ROTELLA v. WOOD et al.

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549 OCTOBER TERM, 1999
Syllabus
ROTELLA v. WOOD et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fifth circuit
No. 98–896. Argued November 3, 1999—Decided February 23, 2000
Petitioner Rotella was admitted to a private psychiatric facility in 1985
and discharged in 1986. In 1994, the facility’s parent company and one
of its directors pleaded guilty to criminal fraud related to improper rela-
tionships and illegal agreements between the company and its doctors.
Rotella learned of the plea that same year, and in 1997 he filed a civil
damages action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO), claiming that respondents, doctors and related busi-
ness entities, had conspired to keep him hospitalized to maximize their
profits. RICO makes it criminal “to conduct” an “enterprise’s affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity,” 18 U. S. C. § 1962(c). A
“pattern” requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, the last of
which occurred within 10 years after the commission of a prior act.
§ 1961(5). A person injured by a RICO violation may bring a civil
RICO action. § 1964(c). The District Court granted respondents sum-
mary judgment on the ground that the 4-year limitations period for civil
RICO claims, see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates,
Inc., 483 U. S. 143, 156, had expired in 1990, four years after Rotella
admitted discovering his injury. In affirming, the Fifth Circuit re-
jected Rotella’s argument that the limitations period does not begin to
run until a plaintiff discovers (or should have discovered) both the injury
and the pattern of racketeering activity.
Held: The “injury and pattern discovery” rule invoked by Rotella does
not govern the start of the limitations period for civil RICO claims.
Pp. 553–561.
(a) In Malley-Duff, this Court based its choice of a uniform 4-year
statute of limitations period for civil RICO on a Clayton Act analogy,
but did not decide when the period began to run. In Malley-Duff ’s
wake, some Circuits, like the Fifth, applied an injury discovery accrual
rule starting the clock when a plaintiff knew or should have known of
his injury, while others applied the injury and pattern discovery rule
that Rotella seeks. This Court has rejected the Third Circuit’s “last
predicate act” rule, Klehr v. A. O. Smith Corp., 521 U. S. 179, and now
eliminates another possibility. Pp. 553–554.
(b) The injury and pattern discovery rule is unsound for a number of
reasons. It would extend the potential limitations period for most civil

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550 ROTELLA v. WOOD
Syllabus
RICO cases well beyond the time when a plaintiff ’s cause of action is
complete. Under a provision recognizing the possibility of predicate
acts 10 years apart, even an injury occurrence rule unsoftened by a
discovery feature could in theory open the door to proof of predicate acts
occurring 10 years before injury and 14 years before commencement of
suit. A pattern discovery rule would allow proof even more remote
from time of trial and, hence, litigation even more at odds with the basic
policies of all limitations provisions: repose, elimination of stale claims,
and certainty about a plaintiff ’s opportunity for recovery and a defend-
ant’s potential liabilities. See, e. g., Klehr, supra, at 187. In the cir-
cumstance of medical malpractice, where the cry for a discovery rule is
loudest, the Court has been emphatic that the justification for such a
rule does not extend beyond the injury. United States v. Kubrick, 444
U. S. 111, 122. A person suffering from inadequate treatment is thus
responsible for determining within the limitations period then running
whether the inadequacy was malpractice. There is no good reason for
accepting a lesser degree of responsibility on a RICO plaintiff ’s part.
The fact, as Rotella notes, that identifying a pattern in civil RICO may
require considerable effort does not place a RICO plaintiff in a signifi-
cantly different position from the malpractice victim, who may be
thwarted by ignorance of the details of treatment decisions or of prevail-
ing medical practice standards. This Court has also recognized that
the connection between fraud and civil RICO is an insufficient ground
for recognizing a limitations period beyond four years, Malley-Duff,
supra, at 149, and adopting Rotella’s lenient rule would amount to back-
tracking from Malley-Duff. Rotella’s less demanding discovery rule
would also clash with the limitations imposed on Clayton Act suits.
There is a clear legislative record of congressional reliance on the Clay-
ton Act when RICO was under consideration, and the Clayton Act’s
injury-focused accrual rule was well established by the time civil RICO
was enacted. Both statutes share a common congressional objective of
encouraging civil litigation not merely to compensate victims but also
to turn them into private attorneys general, supplementing Government
efforts by undertaking litigation in the public good. The Clayton Act
analogy reflects Congress’s clear intent to reject a potentially longer
basic rule under RICO. Neither of Rotella’s two remaining points—
that this Court itself has undercut the Clayton Act analogy; and that
without a pattern discovery rule, some plaintiffs will be barred from
suit by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires that fraud
be pleaded with particularity—supports adoption of a more protracted
basic limitations period. Pp. 555–561.
147 F. 3d 438, affirmed.

