior
authority to divide the public rangelands into grazing districts, to spec-
ify the amount of grazing permitted in each district, and to issue grazing
leases or permits to “settlers, residents, and other stock owners,” 43
U. S. C. §§ 315, 315a, 315b; gives preference with respect to permits to
“landowners engaged in the livestock business, bona fide occupants or
settlers, or owners of water or water rights,” § 315b; and specifies that
grazing privileges “shall be adequately safeguarded,” but that the cre-
ation of a grazing district or the issuance of a permit does not create
“any right, title, interest, or estate in or to the lands,” ibid. Since 1938,
conditions placed on grazing permits have reflected the grazing privi-
leges’ leasehold nature, and the grazing regulations in effect have pre-
served the Secretary’s authority to (1) cancel a permit under certain
circumstances, (2) reclassify and withdraw land from grazing to devote
it to a more valuable or suitable use, and (3) suspend animal unit months
(AUMs) of grazing privileges in the event of range depletion. Petition-
ers, ranching-related organizations, challenged several 1995 amend-
ments to the regulations. The District Court found four of the new
regulations unlawful. The Tenth Circuit reversed as to three of them,
upholding regulations that (1) changed the definition of “grazing prefer-
ence,” 43 CFR § 4100.0–5; (2) permitted those who are not “engaged in
the livestock business” to qualify for grazing permits, § 4110.1(a); and
(3) granted the United States title to all future “permanent” range im-
provements, § 4120.3–2.
Held: The regulatory changes do not exceed the Secretary’s Taylor Graz-
ing Act authority. Pp. 739–750.
(a) Section 4100.0–5’s new definition of “grazing preference” does not
violate 43 U. S. C. § 315b’s requirement that “grazing privileges” “be
adequately safeguarded.” Before its amendment, § 4100.0–5 defined
“grazing preference” as “the total number of [AUMs] of livestock graz-
ing on public lands apportioned and attached to base property owned or
controlled by a permittee or lessee,” but the 1995 version refers only to
a priority, not to a specific number of AUMs, and it adds a new term,

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“permitted use,” which refers to forage “allocated by, or under the guid-
ance of an applicable land use plan.” The new definitions do not exceed
the Secretary’s authority under § 315b. First, § 315b’s words “so far as
consistent with the purposes” of the Act and “issuance of a permit”
creates no “right, title, interest, or estate” make clear that the ranchers’
interest in permit stability is not absolute and that the Secretary is
free reasonably to determine just how, and the extent to which, grazing
privileges are to be safeguarded. Moreover, since Congress itself has
directed development of land use plans, and their use in the allocation
process, it is difficult to see how a definitional change that simply refers
to using such plans could violate the Taylor Act by itself, without more.
Given the broad discretionary powers that the Taylor Act grants the
Secretary, the Act must be read as here granting him at least ordinary
administrative leeway to assess “safeguard[ing]” in terms of the Act’s
other purposes and provisions. Second, the pre-1995 AUM system that
petitioners seek to “safeguard” did not offer them anything like absolute
security, for the Secretary had well-established pre-1995 authority to
cancel, modify, or decline to review permits, including the power to do
so pursuant to a land use plan. Third, the new definitional regulations
by themselves do not automatically bring about a self-executing change
that would significantly diminish the security of grazing privileges.
The Interior Department represents that the new definitions merely
clarify terminology. The new regulations do seem to tie grazing privi-
leges to land use plans more explicitly than did the old. However, all
Bureau of Land Management lands have been covered by land use plans
for nearly 20 years, yet the ranchers have not provided a single example
in which interaction of plan and permit has jeopardized or might jeopar-
dize permit security. A particular land use plan might lead to a denial
of privileges that the pre-1995 regulations would have provided, but
the question here is whether the definition changes by themselves vio-
late the Act’s requirement that grazing privileges be “adequately safe-
guarded.” They do not. Pp. 739–744.
(b) The deletion of the phrase “engaged in the livestock business”
from § 4110.1(a) does not violate the statutory limitation to “stock own-
ers.” Section 315b, just two sentences after using “stock owners,”
gives preference to “landowners engaged in the livestock business.”
This indicates that Congress did not intend to make the phrases syn-
onyms. Neither the Act’s legislative history nor its basic purpose sug-
gests an absolute limit to those engaged in the livestock business was
intended by the term “stock owner.” The ranchers’ underlying concern
is that the amendment is part of a scheme to end grazing on public lands

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by allowing individuals to acquire a few livestock, obtain a permit for
conservation, and then effectively mothball the permit. However, the
remaining regulations, for livestock grazing use or suspended use, do
not encompass the situation that the ranchers describe. Pp. 745–748.
(c) Section 4120.3–2, which specifies that title to permanent range im-
provements, such as fences, wells, and pipelines, made pursuant to coop-
erative agreements with the Government shall be in the name of the
United States, does not violate the Act. Nothing in the statute denies
the Secretary authority reasonably to decide when or whether to grant
title to those who make improvements. Any such person remains free
to negotiate the terms upon which he will make those improvements,
including how he might be compensated in the future for his work,
either by the Government or by those granted a Government permit.
Pp. 748–750.
167 F. 3d 1287, affirmed.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. O’Connor,
J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 750.
Timothy S. Bishop argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the briefs were Steffen N. Johnson and Con-
stance E. Brooks.
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for
respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General
Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, David C.
Frederick, William B. Lazarus, and John D. Leshy.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Wyo-
ming by Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General, Thomas J. Davidson, Deputy
Attorney General, and Theodore C. Preston, Assistant Attorney General;
for the Alameda Bookcliffs Ranch et al. by Karen Budd-Falen and Jeffrey
B. Teichert; for the Association of Rangeland Consultants by W. Alan
Schroeder; for the Farm Credit Institutions by William G. Myers III and
Marcy G. Glenn; for the Northwest Mining Association by William Perry
Pendley and Steven J. Lechner; for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al.
by M. Reed Hopper; and for Congressman Don Young et al. by William
K. Kelley.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Natural
Resources Defense Council et al. by Thomas D. Lustig; and for the Nature
Conservancy by W. Cullen Battle and Michael Dennis.

