UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON

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53 OCTOBER TERM, 1999
Syllabus
UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 98–1696. Argued December 8, 1999—Decided March 1, 2000
Respondent had been serving time in federal prison for multiple drug
and firearms felonies when two of his convictions were declared invalid.
As a result, he had served 2.5 years’ too much prison time and was at
once set free, but a 3-year term of supervised release was yet to be
served on the remaining convictions. He filed a motion to reduce his
supervised release term by the amount of extra prison time he served.
The District Court denied relief, explaining that the supervised release
commenced upon respondent’s actual release from incarceration, not be-
fore. The Sixth Circuit reversed, accepting respondent’s argument that
his supervised release term commenced not on the day he left prison,
but when his lawful term of imprisonment expired.
Held: This Court is bound by the controlling statute, 18 U. S. C. § 3624(e),
which, by its necessary operation, does not reduce the length of a
supervised release term by reason of excess time served in prison.
Under § 3624(e), a supervised release term does not commence until an
individual “is released from imprisonment.” The ordinary, common-
sense meaning of “release” is to be freed from confinement. To say
respondent was released while still imprisoned diminishes the concept
the word intends to convey. Section 3624(e) also provides that a super-
vised release term comes “after imprisonment,” once the prisoner is
“released by the Bureau of Prisons to the supervision of a probation
officer.” Thus, supervised release does not run while an individual
remains in the Bureau of Prisons’ custody. The phrase “on the day the
person is released” in § 3624(e) suggests a strict temporal interpreta-
tion, not some fictitious or constructive earlier time. Indeed, the sec-
tion admonishes that “supervised release does not run during any period
in which the person is imprisoned.” The statute does provide for con-
current running of supervised release in specific, identified cases, but
the Court infers that Congress limited § 3624(e) to the exceptions set
forth. Finally, § 3583(e)(3) does not have a substantial bearing on the
interpretive issue, for this directive addresses instances where con-
ditions of supervised release have been violated, and the court orders
a revocation. While the text of § 3624(e) resolves the case, the Court’s
conclusion accords with the objectives of supervised release, which in-
clude assisting individuals in their transition to community life. Super-

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54 UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON
Opinion of the Court
vised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by
incarceration. The Court also observes that the statutory structure
provides a means to address the equitable concerns that exist when an
individual is incarcerated beyond the proper expiration of his prison
term. The trial court, as it sees fit, may modify the individual’s super-
vised release conditions, § 3583(e)(2), or it may terminate his supervised
release obligations after one year of completed service, § 3583(e)(1).
Pp. 56–60.
154 F. 3d 569, reversed and remanded.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Barbara McDowell argued the cause for the United
States. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General
Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Robinson, Deputy
Solicitor General Dreeben, and Richard A. Friedman.
Kevin M. Schad argued the cause and filed a brief for
respondent.*
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
An offender had been serving time in federal prison for
multiple felonies when two of his convictions were de-
clared invalid. As a result, he had served too much prison
time and was at once set free, but a term of supervised re-
lease was yet to be served on the remaining convictions.
The question becomes whether the excess prison time should
be credited to the supervised release term, reducing its
length. Bound by the text of the controlling statute, 18
U. S. C. § 3624(e), we hold that the supervised release term
remains unaltered.
Respondent Roy Lee Johnson was convicted in 1990 on
two counts of possession with an intent to distribute con-
trolled substances, 84 Stat. 1260, 21 U. S. C. § 841(a), on
two counts of use of a firearm in connection with a drug
trafficking crime, 18 U. S. C. § 924(c) (1994 ed. and Supp. IV),
*Edward M. Chikofsky, Barbara E. Bergman, and Henry J. Bemporad
filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.