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551 Cite as: 528 U. S. 549 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Richard P. Hogan, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Kevin Dubose, Richard W.
Mithoff, Tommy Jacks, and Robert F. Andrews.
Charles T. Frazier, Jr., argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief were Debora B. Alsup, John H. Mar-
tin, Tom Renfro, and Joseph R. Cleveland, Jr.*
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court.
The commencement of petitioner’s civil treble-damages
action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act (RICO) was timely only if the so-called “injury
and pattern discovery” rule governs the start of the 4-year
limitations period. We hold that it does not.
I
In February 1985, petitioner, Mark Rotella, was admitted
to the Brookhaven Psychiatric Pavilion with a diagnosis of
major depression. Rotella v. Pederson, 144 F. 3d 892, 894
(CA5 1998). He was discharged in 1986. In 1994, Brook-
haven’s parent company and one of its directors pleaded
guilty to charges of criminal fraud perpetrated through im-
proper relationships and illegal agreements between the
company and its doctors. Rotella learned of the plea agree-
ment that same year, and in 1997 he filed a civil RICO claim
against respondents, a group of doctors and related business
entities, in Federal District Court.1
*Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp filed a brief for the Washington
Legal Foundation et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
Philip Allen Lacovara, Evan M. Tager, and Gary E. Hughes filed a
brief for the American Council of Life Insurance as amicus curiae.
1 Rotella alleged that “a group of doctors and their related business
entities . . . improperly conspir[ed] to admit, treat, and retain him at
Brookhaven Psychiatric Pavilion for reasons related to their own financial
interests rather than the patient’s psychiatric condition.” 147 F. 3d 438,
439 (CA5 1998). As injuries, he alleged, among other things, confinement

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RICO, 18 U. S. C. §§ 1961–1968 (1994 ed. and Supp. III),
makes it criminal “to conduct” an “enterprise’s affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity,” 18 U. S. C.
§ 1962(c), defined as behavior that violates certain other laws,
either enumerated federal statutes or state laws addressing
specified topics and bearing specified penalties, 18 U. S. C.
§ 1961(1) (Supp. III). “Pattern” is also a defined term re-
quiring “at least two acts of racketeering activity . . . , the
last of which occurred within ten years . . . after the commis-
sion of a prior act of racketeering activity.” 18 U. S. C.
§ 1961(5).
RICO provides for civil actions (like this one) by which
“[a]ny person injured in his business or property” by a RICO
violation may seek treble damages and attorney’s fees. 18
U. S. C. § 1964(c) (Supp. III). Rotella alleged such injury, in
that respondents had conspired to admit, treat, and retain
him at Brookhaven not for any medical reason but simply to
maximize their profits. Respondents raised the statute of
limitations as a defense and sought summary judgment on
the ground that the period for bringing the civil action had
expired before Rotella sued.
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc.,
483 U. S. 143, 156 (1987), established a 4-year limitations pe-
riod for civil RICO claims. The District Court held that the
period began when Rotella discovered his injury, which he
concedes he did in 1986 at the latest. 147 F. 3d 438, 439
(CA5 1998). Under this “injury discovery” rule, the limita-
tions period expired in 1990, and the District Court accord-
ingly ordered summary judgment for respondents. Rotella
appealed to the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the RICO limita-
tions period does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers
(or should have discovered) both the injury and the pattern
for an excessive period because of the conspiracy to draw down his and
other patients’ insurance coverage, loss of a number of personal items,
and fraudulent charges for unnecessary treatment. Brief for Petitioner
3; App. 20–24.