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Opinion of the Court
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to interpret several provisions of
the 1934 Taylor Grazing Act, 48 Stat. 1269, 43 U. S. C. § 315
et seq. The petitioners claim that each of three grazing reg-
ulations, 43 CFR §§ 4100.0–5, 4110.1(a), and 4120.3–2 (1998),
exceeds the authority that this statute grants the Secretary
of the Interior. We disagree and hold that the three reg-
ulations do not violate the Act.
I
We begin with a brief description of the Act’s background,
provisions, and related administrative practice.
A
The Taylor Grazing Act’s enactment in 1934 marked a
turning point in the history of the western rangelands,
the vast, dry grasslands and desert that stretch from west-
ern Nebraska, Kansas, and Texas to the Sierra Nevada.
Ranchers once freely grazed livestock on the publicly owned
range as their herds moved from place to place, searching
for grass and water. But the population growth that fol-
lowed the Civil War eventually doomed that unregulated
economic freedom.
A new era began in 1867 with the first successful long
drive of cattle north from Texas. Cowboys began regularly
driving large herds of grazing cattle each year through thou-
sands of miles of federal lands to railheads like Abilene, Kan-
sas. From there or other towns along the rail line, trains
carried live cattle to newly opened eastern markets. The
long drives initially brought high profits, which attracted
more ranchers and more cattle to the land once home only to
Indian tribes and buffalo. Indeed, an early-1880’s boom in
the cattle market saw the number of cattle grazing the Great
Plains grow well beyond 7 million. See R. White, “It’s Your
Misfortune and None of My Own”: A History of the Ameri-
can West 223 (1991); see generally E. Osgood, The Day of the

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Cattleman 83–113 (1929); W. Webb, The Great Plains 205–
268 (1931).
But more cattle meant more competition for ever-scarcer
water and grass. And that competition was intensified by
the arrival of sheep in the 1870’s. Many believed that sheep
were destroying the range, killing fragile grass plants by
cropping them too closely. The increased competition for
forage, along with droughts, blizzards, and growth in home-
steading, all aggravated natural forage scarcity. This led, in
turn, to overgrazing, diminished profits, and hostility among
forage competitors—to the point where violence and “wars”
broke out, between cattle and sheep ranchers, between
ranchers and homesteaders, and between those who fenced
and those who cut fences to protect an open range. See
W. Gard, Frontier Justice 81–149 (1949). These circum-
stances led to calls for a law to regulate the land that once
was free.
The calls began as early as 1878 when the legendary south-
western explorer, Major John Wesley Powell, fearing water
monopoly, wrote that ordinary homesteading laws would not
work and pressed Congress to enact “a general law . . . to
provide for the organization of pasturage districts.” Report
on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States,
H. Exec. Doc. No. 73, 45th Cong., 2d Sess., 28 (1878). From
the end of the 19th century on, Members of Congress regu-
larly introduced legislation of this kind, often with Presiden-
tial support. In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt reiter-
ated Powell’s request and urged Congress to pass laws that
would “provide for Government control of the public pasture
lands of the West.” S. Doc. No. 310, 59th Cong., 2d Sess.,
5 (1907). But political opposition to federal regulation was
strong. President Roosevelt attributed that opposition to
“those who do not make their homes on the land, but who
own wandering bands of sheep that are driven hither and
thither to eat out the land and render it worthless for the
real home maker”; along with “the men who have already

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obtained control of great areas of the public land . . . who
object . . . because it will break the control that these few
big men now have over the lands which they do not actually
own.” Ibid. Whatever the opposition’s source, bills re-
flecting Powell’s approach did not become law until 1934.
By the 1930’s, opposition to federal regulation of the fed-
eral range had significantly diminished. Population growth,
forage competition, and inadequate range control all began
to have consequences both serious and apparent. With a
horrifying drought came ‘dawns without day’ as dust storms
swept the range. The devastating storms of the Dust Bowl
were in the words of one Senator “the most tragic, the most
impressive lobbyist, that ha[s] ever come to this Capitol.”
79 Cong. Rec. 6013 (1935). Congress acted; and on June 28,
1934, President Franklin Roosevelt signed the Taylor Graz-
ing Act into law.
B
The Taylor Act seeks to “promote the highest use of the
public lands.” 43 U. S. C. § 315. Its specific goals are to
“stop injury” to the lands from “overgrazing and soil deterio-
ration,” to “provide for their use, improvement and develop-
ment,” and “to stabilize the livestock industry dependent on
the public range.” 48 Stat. 1269. The Act grants the Sec-
retary of the Interior authority to divide the public range-
lands into grazing districts, to specify the amount of grazing
permitted in each district, to issue leases or permits “to
graze livestock,” and to charge “reasonable fees” for use of
the land. 43 U. S. C. §§ 315, 315a, 315b. It specifies that
preference in respect to grazing permits “shall be given . . .
to those within or near” a grazing district “who are landown-
ers engaged in the livestock business, bona fide occupants or
settlers, or owners of water or water rights.” § 315b. And,
as particularly relevant here, it adds:
“So far as consistent with the purposes and provisions
of this subchapter, grazing privileges recognized and ac-