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Opinion of the Court
and on one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, § 922(g). He received a sentence of 171 months’ im-
prisonment, consisting of three concurrent 51-month terms
on the § 841(a) and § 922(g) counts, to be followed by two
consecutive 60-month terms on the § 924(c) counts. In addi-
tion, the District Court imposed a mandatory 3-year term
of supervised release for the drug possession offenses. See
21 U. S. C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (1994 ed., Supp. III). The Court of
Appeals, though otherwise affirming respondent’s convic-
tions and sentence, concluded the District Court erred in
sentencing him to consecutive terms of imprisonment for
the two § 924(c) firearm offenses. United States v. Johnson,
25 F. 3d 1335, 1337–1338 (CA6 1994) (en banc). On remand
the District Court modified the prisoner’s sentence to a term
of 111 months.
After our decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137
(1995), respondent filed a motion under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 to
vacate his § 924(c) convictions, and the Government did not
oppose. On May 2, 1996, the District Court vacated those
convictions, modifying respondent’s sentence to 51 months.
He had already served more than that amount of time, so
the District Court ordered his immediate release. His term
of supervised release then went into effect. This dispute
concerns its length.
In June 1996, respondent filed a motion requesting the
District Court to reduce his supervised release term by 2.5
years, the extra time served on the vacated § 924(c) con-
victions. The District Court denied relief, explaining that
pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 3624(e) the supervised release com-
menced upon respondent’s actual release from incarcera-
tion, not before. Granting respondent credit, the court ob-
served, would undermine Congress’ aim of using supervised
release to assist convicted felons in their transitions to com-
munity life.
A divided Court of Appeals reversed. 154 F. 3d 569 (CA6
1998). The court accepted respondent’s argument that his

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56 UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON
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term of supervised release commenced not on the day he left
prison confines but earlier, when his lawful term of imprison-
ment expired. Id., at 571. Awarding respondent credit for
the extra time served, the court further concluded, would
provide meaningful relief because supervised release, while
serving rehabilitative purposes, is also “punitive in nature.”
Ibid. Judge Gilman dissented, agreeing with the position
of the District Court. Id., at 572–573.
The Courts of Appeals have reached differing conclusions
on the question presented. Compare United States v.
Blake, 88 F. 3d 824, 825 (CA9 1996) (supervised release
commences on the date defendants “should have been re-
leased, rather than on the dates of their actual release”),
with United States v. Jeanes, 150 F. 3d 483, 485 (CA5 1998)
(supervised release cannot run during any period of impris-
onment); United States v. Joseph, 109 F. 3d 34 (CA1 1997)
(same); United States v. Douglas, 88 F. 3d 533, 534 (CA8
1996) (same). We granted certiorari to resolve the question,
527 U. S. 1062 (1999), and we now reverse.
Section 3583(a) of Title 18 authorizes, and in some in-
stances mandates, sentencing courts to order supervised
release terms following imprisonment. On the issue pre-
sented for review—whether a term of supervised release
begins on the date of actual release from incarceration or
on an earlier date due to a mistaken interpretation of fed-
eral law—the language of § 3624(e) controls. The statute
provides in relevant part:
“A prisoner whose sentence includes a term of super-
vised release after imprisonment shall be released by
the Bureau of Prisons to the supervision of a probation
officer who shall, during the term imposed, supervise
the person released to the degree warranted by the con-
ditions specified by the sentencing court. The term of
supervised release commences on the day the person is
released from imprisonment and runs concurrently with
any Federal, State, or local term of probation or super-

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vised release or parole for another offense to which the
person is subject or becomes subject during the term
of supervised release. A term of supervised release
does not run during any period in which the person is
imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal,
State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a
period of less than 30 consecutive days.”
The quoted language directs that a supervised release
term does not commence until an individual “is released
from imprisonment.” There can be little question about
the meaning of the word “release” in the context of im-
prisonment. It means “[t]o loosen or destroy the force of;
to remove the obligation or effect of; hence to alleviate
or remove; . . . [t]o let loose again; to set free from re-
straint, confinement, or servitude; to set at liberty; to let go.”
Webster’s New International Dictionary 2103 (2d ed. 1949).
As these definitions illustrate, the ordinary, commonsense
meaning of release is to be freed from confinement. To say
respondent was released while still imprisoned diminishes
the concept the word intends to convey.
The first sentence of § 3624(e) supports our construction.
A term of supervised release comes “after imprisonment,”
once the prisoner is “released by the Bureau of Prisons to
the supervision of a probation officer.” Supervised release
does not run while an individual remains in the custody of
the Bureau of Prisons. The phrase “on the day the person
is released,” in the second sentence of § 3624(e), suggests a
strict temporal interpretation, not some fictitious or con-
structive earlier time. The statute does not say “on the
day the person is released or on the earlier day when he
should have been released.” Indeed, the third sentence
admonishes that “supervised release does not run during any
period in which the person is imprisoned.”
The statute does provide for concurrent running of super-
vised release in specific cases. After the operative phrase
“released from imprisonment,” § 3624(e) requires the con-