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of racketeering activity. After the Fifth Circuit ruled
against him, ibid., we granted certiorari to address a split of
authority among the Courts of Appeals on whether the
limitations period is triggered in accordance with the “injury
and pattern discovery” rule invoked by Rotella. 526 U. S.
1003 (1999). We now affirm.
II
Given civil RICO’s want of any express limitations pro-
vision for civil enforcement actions, in Malley-Duff we un-
dertook to derive one and determined that the limitations
period should take no account of differences among the
multifarious predicate acts of racketeering activity covered
by the statute. Although we chose a uniform 4-year period
on a Clayton Act analogy, § 4B, as added, 69 Stat. 283, 15
U. S. C. § 15b, we did not decide when the period began to
run, and the question has divided the Courts of Appeals.
Three distinct approaches emerged in the wake of
Malley-Duff. Some Circuits, like the Fifth in this case,
applied an injury discovery accrual rule starting the clock
when a plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury.
See, e. g., Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F. 3d 506, 511 (CA9 1996);
McCool v. Strata Oil Co., 972 F. 2d 1452, 1464–1465 (CA7
1992); Rodriguez v. Banco Central Corp., 917 F. 2d 664, 665–
666 (CA1 1990); Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F. 2d
1096, 1102 (CA2 1988); Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co. v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 828 F. 2d 211, 220 (CA4 1987).
Some applied the injury and pattern discovery rule that
Rotella seeks, under which a civil RICO claim accrues only
when the claimant discovers, or should discover, both an
injury and a pattern of RICO activity. See, e. g., Caproni
v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 15 F. 3d 614, 619–620 (CA6
1994); Granite Falls Bank v. Henrikson, 924 F. 2d 150, 154
(CA8 1991); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913
F. 2d 817, 820–821 (CA10 1990); Bivens Gardens Office

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Building, Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 906 F. 2d 1546, 1554–1555
(CA11 1990).
The Third Circuit applied a “last predicate act” rule, see
Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F. 2d 1125, 1130 (CA3
1988). Under this rule, the period began to run as soon as
the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury and
the pattern of racketeering activity, but began to run anew
upon each predicate act forming part of the same pattern.
In Klehr v. A. O. Smith Corp., 521 U. S. 179 (1997), we cut
the possibilities by one in rejecting the last predicate act
rule. Since a pattern of predicate acts can continue indefi-
nitely, with each separated by as many as 10 years, that rule
might have extended the limitations period to many decades,
and so beyond any limit that Congress could have contem-
plated. See ibid. Preserving a right of action for such a
vast stretch of time would have thwarted the basic objective
of repose underlying the very notion of a limitations period.
See id., at 189. The last predicate act rule was likewise at
odds with the model for civil RICO, the Clayton Act, under
which “[g]enerally, a cause of action accrues and the statute
begins to run when a defendant commits an act that injures
a plaintiff ’s business.” Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Re-
search, Inc., 401 U. S. 321, 338 (1971); Klehr, supra, at 188.
The decision in Klehr left two candidates favored by vari-
ous Courts of Appeals: some form of the injury discovery
rule (preferred by a majority of Circuits to have considered
it), and the injury and pattern discovery rule. Today,
guided by principles enunciated in Klehr, we eliminate the
latter.2
2 We do not, however, settle upon a final rule. In addition to the pos-
sibilities entertained in the Courts of Appeals, Justice Scalia has
espoused an “injury occurrence” rule, under which discovery would be
irrelevant, Klehr v. A. O. Smith Corp., 521 U. S. 179, 198 (1997) (opinion
concurring in part and concurring in judgment), and our decision in Klehr
leaves open the possibility of a straight injury occurrence rule. Amicus
American Council of Life Insurance urges us to adopt this injury occur-
rence rule in this case, see Brief for American Council of Life Insurance