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knowledged shall be adequately safeguarded, but the
creation of a grazing district or the issuance of a
permit . . . shall not create any right, title, interest, or
estate in or to the lands.” Ibid.
C
The Taylor Act delegated to the Interior Department an
enormous administrative task. To administer the Act, the
Department needed to determine the bounds of the public
range, create grazing districts, determine their grazing ca-
pacity, and divide that capacity among applicants. It soon
set bounds encompassing more than 140 million acres, and
by 1936 the Department had created 37 grazing districts, see
Department of Interior Ann. Rep. 15 (1935); W. Calef, Pri-
vate Grazing and Public Lands 58–59 (1960). The Secretary
then created district advisory boards made up of local
ranchers and called on them for further help. See 2 App.
809–811 (Rules for Administration of Grazing Districts (Mar.
2, 1936)). Limited department resources and the enormity
of the administrative task made the boards “the effective
governing and administrative body of each grazing district.”
Calef, supra, at 60; accord, P. Foss, Politics and Grass 199–
200 (1960).
By 1937 the Department had set the basic rules for allo-
cation of grazing privileges. Those rules recognized that
many ranchers had long maintained herds on their own pri-
vate lands during part of the year, while allowing their herds
to graze farther afield on public land at other times. The
rules consequently gave a first preference to owners of stock
who also owned “base property,” i. e., private land (or water
rights) sufficient to support their herds, and who had grazed
the public range during the five years just prior to the Taylor
Act’s enactment. See 2 App. 818–819 (Rules for Adminis-
tration of Grazing Districts (June 14, 1937)). They gave a
second preference to other owners of nearby “base” property

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lacking prior use. Ibid. And they gave a third preference
to stock owners without base property, like the nomadic
sheep herder. Ibid. Since lower preference categories di-
vided capacity left over after satisfaction of all higher prefer-
ence claims, this system, in effect, awarded grazing privi-
leges to owners of land or water. See Foss, supra, at 63
(quoting Grazing Division Director F. R. Carpenter’s re-
marks that grazing privileges are given to ranchers “not as
individuals, nor as owners of livestock,” but to “build up [the]
lands and give them stability and value”).
As grazing allocations were determined, the Department
would issue a permit measuring grazing privileges in terms
of “animal unit months” (AUMs), i. e., the right to obtain
the forage needed to sustain one cow (or five sheep) for one
month. Permits were valid for up to 10 years and usually
renewed, as suggested by the Act. See 43 U. S. C. § 315b;
Public Land Law Review Commission, One Third of the Na-
tion’s Land 109 (1970). But the conditions placed on permits
reflected the leasehold nature of grazing privileges, consist-
ent with the fact that Congress had made the Secretary the
landlord of the public range and basically made the grant of
grazing privileges discretionary. The grazing regulations
in effect from 1938 to the present day made clear that the
Department retained the power to modify, fail to renew, or
cancel a permit or lease for various reasons.
First, the Secretary could cancel permits if, for example,
the permit holder persistently overgrazed the public lands,
lost control of the base property, failed to use the permit, or
failed to comply with the Range Code. See, e. g., 43 CFR
§§ 160.26(a)–(f) (1938); Department of Interior, Federal
Range Code §§ 6(c)(6), (7), (10) (1942) (hereinafter 1942
Range Code); 43 CFR §§ 161.6(c)(6)–(7), (10)–(12) (1955); 43
CFR §§ 4115.2–1(d), (e)(7)–(11) (1964); 43 CFR §§ 4115.2–
1(d) (e)(7)–(11) (1977); 43 CFR § 4170.1–2 (1994); 43 CFR
§ 4170.1–2 (1998). Second, the Secretary, consistent first

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with 43 U. S. C. § 315f, and later the land use planning man-
dated by 43 U. S. C. § 1712 (discussed infra, at 737–738), was
authorized to reclassify and withdraw land from grazing
altogether and devote it to a more valuable or suitable use.
See, e. g., 43 CFR § 160.22 (1938); 1942 Range Code § 6(c)(4);
43 CFR § 161.6(c)(5) (1955); 43 CFR §§ 4111.4–2(f), 4115.2–
1(e)(6) (1964); 43 CFR §§ 4111.4–3(f), 4115.2–1(e)(6) (1977);
43 CFR § 4110.4–2(a) (1994); 43 CFR § 4110.4–2(a) (1998).
Third, in the event of range depletion, the Secretary main-
tained a separate authority, not to take areas of land out of
grazing use altogether as above, but to reduce the amount of
grazing allowed on that land, by suspending AUMs of graz-
ing privileges “in whole or in part,” and “for such time as
necessary.” 43 CFR § 4115.2–1(e)(5) (1964); see also 43 CFR
§ 160.30 (1938) (reservation (b)); 1942 Range Code § 6(c)(8);
43 CFR § 161.4(8) (1955); 43 CFR §§ 4111.4–3, 4115.2–1(e)(5)
(1977); 43 CFR § 4110.3–2 (1994); 43 CFR § 4110.3–2 (1998).
Indeed, the Department so often reduced individual per-
mit AUM allocations under this last authority that by 1964
the regulations had introduced the notion of “active AUMs,”
i. e., the AUMs that a permit initially granted minus the
AUMs that the department had “suspended” due to dimin-
ished range capacity. Thus, three ranchers who had initially
received, say, 3,000, 2,000, and 1,000 AUMs respectively,
might find that they could use only two-thirds of that number
because a 33% reduction in the district’s grazing capacity had
led the Department to “suspend” one-third of each allocation.
The “active/suspended” system assured each rancher, how-
ever, that any capacity-related reduction would take place
proportionately among permit holders, see 43 CFR § 4111.4–
2(a)(3) (1964), and that the Department would try to restore
grazing privileges proportionately should the district’s ca-
pacity later increase, see § 4111.4–1.
In practice, active grazing on the public range declined
dramatically and steadily (from about 18 million to about