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current running of a term of supervised release with terms
of probation, parole, or with other, separate terms of super-
vised release. The statute instructs that concurrency is per-
mitted not for prison sentences but only for those other types
of sentences given specific mention. The next sentence in
the statute does address a prison term and does allow con-
current counting, but only for prison terms less than 30 days
in length. When Congress provides exceptions in a statute,
it does not follow that courts have authority to create others.
The proper inference, and the one we adopt here, is that
Congress considered the issue of exceptions and, in the end,
limited the statute to the ones set forth. The 30-day excep-
tion finds no application in this case; each of respondent’s
sentences, to which the term of supervised release attached,
exceeded that amount of time. Finally, § 3583(e)(3) does not
have a substantial bearing on the interpretive issue, for this
directive addresses instances where conditions of supervised
release have been violated, and the court orders a revocation.
Our conclusion finds further support in 18 U. S. C.
§ 3583(a), which authorizes the imposition of “a term of su-
pervised release after imprisonment.” This provision, too,
is inconsistent with respondent’s contention that confinement
and supervised release can run at the same time. The stat-
ute’s direction is clear and precise. Release takes place on
the day the prisoner in fact is freed from confinement.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that reduction of respond-
ent’s supervised release term was a necessary implementa-
tion of § 3624(a), which provides that “[a] prisoner shall be
released by the Bureau of Prisons on the date of the expira-
tion of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment . . . .” All con-
cede respondent’s term of imprisonment should have ended
earlier than it did. It does not follow, however, that the
term of supervised release commenced, as a matter of law,
once he completed serving his lawful sentences. It is true
the prison term and the release term are related, for the
latter cannot begin until the former expires. Though inter-

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related, the terms are not interchangeable. The Court of
Appeals was mistaken in holding otherwise, and the text
of § 3624(e) cannot accommodate the rule the Court of Ap-
peals derived. Supervised release has no statutory func-
tion until confinement ends. Cf. United States v. Grand-
erson, 511 U. S. 39, 50 (1994) (observing that “terms of
supervised release . . . follow up prison terms”). The rule
of lenity does not alter the analysis. Absent ambiguity, the
rule of lenity is not applicable to guide statutory interpreta-
tion. Cf. Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U. S. 395, 410
(1991).
While the text of § 3624(e) resolves the case, we observe
that our conclusion accords with the statute’s purpose and
design. The objectives of supervised release would be un-
fulfilled if excess prison time were to offset and reduce
terms of supervised release. Congress intended super-
vised release to assist individuals in their transition to
community life. Supervised release fulfills rehabilitative
ends, distinct from those served by incarceration. See
§ 3553(a)(2)(D); United States Sentencing Commission,
Guidelines Manual §§ 5D1.3(c), (d), (e) (Nov. 1998); see also
S. Rep. No. 98–225, p. 124 (1983) (declaring that “the primary
goal [of supervised release] is to ease the defendant’s transi-
tion into the community after the service of a long prison
term for a particularly serious offense, or to provide rehabili-
tation to a defendant who has spent a fairly short period
in prison for punishment or other purposes but still needs
supervision and training programs after release”). Sentenc-
ing courts, in determining the conditions of a defendant’s
supervised release, are required to consider, among other
factors, “the nature and circumstances of the offense and
the history and characteristics of the defendant,” “the
need . . . to afford adequate deterrence to criminal con-
duct; . . . to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and . . . to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other cor-

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rectional treatment.” 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a). In the instant
case, the transition assistance ordered by the trial court re-
quired respondent, among other conditions, to avoid possess-
ing or transporting firearms and to participate in a drug de-
pendency treatment program. These conditions illustrate
that supervised release, unlike incarceration, provides indi-
viduals with postconfinement assistance. Cf. Gozlon-Peretz,
supra, at 407 (describing “[s]upervised release [a]s a unique
method of postconfinement supervision invented by the
Congress for a series of sentencing reforms”). The Court
of Appeals erred in treating respondent’s time in prison as
interchangeable with his term of supervised release.
There can be no doubt that equitable considerations of
great weight exist when an individual is incarcerated be-
yond the proper expiration of his prison term. The statu-
tory structure provides a means to address these concerns
in large part. The trial court, as it sees fit, may modify an
individual’s conditions of supervised release. § 3583(e)(2).
Furthermore, the court may terminate an individual’s super-
vised release obligations “at any time after the expiration of
one year . . . if it is satisfied that such action is warranted
by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of
justice.” § 3583(e)(1). Respondent may invoke § 3583(e)(2)
in pursuit of relief; and, having completed one year of super-
vised release, he may also seek relief under § 3583(e)(1).
The statute, by its own necessary operation, does not re-
duce the length of a supervised release term by reason of
excess time served in prison. The judgment of the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.