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III
We think the minority injury and pattern discovery rule
unsound for a number of reasons. We start with the realiza-
tion that under the provision recognizing the possibility of
finding a pattern of racketeering in predicate acts 10 years
apart, even an injury occurrence rule unsoftened by a discov-
ery feature could in theory open the door to proof of predi-
cate acts occurring 10 years before injury and 14 before com-
mencement of litigation. A pattern discovery rule would
allow proof of a defendant’s acts even more remote from time
of trial and, hence, litigation even more at odds with the
basic policies of all limitations provisions: repose, elimination
of stale claims, and certainty about a plaintiff ’s opportunity
for recovery and a defendant’s potential liabilities. See, e. g.,
Klehr, supra, at 187; Malley-Duff, 483 U. S., at 150, 156; Wil-
son v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261, 270, 271 (1985).
How long is too long is, of course, a matter of judgment
based on experience, and it gives us great pause that the
injury and pattern discovery rule is an extension of the tradi-
tional federal accrual rule of injury discovery, and unwar-
ranted by the injury discovery rule’s rationale. Federal
courts, to be sure, generally apply a discovery accrual rule
when a statute is silent on the issue, as civil RICO is here.
Klehr, supra, at 191 (citing Connors v. Hallmark & Son Coal
Co., 935 F. 2d 336, 342 (CADC 1991), and 1 C. Corman, Limi-
tation of Actions § 6.5.5.1, p. 449 (1991)). But in applying a
discovery accrual rule, we have been at pains to explain that
discovery of the injury, not discovery of the other elements
of a claim, is what starts the clock. In the circumstance of
medical malpractice, where the cry for a discovery rule is
loudest, we have been emphatic that the justification for a
discovery rule does not extend beyond the injury:
“We are unconvinced that for statute of limitations pur-
poses a plaintiff ’s ignorance of his legal rights and his
as Amicus Curiae 5–14, but the parties have not focused on this option,
and we would not pass upon it without more attentive advocacy.

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ignorance of the fact of his injury or its cause should
receive identical treatment. That he has been injured
in fact may be unknown or unknowable until the injury
manifests itself; and the facts about causation may be in
the control of the putative defendant, unavailable to the
plaintiff or at least very difficult to obtain. The pros-
pect is not so bleak for a plaintiff in possession of the
critical facts that he has been hurt and who has inflicted
the injury. He is no longer at the mercy of the latter.
There are others who can tell him if he has been
wronged, and he need only ask.” United States v.
Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111, 122 (1979).
A person suffering from inadequate treatment is thus re-
sponsible for determining within the limitations period then
running whether the inadequacy was malpractice.
We see no good reason for accepting a lesser degree of
responsibility on the part of a RICO plaintiff. It is true, of
course, as Rotella points out, that RICO has a unique pattern
requirement, see Malley-Duff, supra, at 154 (“[T]he heart of
any RICO complaint is the allegation of a pattern of rack-
eteering”); H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492
U. S. 229, 236 (1989) (referring to “RICO’s key requirement
of a pattern of racketeering”). And it is true as well that a
pattern of predicate acts may well be complex, concealed, or
fraudulent. But identifying professional negligence may
also be a matter of real complexity, and its discovery is not
required before the statute starts running. Kubrick, supra,
at 122, 124. Although we said that the potential malpractice
plaintiff “need only ask” if he has been wronged by a doctor,
considerable enquiry and investigation may be necessary be-
fore he can make a responsible judgment about the action-
ability of the unsuccessful treatment he received. The fact,
then, that a considerable effort may be required before a
RICO plaintiff can tell whether a pattern of racketeering is
demonstrable does not place him in a significantly different
position from the malpractice victim. A RICO plaintiff ’s