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10 million AUMs between 1953 and 1998) as the following
chart shows:











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Brief for Respondents 9a.
Despite the reductions in grazing, and some improvements
following the passage of the Taylor Act, see App. 374–379
(Department of Interior, 50 Years of Public Land Manage-
ment 1934–1984), the range remained in what many consid-
ered an unsatisfactory condition. In 1962, a congressionally
mandated survey found only 16.6% of the range in excellent
or good condition, 53.1% in fair condition, and 30.3% in poor
condition. Department of Interior Ann. Rep. 62 (1962).
And in 1978 Congress itself determined that “vast segments
of the public rangelands are . . . in an unsatisfactory condi-
tion.” 92 Stat. 1803 (codified as 43 U. S. C. § 1901(a)(1)).
D
In the 1960’s, as the range failed to recover, the Secretary
of the Interior increased grazing fees by more than 50%
(from 19 cents to 30 cents per AUM/year), thereby helping
to capture a little more of the economic costs that grazing
imposed upon the land. Department of Interior Ann. Rep.
66 (1963). And in 1976, Congress enacted a new law, the

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Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA),
90 Stat. 2744, 43 U. S. C. § 1701 et seq., which instructed the
Interior Department to develop districtwide land use plans
based upon concepts of “multiple use” (use for various pur-
poses, such as recreation, range, timber, minerals, water-
shed, wildlife and fish, and natural and scenic, scientific, and
historical usage), § 1702(c), and “sustained yield” (regular re-
newable resource output maintained in perpetuity), § 1702(h).
The FLPMA strengthened the Department’s existing au-
thority to remove or add land from grazing use, allowing
such modification pursuant to a land use plan, §§ 1712, 1714,
while specifying that existing grazing permit holders would
retain a “first priority” for renewal so long as the land use
plan continued to make land “available for domestic livestock
grazing,” § 1752(c).
In 1978, the Department’s grazing regulations were, in
turn, substantially amended to comply with the new law.
See 43 Fed. Reg. 29067. As relevant here, the 1978 reg-
ulations tied permit renewal and validity to the land use
planning process, giving the Secretary the power to can-
cel, suspend, or modify grazing permits due to increases
or decreases in grazing forage or acreage made available
pursuant to land planning. See 43 CFR §§ 4110.3–2(b),
4110.4–2 (1978); see also 43 CFR § 4110.4–2 (1994); 43 CFR
§ 4110.4–2 (1998).
That same year Congress again increased grazing fees for
the period 1979 to 1986. See Public Rangelands Improve-
ment Act of 1978, 43 U. S. C. § 1905. However neither of the
two Acts from the 1970’s significantly modified the particular
provisions of the Taylor Act at issue in this case.
E
This case arises out of a 1995 set of Interior Department
amendments to the federal grazing regulations. 60 Fed.
Reg. 9894 (1995) (Final Rule). The amendments represent
a stated effort to “accelerate restoration” of the rangeland,

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make the rangeland management program “more compatible
with ecosystem management,” “streamline certain adminis-
trative functions,” and “obtain for the public fair and reason-
able compensation for the grazing of livestock on public
lands.” 58 Fed. Reg. 43208 (1993) (Proposed Rule). The
amendments in final form emphasize individual “steward-
ship” of the public land by increasing the accountability of
grazing permit holders; broaden membership on the district
advisory boards; change certain title rules; and change ad-
ministrative rules and practice of the Bureau of Land Man-
agement to bring them into closer conformity with related
Forest Service management practices. See 60 Fed. Reg.
9900–9906 (1995).
Petitioners Public Lands Council and other nonprofit
ranching-related organizations with members who hold graz-
ing permits brought this lawsuit against the Secretary and
other defendants in Federal District Court, challenging 10 of
the new regulations. The court found 4 of 10 unlawful. 929
F. Supp. 1436, 1450–1451 (Wyo. 1996). The Court of Appeals
reversed the District Court in part, upholding three of the
four. 167 F. 3d 1287, 1289 (CA10 1999). Those three (which
we shall describe further below) (1) change the definition of
“grazing preference”; (2) permit those who are not “engaged
in the livestock business” to qualify for grazing permits; and
(3) grant the United States title to all future “permanent”
range improvements. One judge on the Court of Appeals
dissented in respect to the Secretary’s authority to promul-
gate the first and the third regulations. See id., at 1309–
1318. We granted certiorari to consider the ranchers’ claim
that these three regulatory changes exceed the authority
that the Taylor Act grants the Secretary. 528 U. S. 926
(1999).
II
A
The ranchers attack the new “grazing preference” reg-
ulations first and foremost. Their attack relies upon the