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ability to investigate the cause of his injuries is no more im-
paired by his ignorance of the underlying RICO pattern than
a malpractice plaintiff is thwarted by ignorance of the details
of treatment decisions or of prevailing standards of medical
practice.
Nor does Rotella’s argument gain strength from the fact
that some patterns of racketeering will include fraud, which
is generally associated with a different accrual rule; we have
already found the connection between civil RICO and fraud
to be an insufficient ground for recognizing a limitations
period beyond four years, Malley-Duff, supra, at 149, and
the lenient rule Rotella seeks would amount to backsliding
from Malley-Duff.
What is equally bad is that a less demanding basic discov-
ery rule than federal law generally applies would clash with
the limitations imposed on Clayton Act suits. This is impor-
tant because, as we have previously noted, there is a clear
legislative record of congressional reliance on the Clayton
Act when RICO was under consideration, see Sedima, S. P.
R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 489 (1985), and we have
recognized before that the Clayton Act’s injury-focused ac-
crual rule was well established by the time civil RICO was
enacted. Klehr, 521 U. S., at 189. In rejecting a signifi-
cantly different focus under RICO, therefore, we are honor-
ing an analogy that Congress itself accepted and relied upon,
and one that promotes the objectives of civil RICO as readily
as it furthers the objects of the Clayton Act. Both statutes
share a common congressional objective of encouraging civil
litigation to supplement Government efforts to deter and pe-
nalize the respectively prohibited practices. The object of
civil RICO is thus not merely to compensate victims but to
turn them into prosecutors, “private attorneys general,”
dedicated to eliminating racketeering activity.3 Id., at 187
3 This objective of encouraging prompt litigation to combat racketeering
is the most obvious answer to Rotella’s argument that the injury and pat-
tern discovery rule should be adopted because “RICO is to be read

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(citing Malley-Duff, 483 U. S., at 151) (civil RICO specifically
has a “further purpose [of] encouraging potential private
plaintiffs diligently to investigate”). The provision for tre-
ble damages is accordingly justified by the expected benefit
of suppressing racketeering activity, an object pursued the
sooner the better. It would, accordingly, be strange to pro-
vide an unusually long basic limitations period that could
only have the effect of postponing whatever public benefit
civil RICO might realize. The Clayton Act avoids any such
policy conflict by its accrual rule that “[g]enerally, a cause
of action accrues and the statute begins to run when a de-
fendant commits an act that injures a plaintiff ’s business,”
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U. S.,
at 338, and the Clayton Act analogy reflects the clear intent
of Congress to reject a potentially longer basic rule under
RICO.
In sum, any accrual rule softened by a pattern discovery
feature would undercut every single policy we have men-
tioned. By tying the start of the limitations period to a
plaintiff ’s reasonable discovery of a pattern rather than to
the point of injury or its reasonable discovery, the rule would
extend the potential limitations period for most civil RICO
cases well beyond the time when a plaintiff ’s cause of action
is complete,4 as this case shows. Rotella does not deny that
broadly” and “ ‘liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes,’ ”
Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 497–498 (1985) (quoting
Pub. L. 91–452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947).
4 Some Circuits apply injury and pattern discovery out of fear that when
the injury precedes a second predicate act, the limitations period might
otherwise expire before the pattern is created. E. g., Granite Falls Bank
v. Henrikson, 924 F. 2d 150, 154 (CA8 1991). Respondents argue that this
overlooks the cardinal principle that a limitations period does not begin
to run until the cause of action is complete. Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U. S.
96, 98 (1941); see also United States v. Lindsay, 346 U. S. 568, 569 (1954);
Clark v. Iowa City, 20 Wall. 583, 589 (1875).
The quandary is hypothetical here; Rotella does not dispute that his
injury in 1986 completed the elements of his cause of action. Hence, we