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provision in the Taylor Act stating that “grazing privi-
leges recognized and acknowledged shall be adequately
safeguarded . . . .” 43 U. S. C. § 315b. Before 1995 the reg-
ulations defined the term “grazing preference” in terms of
the AUM-denominated amount of grazing privileges that
a permit granted. The regulations then defined “grazing
preference” as
“the total number of animal unit months of livestock
grazing on public lands apportioned and attached to base
property owned or controlled by a permittee or lessee.”
43 CFR § 4100.0–5 (1994).
The 1995 regulations changed this definition, however, so
that it now no longer refers to grazing privileges “appor-
tioned,” nor does it speak in terms of AUMs. The new
definition defines “grazing preference” as
“a superior or priority position against others for
the purpose of receiving a grazing permit or lease.
This priority is attached to base property owned or
controlled by the permittee or lessee.” 43 CFR
§ 4100.0–5 (1995).
The new definition “omits reference to a specified quantity
of forage.” 60 Fed. Reg. 9921 (1995). It refers only to a
priority, not to a specific number of AUMs attached to a base
property. But at the same time the new regulations add a
new term, “permitted use,” which the Secretary defines as
“the forage allocated by, or under the guidance of, an
applicable land use plan for livestock grazing in an al-
lotment under a permit or lease and is expressed in
AUMs.” 43 CFR § 4100.0–5 (1995).
This new “permitted use,” like the old “grazing preference,”
is defined in terms of allocated rights, and it refers to AUMs.
But this new term as defined refers, not to a rancher’s forage
priority, but to forage “allocated by, or under the guidance

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of an applicable land use plan.” Ibid. (emphasis added).
And therein lies the ranchers’ concern.
The ranchers refer us to the administrative history of Tay-
lor Act regulations, much of which we set forth in Part I.
In the ranchers’ view, history has created expectations in
respect to the security of “grazing privileges”; they have re-
lied upon those expectations; and the statute requires the
Secretary to “safeguar[d]” that reliance. Supported by var-
ious farm credit associations, they argue that defining their
privileges in relation to land use plans will undermine that
security. They say that the content of land use plans is dif-
ficult to predict and easily changed. Fearing that the result-
ing uncertainty will discourage lenders from taking mort-
gages on ranches as security for their loans, they conclude
that the new regulations threaten the stability, and possibly
the economic viability, of their ranches, and thus fail to “safe-
guard” the “grazing privileges” that Department regulations
previously “recognized and acknowledged.” Brief for Peti-
tioners 22–23.
We are not persuaded by the ranchers’ argument for three
basic reasons. First, the statute qualifies the duty to “safe-
guard” by referring directly to the Act’s various goals and
the Secretary’s efforts to implement them. The full subsec-
tion says:
“So far as consistent with the purposes and provisions
of this subchapter, grazing privileges recognized and ac-
knowledged shall be adequately safeguarded, but the
creation of a grazing district or the issuance of a permit
pursuant to the provisions of this subchapter shall not
create any right, title, interest or estate in or to the
lands.” 43 U. S. C. § 315b (emphasis added).
The words “so far as consistent with the purposes . . . of
this subchapter” and the warning that “issuance of a permit”
creates no “right, title, interest or estate” make clear that
the ranchers’ interest in permit stability cannot be absolute;

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and that the Secretary is free reasonably to determine just
how, and the extent to which, “grazing privileges” shall be
safeguarded, in light of the Act’s basic purposes. Of course,
those purposes include “stabiliz[ing] the livestock industry,”
but they also include “stop[ping] injury to the public grazing
lands by preventing overgrazing and soil deterioration,” and
“provid[ing] for th[e] orderly use, improvement, and develop-
ment” of the public range. 48 Stat. 1269; see supra, at 733.
Moreover, Congress itself has directed development of
land use plans, and their use in the allocation process, in
order to preserve, improve, and develop the public range-
lands. See 43 U. S. C. §§ 1701(a)(2), 1712. That being so, it
is difficult to see how a definitional change that simply refers
to the use of such plans could violate the Taylor Act by itself,
without more. Given the broad discretionary powers that
the Taylor Act grants the Secretary, we must read that Act
as here granting the Secretary at least ordinary administra-
tive leeway to assess “safeguard[ing]” in terms of the Act’s
other purposes and provisions. Cf. §§ 315, 315a (authorizing
Secretary to establish grazing districts “in his discretion”
(emphasis added), and to “make provision for protection, ad-
ministration, regulation, and improvement of such grazing
districts”).
Second, the pre-1995 AUM system that the ranchers seek
to “safeguard” did not offer them anything like absolute se-
curity—not even in respect to the proportionate shares of
grazing land privileges that the “active/suspended” system
suggested. As discussed above, the Secretary has long had
the power to reduce an individual permit’s AUMs or cancel
the permit if the permit holder did not use the grazing privi-
leges, did not use the base property, or violated the Range
Code. See supra, at 735 (collecting CFR citations 1938–
1998). And the Secretary has always had the statutory au-
thority under the Taylor Act and later FLPMA to reclassify
and withdraw rangeland from grazing use, see 43 U. S. C.

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§ 315f (authorizing Secretary, “in his discretion, to examine
and classify any lands . . . which are more valuable or suitable
for the production of agricultural crops . . . or any other use
than [grazing]”); §§ 1712, 1752(c) (authorizing renewal of per-
mits “so long as the lands . . . remain available for domestic
livestock grazing in accordance with land use plans” (em-
phasis added)). The Secretary has consistently reserved the
authority to cancel or modify grazing permits accordingly.
See supra, at 735–736 (collecting CFR citations). Given
these well-established pre-1995 Secretarial powers to cancel,
modify, or decline to renew individual permits, including the
power to do so pursuant to the adoption of a land use plan,
the ranchers’ diminishment-of-security point is at best a mat-
ter of degree.
Third, the new definitional regulations by themselves do
not automatically bring about a self-executing change that
would significantly diminish the security of granted grazing
privileges. The Department has said that the new defini-
tions do “not cancel preference,” and that any change is
“merely a clarification of terminology.” 60 Fed. Reg. 9922
(1995). It now assures us through the Solicitor General that
the definitional changes “preserve all elements of prefer-
ence” and “merely clarify the regulations within the statu-
tory framework.” See Brief in Opposition 13, 14.
The Secretary did consider making a more sweeping
change by eliminating the concept of “suspended use”; a
change that might have more reasonably prompted the
ranchers’ concerns. But after receiving comments, he
changed his mind. See 59 Fed. Reg. 14323 (1994). The De-
partment has instead said that “suspended” AUMs will
“continue to be recognized and have a priority for addi-
tional grazing use within the allotment. Suspended use
provides an important accounting of past grazing use for
the ranching community and is an insignificant adminis-
trative workload to the agency.” Bureau of Land Man-

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agement, Rangeland Reform ’94: Final Environmental
Impact Statement 144 (1994).
Of course, the new definitions seem to tie grazing privi-
leges to land use plans more explicitly than did the old. But,
as we have pointed out, the Secretary has since 1976 had the
authority to use land use plans to determine the amount of
permissible grazing, 43 U. S. C. § 1712. The Secretary also
points out that since development of land use plans began
nearly 20 years ago, “all BLM lands in the lower 48 States
are covered by land use plans,” and “all grazing permits in
those States have now been issued or renewed in accordance
with such plans, or must now conform to them.” Brief for
Respondents 26. Yet the ranchers have not provided us
with a single example in which interaction of plan and permit
has jeopardized or might yet jeopardize permit security. An
amicus brief filed by a group of Farm Credit Institutions
says that the definitional change will “threate[n]” their
“lending policies.” Brief for Farm Credit Institutions as
Amicus Curiae 3. But they do not explain why that is so,
nor do they state that the new definitions will, in fact, lead
them to stop lending to ranchers.
We recognize that a particular land use plan could change
pre-existing grazing allocation in a particular district. And
that change might arguably lead to a denial of grazing privi-
leges that the pre-1995 regulations would have provided.
But the affected permit holder remains free to challenge
such an individual effect on grazing privileges, and the
courts remain free to determine its lawfulness in context.
We here consider only whether the changes in the definitions
by themselves violate the Taylor Act’s requirement that
recognized grazing privileges be “adequately safeguarded.”
Given the leeway that the statute confers upon the Secre-
tary, the less-than-absolute pre-1995 security that permit
holders enjoyed, and the relatively small differences that the
new definitions create, we conclude that the new definitions
do not violate that law.

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B
The ranchers’ second challenge focuses upon a provision of
the Taylor Act that limits issuance of permits to “settlers,
residents, and other stock owners . . . .” 43 U. S. C. § 315b
(emphasis added). In 1936, the Secretary, following this re-
quirement, issued a regulation that limited eligibility to
those who “ow[n] livestock.” 2 App. 808 (Rules for Adminis-
tration of Grazing Districts (Mar. 2, 1936)). But in 1942, the
Secretary changed the regulation’s wording to limit eligibil-
ity to those “engaged in the livestock business,” 1942 Range
Code § 3(a), and so it remained until 1994. The new regula-
tion eliminates the words “engaged in the livestock busi-
ness,” thereby seeming to make eligible otherwise qualified
applicants even if they do not engage in the livestock busi-
ness. See 43 CFR § 4110.1(a) (1995).
The new change is not as radical as the text of the new
regulation suggests. The new rule deletes the entire phrase
“engaged in the livestock business” from § 4110.1, and seems
to require only that an applicant “own or control land or
water base property . . . .” Ibid. But the omission, stand-
ing alone, does not render the regulation facially invalid, for
the regulation cannot change the statute, and a regulation
promulgated to guide the Secretary’s discretion in exercising
his authority under the Act need not also restate all related
statutory language. Ultimately it is both the Taylor Act and
the regulations promulgated thereunder that constrain the
Secretary’s discretion in issuing permits. The statute con-
tinues to limit the Secretary’s authorization to issue permits
to “bona fide settlers, residents, and other stock owners.”
43 U. S. C. § 315b (emphasis added).
Nor will the change necessarily lead to widespread issu-
ance of grazing permits to “stock owners” who are not in the
livestock business. Those in the business continue to enjoy
a preference in the issuance of grazing permits. The same
section of the Taylor Act mandates that the Secretary accord
a preference to “landowners engaged in the livestock busi-