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he knew of his injury in 1986 when it occurred, or that his
civil RICO claim was complete and subject to suit at that
time. But under Rotella’s rule, the clock would have started
only in 1994, when he discovered the pattern of predicate
acts (his assumption being that he could not reasonably have
been expected to discover them sooner). A limitations pe-
riod that would have begun to run only eight years after
a claim became ripe would bar repose, prove a godsend to
stale claims, and doom any hope of certainty in identifying
potential liability. Whatever disputes may arise about pin-
pointing the moment a plaintiff should have discovered an
injury to himself would be dwarfed by the controversy inher-
ent in divining when a plaintiff should have discovered a
racketeering pattern that might well be complex, concealed
or fraudulent, and involve harm to parties wholly unrelated
to an injured plaintiff. The fact, as Rotella notes, that diffi-
culty in identifying a pattern is inherent in civil RICO, see
H. J. Inc., 492 U. S., at 235, n. 2 (collecting cases), only rein-
forces our reluctance to parlay the necessary complexity of
RICO into worse trouble in applying its limitations rule.
Cf. Wilson, 471 U. S., at 270 (discussing need for firmly de-
fined, easily applied rules). A pattern discovery rule would
patently disserve the congressional objective of a civil en-
forcement scheme parallel to the Clayton Act regime, aimed
at rewarding the swift who undertake litigation in the pub-
lic good.
Rotella has two remaining points about which a word
should be said. We have already encountered his argument
that differences between RICO and the Clayton Act render
their analogy inapt, and we have explained why neither the
RICO pattern requirement nor the occurrence of fraud in
need not and do not decide whether civil RICO allows for a cause of action
when a second predicate act follows the injury, or what limitations accrual
rule might apply in such a case. In any event, doubt about whether a
harm might be actionable before a pattern is complete is a weak justifica-
tion for the cost of a general pattern discovery rule.

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RICO patterns is a good reason to ignore the Clayton Act
model, see supra, at 556–557. Here it remains only to re-
spond to Rotella’s argument that we ourselves undercut the
force of the Clayton Act analogy when we held that RICO
had no racketeering injury requirement comparable to the
antitrust injury requirement under the Clayton Act, see
Sedima, 473 U. S., at 495. This point not only fails to sup-
port but even cuts against Rotella’s position. By eliminating
the complication of anything like an antitrust injury element
we have, to that extent, recognized a simpler RICO cause of
action than its Clayton Act counterpart, and RICO’s compar-
ative simplicity in this respect surely does not support the
adoption of a more protracted basic limitations period.
Finally, Rotella returns to his point that RICO patterns
will involve fraud in many cases, when he argues that unless
a pattern discovery rule is recognized, a RICO plaintiff will
sometimes be barred from suit by Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 9(b), which provides that fraud must be pleaded with
particularity. While we will assume that Rule 9(b) will
exact some cost, we are wary of allowing speculation about
that cost to control the resolution of the issue here. Rotella
has presented no case in which Rule 9(b) has effectively
barred a claim like his, and he ignores the flexibility provided
by Rule 11(b)(3), allowing pleadings based on evidence rea-
sonably anticipated after further investigation or discovery.
See, e. g., Corley v. Rosewood Care Center, Inc. of Peoria,
142 F. 3d 1041, 1050–1051 (CA7 1998) (relaxing particularity
requirements of Rule 9(b) where RICO plaintiff lacks access
to all facts necessary to detail claim). It is not that we mean
to reject Rotella’s concern about allowing “blameless igno-
rance” to defeat a claim, Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163,
170 (1949); we simply do not think such a concern should
control the decision about the basic limitations rule. In re-
jecting pattern discovery as a basic rule, we do not unsettle
the understanding that federal statutes of limitations are
generally subject to equitable principles of tolling, see Holm-

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berg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 397 (1946), and where a
pattern remains obscure in the face of a plaintiff ’s diligence
in seeking to identify it, equitable tolling may be one answer
to the plaintiff ’s difficulty, complementing Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11(b)(3). See ibid.; see generally Klehr, 521
U. S., at 192–193 (noting distinctions between different equi-
table devices). The virtue of relying on equitable tolling lies
in the very nature of such tolling as the exception, not the
rule.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.