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ness, bona fide occupants or settlers.” Ibid. And this stat-
utory language has been extremely important in practice.
See supra, at 734–735.
The ranchers nonetheless contend that the deletion of the
term “engaged in the livestock business” violates the statu-
tory limitation to “stock owners” in § 315b. The words
“stock owner,” they say, meant “commercial stock owner” in
1934, and a commercial stock owner is not simply one who
owns livestock, but one who engages in the business.
Hence, they argue, the Secretary lacks the authority to allow
those who are not engaged in the business to apply for
permits.
The words “stock owner” and “stock owner engaged in the
livestock business,” however, are not obvious synonyms.
And we have found no convincing indication that Congress
intended that we treat them as such. Just two sentences
after using the words “stock owner,” Congress said that,
among those eligible for permits (i. e., stock owners), prefer-
ence should be given to “landowners engaged in the livestock
business, bona fide occupants or settlers, or owners of water
or water rights.” § 315b (emphasis added). Why would
Congress add the words “engaged in the livestock business”
if (as the ranchers’ argument implies) they add nothing? Cf.
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 36 (1992)
(“[A] statute must, if possible, be construed in such fashion
that every word has some operative effect”). The legisla-
tive history to which the ranchers point shows that Congress
expected that ordinarily permit holders would be ranchers,
who do engage in the livestock business, but does not show
any such absolute requirement. See, e. g., H. R. Rep.
No. 903, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934); Hearings on H. R. 2835
and H. R. 6462 before the House Committee on the Public
Lands, 73d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 96 (1933–1934); Hearings
on H. R. 6462 before the Senate Committee on Public Lands
and Surveys, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 40 (1934). Nor does the
statute’s basic purpose require that the two sets of different

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words mean the same thing. Congress could reasonably
have written the statute to mandate a preference in the
granting of permits to those actively involved in the live-
stock business, while not absolutely excluding the possibility
of granting permits to others. The Secretary has not ex-
ceeded his powers under the statute.
The ranchers’ underlying concern is that the qualifications
amendment is part of a scheme to end livestock grazing on
the public lands. They say that “individuals or organiza-
tions owning small quantities of stock [will] acquire grazing
permits, even though they intend not to graze at all or to
graze only a nominal number of livestock—all the while ex-
cluding others from using the public range for grazing.”
Brief for Petitioners 47–48. The new regulations, they
charge, will allow individuals to “acquire a few livestock, . . .
obtain a permit for what amounts to a conservation purpose
and then effectively mothball the permit.” Id., at 48.
But the regulations do not allow this. The regulations
specify that regular grazing permits will be issued for live-
stock grazing or suspended use. See 43 CFR §§ 4130.2(a),
4130.2(g) (1998). New regulations allowing issuance of per-
mits for conservation use were held unlawful by the Court
of Appeals, see 167 F. 3d, at 1307–1308, and the Secretary
did not seek review of that decision.
Neither livestock grazing use nor suspended use encom-
passes the situation that the ranchers describe. With re-
gard to the former, the regulations state that permitted live-
stock grazing “shall be based upon the amount of forage
available for livestock grazing as established in the land use
plan . . . .” 43 CFR § 4110.2–2(a) (1998) (emphasis added).
Permitted livestock use is not simply a symbolic upper limit.
Under the regulations, a permit holder is expected to make
substantial use of the permitted use set forth in the grazing
permit. For example, the regulations prohibit a permit
holder from “[f]ailing to make substantial grazing use as au-
thorized for 2 consecutive fee years.” § 4140.1(a)(2). If a

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permit holder does fail to make substantial use as authorized
in his permit for two consecutive years, the Secretary is au-
thorized to cancel from the grazing permit that portion of
permitted use that the permit holder has failed to use. See
§ 4170.1–2. On the basis of these regulations, the Secretary
has represented to the Court that “[a] longstanding rule re-
quires that a grazing permit be used for grazing.” Brief for
Respondents 43, n. 25. Suspended use, in turn, is generally
imposed by the Secretary in response to changing range con-
ditions. See supra, at 736. Permittees may also apply to
place forage in “[t]emporary nonuse” for financial reasons,
but the Secretary must approve such nonuse on an annual
basis and may not grant it for more than three consecutive
years. 43 CFR § 4130.2(g)(2) (1998). A successful tempo-
rary nonuse application, moreover, does not necessarily take
the land out of grazing use—the Secretary may allocate
to others the forage temporarily made available via non-
renewable permit. See §§ 4130.2(h), 4130.6–2. In short,
nothing in the change to § 4110.1(a) undermines the Taylor
Act’s requirement that the Secretary grant permits “to graze
livestock.” 43 U. S. C. § 315b.
C
The ranchers’ final challenge focuses upon a change in the
way the new rules allocate ownership of range improve-
ments, such as fencing, well drilling, or spraying for weeds
on the public lands. The Taylor Act provides that permit
holders may undertake range improvements pursuant to (1)
a cooperative agreement with the United States, or (2) a
range improvement permit. 43 U. S. C. § 315c; see 43 CFR
§§ 4120.3–2, 4120.3–3 (1998). The pre-1995 regulations ap-
plicable to cooperative agreements gave the United States
full title to “nonstructural” improvements, such as spraying
for weeds, and to “non-removable improvements,” such as
wells. 43 CFR § 4120.3–2 (1994). But for “structural or re-
movable improvements,” such as fencing, stock tanks, or

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pipelines, the regulations shared title between the permit
holder and the United States “in proportion to the actual
amount of the respective contribution to the initial construc-
tion.” Ibid. And for range improvements made pursuant
to permit, the pre-1995 regulations gave the permittee “title
to removable range improvements.” § 4120.3–3(b).
The 1995 regulations change the title rules for range im-
provements made pursuant to a cooperative agreement, but
not the rules for improvements made pursuant to permit.
For cooperative agreements, they specify that “title to per-
manent range improvements” (authorized in the future)
“such as fences, wells, and pipelines . . . shall be in the name
of the United States.” 43 CFR § 4120.3–2(b) (1995).
The ranchers argue that this change violates 43 U. S. C.
§ 315c, which says:
“No permit shall be issued which shall entitle the per-
mittee to the use of such [range] improvements con-
structed and owned by a prior occupant until the appli-
cant has paid to such prior occupant the reasonable
value of such improvements . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
In their view, the word “owned” foresees ownership by a
“prior occupant” of at least some such improvements, a possi-
bility they say is denied by the new rule mandating blanket
Government ownership of permanent range improvements.
The Secretary responds that, since the statute gives him
the power to authorize range improvements pursuant to a
cooperative agreement—a greater power, § 315c—he also has
the power to set the terms of title ownership to such im-
provements—a lesser power—just like any landlord. See
R. Schoshinski, American Law of Landlord and Tenant § 5:31
(1980) (ownership of tenant improvements is a matter open
to negotiation with landlord); H. Bronson, A Treatise on the
Law of Fixtures § 40 (1904); 2 J. Taylor, A Treatise on the
American Law of Landlord and Tenant § 554, pp. 164–166
(1887). Under this reading, the subsequent statutory provi-

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O’Connor, J., concurring
sion relating to “ownership” simply provides for compensa-
tion by some future permit holder in the event that the Sec-
retary decides to grant title.
As detailed above, the Secretary did grant ownership
rights to range improvements under certain circumstances
prior to 1995. We see nothing in the statute that prevents
him from changing his mind in respect to the future. And
the Secretary has now changed his mind for reasons of ad-
ministrative convenience and because what he takes as the
original purpose of this provision (assuring that, in 1934,
ranchers would pay compensation to nomadic sheep herders)
is no longer important. In any event, the provision retains
even the “contemplation of ownership” meaning stressed by
the ranchers, for permit holders may still “own” removable
range improvements, such as “corrals, creep feeders, and
loading chutes, and temporary structural improvements such
as troughs for hauled water,” 43 CFR § 4120.3–3(b) (1995),
which could be transferred to a new permit holder and thus
compel compensation under § 315f.
In short, we find nothing in the statute that denies the
Secretary authority reasonably to decide when or whether
to grant title to those who make improvements. And any
such person remains free to negotiate the terms upon which
he will make those improvements irrespective of where title
formally lies, including how he might be compensated in the
future for the work he had done, either by the Government
directly or by those to whom the Government later grants
a permit. Cf. 43 U. S. C. § 1752(g) (requiring the United
States to pay compensation to a permittee for his “interest”
in range improvements if it cancels a permit).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Justice O’Connor, with whom Justice Thomas joins,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion. I write separately to make the
following observations concerning the Court’s decision.

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O’Connor, J., concurring
First, in Part II–A, the Court holds that the Secretary did
not exceed his authority under the Taylor Grazing Act by
promulgating the new “grazing preference” and “permitted
use” rules. I agree with that holding but would place spe-
cial emphasis on the Court’s third reason for rejecting peti-
tioners’ facial challenge to the regulations. Petitioners have
not shown how the new regulations themselves—rather than
specific actions the Secretary might take pursuant to those
regulations—violate the Taylor Grazing Act’s requirement
that “grazing privileges recognized and acknowledged . . . be
adequately safeguarded.” 43 U. S. C. § 315b. It is of partic-
ular importance, as the Court notes, ante, at 743, that the
Secretary has assured us that the new regulations do not in
actual practice “alter the active use/suspended use formula
in grazing permits” and that “ ‘present suspended use would
continue to be recognized and have a priority for additional
grazing use within the allotment.’ ” Brief for Respondents
22 (quoting Bureau of Land Management, Rangeland Reform
’94: Final Environmental Impact Statement 144 (1994)).
For these reasons, petitioners’ facial challenge to the regula-
tions must fail. Should a permit holder find, however, that
the Secretary’s specific application of the new regulations
deviates from the above assurances and in the process de-
prives the permit holder of grazing privileges to such an ex-
tent that the Secretary’s conduct can be termed a failure to
adequately safeguard such privileges, the permit holder may
bring an as-applied challenge to the Secretary’s action at
that time. The Court’s holding today in no way forecloses
such a challenge. See ante, at 744 (“[T]he affected permit
holder remains free to challenge such an individual [denial
of] grazing privileges, and the courts remain free to deter-
mine its lawfulness in context”).
Second, it is important to note that the Court’s decision
today only rejects petitioners’ claim that the 1995 regula-
tions exceed the Secretary’s authority under the Taylor
Grazing Act. We are not presented in this case with a claim
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C.

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O’Connor, J., concurring
§ 706(2)(A), that the Secretary acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously in promulgating the new regulations. Under our de-
cision in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v.
State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 42 (1983),
an agency that departs from its previous rules will be found
to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously if it fails “to supply
a reasoned analysis for the change . . . .” Although peti-
tioners pressed precisely such an “arbitrary and capricious”
challenge before the District Court, for whatever reason,
they chose not to raise it before this Court. Regardless of
whether the “arbitrary and capricious” claim remains open
to these permit holders, the Court’s decision does not fore-
close such an APA challenge generally by permit holders af-
fected by the 1995 regulations.
With these understandings, I join the Court’s opinion.